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P.  7,  the  last  paragraph  should  read  as  follows: 
Two  related  criticisms  follow.  The  pure  encounter 
theologian  speaks  of  I-Thou  encounters  as  self-authen- 
ticating;  yet,  he  uses  language  in  some  instances  which 
makes  this-contention  questionable.  On  the  one  hand, 
an  I-Thou  encounter  is  described  as  the  awareness  of 
"numinous  awful  presence".  This  term  qualifies  as 
being  appropriate  to  describe  a  self-authenticating 
experience.  It  is  difficult  to  take  exception  to  such 
non-specific,  non-descriptive  terminology;  names  for 
the  Godhead  are  not  suggested.  The  experience  may  be 
as  the  theologian  claims.  But  other  terms  are  also 
used  to  describe  encounter  and  they  present  immediate 
questions.  Terms  such  as  "Father  of  Jesus  Christ", 
"Creator",  and  others  are  used  to  describe  the  I-Thou 
encounter.  They  add  -- 
P.  66,  line  twelve  -  delete  the  word  "vocational". 
P.  133,  the  ninth  and  tenth  lines  should  read:  per- 
ceptual  synthesis  is  incomplete  because  transcendency 
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I  take  full  responsibility  for  the  quality  of  this  study, 
but  as  a  study  of  the  interpersonal  it  owes  much  to  them. The  motivation  for  this  study  comes  from  the  author's 
acquaintance  with  Martin  Buber,  a  strong  appreciation  of  his 
thought,  and  a  long  held  assumption  that  theology  today  is 
justly  indebted  to  his  phenomenology  of  interpersonal  rela- 
tions. 
The  purpose  of  the  investigation  is,  generally 
speaking,  to  ascertain  the  validity  of  my  long-held  assumption. 
More  specifically,  I  seek  to  analyze  the  I-Thou  typology 
critically.  The  phenomenology  of  personal  encounter  is 
cast  in  two  categories,  the  I-It  and  I-Thou  forms.  What 
these  forms  specify  about  human  interaction  is  of  special 
interest.  Secondly,  his  phenomenology  is  connected  to  a 
specific  ontology  and  theology;  I  seek  to  analyze  and  evaluate 
those  connections  in  order  to  understand  viable  relationships 
among  phenomenology,  ontology  and  theology.  Specifically,  I 
concentrate  on  how  a  phenomenology  of  the  interhuman  bears 
upon  the  issue  of  transcendence.  What  is  its  proper  function, 
and  how  can  theological  study  "make  use"  of  such  a  phenomen- 
ology? 
The  study  is  a  philosophical  investigation;  it  seeks 
to  clarify  the  proper  use  of  phenomenology,  and  specifically 
how  it  relates  to  belief  in  God.  The  challenge  in  such  an 
investigation  is  to  remain  sensitive  to  the  insights  offered 
in  a  phenomenology  of  interpersonal  encounter,  while  retaining 
a  critical  approach  to  it  and  its  connections  with  ontology ii 
and  theology.  This  complex  of  tasks  suggests  a  particular 
procedure. 
The  first  task  is  to  ascertain  which  issues  need  to 
be  isolated.  This  calls  for  a  critical  study  of  Buber 
before  we  begin  the  constructive  effort.  To  ask  questions 
about  his  phenomenology  is,  perhaps,  as  important  as  building 
a  case  for  how  a  phenomenology  should  function  in  opening 
the  issue  of  transcendence.  I  study  Buber  by  dealing  with 
the  questions  of  a  noted  critic,  Ronald  Hepburn. 
Following  this  I  describe  and  analyze  the  phenomen- 
ology  of  Maurice  Merleau-Ponty,  a  distinguished  phenomen- 
ologist  of  the  interpersonal;  reasons  are  given  for  selection 
of  this  thinker  at  the  appropriate  place.  This  is  the 
beginning  of  the  constructive  effort,  although  the  first 
priority  is  to  describe  the  concepts  germane  to  his  phenomen- 
ology  of  intersubjectivity.  I  learn  from  him  that  a  phen- 
omenology  of  the  interhuman  can  do  justice  to  the  insights 
of  Buber  while  at  the  same  time  forming  more  viable  connections 
between  phenomenology,  ontology,  and  theology.  Alternatives 
are  found  at  many  points,  which  are  more  credible  than  those 
Buber  allows. 
There  is  also  good  reason  for  comparative  studies 
which  concentrate  on  two  issues.  The  first  is  that  of 
refining  a  method  which  will  be  proper  for  the  construction 
of  a  phenomenology  of  interpersonal  encounter.  We  investigate 111 
the  thought  of  Edmund  Husserl  and  its  relation  to  the  thought 
of  Merleau-Ponty  to  develop  a  method  which  will  serve  our 
overall  objective.  I  also  analyze  the  phenomenological- 
ontology  of  Martin  Heidegger  to  sharpen  the  relationship 
between  a  phenomenology  of  intersubjectivity  and  ontology. 
Finally,  I  undertake  the  constructive  effort  to  bring 
together  the  findings  of  the  analytical  and  comparative  seg- 
ments,  and  to  suggest  a  relation  between  a  phenomenology  of 
the  interhuman  and  faith  which  conforms  to  those  findings. 
The  study  is  critical  and  constructive;  though  it 
is  certainly  not  exhaustive  of  all  the  issues,  it  is  hoped 
that  it  can  be  of  use  in  the  theolological  community. CHAPTER  I 
MARTIN  BUBER'S  PHENOMENOLOGY  OF 
INTERSUBJECTIVITY--MEETIN  G- 
It  is  our  purpose  in  this  first  chapter  to  describe 
and  interpret  Martin  Buber's  I-Thou  philosophy,  paying 
special  attention  to  his  concept  of  interpersonal  meetings. 
We  single  out  this  aspect  of  his  thought  in  the  beginning 
because  it  plays  a  central  role  in  the  rest  of  his  work; 
his  notion  of  the  interpersonal  gives  us  access  to  his 
ontological  explications  and  clarifies  his  religious'con- 
victions.  These  will  be  discussed  in  Chapter  II. 
As  for  procedure,  we  shall  follow  a  simple  model, 
i.  e.  letting  our  reading  of  Buber  be  a  response  to  crit- 
icisms,  specifically  those  of  Ronald  Hepburn.  The  reason 
is  twofölds  too  often  we  read  theologians  heavily  indebted 
to  Buber,  both  Christian  and  Jewish,  who  in  applying  his 
thought  court  a  misunderstanding  of  the  original.  1  The 
first  task  is  to  understand  what  Buber  intends  to  say  about 
meeting;  we  readily  admit  that  it  is  our  interpretation  of 
what  he  says,  and  his  intentions,  but  there  is  strong  evi- 
dence  to  support  our  case.  Second,  we  shall  concentrate  on 
responding  to  Hepburn's  criticisms  because  this  procedure 
1This  is  true  in  Buber's  mind  to  be  sure.  See  his, 
"Replies  to  My  Critics",  especially  his  criticisms  of  Wheel- 
wright  and  Rotenstreich,  Schlipp,  Paul  and  Friedman,  Maurice,  (eds.  ) 
The  Philosophy  of  Martin  Buber,  LaSalle,  Ill.,  Open  Court 
Publ.  Co.,  1967,  pp.  689  ff. 2 
should  highlight  the  central  tenets  of  Buber's  philosophy 
rather  than  focusing  upon  details.  Our  objective  is  to 
uncover  the  structures  of  his  phenomenology  of  meeting 
and  to  organize  epistemological  issues;  response  to  ob- 
jections  should  help.  us  to  see-  the_  major'difficulties  in 
his  thought  and  the  unique  contributions. 
Ronald  Hepburn's  book,  Christianity  and  Paradox, 
contains  serious  criticism  of  many  theological  viewpoints, 
but  his  two  chapters  on  "Encounters"  have,  to  my  mind,  the 
most  thorough  and  challenging  objections  to  the  I-Thou  phil- 
osophy  of  any  work  read.  1  He  cannot  be  considered  an  "enemy" 
to  whom  counter-attack  is  due;  his  questions  strike  at  the 
heart  of  the  I-Thou  concept  of  meeting.  He  is  a  thoughtful 
and  at  times  sympathetic  critic.  Understandably  we  will  be 
asking  if  Hepburn  has  criticized  Buber  correctly  but  this 
is  not  meant  to  imply  that  his  questions  are  irrelevant; 
rather  we  do  so  to  rethink  the  I-Thou  concepts  of  meeting 
and  to  reread  Buber  in  light  of  thoughtful  criticisms.  What 
follows  is  an  enumeration  of  the  assumptions  and  objections 
Hepburn  makes. 
To  begin,  we  cite  Hepburn's  primary  assumption: 
it  is  that  encounter  theologians  maintain  that  an  ostensive 
definition  of  God  is  obtainable  within  their  philosophy  of 
1Hepburn, 
Ronald,  Christianity  and  Paradox,  London, 
C.  A.  Watts  and  Co.,  1958. 3 
meeting. 
'  In  Hepburn's  words,  the  theologians  say: 
God  cannot  be  pointed  out,  brought  forward  for 
identification,  or  indeed  made  perceptible  to  any 
of  the  senses.  But  He  may  be  encountered  as  the 
Thou  of  my  prayer.  2 
This  statement  points  out  that  encounter  theologians 
do  seek  to  demonstrate  the  existence  of  God,  not  through 
reason,  or  empirically  verifiable  tests,..  but  through  the 
"gesture"  of  encountering  Otherness  as  the  supreme  Thou. 
Prayer,  as  we  shall  see,  is  for  Buber  a  gesture  which  grows 
out  of  meeting  another  person  as  a  Thou.  We  emphasize  now 
the  assumption  which  leads  Hepburn  to  his  severest  critique-- 
the  fact  that  Buber  and  others  seek  to  demonstrate  through  a 
philosophy  of  meeting,  that  God  exists.  In  Hepburn's  por- 
trayal  of  this  objective,  he  specifies  the  way  it  is  supposed 
to  be  carried  out.  Their  procedure: 
.  if  God  is  no  object,  if  instead  He  is  a  person 
.  another  approach  is  demanded  ....  The  one 
appropriate  procedure  is  to  entrust  ourselves  in  prayer 
to  the  being  who  is  properly  only  talked  to  not  theorized 
about  ...  Instead  of  depending  on  uncertain  chains  of 
reasoning,  we  should  depend  on  a  self-authenticating 
direct  awareness  of  God;  a  knowledge  by  acquaintance 
from  which  all  fallible  inference-steps  are  absent. 
ZHepburn  does  not  address  himself  exclusively  to 
Martin  Buber;  he  includes  those  who,  like  H.  H.  Farmer, 
and  Emil  Brunner,  are  indebted  to  Buber.  We  shall  record 
those  places  where  he  has  someone  else  in  mind;  otherwise  it  can  be  assumed  that  Buber  would  be  an  object  of  his 
criticism. 
2Hepburn,  R.,  op.  cit.,  p.  18. 
31bid. L. 
This  procedure  leads  the  theologian  to  use  inter- 
personal  I-Thou  meetings  as  the  central  analogy  to  demon- 
strate  God's  existence.  We  meet  others  as  particular 
thou's;  we  meet  God  as  absolute  Person.  The  important 
thing  is  the  theologian's  objective:  as  far  as  Hepburn 
is  concerned,  the  theologian  seeks  to  demonstrate  the 
existence  of  God  by  this  means.  This  assumption  is  central 
for  Hepburn's  critique;  the  effectiveness  of  a  theology  of 
encounter  rests  upon  its  ability  to  establish  God's  exis- 
tence.  It  fails  if  it  cannot  produce  such  a  result. 
Later,  in  response  to  this  assumption  we  shall  ask 
if  Buber  pursues  such  an  objective,  either  overtly  or 
covertly.  Does  he  believe  that  such  an  objective  is  proper? 
If  not,  what  is  the  significance  of  I-Thou  encounters? 
Specifically,  what  is  Buber's  conception  of  the  linkage 
between  interhuman  encounters  and  divine-human  meeting? 
We  shall  discuss  this.  in  Chapter  II,  but  Buber's  objectives 
should  be  made  clear,  if  possible,  in  the  present  chapter. 
To  fail  to  bring  clarity  here  would  be  to  court  wrong 
assumptions  about  Buber's  efforts.  By  establishing  his 
objectives,  the  phenomenology  of  meeting  will  be  put  into 
perspective. 
Hepburn's  criticisms  commence  under  the  general 
heading  of  "possibilities  for  error  and  illusion".  1  His 
llbid.,  p.  30. 5 
first  concern  is  that  the  theologians  being  considered 
provide  no  checking-procedures  in  their  assumption  that 
interpersonal  relations  demonstrate  the  existence  and 
nature  of  divine-human  encounters. 
1  When  the  encounter 
theologian  argues  that  because  such  and  such  is  the  case 
in  human  relations,  we  can  justifiably  believe  in  God's 
existence,  he  says  something  which  can  be  checked  with 
regard  to  human  relationships.  But  what  he  says  about 
the  interpersonal  does  not  necessarily  support  his  conclusion 
that  God  exists.  The  theologian  makes  a  crucial  transition; 
checking  procedures,  Hepburn  says,  apply  to  the  premise  but 
not  to  the  conclusion.  The  latter  sphere,  the  theologian 
contends,  is  beyond  all  "fallible  inference  steps";  that 
is,  no  checking  procedures  are  admissible. 
2  Hepburn 
responds,  "Can  we  accept  the  sharp  division--either  argu- 
ments  for  God  or  personal  relations,  nothing  in  between?  "3 
In  extreme  cases  (and  Buber  is  an  extreme  in  Hepburn's 
estimation)  no  checking-procedures  are  admissible  in  the 
sphere  of  interpersonal  relations.  Hepburn  deals  with 
Buber  as  a  "pure  encounter  theologian".  Buber,  he  says, 
makes  no  connection  between  the  spheres  of  It  and  Thou; 
1The  term  "checking-procedures"  refers  to  the  phen- 
omenon's  being  open  to  both  empirical  and  logical  verifi- 
cation.  It  must  be  available.  for  the  weighing  of-evidence. 
2Hepburn,  op.  cit.,  p.  18 
31bid.,  p.  30. 6 
that  is,  checking-procedures  apply  only  to  the  world  where 
an  interpersonal  encounter  is  excluded,  the  I-It  world. 
In  the  I-Thou  sphere,.  checking  is  irrelevant. 
To  Buber,  the  two  'primary  words'  I-Thou  and  I-It, 
describe  two  fundamentally  different,  mutually  exclusive 
forms  of  our  relation  to  our  world. 
In  connection  with  this  objection,.  Hepburn  defines 
two  terms  he  uses  frequently  in  his  argument,  "knowledge 
about"  and  "direct  awareness".  The  first  term  pertains  to 
checking-procedures.  We  can  have  knowledge  about  another 
if  we  can  look  at  behavioral  patterns,  physical  character- 
istics,  or  evaluate  discourse  between  two  people.  Knowledge 
about  is  the  key  in  describing  what  kind  of  a  relationship 
exists.  Direct  awareness  is  synonomous  with  Buber's  I-Thou 
notion;  it  is  the  form  of  meeting  or  encounter.  Hepburn 
argues  that  Buber  separates  such  knowledge  about  another 
from  the  sphere  of  encounter  by  placing  it  completely  in 
the  I-It  category.  Direct  awareness  in  the  I-Thou  sphere, 
is  immune  to  checking  procedures  and  knowledge  about  the 
other.  This  includes  all  forms  of  empirical  or  logical 
evidence.  The  two  spheres  in  Buber's  thought  are  mutually 
exclusive;  this  is  fundamental  to  Hepburn's  objection. 
It  leads  us  to  ask  if  Buber  does,  indeed,  make  the 
I-It,  I-Thou  forms  mutually  exclusive?  Does  he  argue  that 
the  sphere  of  knowledge  about  objects  and  persons  is  totally 
lIbid.,  p.  26  (underlining  mine). 7 
divorced  from  the  sphere  of  meeting?  Is  our  experience  of 
another  person  in  the  I-Thou  form,  something  we  can  know 
anything  about? 
We  anticipate  our  reading  of  Buber  in  saying  that 
there  will  be  no  argument  with  Hepburn  about  the  differences 
between  I-It  and  I-Thou  forms.  But  Hepburn  perceives  more 
than  differences;  he  claims  there  are  no  connections  between 
the  two  forms  of,  relation.  They  are  mutually  exclusive; 
this  is  the  argument  that  concerns  us.  If  they  are  truly 
separate  and  totally  divorced,  Hepburn  has  found  a  telling 
criticism  to  the  I-Thou  phenomenology.  The  total  absence 
of  knowledge  about  another  would  seem  to  make  I-Thou 
encounters  a  highly  problematic  form,  unavailable  for 
logical  interpretation  and  divorced  from  the  concrete 
world  of  experience.  If  Buber  does  not  intend  exclusiveness, 
, 'that  are  the  points  of  connection  between  the  two  forms? 
Two  related  criticisms  follow.  First,  the  pure 
encounter  theologian  speaks  of  I-Thou  encounters  as 
"self-authenticating";  yet,  he  uses  language  which  makes 
such  a  contention  questionable.  In  addition  to  portraying 
I-Thou  encounter  as  an  awareness  of  a  "numinous  awful 
presence",  the  terms  "Creator,  "  "Father  of  Jesus  Christ,  " 
and  others,  are  employed.  Whereas  "numinous  awful  presence" 
is  non-descriptive  and  therefore  appropriate  for  describing 
a  direct  awareness,  the  latter  terms  are  not.  They  add 8 
descriptive  interpretations  to  the  experience;  they  describe 
the  "Thou,  "  and  this  leads  Hepburn  to  observe  that  a  "pure" 
twareness  or  directness  cannot  be  claimed  for  an  encounter 
if  such  terms  are  employed.  The  cherished  beliefs  of  a 
religious  community  very  likely  influence  the  theologian's 
description.  This  is  the  first  difficulty  with  the  claim 
to  direct  awareness. 
The  second  difficulty  is  the  theologian's  use  of 
psychological  terminology  to  demonstrate  the  existence  of 
I-Thou  encounters. 
We  shall  also  have  to  consider  the  objection  that 
such  certainty  as  the  Christian  claims  for  his  encounter 
with  God  can  only  be  had  by  'subjective'  or  'psych- 
ological'  statements:  statements  not  to  the  effect 
that  such  and  such  exists  or  is  the  case,  but  that  I 
have  such  and  such  sensations  and  no  more  . 
l. 
When  this  criticism  is  associated  with  the  assumption 
credited  to  the  encounter  theologians  i.  e.  that  I-Thou  events 
demonstrate  God's  existence,  we  can  see  the  seriousness  of 
Hepburn's  objections.  Pure  encounter  theologians,  he 
implies,  use  a  kind  of  "double-think"  in  their  explication 
of  an  event;  they  claim  God's  existence  an  acceptable 
"conclusion"  and  they  employ  language  which  exposes  reliance 
upon  sensations  and  feelings.  Understandably,  Hepburn  finds 
this  to  be  contradictory. 
llbid., 
p.  31.  We  take  note  of  the  fact  that  Hepburn 
directs  his  criticism  towards  "Christians",  and  Buber  was  a 
Hasidic  Jew.  Still,  the  criticism  can  apply  if  Buber  uses 
psychological  statements  appropriate  to  his  tradition. 9 
Concerning  the  use  of  both  descriptive  and  psych- 
ological  terminology,  we  are  obligated  to  see  whether 
Buber  consciously  employs  them  and  if  so  with  what  objectives 
in  mind.  Does  Buber  use  these  two  forms  of  language  in  his 
I-Thou  catagory?  Can  a  psychological  rootage  be  uncovered 
in  Buber's  descriptions  of  the  I-Thou  form?  Another  consid- 
eration:  if  Buber  denies  that  I-Thou  encounters  demonstrate 
God's  existence,  must  we  conclude  that  I-Thou  encounters 
have  only  a  psychological  reference?  We  ask  as  does  Hepburn: 
is  there  any  middle  ground  between  a  case  for  God's  existence 
and  "sensations  and  no  more"? 
Hepburn's  final,  and  most  extensively  described 
objection,  concerns  the  method  that  theologians  employ  in 
relating  the  sphere  of  the  interpersonal  to  divine-human 
encounter. 
If  the  vital  analogy  here  is  that  between  meeting 
people  and  meeting  God,  have  the  theologians  esta- 
blished  this  analogy  firmly  enough  to  bear  the  weighty 
super-structure  they  have  reared  upon  it? 
Encounters  between  people  are  supposed  to  serve  as 
an  analogy  for  the  pure  unfettered  meeting  between  God  and 
man.  The  way  the  theologians  construct  the  analogy  concerns 
Hepburn;  it  is  in  their  interpretation  of  interpersonal 
relations  that  the  theologian  errs.  They  have  not  only 
misunderstood  the  problematics  of  belief  in  God;  they  have 
1lbid., 
p.  30. 10 
misjudged  philosophically  what  can  be  said  about  human 
encounters.  Certainly,  if  Hepburn  is  correct  about  the 
theologian's  misjudgment  of  the  interpersonal,  it  will  be 
a  telling  criticism  of  teachings  resting  upon  it. 
Hepburn  says  that  the  encounter  theologians  construct 
a  "scale  of  relative  purity"  to  make  the  connection.  1  By 
this  he  means  that  a  model  is  constructed;  the  lowest  points 
on  the  scale  indicate  "impure"  relationships,  i.  e.  situ- 
ations  in  which  people  use  one  another  or  treat  the  opposite 
party  as  an  "object".  There  is  reliance,  at  this  point  on 
the  scale,  on  the  other's  behavioral  characterisitics,  and 
on  physical  appearance;  the  predominant  form  of  the  relation 
is  "knowledge  about".  At  a  higher  point  on  the  scale, 
perhaps,  when  the  parties  are  well  acquainted,  the  theo- 
logian  claims  there  is  a  decrease  in  utilitarian  aspects 
and,  more  important,  a  decrease  in  the  function  of  "know- 
ledge  about"  the  other.  The  emergence  of  trust  and  concern 
begins  to  replace  the  "impure"  characteristics.  Persons 
observe  one  another  not  as  objects,  but  observe  "in  order 
to  enter  into  living  relation.  "2  At  the  highest  point  on 
the  scale  it  is  conceivable  that  the  parties  do  not  rely  at 
1Ibid., 
p.  32.  Hepburn  singles  out  Emil  Brunner  here; 
but  as  we  shall  see  the  objection.  also  applies  to  Martin 
Buber's  I-Thou  phenomenology. 
2Ibid. 11 
all  upon  behavioral  checks,  upon  knowledge  about.  Cer- 
tainly  they  say,  there  is  no  treatment  of  the  other  as  an 
object.  Both  are  "subjects",  interacting;  the  impurities 
are  absent;  an  I-Thou  encounter  exists. 
The  encounter  theologian  then  extends  the  application 
of  the  model  from  description  of  the  interpersonal  to 
description  of  divine-human  encounter.  Purified  of  all 
utilitarian  purposes  or  actions  and  of  all  "knowledge 
about",  the  interpersonal  becomes  an  effective  analogy  for 
encounter  with  a  Holy  God. 
Hepburn  summarizes  the  position: 
We  can  move  in  thought  away  from  the  imperfections 
of  our  human-encounter  examples  towards  an  idea  of  the 
perfection  of  meeting  with  God.  This  we  do  by  thinking 
away  all  that  remains  of  I-It,  all  vacillating  between 
experiencing  the  other  as  personal  and  as  an  object, 
until  there  remains  nothing  at  all  of  object-knowledge, 
only  pure  encounter  with  a  Thou. 
Hepburn's  objection  is  not  difficult  to  perceive; 
if  the  analogy  is  to  effectively  illustrate  man's  meeting 
with  God,  it  is  imperative  that  there  be  a  decrease  in  one's 
treatment  of  the  other  as  an  object,  and  also  a  decrease  of 
1Tbid., 
p.  31-32.  We  cannot  see  how  Hepburn's  first 
objection  to  encounter  theology  (the  mutual  exclusiveness 
of  I-It  and  I-Thou  forms)  can  be  reconciled  with  this  one--  the  "scale  of  relative  purity".  If  the  two  forms  have  no 
relation,  there  could  hardly  be  a  scale  which  leads  progress-  ively  from  It  to  Thou,  from  the  interpersonal  to  divine 
encounter.  The  notion  of  a  "scale"  is  incompatiblp.  with  the  former  objection;  one  or  the  other  can  apply  but  not  both,  and  perhaps  neither. 12 
dependence  upon  behavioral  checks  or  knowledge  about.  If 
both  requirements  cannot  be  met  the  interpersonal  analogy 
will  lead  nowhere;  it  will  be  "like  a  car  that  stalls  at 
the  very  start  of  the  race".  1 
Concerning  the  issue  of  decrease  in  the  participant's 
treatments  of  the  other  as  an  "object",  Hepburn  registers  no 
objection.  His  examples  make  it  clear  that  he  believes  with 
Buber  that  there  are  human  exchanges  in  which  the  parties 
relate  as  "subject  to  subject",  i.  e.  in  trust  and  intimacy. 
His  criticism  focuses  on  the  second  aspect  of  the  argument; 
it  is  whether 
...  the  physical-events  (hands,  eyes,  voice  in  move- 
ment  and  sound)  have  become  less  essential,  or  have 
they  remained  quite  essential  in  each  case,  although 
approached,  used,  attended  to,  in  different  ways,  or 
checked  up  on  less  and  less  frequently  because  of  the 
increasing  intimacy  of  the  people  concerned?  2 
His  answer  is  obvious:  he  argues  that  knowledge 
about  the  other  is  still  quite  essential  in  trustful  rela- 
tions.  Behavioral  checks  may  be  less  frequent,  but  when 
so,  it  is  because  one  is  confident  that  the  person 
trusted  is  someone  who  behaves  in  a  familiar  way.  Moreover, 
1lbid.,  p.  39. 
2Ibid.,  p.  35. 13 
On  the  occasions  when  I  sit  opposite  a  friend  and  observe 
his  gestures  and  expression,  I  am  neither  looking  at 
these  as  so  many  objects,  nor  in  the  belief  that  his 
entire  being  consists  in  such  overt  actions  (behaviour- 
ism),  nor  am  I  looking  'through'  these  to  a  hidden  per- 
sonality,  as  I  might  look  through  a  glass  of  a  window, 
concerned  only  with  the  view  beyond  ...  I  admit  that 
his  inner  life,  like  mine,  is  more  than  gestures,  speech, 
smiles;  but  I  doubt  if  we  know  what  we  are  saying  when 
we  declare  that  personality  and  knowledge  of  personality 
are  possible  without  these:  I  doubt  if  anything  recog- 
nizably  personal  can  be  left  over  once  we  have  stripped 
all  such  behaviour  away. 
Because  he  believes  that  knowledge  about  remains 
integral  to  the  most  intimate  relations,  Hepburn  concludes 
that  the  theologian's  construction  of  a  scale  of  relative 
purity  is  faulty.  The  pure  encounter  theologian  has  misjudged 
the  nature  of  the  interpersonal;  his  phenomenology  of  meeting 
is  misconceived.  Hence  it  is  inappropriate  to  use  it  as  an 
analogy  for  encounter  with  God.  The  inter-human  analogy 
as  the  theologian  constructs  it,  indeed,  leads  nowhere.  "In 
face  of  these  reflections,  the  theologian  might  well  decide 
that  the  analogy  between  meeting  human  beings  and  meeting 
God  is  too  weak  to  carry  any  apologetic  weight.  "2 
We  have  spent  some  time  with  this  objection  because 
it  is  important  for  reading  Buber.  Does  he  employ  a  scale 
of  relative  purity,  or  can  one  be  perceived  lurking  behind 
1Ibid.,  p.  36. 
2Ibid.,  p.  37. 14 
his  two-fold  construction,  I-It  and  I-Thou?  If  not,  what 
part  does  knowledge  about  play  in  encounter  situations? 
We  anticipate  somewhat  by  saying  that  Hepburn's 
objection  aids  us  in  uncovering  an  often  unnoticed  aspect 
of  Buber's  phenomenology  of  the  inter-personal--the  positive 
connections  he  intended  between  I-It  and  I-Thou  relations. 
His  criticism  will  also  point  out  a  major  difficulty  in 
Buber's  phenomenology.  He  never  bothered  to  write  an 
adequate  philosophical  explanation  of  the  role  that  know- 
ledge  about  actually  plays  in  the  interpersonal.  We  shall 
address  ourselves  to  these  points  later. 
Hepburn's  objections  are  far  from  casual.  Their 
general  import  is  to  challenge  the  theologian  to  use  empir- 
ical  and  logical  evidence  in  his  descriptions  and  theories 
of  meeting.  We  turn  now  to  Buber  to  ascertain  how  Hepburn's 
objections  apply. 
Concerning  Hepburn's  first  assumption,  does  Martin 
Buber  court  the  notion  that  an  ostensive  definition  of  God 
can  be  obtained  via  his  philosophy  of  meeting?  Does  he 
believe  that  his  descriptions  of  the  interhuman  answer  man's 
questions  about  the  existence  of  God?  This  area  of  inves- 
tigation  is  most  important;  we  need  to  uncover,  as  best  we 
can,  the  objectives  or  intentions  he  entertained. 
Answers  about  intentions  certainly  do  not  cover  the 15 
issue.  As  with  many  philosophers,  immediate  intentions 
and  later  interpretations,  do  not  always  fall  into  logical 
order.  We  may  find  that  Buber's  stated  objectives  conflict 
with  the  actual  structures  of  his  work.  Specifically,  he 
may  entertain  no  objective  of  demonstrating  God's  existence, 
but  unless  we  assume  it,  Buber's  position  could  be  non- 
sensical. 
The  material  we  cite  lends  itself  to  this  possibility. 
Note  the  following  passage. 
Every  particular  Thou  is  a  glimpse  through  to  the 
eternal  Thou  ...  The  Thou  that  by  its  nature  cannot 
become  It  ...  What  does  all  this  mistaken  talk  about 
God's  being  and  works  (though  there  has  been  and  can 
be,  no  other  talk  about  these)  matter  in  comparison 
with  the  one  truth  that  all  men  who  have  addressed 
God  had  God  himself  in  mind?  1 
Buber  wants,  first  of  all,  to  make  it  clear  that 
talk  about  God  or  descriptions  of  his  being  and  activity 
are  "mistakes".  The  term  he  uses,  notably  "talk  about" 
is  closely  allied  to  Hepburn's  phrase  "knowledge  about". 
He  says,  in  effect,  there  can  be  no  apologia  for  God's 
existence.  If  we  take  him  at  his  word,  descriptions  of 
the  inter-human  will  not  lead  to  the  conclusive  proposition 
that  God  exists.  He  wants  to  avoid  the  classical  argumen- 
tative  characteristic  in  philosophic  discourse. 
1Buber,  Martin,  I  and  Thou,  New  York,  Chas.  Scribners 
Sons,  New  York,  1958,  pp.  75--71-6-. 16 
What  does  he  intend?  The  following  passage  attempts 
to  clarify  this  issue. 
Of  the  relational  event  we  know  with  the  knowledge  of 
the  life  lived,  our  going  out  to  relation,  our  part  of 
the  way.  The  other  part  only  comes  upon  us,  we  do  not 
know  it;  it  comes  upon  us  in  the  meeting.  But  we  strain 
ourselves  on  it  if  we  speak  of  it  as  though  it  were 
something  beyond  the  meeting. 
A  person  can  make  claim  to  have  experienced  meeting. 
The  key  to  this  is  the  form  of  address.  Though  we  cannot 
pretend  to  know  something  about  the  one  who  is  met  we  can 
claim  to  "go  out  to  relation".  No  claims  about  the  Other 
have  currency  but  claims  do  count  when  we  say  we  are  met  in 
relation.  The  form  of  address  constitutes  the  "relational' 
event". 
The  "relational  event"  is  known  to  occur  simply  by 
living  it.  It  cannot  prove  the  existence  of  God,  but  when 
we  ask  what  it  does  demonstrate,  we  begin  to  catch  the 
ambiguity  of  Buber's  position. 
On  the  one  hand,  he  says  that  the  relational  mode 
of  address  occurs  and  is  the  basis  of  one's  total  life 
experience. 
I  proceed  from  a  simple  real  situation:  two  men  are 
engrossed  in  a  genuine  dialogue.  I  want  to  appraise 
the  facts  of  this  situation.  It  turns  out  that  the 
customary  categories  do  not  suffice  for  it.  I  mark:  first  the  "physical"  phenomena  of  the  two  speaking  and 
gesturing  men,  second  the  'psychic'  phenomena  of  it, 
lIbid. 17 
what  goes  on  'in  them'.  But  the  meaningful  dialogue 
itself  that  proceeds  between  the  two  men  and  into 
which  the  acoustical  and  optical  events  fit,  the  dia- 
logue  that  arises  out  of  the  souls  and  is  reflected 
in  them,  this  remains  unregistered.  1 
The  significance  of  dialogue  or  meeting  is  his  chosen 
issue.  It  is  to  be  the  focus  for  his  entire  philosophy; 
meeting,  the  "relational  event",  the  "between",  constitute 
ways  of  reordering  of  philosophical  debate.  He  seeks  to 
describe  one  unique  event,  and  this  precludes  the  necessity 
of  describing  the  Holy  God.  Hepburn,  he  would  say,  wrongly 
identifies  him  as  an  apologist.  He  views  his  work  as  descrip- 
tive.  If  we  were  to  choose  an  appropriate  term  for  these 
objectives,  it  would  be  "phenomenology".  Specifically, 
Buber  should  be  called  a  phenomenologist  of  intersubjectivity 
when  speaking  of  his  declared  objectives. 
But  can  we  take  him  at  his  word?  When  he  speaks  of 
the  relational  event  does  he  exclude  the  presence  of  God? 
Certainly  not.  Divine  presence  is  the  apex  of  the  event's 
meaning.  We  cannot  be  assured  that  apologia  is  absent  when 
this  is  considered.  The  "eternal  Thou  that  by  its  nature 
cannot  become  It",  is  integral  to  interhuman  dialogue. 
Though  description  of  God  is  eschewed,  divine  presence 
is  assumed,  and  this  alters  our  view  of  his  claims  to 
1Schlipp,  P.  and  Friedman,  M.  ,  op.  cit.  ,  p.  698. i8 
describe  an  interpersonal  event. 
Manifestly,  the  "relational  event"  is  also  a  meeting 
between  man  and  God,  because  the  parties  are,  so  to  speak, 
identified.  He  never  strays  from  the  assumption  that  the 
interhuman  puts  man  into  relation  with  God.  If  we  agree 
with  him  that  there  is  no  "apology"  in  this,  i.  e.,  if 
apologetic  maneuvers  are  denied,  that  would  contradict  his  "" 
own  identification  of  meeting  as  a  "glimpse"  of  the  eternal 
Thou.  Buber's  work  would  make  no  sense  apart 
from  the  divine-human  context  of  meeting.  Such  an  appraisal 
is  necessary  if  we  are  to  read  him  accurately. 
Admittedly,  no  effort  is  made  to  force  the  conclusion 
that  God  exists.  Buber  assumes  that  God  is  present  in  the 
experience  of  meeting;  perhaps,  that  is  why  he  makes  the 
disclaimer  about  doing  apologetics.  From  his  comment  about 
mistaken  talk,  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  he  thinks  argu- 
ment  is  inappropriate.  But  to  disclaim  apologetics  because 
he  does  not  argue  for  the  existence  of  God  is  to  take  a 
narrow  view  of  the  apologetic  enterprise.  And  to  assume 
God's  existence  is  to  short-circuit  a  very  important  element 
in  philosophical  discourse,  that  of  making  assumptions 
public. 
There  can  be  little  doubt  that  this  conflict  between 
declared  objectives  and  implicit  assumptions  does  create 
difficulties  in  appraising  his  work;  the  relation  between 19 
theology  and  philosophy  as  distinct  disciplines  is  clouded 
rather  than  clarified.  We  can  never  be  sure  whether  he 
speaks  as  a  philosopher  who  believes  and  is  giving  reasons 
for  belief,  whether  he  is  a  theologian  who  is  developing 
a  "complimentary"  philosophy  of  religion,  or  whether  he 
is  a  philosopher  of  religion  who  borrows  from  both  disci- 
plines  to  create  a  way  of  standing  between  pure  philosophy 
and  apologetic  theology.  Regretfully,  we  cannot  deal  with 
these  broader  questions  here  if  we  are  to  complete  an  analysis 
of  his  phenomenology  of  meeting.  We  shall  deal  with  this 
in  our  concluding  chapters. 
We  turn  to  Hepburn's  objection  that  Buber's  I-It, 
I-Thou  categories  are  mutually  exclusive.  The  connection 
between  them,  or  lack  of  one,  is  an  important  matter  in 
analyzing  Buber's  work.  If  there  is  none,  it  would  be 
increasingly  difficult  to  see  the  connection  between  mun- 
dane  experience  and  the  intimate  experience  of  living 
relation.  Moreover,  it  would  become  improbable,  if  not 
impossible,  to  see  the  connection  between  interpersonal 
encounter  and  divine-human  meeting.  Again,  Buber's  inten- 
tions,  are  of  utmost  importance.  We  must  know  whether  or 
not  he  intended  to  relate  the  two  forms,  and  we  must  also 20 
know  what  evidence  he  provides  to  support  his  case.  1 
We  begin  by  asking,  what  if  any  are  the  positive 
functions  of  Buber's  I-It  form  of  relation?  This  question 
should  give  us  access  to  the  main  issue. 
Buber  says  that  man's  life  is  lived  in  both  I-It 
and  I-Thou  forms;  "to  man  the  world  is  twofold  in  accordance 
with  his  twofold  attitude".  2  Man,  being  who  he  is,  is  a 
creature  of  the  I-It  relation;  it  is  the  dominant  form 
of  his  existence.  3  It  is  the  "exalted  mel.  ancholy  of  our 
fate".  4.  In  the  I-It  mode  man*is  bound  to  act  in  two  ways; 
he  objectifies  and  analyses  the  objects  of  his  world,  and 
he  treats  things  and  people  as  instrumental  objects.  (As 
Hepburn  so  well  said,  the  I-It  relation  is  a  composite  of 
'We 
meet  two  difficulties  in  this  endeavor.  Buber's 
thought  is  disguised  in  poetic  language.  The  little  book 
I  and  Thou  is  a  poetic  product;  systematizing  the  relation 
will  not  be  easy  for  this  reason.  Secondly,  Buber  admits  in 
a  later  work  that  readers  are  left  with  a  negative  impression 
of..  the  I-it  relation.  Speaking  about  I  and  Thou  Buber  says, 
It.  ..  Indeed  it  does  not  do  justice  to  it;  because  I  am  born 
in  the  midst  of  this  situation  of  man  and  see  what  I  see  and 
must  point  out  what  I  have  seen.  In  another  hour  it  would 
perhaps  have  been  granted  to  me  to  sound  the  praises  of  the 
It;  today  not:  because  without  a  turning  of  man  to  his  Thou 
no  turn  in  his  destiny  can  come.  "  From  Schlipp,  P.,  and 
Friedman,  M.,  eds.,  The  Philosophy  of  Martin  Buber,  op.,  it., 
p.  704.  We  repeat  our  earlier  stipulation  about  this  issue; 
we  are  asking  whether  the  two  relational  forms  are  mutually 
exclusive  or  not.  We  do  not  contest  that  they  are  different. 
2Buber,  M.,  I  and  Thou,  p.  3. 
3Ibid.,  pp.  Q,  14,17,33. 
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"knowledge  about;  "  as  well  as  the  activity  of  looking  upon 
others  as  objects).  When  it  comes  to  treating  people  as 
objects,  Buber's  answer  is  obvious;  he  emphasizes  that  it 
is  a  negative  relationship.  But  what  about  man's  effort 
to  know  his  world?  Is  it  also  a  negative  form? 
Buber  speaks  of  the  act  of  knowing  as  a  rhythmic 
passage  from  I-Thou  to  I-It,  and  finally  to  I-Thou  again. 
Take  knowledge:  being  is  diclosed  to  the  man  engaged 
in  knowing,  as  he  looks  over  what  is  over  against  him. 
He  will,  indeed,  have  to  grasp  as  an  object  that  which 
he-has  seen  with  the  force  of  presence,  he  will  have 
to  compare  it  with  objects,  establish  it  in  its  order 
among  classes  of  objects,  describe  and  analyze  it 
objectively.  Only  as  It  can  it  enter  the  structure 
of  knowledge.  1 
We  are  led  to  believe  that  the  I-Thou  form  of  direct 
encounter  is  supposed  to  be  followed  by  the  act  of  getting 
to  "know  about"  what  has  been  encountered.  The  I-It  form 
becomes  the  inevitable  successor  to  the  I-Thou  form.  Buber 
goes  on: 
Now  the  incident  is  included  in  the  It  of  knowledge 
which  is  composed  of  ideas.  He  who  frees  it  from  that, 
and  looks  on  it  again  in  the  present  moment,  fulfills 
the  nature  of  the  act  2f  knowledge  to  be  real  and 
effective  between  men. 
"Knowledge  about"  is  fulfilled  by  its  return  to  the 
I-Thou  form  where  it  becomes  "effective  between  men". 
llbid.,  p.  40. 
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Buber's  language  of  fulfillment  stipulates  that  the  I-It 
function  is  necessary.  He  says,  in  effect,  that  the  initial 
sense  of  "presence"  is  not  enough;  the  act  of  knowing  matures 
as  objectification  and  evaluation  occur.  Man's  relation  to 
his  world  is  enhanced  because  he  has  analyzed  and  scrutinized 
things  and  people  around  him.  As  the  fulfillment  of  this 
procedure,  the  object  is  attended  to  again,  as  presence,  as 
a  "thou". 
Buber  clarifies  the  importance  of  the  I-It  relation 
somewhat  with  the  following: 
It  is  not  as  though  scientific  and  aesthetic  under- 
standing  were  not  necessary;  but  they  are  necessary 
to  man  that  he  may  do  his  work  with  precision  and 
plunge  it  in  the  truth  of  relation,  which  is  above 
the  understanding  and  gathers  itself  up  in  it.  1 
The  I-It  form  in  this  example  is  far  from  being 
inconsequential  and  negative;  it  is  both  necessary,  and  is 
beneficial  depending  on  its  fulfillment  in  the  I-Thou  form. 
He  goes  on  to  say  that  only  in  its  unfulfilled  state  is  the 
act  of  knowing  negative.  That  is,  the  purpose  of  objecti- 
fying  and  "knowing  about"  is  not  to  conquer  the  world  of 
others  but  to  enter  into  relation  with  it.  2 
Given  the  foregoing  examples,  Hepburn's  position 
1lbid.,  pp.  41-42. 
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courts  a  misunderstanding  of  Buber.  Though  the  two  forms 
are  different,  Buber  states  that  they  are  not  mutually 
exclusive.  Rather,  in  the  light  of  I-Thou  encounter,  the 
I-It  form  of  relation  is  necessary,  even  complimentary  to 
the  I-Thou  form. 
Buber  also  speaks  of  the  relation  between  the  two 
forms  in  other  ways.  The  I-It  form  is  subordinate  to  the 
I-Thou:  the  other  is  not  a  "thing  among  things"  in  the 
I-Thou  form;  this  does  not  mean  "that  nothing  else  exists 
except  himself.  But  all  else  lives  in  his  light.  111  The 
I-It  sphere  is,  not  deprecated,  but  is  subordinate  to  the 
I-Thou  form.  Because  the  I-Thou  relation  is  an  act  of 
total  self-offering  of  one  person  to  the  other,  there  is 
a  "suspension  of  all  partial  actions  and  consequently  of 
all  sensations  of  actions  grounded  only  in  their  particular 
limitation.  "2  In  this  reference,  the  I-It  relation  is 
again  subordinate;  only  in  complete  separation  from  the 
I-Thou  encounter  does  it  operate  negatively.  If  meeting 
is  to  be  understood  as  the  primary  mode  of  personal  exis- 
tence,  the  I-It  form  can  be  regarded  as  complimentary. 
The  subordinate  but  complimentary  relation  he  writes 
of  is  made  somewhat  more  explicit  in  the  following. 
1Ibid., 
p.  8. 
2Ibid. 
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No  system  of  ideas  or  foreknowledge  intervenes 
... 
memory  itself  is  transformed  ...  No  aim,  no  lust, 
and  no  anticipation  intervene  between  I  and  Thou. 
Desire  itself  is  transformed  ...  Only  when  every 
means  has  collapsed  does  the  meeting  come  about.  1 
His  poetic  language  does  not  conceal  the  conceptual 
implication:  I-It  characteristics  are  meant  to  be  trans- 
formed,  "taken  into"  the  vitality  of  encounter.  He  is 
speaking  of  affective  states  but  the  model  again  applies. 
The  I-It  form  is  a  subordinate  form,  but  it  is  a  necessary 
compliment  to  the  form  of  living  relation. 
Almost  in  passing,  he  mentions  that  the  character- 
istics  of  individual  perception  are  not  excluded  in  the 
experience  of  presence.  Of  a  tree,  the  subject  may  say, 
...  it  is  not  necessary  for  me  to  give  up  any  of 
the  ways  in  which  I  consider  the  tree  ...  Rather  is 
everything,  picture  and  movement,  species  and  type, 
law  and  number,  indivisibly  united  in  this  event.  2 
Once  more  knowledge  about  is  related  directly  to 
the  I-Thou  encounter.  With  regard  to  persons, 
Good  people  and  evil,  wise  and  foolish,  beautiful  and 
ugly,  become  successively  real  to  him:  that  is,  free, 
they  step  forth  in  their  singleness  and  confront  him 
as  Thou. 
That  Buber  intends  no  total  separation  is  abundantly 
clear  in  the  preceding  quotations.  The  two  forms  are 
distinct;  the  I-Thou  form  is  primary;  the  I-It  form  is 
1lbid., 
pp.  11-12. 
2Ibid., 
p.  7. 
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"demonic"  only  when  divorced  from  its  subordinate  role. 
This  much  we  can  ascertain  from  Buber's  early  piece, 
.j 
and 
Thou.  But  the  language  is  poetic  and  there  is  no  evidence 
which  helps  us  to  be  more  specific  about  the  intended 
relation.  Buber  fails  to  explain  systematically  how  the 
relationship  between  the  two  forms  is  to  be  conceived. 
In  his  later  works,  where  he  undertakes  explanation 
of  the  two  orders  and  their  application  to  specific  issues, 
there  is  likewise  no  specific  relation  expounded.  We  have 
already  noted  that  he  did  not  count  it  his  responsibility 
to  "sound  the  praises  of  It".  The  absence  of  such  "praise" 
helps  explain  why  there  is  no  specific  relation  expounded, 
but  because  there  is  no  more  specific  information  available 
on  the  positive  structures  of  the  I-It  form,  one  can  easily 
assume  that  no  relation  to  the  I-Thou  form  exists.  This,  it 
seems  to  me,  constitutes  a  major  difficulty  in  Buber's 
thought  and  explains  why  Hepburn  offered  his  criticism. 
It  is  not  that  Buber  intends  a  negative  estimation  of  the 
acts  of  knowing  about  or  perceiving;  it  is  that  he  fails  to 
describe  them  with  the  same  rigour  that  he  does  the  act  of 
meeting.  Hepburn  is  mistaken  about  Buber's  intentions,  but 
he  is  correct  in  seeing  the  consequences  of  Buber's  failure 
to  describe  the  structures  of  perception  and  ratiocination. 
Without  an  explicit  phenomenology  of  perception  and  reflection 
it  is  difficult  to  maintain  that  I-It  and  I-Thou  modalities 26 
have  a  complimentary  relation.  That  the  two  forms  exist 
in  unhappy  tension  is  an  understandable  conclusion  given 
the  absence  of  systematic  evidence  to  the  contrary.  In  our 
concluding  remarks  we  shall  discuss  why  Buber  did  not  arti- 
culate  a  phenomenology  of  perception,  a  phenomenology  of 
"knowledge  about". 
Related  to  the  above  criticism  we  ask,  is  Hepburn's 
contention  valid,  that  the  I-Thou  form  is  questionable  as 
a  "self-authenticating  experience"?  Hepburn  cites  the 
use  of  descriptive  terms  when  Buber  describes  a  pure 
encounter  situation,  terms  describing  the  Other  which 
indicate  prior  education  and  are  attributable  to  the  cher- 
ished  beliefs  of  a  community. 
In  order  to  understand  Buber's  response  to  this 
criticism,  we  cite  two  factors  in  his  portrayal  of  meeting. 
The  first  is  readily  observed:  Buber,  of  all  writers  in 
the  encounter  tradition,  is  most  careful  in  his  choice  of 
language  concerning  an  experience  of  the  other.  Strictly 
speaking,  the  terms  he  employs  are  not  descriptive;  they 
are  indicative  of  the  living  relation  he  says  exists 
"between".  With  regard  to  interpersonal  encounters,  the 
term  is  always  "thou";  hardly  a  descriptive  term.  With 
regard  to  divine-human  meeting,  it  is  "Thou",  "Presence", 
or  "Word".  These  terms  tell  us  nothing  about  the  party 
in  question;  they  do  not  give  us  information  nor  do  they 27 
determine  the  personal  or  super-personal  characteristics 
of  the  one  over-against  the  "I".  Rather  they  indicate  the 
relationship  between  the  "I"  and  the  Other.  Buber,  unlike 
those  who  are  influenced  by  him,  avoids  terms  which  could 
be  construed  as  descriptive  of  the  Other.  On  this  he  is 
consistent;  he  is  not  an  open  target  for  Hepburn's  objection. 
Desdribing  meeting  does  not  ential  description  of  the  Other. 
Object  language  is  inappropriate  in  the  description  of 
meeting;  such  could  be  inferred  when  we  recall  Buber's 
objectives.  It  must  be  said  of  the  interpersonal  as  well 
as  of  his  notion  of  divine-human  encounters.  Buber  concen- 
trates  on  describing  "meeting",  not  the  one  met. 
There  is  a  concept  in  Buber's  poetry  which  should 
clarify  this  position  somewhat.  It  concerns  his  use  of 
the  word  "modification",  a  term  which  has  a  very  different 
meaning  for  him  than  for  the  language  analyst. 
In  I  and  Thou  this  notion  is  given  poetic  expression. 
With  regard  to  divine-human  encounter  he  says, 
The  revelation  does  not  pour  itself  into  a  funnel, 
it  comes  to  him  and  seizes  his  whole  elemental  being 
in  all  its  particular  nature  and  fuses  with  it.  The 
man,  too,  who  is  the  'mouth'  of  revelation,  is  indeed 
this,  not  a  speaking-tube  and  any  kind  of  instrument, 
but  an  organ  which  sounds  acc9rding  to  its  own  laws: 
and  to  sound  means  to  modify. 
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From  this  we  can  at  least  see  the  direction  of  his 
thought.  In  terms  of  the  classic  problem  of  the  relation 
between  subject  and  object,  we  might  say  that  Buber's 
emphasis  is  upon  subjectivity.  In  experiencing  the  I-Thou 
relation,  the  subject  always  injects  himself  into  the  exper- 
ience.  Living  relation  terminology  is  open  to  language 
about  the  subject's  position,  gesture,  viewpoint,  or 
involvement.  This  holds  for  the  interpersonal  as  well  as 
the  experience  of  relation  with  God;  l  Buber's  notion  of 
modification  expresses  his  attempt  to  recognize  human 
subjectivity.  Obviously,  the  concept  is  not  supposed  to 
rule  out  experience  of  a  genuine  relationship.  That  is, 
his  recognition  of  subjectivity  in  no  way  implies  "invention" 
on  the  part  of  the  subject.  Buber  says  of  the  religious 
experience:  "I  possess  no  security  against  the  necessity 
to  live  in  fear  and  trembling;  I  have  nothing  but  the 
certainty  that  we  share  in  the  revelation.  "2 
Buber's  conviction  about  being  bound  up  in  relation, 
is  the  nub  of  his  philosophical  apologetic.  One  cannot 
demonstrate  the  object  qua  object--that  would  yield  neither 
the  real  person  nor  the  holy  God.  He  must  live  in  fear 
1Vide.  Schlipp,  Paul,  and  Friedman,  Maurice,  op.  cit., 
p.  698. 
2Ibid., 
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and  trembling,  and  he  must  reserve  judgment  about  the  object. 
But  in  so  doing  a  person  can  still  know  he  is  bound  up  in 
meeting,  and  meeting  is  not  a  subjective  creation.  Buber's 
notion  of  modification  is  supposed  to  represent  the  subject's 
deep  involvement  in  the  experience  of  encounter. 
Does  this  answer  Hepburn's  objection?  Taken  cumula- 
tively,  does  Buber's  hesitancy  to  employ  descriptive  terms 
for  the  object  and  his  notion  of  modification,  take  Hepburn's 
target  away? 
Buber's  "reply"  can  be  summarized;  one  cannot  demon- 
strate  the  existence  of  the  object,  only  the  experience  of 
relation;  in  that  context  the  subject's  involvement  and  the 
existence  of  relation  are  inextricably  mixed..  "Knowledge 
about"  the  relation  or  description,  is  always  partial  and 
secondary  to  the  lived  relation  itself;  we  are  supposed  to 
acknowledge  the  relation  before  we  describe  or  demonstrate 
it.  Experience  of  relation  is  the  irreducible.  Again,  he 
seeks  to  be  a  phenomenologist  whose  primary  datum  is  an 
event  called  "meeting". 
Hepburn  would  be  understandably  dissatisfied  with 
such  a  reply;  description  of  the  object  is  the  only  way  to 
achieve  reliable  knowledge  about  a  relationship  and  Buber's 
refusal  to  describe  "the  object"  is  an  evasion  of  the  issue 
rather  than  a  clarification.  We  are  at  a  point  where  it  is 
difficult  to  pass  off  Hepburri's  objections.  We  are  not 30 
given  an  argument  to  counteract  Hepburn's  claim  to  the 
questionableness  of  a  self-authenticating  encounter.  Buber 
refuses  to  claim  the  existence  of  God  in  an  explicit  manner; 
he  refuses  to  identify  any  "object"  of  experience.  Yet, 
he  willingly  admits  to  the  operation  of  human  subjectivity. 
We  have  not  seen  what  he  means  by  human  subjectivity  and 
without  a  stipulation  of  that  term,  it  would  seem  that  we 
are  on  very  unstable  ground  if  we  accept  his  affirmation 
of  the  self-validating  character  of  experience. 
Hepburn's  questions  about  self-authentification 
pursue  next,  the  use  of  psychological  referents,  i.  e.  the 
"I  sense",  "I  feel"  sort  of  language.  From  the  above 
discussion  of  modification  it  follows  that  Buber  acknowledges 
a  psychological  dimension  in  his  descriptions  of  meeting. 
"Modification",  I  assume,  includes  expressions  that  indicate 
one's  mental  condition.  But  does  his  notion  lead  us  to 
believe  that  meeting  depends  solely  upon  a  subject's  feelings 
and  sensations?  Buber's  disclaimer  is  most  emphatic. 
I  perceive  something.  I  am  sensible  of  something.  I 
imagine  something.  I  will  something.  I  think  something. 
The  life  of  human  beings  does  not  consist  of  all  this 
and  the  like  alone.  This  and  the  like  together  esta- 
blish  the  realm  of  It. 
But  the  realm  of  Thou  has  a  different  basis.  1 
Buber  is  saying  that  psychological  or  subjective  referents  do 
1Buber,  M.,  I  and  Thou,  p.  L. 31 
not  get  at  the  heart  of  the  experience  of  encounter;  they 
are  not  dependable  descriptive  terms  for  that  event.  What 
is  his  alternative? 
To  clarify  his  limitation  on  the  use  of  psycholog- 
ical  terms  we  must  go  deeper  into  Buber's  notion  of  subjec- 
tivity,  what  he  calls  "genuine  subjectivity".  He  contrasts 
genuine  subjectivity  with  the  term  "individuality". 
The  I  of  the  primary  word  I-It  makes  its  appearance 
as  individuality  and  becomes  conscioys  of  itself  as 
subject  (of  experiencing  and  using). 
Individuality  occurs  when  the  I-It  form  is  the 
dominant  mode  in  a  person's  life.  Clearly,  individuality 
is  a  negative  term,  signifying  differentiation  of  self 
from  others,  self-appropriation,  and  detachment.  2  Individ- 
uality  is  a  kind  of  Pre-Copernican  orientation  to  the  world 
where  the  self  is  "concerned  with  My--my  kind,  my  race, 
my  creation,  my  genius.  "3  Everything  revolves  about  the 
subject  in  this  aspect  of  the  I-It  form.  As  Buber  sees  it, 
individuality  centers  on  selfish  motives  and  emotions. 
Individuality  would  then  be  a  form  of  thinking  and  acting, 
as  well  as  feeling.  Anything  which  indicates  alienation 
. 
I,  Ibid.,  p.  62. 
2Ibid. 
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or  complete  dependence  on  the  I  applies.  Subjectivism, 
if  we  were  to  use  it  in  the  sense  that  Buber  uses  individ- 
uality,  would  be  a  completely  negative  term.  It  would  not 
answer  to  Hepburn's  objection  in  that  it  stipulates  one 
modus  operandi  in  the  I-It  sphere.  It  does  not  even  take 
up  the  question  of  human  perception  in  Hepburn's  terms. 
Genuine  subjectivity  stands  in  sharp  contrast  to 
individuality. 
-  "The  I  of  the  primary  word  I-Thou  makes 
its  appearance  as  person  and  becomes  conscious  of  itself 
as  a  genuine  subjectivity  (without  a  dependent  genitive).  "i 
The  authentic  person  enters  into  relation  with  others;  the 
primary  gesture  is  out  to  relation  rather  than  inward  to- 
wards  self.  Genuine  subjectivity  represents  an  orientation 
towards  relations;  the  person  is  a  participant,  cognitively 
and  emotionally.  Again,  Buber  describes  a  personal  mode 
of  existence  and  in  so  doing  has  given  the  term  subjectivity 
a  different  meaning. 
Where  do  psychological  references  fit  here?  They 
have  a  place,  for  Buber  never  counsels  the  loss  of  sense 
or  feeling  in  encounter;  they  are  meant  to  be  part  of  a 
given  relation.  Buber  gives  us  one  example;  it  stresses 
the  difference  between  expressions  such  as  "I  feel",  and 
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"I  love"  or  "I  trust".  1  Here,  the  "I  feel"  is  wholly  within 
the  context  of  an  "I"  centered  world,  i.  e.  individuality; 
the  latter  two  expressions  illustrate  the  existence  of  a 
living  relation  and  genuine  subjectivity.  Emotions  and 
sensations  (the  "I  feel"),  can  express  a  living  relation 
if  the  other  marks  of  genuine  subjectivity  are  predominant. 
This  is  Buber's  main  way  of  responding  to  Hepburn.  Within 
the  I-Thou  event,  emotional  life  has  its  place,  but  not  as 
its  primary  aspect.  The  relation  is  primary;  emotions 
and  sensations  are  expressions  of  relations  but  not  exhaustive 
ones. 
As  before,  Buber  does  not  give  a  direct  answer  to 
Hepburn;  he  will  not  subject  the  event  of  meeting  to  My 
explanation,  psychological  or  otherwise.  He  shifts  the 
reader's  attention  to  a  peculiar  type  of  phenomenology; 
the  question  "how  do  I  know"  is  simply  not  as  important  as 
1The  example:  "Feelings  dwell  in  man  but  man  dwells 
in  love.  Love  does  not  cling  to  the  I  in  such  a  way  as 
to  have  the  Thou  only  for  its  'contents'  its  object;  but 
love  is  between  the  I  and  the  Thou.  "  Buber,  I  and  Thou, 
pp.  14-15.  As  was  true  in  our  discussion  of  relations 
between  the  I-It  and  I-Thou  forms,  there  is  a  relation 
between  individuality  and  genuine  subjectivity;  they  are 
not  mutually  exclusive.  Again,  this  is  expressed  poetically.  "The  I  that  steps  out  of  the  relational  event  into  separation 
and  consciousness  of  separation,  does  not  lose  its  reality.  Its  sharing  is  preserved  in  it  in  a  living  way.  In  other 
words,  as  it  is  said  of  the  supreme  relation  and  may  be 
used  of  all,  `  the  seed  remains  in  it.  '  This  is  the  province 
of  subjectivity  in  which  the  I  is  aware  with  a  single 
awareness  of  its  solidarity  of  connexion  and  of  its  separation.  Genuine  subjectivity  can  only  be  dynamically  understood  as  the  swinging  of  the  I  in  its  lonely  truth.  "  Ibid.,  p.  63. 34 
the  question,  "What  does  meeting  mean?  "  His  apologetic 
effort  focuses  upon  one  kind  of  intersubjective  event 
called  meeting.  We  have  already  cited  a  major  difficulty 
in  this;  he  will  not  utilize  any  method  which  explains 
the  nature  of  meeting  in  terms  of  perceptual  activity. 
Now  we  find  him  again  refusing  to  explain  how  the  psych- 
ological  dimensions  are  subordinate.  His  catagories 
"individuality"  and  "genuine  subjectivity"  are  suggestive 
of  a  different  approach  to  an  analysis  of  the  intersubjective 
event,  but  they  do  not  clarify  the  question  pressed  by 
Hepburn. 
We  shall  not  receive  a  satisfying  answer  if  we  press 
Buber  on  the  question  of  a  covert  psychological  foundation 
for  his  phenomenology.  As  we  have  said,  such  an  affirmation 
could  not  satisfy  Hepburn;  there  is  no  reliance  upon 
empirically  testable  data.  Buber's  refusal  to  restrict 
intersubjectivity  by  submitting  it  to  any  means  of  veri- 
fication  has  the  unavoidable  effect  of  leaving  the  reader 
without  any  means  of  refuting  Hepburn's  pointed  questions 
and  criticisms.  Buber  invites  our  acceptance  of  the  unique 
I-Thou  mode  of  relationship  but  he  does  not  provide  us 
with  any  means  of  understanding  it  in  terms  of  traditional 
philosophical  interrogation. 
It  becomes  clear,  even  at  this  early  stage,  that 
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the  two  thinkers.  Buber  is  the  apologist  for  meeting, 
Hepburn  the  critic.  Buber  measures  all  else  by  the  inter- 
subjective  sphere.  Human  perception,  judgment,  and  existence 
in  general,  is  looked  at  through  the  relational  event. 
Hepburn  demands  that  we  assess  the  value  of  the  inter- 
subjective  by  other  means,  namely,  individual  perception 
and  judgment.  We  must  know  about  these  before  we  can 
accept  the  affirmations  about  the  interhuman  or  the  "between". 
The  two  start  from  different  vantage  points;  it  is  under- 
standable  that  their  conclusions  differ. 
We  come  now  to  Hepburn's  final  objection,  the  theo- 
logian's  use  of  a  scale  of  relative  purity  as  an  analogy 
for  divine-human  encounter.  While  it  is  abundantly  clear 
that  Buber's  relational  event  is  rooted  in  and  descriptive 
of  a  "religious  event',  this  needs  clarification.  1 
We  have  already  said  that  Buber  does  not  seek  to 
demonstrate  God's  existence,  but  assumes  it  when  expounding 
upon  the  significance  of  meeting.  This  means  that  Buber's 
descriptions  of  the  interpersonal  sphere  invite  the  accept- 
ance  of  a  religious  encounter  or  meeting  in  which  faith 
is  born.  Undeniably,  Buber's  work  rests  upon  this  conviction. 
What  then  of  a  scale?  Is  there  one  which  "peaks  out"  in 
1vide.  Buber,  M. 
_I  and  Thou,  pp.  75  ff.,  and  Schlipp, 
Paul,  and  Friedman,  M.  ,  eds.  2.  cit.  pp.  741  if. 36 
this  supreme  event. 
We  would  mistake  Buber's  phenomenology  if  we  saw  it 
as  a  progressive  analogical  scale  leading  the  skeptic  to 
accept  divine  meeting.  Two  reasons  bear  this  out.  First, 
the  interpersonal  events  he  interprets  are  not  like  divine- 
human  encounter;  they  are  not  conceived  of  as  encounters 
which  need  purification  in  order  to  fulfill  their  proper 
function.  The  I-Thou  form  is  expressive  of  an  authentic 
relationship  in  the  intersubjective  sphere.  If  we  take 
this  point  seriously,  i.  e.  that  there  is  nothing  to  be 
added  to  I-Thou  encounters,  we  see  that  no  scale  of  relative 
purity  is  needed,  implied,  or  expounded.  I-Thou  encounters 
between  people  are  not  analogies  for  something  else;  they 
are  authentic  modes  of  man's  existence. 
Another  way  is  needed  to  express  the  religious  aspect 
of  the  interhuman.  Buber's  way  to  express  this  connection 
between  the  interhuman  and  the  divine-human  is  to  say  that 
the  holy  God  is  glimpsed  in  the  experience  of  others.  1 
Man  experiences  the  holy  in  the  context  of  the  common. 
This  may  not  seem  too  different  from  a  "scale",  but  it  is. 
Buber's  refusal  to  talk  about  God  in  other-worldly  terms 
is  one  clue.  There  is  no  experience  of  God  apart  from  a 
1Schlipp, 
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mundane  world.  We  shall  go  into  what  this  means  in  the 
succeeding  chapter.  But  now  it  should  be  emphasized  that 
Buber's  concept  of  divine  Presence  is  always  expressed  in 
existential,  historical,  and  interpersonal  terms.  Divine- 
human  encounter  is  expressed  in  terms  of  talk  about  inter- 
personal  encounter;  to  explicate  the  full  measure  of  this 
is  Buber's  philosophical  vocation. 
We  should  also  remind  ourselves  of  the  potentially 
positive  role  of  I-It  relations.  When  considered  in  light 
of  an  I-Thou  encounter,  what  Hepburn  calls  "impurities" 
are  always  present  even  if  they  are  subordinate.  The  act 
of  knowing  about  can  be  beneficial  and  complimentary  to 
living  relation.  We  find  it  hard  to  discern  any  scale  of 
purification  in  this;  the  I-It  form  can  work  for  the  deep- 
ening  of  man's  sense  of  encounter  and  Presence.  There  is 
no  need  to  "think  away"  one's  perceptions,  analyses,  etc. 
Rather  they  can  be  taken  into  relation  where  they  are 
"effective  between  men".  There  is  no  scale  in  this. 
Lastly  we  cite  Buber's  concept  of  "duration";  it 
is  his  alternative  to  any  suggestion  of  a  scale.  It  helps 
specify  the  sort  of  religious  heritage  he  employs  in  his 
phenomenology  of  meeting. 
He  says  that  the  I-Thou  event  is  "lived  in  a 
'duration'  whose  purely  intensive  dimension  is  defineable 
only  in  terms  of  itself,  and  not  as  part  of  a  continuous 38 
and  ordered  sequence.  "1  Such  poetic  language  is  highly 
suggestive  of  a  distinction  made  by  many  theologians  in 
their  expositions  of  biblical  theology.  They  specify  a 
difference  between  chronos,  and  Kairos.  Chronos  is  clock- 
time,  duration  in  the  sense  of  measured  moments,  Buber's 
"continuous  and  ordered  sequence".  Kairos  refers  to  the 
impact  of  the  event,  its  meaning  in  the  lives  and  history 
of  the  participants.  The  affinity  of  this  distinction  with 
that  of  I-It  and  I-Thou  is  readily  discernible.  I-It  is 
kin  to  chronos,  I-Thou  to  Kairos.  We  can  also  see  that 
history  if  conceived  this  way,  has  no  progressive  pattern, 
no  necessary  transition  from  chronos  to  the  intensive 
dimension.  Buber  thinks  of  encounter  moments  in  terms  of 
Kairos  which  breaks  in  upon  the  everyday.  The  form  is 
"meeting",  and  in  it,  no  scale  of  relative  purity  is 
implied. 
Once  again  it  is  evident  that  Hepburn  and  Buber 
speak  different  languages  and  employ  diverse  conceptual 
tools.  Hepburn  has  not  properly  criticized  Buber  at  this 
point,  but  as  we  shall  see,  Buber's  response  will  not 
explain  how  the  divine-human  experience  is  related  to  the 
inter-personal  or  the  mundane.  We  save  further  explanation 
of  his  theory  for  the  next  chapter  as  it  is  of  central 
importance  in  our  study. 
1Buber,  M.,  I  and  Thou,  p.  30. 39 
OBSERVATIONS 
Charles  Hartshorne  in  describing  Buber's  metaphysics 
made  the  comment,  "Buber  has  no  metaphysics;  Buber  is  one 
of  the  greatest  of  metaphysicians.  .  .  "1  To  me  this  state- 
ment  suggests  an  appropriate  appraisal  of  Buber  concerning 
phenomenology.  "He  has  no  phenomenology  and  he  is  one  of 
the  greatest  of  phenomenologists.  "  Buber,  in  I  and  Thou, 
has  written  one  of  the  classics  on  intersubjectivity.  In 
contrast  to  the  empirical--logical  fixations  which  try  to 
"arrive  at"  a  concept  of  intersubjectivity  through  knowledge 
about  the  other,  Buber  begins  with  intersubjectivity.  He 
shifts  the  ground  of  concern  to  an  interrogation  of  what 
meeting  means.  In  this  he  is  original  and  suggestive. 
As  a  phenomenologist  of  intersubjective  experience  he  shifts 
the  philosophical  burden  from  its  concentration  upon  the 
logical-empirical  criteria  for  demonstrating  the  existence 
of  intersubjective  interchange,  to  a  descriptive-interpretive 
explication  of  that  interchange.  His  goal  is  not  to  demon- 
strate  "meeting"  but  to  interpret  its  significance.  In 
this  sense  his  work  is  constructive  or  apologetic.  He 
speaks  primarily  to  the  reader  who  affirms  the  occurrence 
of  encounter.  Buber's  insistence  upon  this  as  the  pivotal 
phenomenon  in  human  existence  carries  impressive  weight;  for 
humanists  and  religious  alike,  Buber  has  selected  the  critical 
1Schlipp,  P.,  and  Friedman,  M.,  eds.;  op.  cit.  p.  49. 40 
event  which  gives  life  meaning,  the  intersubjective  encounter. 
At  every  point  we  have  seen  Buber  redirect  the  criticisms, 
searching  not  for  a  proof  but  for  a  meaningful  exposition 
of  the  irreducible  phenomenon,  meeting.  He  is  a  most  signi- 
ficant  phenomenologist  of  intersubjectivity. 
Buber  also  brings  home  the  suggestion  that  inter- 
subjectivity  plays  a  central  role  in  a  conception  of  God 
or  transcendence.  There  is  no  question  in  my  mind  that 
Martin  Buber  has  done  more  to  focus  philosophical  explica- 
tion  upon  intersubjectivity  as  it  applies  to  the  issue  of 
transcendence  than  anyone  before  or  since.  One  reads  and 
rereads  Buber  because  of  this  focus;  it  is  his  major  contri- 
bution  and  is  a  major  contribution  to  any  investigation  of 
"religious  experience". 
But  just  at  the  point  of  Buber's  redirection  of 
phenomenological  concern,  questions  arise.  The  reserva- 
tions  come  not  at  the  level  of  acknowledging  intersubjective 
encounter  as  central;  they  arise  when  we  ask  how  it  is  to 
be  understood  or  conceptualized  as  central. 
There  is  little  leverage  one  has  for  the  claim  that 
encounter  is  the  irreducible  foundation  upon  which  phen- 
omenology  must  rest.  Buber  affirms  but  does  not  give 
evidence  that  his  work  is  non-apologetic.  He  says  he  does 
not  seek  to  demonstrate  God's  existence  but  he  assumes 
it,  affirms  it,  and  describes  relationship  with  God. 41 
How  can  we  accept  the  "purely  descriptive"  objectives  he 
claims  to  espouse? 
Buber  also  intends  no  complete  separation  between 
the  mundane  I-It  mode  and  the  all  important  I-Thou  mode. 
But  he  gives  us  preciously  little  evidence  to  understand 
how  they  relate.  We  are  told  to  accept  "differences" 
but  we  are  not  given  the  opportunity  to  distinguish  differ- 
ences  from  exclusivity.  No  patient  investigation  of  the 
I-It  mode  is  conducted  to  help  provide  the  necessary  links. 
Psychological  language  is  limited  but  since  perception 
and  affective  states  are  dealt  with  so  hurriedly  it  sounds 
vacuous  to  affirm  a  "self-authenticated,  relational  event". 
No  scale  of  relative  purity  is  expounded,  but  the 
concepts  of  chronos  and  kairos  hardly  aid  us  in  relating 
the  interpersonal  to  divine  encounters  in  any  systematic 
way. 
The  most  serious  vacancy,  however,  is  Buber's  general 
lack  of  interest  in  relating  human  perceptual  modalities 
to  the  interpersonal  sphere.  Without  systematic  investi- 
gation  of  this,  we  are  left  with  the  tempting  invitation 
to  accept  meeting  as  the  irreducible  central  phenomenon  of 
human  existence.  In  short,  we  are  left  with  Buber's  objectives 
and  intentions,  no  more.  We  appreciate  them  but  can  we  over- 
come  the  obstacles  he  leaves  in  our  way? 
Failure  to  take  on  the  task  of  describing  the  rela- 
tion  between  perception  and  the  interpersonal  must  qualify 
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our  estimation  of  Buber  as  a  phenomenologist.  There  is  no 
real  "debate"  between  Buber  and  Hepburn.  Buber's  "invi- 
tations"  to  acknowledge  the  irreducibility  of  encounter, 
really  avoid  philosophical  exposition  or  debate.  In  the 
context  of  any  philosophical  discipline,  one  can  hardly 
accept  his  alternatives  unless  they  are  demonstrated  as 
being  better  ones.  By  refusing  to  debate,  he  is  hardly 
a  phenomenologist  as  he  declares. 
One  final  observation:  we  said  we  would  ask  why 
Buber  did  not  count  it  his  responsibility  to  write  a  phen- 
omenology  of  "knowledge  about"  which  would  compliment  his 
concept  of  encounter.  We  make  one  suggestion  based  on  our 
work  here  and  will  enlarge  upon  it  in  the  following  chapter. 
It  seems  an  ironic  one  in  light  of  our  concern. 
Buber's  thought  springs  from  the  intensity  of  reli- 
gious  experience;  he  is  closely  related  to  the  traditions  of 
Kierkegaard,  Hamman  and  Rosenzweig  as  well  as  being  a  most 
noted  interpreter  of  Hasidic  tradition.  We  have  said,  with 
his  full  consent,  that  the  I-Thou  phenomenology  is  an  expli- 
cation  of  the  experience  of  faith.  Religious  faith  plays 
a  major  part  in  his  phenomenology,  but  what  is  its  specific 
function?  The  clue  to  its  specific  function  is  found  in 
Buber's  discussion  of  faith  and  reason.  His  remarks  on 
the  subject  of  gnosis  are  revealing. 
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In  so  far  as  it  (gnosis)  originates  in  genuine  personal 
ecstasies,  it  betrays  its  origin  in  which  it  has  to  do 
with  no  object  at  all,  with  nothing  that  could  be  legit- 
imately  made  into  the  object  of  an  assertion.  Thereby 
it  not  only  offends  the  transcendent  but  also  human 
existence  because  it  constructs  a  structure  of  know- 
ledge  which  passes  from  now  on  as  complete,  which 
claims  the  absolute  legitimacy  of  the  transmutation 
in  an  allegedly  finally  valid  appeal  to  the  'known' 
mysterium.  That  the  being  into  which  this  structure 
is  here  transmuted  ultimately  signifies  the  annihila- 
tion  of  creation,  is  conclusive. 
Obviously  he  is  speaking  of  the  misuse  of  reason, 
gnosis,  but  it  is  fair  to  say  he  thinks  such  an  excess 
is  fostered  when  one  adheres  to  the  modalities  of  reason. 
Buber's  distaste  for  objectification  leads  him  to  eschew 
all  arguments  concerning  the  credibility  of  his  views. 
Misunderstandings  might  follow,  or  the  primacy  of  the 
encounter  event  would  be  eclipsed.  He  was  a  radical  on 
this;  encounter  phenomenology  stands  or  falls  on  the  basis 
of  its  power  to  invite  our  acceptance  and  acknowledgement.  2 
I  must  say  it  once  again.  I  have  no  teaching.  I  only 
point  to  something.  I  point  to  reality,  I  point  to 
something  in  reality  that  had  not  or  had  too  little 
been  seen.  I  take  him  who  listens  to  me  by  the  hand 
and  lead  him  to  the  window.  I  open  the  window  and  point 
to  what  is  outside. 
I  have  no  teaching,  but  I  carry  on  a  conversation.  3 
1lbid.,  p.  743. 
2That  I  view  this  position  as  lamentable  should  be 
clear.  In  the  following  study  of  Maurice  Merleau-Ponty,  it 
will  be  discovered  that  a  phenomenology  of  perception  and 
rational  activity  need  not  be  either  religiously  based,  or  a 
closed  system,  in  order  to  retain  the  central  importance  of  intersubjective  encounter. 
3Schlipp,  P.,  and  Friedman,  M.,  eds.  op.  cit.  p.  693. 44 
Buber  chose  the  way  of  the  biblical  prophet;  showing 
the  positive  role  of  reason  was  an  empty  endeavor. 
The  irony  is  that  Buber's  religious  convictions 
encouraged  his  reluctance  to  explain  how  a  phenomenology 
of 
of  intersubjectivity  bears  upon  the  affirmation,,  transcen- 
dence.  He  seems  to  be  saying  that  one  must  remain  silent 
about  the  relationship  between  faith  and  reason  in  order  to 
appreciate  it.  There  has  never  been  a  more  suggestive 
and  imaginative  exposition  of  the  full  potential  of  inter- 
subjective  encounter.  But  if  we  are  expected  to  see  the 
relation  between  intersubjectivity  and  transcendence,  why 
are  we  left  without  conceptual  exposition?  Must  faith, 
to  be  vigorous,  remain  silent  about  this  most  important 
issue?  Our  next  chapter  seeks  a  more  complete  answer  to 
this  question. 
I CHAPTER  II 
MARTIN  BUBER'S  ONTOLOGY  AND 
CONCEPT  OF  TRANSCENDENCE 
From  our  previous  investigation  it  is  clear  that 
Martin  Buber's  phenomenology  of  intersubjectivity  sought 
to  interpret  phenomena  much  more  significant  than  isolated 
or  bizarre  occurences.  Though  he  bases  his  interpretation 
on  the  conviction  that  meeting  is  a  concrete  event,  it 
cannot  be  understood  that  meeting  is  inconsequential, 
however  rare  its  occurence.  Meeting  is  central  to  man's 
existence  and  the  key  to  his  being.  The  purpose  of  the 
present  discussion  is  to  get  at  Buber's  explication  of 
meeting  in  terms  of  its  ontological  rootage  and  its  central 
place  in  his  theology.  More  specifically  we  aim  to  uncover 
the  ontological  significance  of  the  relational  event  and 
to  see  the  doctrine  of  transcendence  which  both  shapes  it 
and  emerges  from  it. 
The  effect  should  be  twofold:  we  will  be  able  to 
see  his  phenomenology  in  proper  perspective  and  we  will 
approach  the  central  question  of  this  study.  Namely,  can 
a  concept  of  transcendence  be  introduced  because  of  its 
solid  connections  with  a  phenomenology  of  intersubjectivity? 
The  first  task  in  approaching  the  question  will  be  to 
ascertain  how  Buber  deals  with  the  connections.  We  put 
the  issue  in  general  terms  here,  anticipating  that  the 46 
following  discussion  will  sharpen  it  considerably. 
Buber,  all  agree,  did  not  work  out  such  questions 
systematically,  but  it  is  appropriate  to  take  up  the  onto- 
logical  question  after  having  analyzed  the  phenomenology. 
I  and  Thou  speaks  entirely  in  poetic  terms  of  the  inter- 
subjective  experience;  Buber's  later  works  attempt  to 
interpret  his  phenomenology  and  to  apply  it  to  many  areas 
of  concern;  two  important  areas  are  ontology  and  theology. 
If  we  are  to  understand  the  ontological  and  theological 
dimensions  of  meeting,  we  must  turn  to  his  later  writings., 
Two  important  articles  address  the  question  of 
the  ontological  significance  of  meeting,  "Distance  and 
Relation"  and  "Elements  of  the  Interhuman.  "l  The  first 
essay  explicates  the  significance  of  the  I-Thou  phenomen- 
ology  in  terms  of  "the  principle  of  human  life,  that  is, 
its  beginning".  2  Buber  thinks  not  of  a  temporal  point  in 
time  at  which  man  emerges  as  man,  but  of  a  principle  which 
grounds  and  characterizes  all  human  life.  The  principle 
1Vide.,  Friedman,  Maurice,  ed.  The  Knowledge  of  Man, 
Harper  and  Row,  New  York,  1965.  "Distance  and.  Relation" 
was  originally  published  in  the  Hibbert  Journal,  Vol.  XLIX, 
1951;  "Elements  of  the  Interhuman"  appeared  first  in 
Psychiatry,  Vol.  XX,  1957. 
2Ibid., 
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is  man's  "special  way  of  being"  and  as  such,  is  a  special 
"category  of  being".  1 
.  the  principle  of  human  life  is  not  simple  but 
twofold,  being  built  up  in  a  twofold  movement  which 
is  of  such  a  kind  that  the  one  movement  is  the  presup- 
position  of  the  other.  I  propose  to  call  the  first 
movement  'the  primal  setting  at  a  distance'  and  the 
second  'entering  into  relation'.  That  the  first  move- 
ment  is  the  presupposition  of  the  other  is  plain  from 
the  fact  that  one  can  enter  into  relation  only  with  a 
being  which  has  been  set  at  a  distance,  more  precisely, 
has=-become  an_.  independent  opposite.  And  it  Is  only 
for  man  that  an  independent  opposite  exists. 
Distancing  signifies  a  movement  peculiar  to  man; 
it  is  his  unique  capacity  to  set  apart  a  world,  (Welt  as 
distinguished  from  the  animal's  limited  capacity  to  live 
only  in  the  immediacy  of  its  environment  (Umwelt).  Man 
acknowledges  the  life-ways  and  existence  of  the  "other". 
Otherness,  spoken  of  generally,  is  the  world  over  against 
man.  In  its  most  inclusive  terms,  otherness  is  a  totality 
larger  than  immediately  perceivable  things.  "With  soaring 
power  he  (man)  reaches  out  beyond  what  is  given  him,  flies 
beyond  the  horizon  and  the  familiar  stars,  and  grasps  a 
totality--3 
Two  characteristics  emerge  from  these  statements: 
the  mark  of  being  human  is  to  recognize  that  things  have 
1Ibid.,  p.  60. 
2lbid. 
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independent  existence;  second,  the  world  we  set  apart  is 
not  an  "unsteady  conglomeration",  but  a  unity  or  whole. 
This  is  Buber's  meaning  when  he  describes  distancing  as 
a  movement,  the  peculiar  way  distancing  is  accomplished 
reveals  him  who  accomplishes  it.  Distancing  reveals  the 
human;  it  is  the  principle  of  all  human  existence. 
Along  with  this,  he  says  that  distancing  cannot  be 
acknowledged  as  the  principle  of  human  life  unless  we  also 
acknowledge  the  contact  man  has  with  the  world.  In  order 
to  see  the  distancing  principle,  it  is  necessary  that  we 
assume  a  primal,  relation.  He  puts  it  this  way: 
Only  the  view  of  what  is  over  against  me  in  the  world 
in  its  full  presence,  with  which  I  have  set  myself, 
present  in  my  whole  person,  in  relation--only  this 
view  gives  me  the  world  truly  as  whole  and  one.  1 
What  Buber  seems  to  be  getting  at  is  that  man  is 
inextricably  bound  to  his  world  as  a  perceiving,  thinking, 
and  imagining  being;  his  way  of  being  in  contact  is  to 
set  apart  things  and  others.  2  If  this  is  a  correct  inter- 
pretation,  the  distancing-relationship  connection  is  clear: 
they  are  equally  necessary  and  of  equal  importance  in 
describing  human  existence.  One  cannot  be  had  without 
the  other;  distancing  and  relation  are  two  fundamental 
characteristics  of  human  activity. 
llbid., 
p.  63. 
2For  the  present  we  should  not  read  his  term 
"relation"  as  indicating  the  I-Thou  form.  It  is  a  more 
general  term  and  refers  to  either  the  I-It  or  the  I-Thou 
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But  some  confusion  occurs  with  the  additional  term- 
inology  he  uses  in  describing  distance.  In  addition  to 
its  being  a  "movement",  it  is  termed  a  category. 
...  the  great  phenomena  on  the  side  of  the  acts  of  dis- 
tance  are  preponderantly  universal,  and  those  on  the  side 
of  the  acts  of  relation  preponderantly  personal,  as  in- 
deed  corresponds  to  their  connection  with  one  another. 
The  facts  of  the  movement  of  distance  yield  the  essential 
answer  to  the  question,  How  is  man  possible;  the  facts  of 
the  movement  of  relation  yield  the  answer  to  the  question, 
How  is  human  life  realized.  The  first  question  is 
strictly  one  about  category;  the  second  is  one  of  cate- 
gory  and  history. 
Distance  answers  the  question,  how  is  man  possible? 
It  is  not  entirely  clear  how  we  are  to  take  this  specification. 
Conceived  of  as  a  human  action,  distancing  would  be  compat- 
ible  with  the  rest  of  his  phenomenology;  in  its  emphasis  upon 
concrete  experience,  distancing  serves  well  as  a  general  label 
for  the  activities  of  hearing,  seeing,  i.  e.,  for  perception. 
Distancing  describes  one  characteristic  of  the  Lebenswelt.  2 
If  he  intends  something  else  by  calling  distance 
a  category,  some  confusion  is  generated.  He  could  con- 
sider  distance  a  kind  of  categorical  imperative,  a  principle 
which  attempts  to  explain  how  human  experience  is  possible. 
This  perspective  would  indicate  a  much  different  rela- 
tionship  between  distance  and  relation.  The  terminology  should 
lIbid., 
p.  64. 
2The  term  Lebenswelt,  often  used  by  Husserl  and  Mer- 
leau-Ponty  is  appropriate  here.  It  specifies  that  categories 
are  always  drawn  from  the  experiential  world  and  are  not 
purely  mental  contrivances. 
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be  sorted.  Once  we  clarify  the  confusion  it  will  be  easier 
to  see  how  his  ontology  relates  to  the  phenomenology  of 
meeting. 
Buber  illustrates  with  two  examples.  Man  uses  ob- 
jects  as  tools,  and  tools  are  created  for  specific  tasks. 
Objects  fashioned  for  a  particular  task,  however,  may  also 
be  set  aside  to  perform  different  tasks.  A  knife  can  be 
used  to  kill  or  to-carve.  Two  aspects  of  the  concept  emerge 
In  the  first  sense  the  tool,  as  "distanced",  has  an  identity 
of  its  own.  But  at  the  same  time  it  is  always  used  "in 
relation";  i.  e,  it  is  an  object  which  expresses  man's 
relation  to  his  world,  a  tool  which  serves  human  purposes, 
such  as  killing  or  carving. 
Concerning  humans,  Buber  says,  "Man  as  man,  sets  man 
at  a  distance  and  makes  him  independent;  he  lets  the  life 
of  men  like  himself  go  on  round  about  him,  and  so  he,  and 
he  alone,  is  able  to  enter  into  relation,  in  his  own, 
individual  status,  with  those  like  himself.  "1  As  a  signi- 
ficant  other,  an  individual,  man  is  capable  of  relating 
to  others.  He  imagines  the  other  as  an  "other",  and  this 
can  be  the  beginning  of  what  Buber  calls  "personal  making 
present.  "2  Making  the  other  present  is  associated  with 
1Friedman,  M.,  ed.  op.  cit.,  p.  67. 
2lbid., 
p.  78  if. 
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the  occurrence  of  an  I-Thou  encounter.  Distancing  is  the 
universal  fact  of  mutual  existence;  men  are  individual  and 
social  beings;  "making  present"  is  the  personal  fulfillment 
of  the  two  fold  principle. 
In  both  illustrations,  the  implication  is  that 
distancing  is  a  movement  characteristic  of  all  human  beings. 
We  must  turn  to  Buber's  last  published  work,  if  we 
are  to  receive  further  clarification.  There,  distancing 
is  primarily  a  "movement".  Taken  cumulatively  with  the 
above,  it  gives  us  reason  to  think  that  his  ontology  is 
based  upon  an  existential-historical  perception  of  existence 
rather  than  upon  some  a  priori  principle  which  provides 
truths  about  man. 
Man,  as  I  have  indicated,  is  the  only  living  being  that 
by  its  nature  perceives  what  surrounds  it  not  as  some- 
thing  connected  with  it,  as  it  were,  with  its  vital 
acts,  but  as  something  detached,  existing  for  itself. 
This  'first  movement',  which  once  constituted  man  as 
such,  is  in  no  way  a  'reflective  attitude';  it  is  the 
primal  act,  the  primal  attitude  of  man  that  makes  him 
man.  It  is  also  the  presupposition  for  man's  entering 
into  relation.  ...  I  cannot  bring  this  primal  con- 
stitution  of  man,  without  which  there  would  be  neither 
speech  nor  tools,  into  connection  with  a  reflective 
attitude.  Man,  I  say,  'is  the  creature  through  whose 
being  the  existing  being  is  set  at  a  distance  from 
him.  '  Not  through  reflections  but  through  human  being.  1 
:.;  Distancing  is  primarily  a  movement  of  existential 
character,  established  as  a  principle  because  it  is  the  way 
man  relates  to  his  world.  Comparison  with  other  phenomen- 
1Schlipp,  P.,  and  Friedman,  M.,  eds.  off.  Lit.,  p.  695. 52 
ologists  will  help  us  further  stipulate  the  meaning  of 
distancing. 
Buber  has  written  little  of  the  influence-of  Husserl, 
but  one  of  Husserl's  concepts  applies.  Eidetic  intuition 
Husserl  advises,  is  that  capacity  of  man  to  see  the  essence 
of  his  existential  activity.  By  reflecting  upon  the 
phenomenon  (in  this  case,  relations)  the  thinker  sees  the 
ongoing  themes  operative  in  various  activities.  The  con- 
cept  of  distance,  in  this  sense,  is  the  essence  of  living 
experience.  It  can  be  called  the  form  or  eidos  of  all 
human  experience. 
Martin  Heidegger's  notion  of  phenomenology  is  also 
appropriate  in  getting  at  Buber's  conception.  Heidegger 
expressly  counsels  reflection  upon  man's  pre-reflective 
activities  (modes  of  existence)  to  gain  access  to  ontolog- 
ical  truth.  The  ontological  dimension  is  deeply  embedded 
in  the  existential  actualities  and  can  be  uncovered,  as  it 
were,  through  critical  reflection  upon  the  themes  which 
emerge  in  man's  history.  Buber,  to  my  knowledge,  never 
mentions  the  Heideggerian  conception  of  phenomenology  but 
there  is  a  parallel;  the  distance-relation  concept  functions 
as  the  ontological  dimension  of  an  existential  modality. 
Again,  it  is  the  essence  of  experience. 
This  may  serve  to  clarify  Buber's  conviction  that 
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Man's  actual  living  is  indicative  of  his  being;  we  are  not 
suggesting  further  similarities  between  Buber,  Husserl  and 
Heidegger.  Buber's  concept  of  human  activity  has  led  him 
to  postulate  the  "principle  of  human  life".  1  Perhaps,  this 
clears  the  fuzziness  of  his  terminology  a  bit. 
To  complete  what  Buber  says  about  distance  and  rela- 
tion,  it  should  be  said  that  the  realization  or  fulfillment 
of  the  distance-relation  principle  returns  us  to  the  I-Thou 
phenomenDlogy.  The  other  who  is  distanced  and  who  shares  a 
common  existence  can  become  a  "self  for  me".  The  beginning 
of  a  relation  "is  ontologically  complete  only  when  the  other 
knows  that  he  is  made  present  by  me,  and  when  this  knowledge 
induces  the  process  of  his  inmost  self-becoming.  "2  Man  truly 
becomes  himself  only  in  acceptance  and  confirmation  of  the 
other.  The  distacne-relation  principle  is  meant  to  be 
actualized  in  an  I-Thou  relationship. 
Buber's  conception  of  the  relationship  between 
phenomenology  and  ontology  is  "circular".  His  apologetic 
begins  with  and  culminates  with  the  affirmation  of  meeting; 
a  brief  restatement  shows  this  clearly.  Man's  contact  with 
the  world  is  assumed  in  his  discussion  of  distancing. 
Buber  did  not  stipulate  that  a  living  relation  was  necessary 
1Friedman,  M.,  ed.,  op.  cit.,  p.  69. 
2lbid. 
9  p.  71. 
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in  noting  the  distance  principle,  but  we  cannot  conclude 
that  it  is  unimportant.  Distance  would  make  no  sense  if  it 
were  separated  from  the  two-fold  form  of  man's  relation  to 
the  world.  The  I-Thou  encounter  is  pivotal  in  that  phen- 
omenology.  The  ontological  theme,  distance-relationship, 
rests  upon  the  truth  that  meeting  occurs.  And  as  Buber 
openly  affirms,  the  distance-relation  theme  is  complete 
only  when  a  living  relation  is  its  capstone.  It  becomes 
increasingly  evident  that  the  truth  about  man's  being  has 
one  specific  "home";  ontology  arises  out  of  the  phenomen- 
ology's  religious  orientation  and  reaffirms  that  conviction 
in  its  fulfillment. 
When  Buber's  ontology  is  brought  into  focus  in  this 
manner,  our  appreciation  for  it  is  heightened.  Our  questions 
about  it  are  also  intensified.  We  can  appreciate  the  fact 
that  his  ontology  is  an  outgrowth  of  his  pehnomenology. 
Ontology  does  not  seem  to  dictate  what  he  believes  occurs 
in  the  phenomenal  world.  He  does  not  care  so  much  for 
metaphysical  principles  of  human  existence  as  he  does  for 
the  "movements"  which  characterize  human  existence.  The 
occurrence  of  interpersonal  meeting  dictates  the  phenomen- 
ology  and  eventuates  in  an  ontological  doctrine.  This  is 
as  it  should  be;  we  shall  argue  below,  that  an  adequate 
phenomenology  is  the  only  viable  resource  for  ontological 
reflection  and  exposition. 
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Our  appreciation  of  this  pattern  is  qualified,  however. 
For  the  truth  about  meeting  is  primarily  religious  as  we 
have  inferred  above  and  will  discuss  below.  Our  questions 
about  his  phenomenology  (and  now  ontology)  take  us  back  to 
the  influence  of  theology.  The  pattern  just  described 
seems  to  rest  ultimately  upon  a  theological  conviction. 
If  so,  it  seems  rather  unimportant  that  the  ontology  grows 
out  of  a  phenomenology.  The  whole  structure  stands  upon 
the  credibility  of  a  religious  affirmation.  Despite  his 
protestations,  we  have  encountered  nothing  to  mollify  this 
growing  suspicion.  We  turn  now  to  his  doctrine  of  the 
interhuman. 
Buber  singles  out  for  special  exposition  the  term, 
Zwischenmenschlich.  1  His  exposition  helps  explain  how  the 
entire  ontology  is  formulated  in  the  context  of  the  I-Thou 
relationship.  It  emphasizes  the  importance  of  meeting  as 
being  the  key  for  man's  capacity  to  be  truly  human. 
The  interhuman,  Buber  says,  has  to  do  with  a  "separate 
category  of  our  existence,  even  a  separate  dimension,  to 
use  a  mathematical  term,  and  one  with  which  we  are  so 
familiar  that  its  peculiarity  has  hitherto  almost  escaped 
"'So  far  as  I  know,  Buber's  use  of  the  word  'Zwischenmenschlich'  which  I  have  translated  as  'interhuman' 
is  the  first  recorded  usage.  "  Smith,  R.  G.,  "Martin  Buber's 
View  of  the  Interhuman",  The  Jewish  Journal  of  Sociology, 
Vol.  VIII,  No.  I,  June  1966,  p.  74.  The  article  Smith  refers  to  is  "Elements  of  the  Interhuman". 
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us.  "1  Zwischenmenschlich,  is  the  sphere  of  the  "between"; 
it  is  dialogue  which  stands  apart  as  an  ontologically 
relevant  sphere  and  indicates  what  is  truly  human  about 
men. 
"Being"  man  is  contrasted  with  "seeming"  man.  The 
two  modes  of  existence  have  to  do  with  the  question  of 
authentic  ways  of  relating.  A  glance  can  be  manufactured 
or  it  can  be  spontaneous  and  genuine.  The  man  who  'makes' 
his  look  is  dominated  by  the  mode  of  semblance;  the  spon- 
taneous  glance  indicates  that  man  is  "being  himself".  In 
the  being  mode,,  men  communicate  the  truth  about  themselves. 
I-Thou  encounter,  Begegnung,  occurs  if  the  being  mode 
dominates  the  lives  of  those  who  come  into  contact.  2 
There  is  no  one  way  to  bring  about  this  mode  of  human 
interaction;  one  party  may  incite  the  other  to  be  himself; 
one  may  struggle  to  regain  self  authenticity  in  order  to 
communicate.  However  realized,  the  "being"  mode  is  what 
is  true  about  individuals  as  well  as  the  authentic  mode 
of  interaction.  This  is  Buber's  first  way  of  describing 
the  ontological  dimensions  of  meeting. 
1Friedman,  M.,  ed.  off.  cit.,  p.  71. 
2"Because 
genuine  dialogue  is  an  ontological  sphere 
which  is  constituted  by  the  authenticity  of  Bein  every  invasion  of  semblance  must'  damage  it..  '  Ibid.  p.  ý.,; 
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Buber's  next  contrast  distinguishes  between  "inad- 
equate  perception"  and  "personal  making  present",  two 
forms  of  man's  awareness  of  the  other.  Inadequate  perception 
is  an  awareness  of  the  other  in  reductionist  terms;  e.  g. 
we  assert  the  other  can  be  known  fully  in  terms  of  his 
behavior,  economic  background,  or  parental  influences. 
Personal  making  present  on  the  other  hand,  is  Buber's  term 
for  perceiving  another's  wholeness.  More  specifically  it 
means  to  "perceive  his  wholeness  as  a  person  determined  by 
the  spirit;  it  means  to  perceive  the  dynamic  centre  which 
stamps  his  every  utterance,  action,  and  attitude  with  the 
recognizable  sign  of  uniqueness.  "1  Unity,  uniqueness,  and 
wholeness  are  the  marks  of  personal  making  present.  2  The 
mode  of  personal  making  present  is  a  key  factor  in  realizing 
the  truth  about  man  and  his  capacity  for  interhuman  exchange. 
Lastly,  he  contrasts  the  mode  of  "imposition"  with 
that  of  "unfolding".  Imposition  is  the  logical  extension 
of  inadequate  perception;  it  is  man's  way  of  manipulating 
another.  Buber's  example  is  the  propogandist.  Such  a  man 
views  the  other  as  an  object  to  be  swayed;  he  seeks  to  bring 
the  other  into  his  way  of  thinking,  his  club,  his  sphere  of 
1Ibid.,  p.  80. 
2In  connection  with  these  contrasting  modes,  Buber 
makes  special  mention,  as  quoted,  of  the  spirit;  we  shall  return  to  this  below,  as  it  is  an  excellent  illustration 
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influence.  Contrasted  with  this  are  the  actions  of  the 
educator;  he  goes  out  to  the  other  in  order  that  the  other 
may  become  more  himself.  He  seeks  to  encourage  the  other's 
potential.  As  in  the  former  examples,  'the  unfolding  mode 
makes  meeting  possible;  with  imposition,  meeting  is  of 
course,  frustrated. 
These  three  conceptual  pairs  specify  how  man  fulfills 
what  the  distance-relationship  pattern  described  as  man's 
potential.  They  make  clear  Buber's  contention  that  the 
interhuman  is  freighted  with  ontological  status.  They 
complete  the  apologetic  circle.  In  this  "realization" 
of  the  distance-relation  principle  the  events  of  meeting 
are  given  proper  ontological  description  in  that  they  now 
pertain  to  a  fully  human  way  of  being  in  the  world.  This 
is  Buber's  way  of  holding  the  connection  between  phenomenology 
and  ontology.  Put  simply,  man's  acts  indicate  most  deeply 
who  he  is;  the  I-Thou  relation  indicates  man's  humanity, 
and  consequently,  it  animates  the  ontology. 
We  turn  now  to  a  discussion  of  Buber's  notion, 
spirit.  It  will  specify  the  place  his  doctrine  of  transcen- 
dence  occupies  in  the  phenomenology  and  ontology.  We  choose 
to  analyze  his  use  of  the  term  spirit,  for  it  easily  illus- 
trates  the  elements  which  make  up  Buber's  peculiar  notion 
of  transcendence. 
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notions  of  spirit.  The  first  notion  is  shown  in  the 
article  just  discussed,  "Elements  of  the'Interhuman";  he 
is  brief  but  the  idea  is  significant. 
A  man  cannot  really  be  grasped  except  on  the  basis  of 
the  gift  of  the  spirit  which  belongs  to  man  alone  among 
all  things,  the  spirit  as  sharing  decisively  in  the 
personal  life  of  the  living  man,  that  is,  the  spirit 
which  determines  the  person.  To  be  aware  of  a  man, 
therefore,  means  in  particular  to  perceive  his  whole- 
ness  as  a  person  determined  by  the  spirit;  it  means 
to  perceive  the  dynamic  centre  which  stamps  his  every 
utterance,  action,  ?  nd  attitude  with  the  recognizable 
sign  of  uniqueness. 
As  above,  personal  making  present  is  an  authentic 
human  mode  of  awareness,  and  this  mention  of  spirit  is  to 
be  identified  with  that  kind  of  human  awareness.  To  make 
another  present  is  to  utilize  one's  own  uniqueness  to  see 
others;  it  is  to  perceive  the  center  of  the  other's  person- 
ality.  Spirit  in  this  context,  is  the  stirring  within  a 
man  to  enter  into  relation.  This  does  not  mean  that  some- 
thing  in  man  drives  him  to  relate,  as  a  chemical  would 
stimulate  a  given  reaction.  It  means  that  man  aua  man 
is  inclined  to  interact,  and  that  inclination  makes  possible 
the  rare  I-Thou  event.  Spirit  signifies  the  human  capacity 
to  "go  out"  to  others;  man  can  be  aware  of  his  going  out 
as  was  noted  in  I  and  Thou.  2  Secondly,  man  who  is  aware 
this  way  consciously  receives  the  other  as  a  significant 
1Friedman,  M.,  ed.  op.  cit.,  p.  80. 
2Vide,  Buber,  M.,  I  and  Thou,  p,  76. 
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other;  there  is  acceptance  of  the  other's  peculiarities 
and  differences.  1  The  essentials  of  the  movement  are  open- 
ness  and  receptivity.  Buber  is  describing  that  which  makes 
meeting  possible  in  terms  of  the  individual's  mode  of  living. 
Spirit  in  this  context,  is  a  human  movement,  fulfilled  in 
the  mutuality  of  meeting.  As  meeting  occurs,  the  two  become 
human  with  each  other. 
Buber  has  placed  his  concept  of  spirit  in  the  context 
of  human  capacities,  and  awareness;  he  has  not  introduced 
as  he  does  elsewhere,  the  notion  of  a  divine  spirit.  There 
is  evidently  room  in  Buber's  thought  for  conceiving  of 
spirit  as  a  human  mode  of  existence. 
Though  Buber  does  not  mention  a  divine  spirit,  we 
would  be  hasty  in  concluding  that  spirit  here  can  be 
confined  to  "man's  spirit"  or  the"human  spirit".  Most 
surely,  the  phenomenon  of  meeting  takes  precedence;  spirit 
is  discerned  only  in  the  context  of  genuine  human  inter- 
action--the  interhuman.  He  describes  the  individual's 
capacities  and  movements  from  that  vantage  point  alone. 
Personal  making  present  indicates  the  modes  of  openness 
and  receptivity,  elements  of  dialogue.  Spirit  can  be 
referred  to  as  a  human  mode  of  awareness  only  in  the  context 
of  the  I-Thou  phenomenology.  Spirit  is  never  circumscribed 
1Ibid., 
p"  79. 
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by  a  militant  humanism. 
The  notion  of  spirit  illustrates  man's  primal 
association  with  God.  R.  G.  Smith  states  this  well. 
It  is  spirit,  not  simply  as  a  category  but  as  a  mode 
of  man's  being  which  Buber  wishes  to  disclose  anew. 
So  this  realm  of  'betweeness'  is  not  a  state,  far  less 
simply  an  idea  derived  from  looking  atmen  in  relation. 
But  it  is  an  action  and  a  source  of  action.  1 
This  second  and  more  familiar  reference  to  man's 
interaction  with  God  has  its  home  in  the  concepts  of  grace 
or  transcendence.  There  are  numerous  references  we  could 
cite;  we  shall  confine  ourselves  to  a  few  relevant  passages' 
in  I  and  Thou,  interpreting  them  as  far  as  possible  with 
his  later  writings.  The  notion  of  spirit  as  divine  grace 
or  transcendence  is  communicated  by  Buber's  use  of  many 
synonymous  terms. 
In  every  sphere  in  its  own  way,  through  each  process 
of  becoming  that  is  present  to  us,  we  look  out  toward 
the  fringe  of  the  eternal  Thou;  in  each  we  are  aware 
of  a  breath  from  the  eternal  Thou;  in  each  Thou  we 
address  the  eternal  Thou.  2 
There  is  Eros  for  man  only  when  beings  become  for  him 
pictures  of  the  eternal  and  community  is  revealed  along 
with  them;  and  there  is  Logos  for  man  only  when  he 
addresses  the  mystery  with  work  and  service  for  the 
spirit.  3 
Forms  silent  asking,  man's  loving  speech,  the  mute 
proclamation  of  the  creature,  re  all  gates  leading 
into  the  presence  of  the  Word. 
1Smith,  R.  G.,  op.  cit.  P.  76-77. 
2Buber, 
M.,  I  and  Thou,  p.  101. 
31bid., 
p.  102. 
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"Breath",  "logos",  "Mystery",  "Word":  these  can  be 
taken  as  the  poetic  synonyms  for  spirit  or  transcendence, 
the  eternal  Thou.  All  illustrate  Buber's  position  that 
interhuman  encounters  and  individual  modes  of  living  are 
grounded  in  God's  action.  They  introduce  us  to  the  critical 
place  transcendence  occupies.  in  the  phenomenology  and  onto- 
logy  we  have  outlined. 
We  are  ready  to  ask  specific  questions  about  Buber!  s 
conception  of  transcendence.  That  it  plays  some  role  in 
his  philosophy  has  never  been  doubted.  The  question  is, 
what  is  its  role?  We  have  become  increasingly  suspicious 
that  Buber's  conception  of  transcendence  dictates  the 
content  of  the  phenomenology  and  shapes  the  ontology.  Our 
first  question  grows  out  of  this  suspicion.  In  line  with 
Buber's  second  way  of  referring  to  spirit,  is  the  acknow- 
ledgment  of  transcendence  a  prior  requirement  for  under- 
standing  the  I-Thou  phenomenology?  Our  question,  when  posed 
this  way  asks  if  the  acknowledgment  of  God's  existence  and 
grace  is  a  prior  requirement  which  determines  the  character 
of  the  phenomenology  and  resulting  ontology. 
The  other  alternative  is  that  the  acknowledgment  of 
transcendence  is  not  required  to  understand  the  I-Thou 
phenomenology  and  ontology;  rather  the  phenomenology  and 
ontology  lead  to  and  introduce  acknowledgment,  We  ask, 
in  line  with  Buber's  first  use  of  spirit,  if  a  conception 63 
of  transcendence  is  the  outcome  of  a  philosophy  of  meeting. 
This  is  Buber's  declared  position;  we  shall  discuss  it 
first. 
Two  factors  give  evidence  for  this  alternative. 
Buber  speaks  poetically  about  the  event  of  meeting  as  a 
"gate  leading  into  the  presence  of  the  Word.  "1  He  also 
says  that  "the  relation  with  man  is  the  real  simile  of 
the  relation  with  God.  "2  This  would  indicate  that  the 
affirmation  of  transcendence  is  possible  because  of  the 
irreducible  nature  of  inter-personal  meeting.  The  phen- 
omenology  cites  both  the  capacity  for  and  the  emergence  of 
faith  in  God,  as  anthropological  observations.  He  backs  up 
this  position  somewhat  by  claiming  that  his  work  is  primarily 
philosophical  in  nature. 
... 
if  that  connection  of  experience  (i.  e.  I-Thou 
meeting  in  the  interpersonal  sense,  and  I-Thou  as 
acknowledgment  of  transcendence)is  to  be  understood 
as  an  experience  of  faith,  then  its  communication  is 
certainly  to  be  called  preferably  a  theological  one. 
But  that  is  not  so.  For  theology  is  understood, 
certainly  as  a  teaching  about  God,  even  if  it  is  only 
a'negative'  one  which  then  appears  instead  of  a 
teaching  of  the  nature  of  God,  a  teaching  of  the  word 
of  God,  the  Logos.  But  I  am  absolutely  not  capable 
nor  even  disposed  to  teach  this  or  that  about  God. 
Certainly,  when  I  seek  to  explain  the  fact  of  man,  I 
cannot  leave  out  that  he,  man  lives  over  against  God. 
But  I  cannot  include  God  himself  at  any  point  in  my 
explanation,  any  more  than  I  could  detach  from  history 
the,  to  me  indubitable,  working  of  God  in  it,  and  make 
1Ibid. 
2Ibid., 
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it  an  object  of  my  contemplation.  As  I  know  no  theolog- 
ical  world  history,  so  I  know  no  theological  anthro- 
pology  in  this  sense:  I  know  only  a  philosophical  one-1 
He  intends  that  the  reader  understand  his  work  as  a 
purely  philosophical  enterprise  which  does  not  exclude  the 
experience  of  faith.  It  would  seem  that  our  second  alter- 
native  corresponds  to  these  objectives.  The  phenomenology 
of  I-Thou  encounter  stands  as  the  irreducible;  faith  is 
dealt  with  as  an  experience  that  is  born  of  intersubjective 
interaction. 
A  second  factor  also  lends  itself  to  the  latter 
alternative.  It  is  seen  in  Buber's  discussion  of  transcen- 
dence  in  the  1957  Postscript  to  I  and  Thou. 
The  question  is,  how  can  the  eternal  Thou  in  the 
relation  be  at  once  exclusive  and  inclusive?  How 
can  the  Thou  relationship  of  man  to  God,  which  is 
conditioned  by  an  unconditioned  turning  to  him, 
diverted  by  nothing,  nevertheless  include  all  other 
I-Thou  relations  of  this  man,  and  bring  them  as  it 
were  to  God?  2 
The  question,  he  insists,  is  not  one  about  God,  for 
that  can  never  be  answered.  It  is  about  man's  relationship 
with  God,  and  he  insists  that  this  is  discernible  in  the 
I-Thou  relation.  He  reminds  us  that  the  only  thing  that 
can  be  known  about  is  the  conversation  man  has  with  God. 
"Conversation"  always  pertains  to  historical  living  and 
social  interaction;  it  will  not  be  other-worldly  talk. 
1Schlipp,  P.,  and  Friedman,  M.,  eds.  op.  cit.  p.  690. 
(underlining  mine). 
2Buber,  M.,  I  and  Thou,  p.  134. 65 
Faith  is  an  expression  of  the  phenomenon  of  meeting; 
so  "religious"  language  is  the  language  of  the  everyday 
and-  the  social. 
Buber  seeks  to  redirect  the  theological  enterprise 
to  embrace  this-worldly  talk,  specifically  to  base  any 
God-talk  on  the  interhuman  phenomenon.  1  This  effort  would 
seem  to  view  acknowledgment  of  transcendence  as  a  companion 
to,  but  not  a  presupposition  for  meeting.  Again,  this 
corresponds  to  the  alternative  under  discussion;  the  theo- 
logical  domain  is  supposed  to  emerge  from  the  pheonmenolog- 
ical  sphere.  Theology  makes  sense  in  terms  of  meeting--in 
that  order. 
But  this  is  not  the  whole  story.  Though  he  mutes 
the  other  alternative,  it  nevertheless  remains.  Our  previous 
quotations  indicate  that  transcendence  is  often  the  presup- 
position  for  his  phenomenology:  "there  is  eros  for  man 
only  when  beings  become  for  him  pictures  of  the  eternal.  .. 
only  when  he  addresses  the  mystery.  "  Acknowledgment  of 
transcendence  is  here  a  prior  requirement  for  understanding 
the  meaning  of  inter-personal  love.  Acknowledgment  of 
1"0ne 
must,  however,  take  care  not  to  understand 
this  conversation  with  God--the  conversation  of  which  I 
have  spoken  in  this  book  and  in  almost  all  the  works  which  followed--as  something  happening  solely  alongside  or  above  the  everyday.  God's  speech  to  man  penetrates  what  happens 
in  the  life  of  each  one  of  us,  biographical  and  historical, 
and  makes  it  for  you  and  me  into  instruction,  message,  demand. 
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transcendence  gives  the  interhuman  proper  perspective, 
and  in  so  doing  serves  as  a  presupposition  for  understanding 
the  phenomenology  of  meeting. 
Stripped  of  this  presupposition,  the  phenomenology 
and  the  ontology  would  be  without  anchor.  Faith  could  be 
"faith  in  whatever.  "  And  Buber  is  very  clear  that  true 
faith  is  faith  in"God,  who  cannot  become  an  It.  "  The 
theistic  presupposition.  is  essential;  Buber  permits  it  to 
operate  alongside  the  other  option. 
In  saying  this,  we  take  issue  with  Buber's  claims. 
His  protestations  are  aceelý"table  as  statements  of  his 
vocational  intentions,  but  they  are  not  accurate  indicators 
of  much  that  he  writes  in  I  and  Thou.  Once  the  experience 
of  God's  grace  functions  as  the  key  to  understanding 
meeting,  it  becomes  a  presupposition  for  the  whole  phen- 
omenological-ontological  structure.  Whether  he  admits  it 
or  not,  his  phenomenology  and  the  ontology  are  based  upon 
a  distinct  theological  premise.  His  philosophical  work 
cannot  be  separated  from  what  animates  it;  we  are  obligated 
to  see  the  whole  philosophical  venture  as  the  expression' 
of  a  prior  acknowledgment  of  divine  grace. 
Buber  is  not  convincing  when  he  describes  his  work 
as  purely  philosophical.  His  claim  that  the  experience  of 
faith  induces  a  philosophical  vocation  different  than  the 
theological  vocation,  seems  academic.  Transcendence  is 67 
the  presupposition  for  this  "philosophical"  venture;  his 
phenomenology  and  ontology  may  be  a  unique  kind  of  "phil- 
osophical  theology"  or  a  "theologically  oriented  philosophy" 
but  it  is  certainly  not  philosophy  per  se.  His  conception 
of  transcendence  explains  the  philosophy  and  makes  it 
credible. 
It  is  an  unavoidable  observation  that  the  two  con- 
ceptions  of  transcendence  which  we  outlined  did  not  conflict 
in  Buber's  mind.  R.  G.  Smith  summarizes  this  quite  well  in 
his  introduction  to  the  second  edition  of  I  and  Thou. 
For  Buber  himself  God's  transcendence,  his  absolute 
otherness  is  so  thoroughly  involved  in  his  whole 
understanding  of  the  relation  between  God  and  man, 
that  it  is  difficult  to  select  one  point  rather  than 
another  in  his  exposition  of  this.  The  otherness 
which  runs  through  man's  whole  relation  to  his  world 
points  to  this  transcendence,  at  the  same  time  as 
transcendence  is  drawn  into  the  whole  world.  1 
Smith  says  well  that  Buber's  doctrine  of  transcendence 
functions  as  both  an  encountered  reality  in  the  context  of 
meeting,  and  as  a  presuppostion  which  lends  the  inter- 
human  its  phenomenological  and  ontological  credence.  The 
lack  of  contradiction,  for  Buber,  is  no  more  mysterious 
than  the  aforementioned  intertwining  of  I-It  and  I-Thou 
spheres  which  characterized  his  phenomenology;  "for  our 
relation  to  him  is  as  above  contradictions  as  it  is,  because 
he  is  as  above  contradictions  as  he  is.  "2  This  is  another 
1Buber,,  M..,  I,  and-Thou,  from  the  translator's  prefaoe,  p.  x., 
2Ibid.,  from  the  author's  postscript,  p.  134. 68 
dialogical  truth  in  Buber's  mind,  a  paradox,  and  not  a 
contradiction. 
SUMMARY  AND  STATEMENT  OF 
THE  ISSUES 
We  asked  in  the  beginning  of  this  chapter  how  Buber 
related  his  phenomenology  of  meeting  to  his  ontology.  The 
answer  is  fairly  clear.  The  phenomenology  of  meeting  is 
grounded  in  the  primal  movements  of  distance  and  relation- 
ship.  This  two-fold  movement  rested  upon  Buber's  conviction 
that  the  event  of  meeting  occurs,  i.  e.  it  rests  upon  a 
conviction  about  human  experience.  Distancing  functions 
as  a  conceptual  principle  which  makes  the  occurrence  of 
meeting  understandable;  "relation"  is  the  conceptual  capstone 
of  the  two-fold  movement.  The  pivotal  concept  which  gives 
the  phenomenology  ontological  status  is  that  distance  and 
relationship  describe  the  truth  about  man,  i.  e.  his  unique 
capability  for  being  human  with  another.  No  philosopher  has 
gone  further  in  placing  intersubjectivity  at  the  center  of 
his  thought.  Intersubjectivity  really  defines  man;  this  is 
Buber's  unique  contribution  to  ontological  thought. 
We  inquired  about  the  function  of  transcendence  in 
the  phenomenology  and  ontology.  While  Buber  declares  that 
an  acknowledgment  of  divine  grace  follows  from  the  exper- 
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sole  means  for  understanding  the  true  depths  of  meeting. 
Only  by  affirming  it  can  we  come  to  know  what  meeting  means. 
Though  there  is  no  problem  in  Buber's  mind  for 
holding  such  a  position,  there  is  in  mine.  If  we  were  to 
confine  ourselves  to  his  declared  emphasis,  the  "discovery" 
of  transcendence  could  be  considered  on  philosophical 
grounds.  More  specifically,  we  could  render  critique  of 
the  phenomenological-ontological  structure  to  see  if  the 
acknowledgment  of  transcendence  does  have  a  place.  Buber's 
position  makes  that  approach  impossible.  We  are  required 
to  interpret  meeting  in  the  context  of  a  prior  acknowledg- 
ment;  its  true  meaning  depends  on  a  prior  notion  of  divine 
grace.  Can  he  have  it  both  ways? 
Because  we  cannot  accept  the  ambiguous  role  of 
Buber's  doctrine  of  transcendence,  we  are  led  to  state  the 
issue  for  study  in  the  following  manner.  The  following 
study  seeks  to  ascertain  the  proper  function  of  a  phenomen- 
ology  of  intersubjectivity  in  answering  our  questions  about 
transcendence.  Does  a  phenomenology  of  intersubjectivity 
really  lead  to  an  affirmation  of  transcendence?  If  so, 
what  sort  of  doctrine  might  be  inferred  from  it?  Will  the 
proper  function  of  a  phenomenology  be  to  encourage  the 
affirmation  of  a  transcendent  God  as  conceived  in  Judeo- 
Christian  terms  or  will  another  sort  of  conception  be 
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transcendence  become  credible?  We  must  leave  all  the  alter- 
natives  open  if  we  are  to  learn  from  the  introductory  study. 
The  issue  is  to  determine  how,  if  at  all,  a  phenomenology 
of  intersubjectivity  affects  our  views  about  transcendence? 
Our  study  is  investigative. 
We  have  learned  a  number  of  things  which  should 
guide  the  investigation.  It  is  of  the  utmost  importance 
to  relate  "knowledge  about"  human  relationships  to  encounter 
situations.  If  we  maintain  that  encounters  are  irreducible 
and  foundational  forms  for  knowing  others,  we  should  be 
able  to  explain  why  and  how.  It  will  do  no  good  to  affirm 
relationships  and  leave  knowledge  about  them  in  the  back- 
ground.  We  must  attend  to  the  problem  of  establishing  a 
viable  relationship  between  intersubjective  encounter  and 
knowledge  about  the  other.  Methodology  will  become  a  major 
consideration  in  this  endeavor. 
Secondly,  if  we  do  come  to  some  way  of  affirming  a 
connection  between  a  phenomenology  of  human  encounters 
and  acknowledgment  of  transcendence,  we  must  attend  to  the 
function  of  ontology.  Though  no  assumptions  can  be 
warrented,  it  seems  necessary  to  draw  a  coherent  relation 
between  phenomenology  and  ontology  in  the  ensuing  study. 
If  the  connecting  links  between  phenomenology  and  ontology 
are  weak  or  non-existent,  it  would  seem  presumptuous  to 
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going  is  clear  on  this.  Buber's  notion  of  ontology  was 
built  upon  the  phenomenology;  the  connections  were  clear 
and  strong.  If  an  acknowledgment  of  transcendence  is 
warrented,  its  ontological  rootage  must  be  there.  We 
cannot  accept  the  contradictory  roles  theology  played  in 
Buber;  we  therefore  seek  to  discover  if  a  phenomenology 
of  the  interhuman  should  have  an  ontological  status.  If 
it  does,  some  form  of  affirmation  of  transcendence  may  be 
possible. 
These  issues,  I  believe,  are  important  for  the 
theological  community.  Theologians  have  never  been  of  one 
mind,  especially  with  regard  to  our  concern.  Though  I 
seek  no  final  agreement  among  them,  perhaps,  some  light 
will  emerge  to  forward  theological  debate.  The  relation- 
ship  between  a  phenomenology  of  encounter  and  the  affirma- 
tion  of  transcendence  is  of  central  importance  if  it  is 
not  the  only  issue  theologians  discuss.  ' 
In  our  attempt  to  shed  light  upon  these  issues  we 
shall  concentrate  on  one  philosopher's  views,  those  of 
Maurice  Merleau-Ponty.  There  are  specific  reasons  for 
selecting  him  for  the  study. 
Merleau-Ponty's  phenomenological  investigations 
1For  a  good  example  of  the  importance  of  our  topic, 
vide,  Macquarrie,  John.  God  Talk,  an  Examination  of  the 
Language  and  Logic  of  Theology,  London,  S.  C.  M.  Press,  1967, 
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argue  for  the  centrality  of  the  concrete  world  of  exper- 
ience;  he  is  noted  among  French  philosophers  for  presenting 
a  Lebenswelt  phenomenology.  Though  this  in  no  way  means 
that  his  thoughts  coincide  with  those  of  Martin  Buber, 
it  does  put  the  two  philosophers  in  the  same  arena,  in 
terms  of  their  pivotal  thesis., 
Secondly,  Merleau-Ponty  concentrated  on  a  phenomen- 
1 
ology  of  perception  as  the  vital  artery  for  all  phenomen- 
ological  reflection.  We  shall  see  that  the  (Lebenswelt) 
presupposition  and  his  study  of  perception  are  related; 
how  they  relate  suggests  that  Merleau-Ponty  cares  very 
much  about  the  connection  between  "knowing"  and  "knowledge 
about".  He  holds  as  does  Buber  that  intersubjectivity  is 
an  irreducible  phenomenon,  but  he  does  so  not  by  apologogetic 
means  but  by  the  more  traditional  means  of  philosophical 
argumentation.  We  shall  see  in  our  study  a  very  different 
approach  to  the  irreducibility  of  the  intersubjective 
sphere,  one  which  illumines  if  it  does  not  "correct"  the 
difficulties  encountered  in  the  I-Thou  phenomenology. 
Again,  Merleau-Ponty  is  notable  on  the  contemporary 
scene  for  his  concepts  regarding  the  way  ontology  relates 
to  phenomenological  research.  He  was  a  reluctant  student 
of  ontology,  maintaining  a  first  obligation  to  phenomen- 
ological  interrogation,  but  his  later  work  contains,  without 
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ever  written.  We  shall  not  find  him  as  complete  or  as 
systematic  in  the  later  ontological  research--he  died  too 
early;  but  the  existing  writings  do  give  us  valuable  mat- 
erial  for  relating  ontological  research  to  the  issue  of 
intersubjectivity. 
Finally,  the  place  and  function  of  transcendence 
was  a  recurring  issue  for  Merleau-Ponty.  What  makes  him 
so  valuable  for  our  purposes  is  that  he  considered  himself 
outside  the  realm  of  faith;  yet,  he  could  not  avoid  the 
issue  which  motivates  our  study.  At  many  different  periods 
in  his  philosophical  career,  he  took  up  the  issue  of  tran- 
scendence.  It  was  not  a  presupposition  he  could  accept 
in  any  traditional  manner.  Still  he  attempted  to  describe 
its  place  in  a  philosophy  of  intersubjectivity  with  great 
attentiveness;  he  could  not  avoid  the  issue.  We  shall 
find  important  reflections,  especially  in  the  period  just 
before  his  death,  that  bear  directly  on  the  problem  we 
have  chosen  to  study. 
It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  issue  we  have 
chosen  cannot  be  attacked  directly,  as  it  were,  without 
preparation.  The  phenomenology  itself  will  have  great 
bearing  on  the  way  the  issue  is  eventually  dealt  with. 
We  follow  an  outline  much  the  same  as  our  discussion  of 
Martin  Buber.  Our  first  task  is  to  clarify  the  contents 
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subjectivity;  we  shall  then  deal  with  it  in  terms  of  the 
ontological,  and  finally  the  theological  context. PART  TWO 
ANALYTICAL  STUDY: 
MAURICE  MERLEAU-PONTY CHAPTER  ONE 
MAURICE  NIERLEAU-PONTY:  HIS  METHOD 
AND 
THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PERCEPTION 
In  undertaking  a  study  of  Merleau-Ponty's  phen- 
omenology  we  do,  indeed,  enter'  a  different  philosophical 
world.  Historically  speaking,  there  is  no  relation  between 
Martin  Buber  and  Merleau-Ponty.  Martin  Buber'wrote  a  major 
portion  of  his  works  before  Merleau-Ponty  began  to  write; 
neither  gives  any  indication  of  having  read  the  other. 
Martin  Buber's  philosophical  heritage  was  primarily  German 
idealism;  although  he  was  acquainted  with  Husserl's  method 
he  can  hardly  be  called  a  student  of  that  early  phenomenology. 
He  had  read  Heidegger  but  spent  little  time  in  criticism. 
1 
Merleau-Ponty  on  the  other  hand,  learned  phenomenological 
method  as  a  student  of  Edmund  Husserl;  major  principles 
in  his  work  are  borrowed  from  Martin  Heidegger.  His  aud- 
ience  is  the  French  academy.  He  was  a  colleague,  and  co- 
editor  of  a  widely  respected  journal  with  John  Paul  Sartre;  2 
'Vid'e-..  Buber,  M,  q  Between  Man  and  Man,  Smith  R.  G. 
trans.  , 
mew  York,  The  Macmillan  Co.  ,  1967 
.  For  comments  on 
Husserl,  pp.  159  ff,  for  those  on  Heidegger  pp.  160  ff. 
2The  co-editorship  was  for  the  monthly  Le  Temps 
Moderne,  1945  to  1952. 77 
their  concerns  during  the  World  War  II  period  were  broadly 
speaking,  formative  for  French  existentialism.  Obviously, 
there  is  little  reason  to  compare  Merleau-Ponty  and  Buber 
on  the  basis  of  a  historical  kinship.  Our  purpose  is  to 
see  if,  and  how,  Merleau-Ponty's  very  different  philosoph- 
ical  perspectives  help  elucidate  the  issues-we  outlined  with 
respect  to  Buber. 
Once  we  leave  behind  the  quest  for  historical  compar- 
isons,  it  becomes  evident  that  there  is  a  common  bond 
between  the  two.  The  language  and  setting  may  be  different 
but  they  share  a  common  presupposition  about  the  philosoph- 
ical  vocation.  One  example  illustrates  this  and  introduces 
us  to  the  method  employed  by  Merleau-Ponty. 
Speaking  of  the  aim  of  phenomenology  he  says,  "all 
its  efforts  are  concentrated  upon  re-achieving  a  direct  and 
primitive  contact  with  the  world,  and  endowing  that  contact 
with  philosophical  status.  "1  Merleau-Ponty  assumes  that  the 
world  of  experience  calls  the  philosophical  task  into  being 
and  provides  the  issues  with  which  it  must  deal.  The  world 
is  "always  'already  there'  before  reflection  begins,  "2  and 
the  philosopher  consciously  recognizes  that  his  reflections 
are  but  efforts  to  bring  that  world  into  focus.  Merleau-Ponty 
1Merleau-Ponty,  Maurice,  The  Phenomenology  of  Perception, 
Smith,  Colin,  trans.  London,  Routledge  and  Kegen  Paul  1962 
p.  vii. 
ZIbid. 78 
is  a  Lebenswelt  phenomenologist.  His  discipline  develops 
as  it  is  given  animation  by  the  diversity  and  richness  of 
experience,  and  its  objectives  are  fulfilled  only  as  it 
puts  men  back  in  touch  with  pre-philosophical  experience. 
Lebenswelt  phenomenology  for  him  has  no  other  credibility; 
it  is  a  discipline  which  has  a  thoroughly  social  foundation. 
Merleau-Ponty's  personal  and  professional  interests  support 
this  notion  of  philosophy;  he  was  a  teacher  and  writer, 
a  political  commentator,  a  person  deeply  involved  in  the 
struggle  for  peace  and  social  change.  He  was  also  an  aesthe- 
tician  of  great  respect.  His  own  life  is  a  fine  example  of 
his  conception  of  phenomenology.  Both  Buber  and  Merleau- 
Ponty  strived  to  make  their  philosophical  reflections 
responsive  to  the  range  of  'man's  experience;  in  the  perfor- 
mance  of  their  respective  Lebenswelt  phenomenologies  they 
differed  much  but  they  did  hold  this  singular  perception  of 
the  philosophical  task. 
Beyond  their  common  committment  to  do  a  philosophy 
of  concrete  experience,  the  two  begin  to  part  ways.  Buber 
chose  apologetics;  Merleau-Ponty  is  confident  that  the 
discipline  of  method  will  yield  a  credible  phenomenology. 
We  faced  constant  difficulties  with  Buber  in  bringing  his 
suggestive  phenomenology  into  dialogue  with  Hepburn.  The 
absence  of  method,  was  one  source  of  these  difficulties. 
We  shall  also  face  difficulties  with  Merleau-Ponty,  but  not 79 
in  this  respect;  he  sought  above  all  to  elucidate  concrete 
experience  in  the  context  of  philosophical  debatae.  The 
presupposition  that  man  is  deeply  involved  in  this  world 
with  others  is  not  an  article  of  faith;  it  is  a  thesis 
which  must  be  tested  and  eventually  demonstrated.  One 
must  develop  a  method  which  speaks  to  others  who  might 
oppose.  For  our  purposes,  the  development  of  method  is  an 
instructive  and  helpful  alternative  to  Buber's  apologetic. 
Investigating  its  forms  is  not  an  exercise  of  peripheral 
concern;  it  is  essential  in  the  study  of  intersubjectivity. 
In  debt  to  Husserl,  Merleau-Ponty  sought  to  pursue 
his  objectives  in  the  context  of  a  phenomenological  method. 
Husserl  had  given  modern  phenomenology  its  dictum: 
"to  the  things  themselvess"1  this  banner  was  supposed  to 
distinguish  phenomenology  from  the  epistemologies  of  Hume 
and  Kant.  Borrowing  on  Descarte's  concept  of  methodic  doubt, 
Husserl  developed  a  tool  he  called  the  phenomenological 
reduction.  Anything  outside  the  sphere  of  absolute  certainty, 
that  is,  any  transcendent  object  must  be  submitted  to  the 
philosopher's  scrutiny.  The  phenomenologist  "suspends"  his 
judgment  or  natural  acceptance  of  things  in  order  to  discover 
his  essential  relation  to  them.  Objects  and  other  people 
1Husserl,  Edmund,  Ideas,  Boyce,  W.  R.,  trans.,  London, 
Geo.  Allen  and  Unwin  Ltd.,  1952,  p.  Q6. 80 
particularly,  come  under  the  reduction.  As  the  true  essence 
of  man's  relation  to  things  becomes  available,  phenomenology 
can  proceed  to  become  a  fully  "scientific"  epistemology,  one 
based  upon  certainty.  1 
Merleau-Ponty  also  employs  the  concept  of  phenomen- 
ological  reduction.  But  it  may  be  suspected,  he  does  so 
with  different  presuppositions  and  results.  First,  the 
epoche2  is  used  to  sharpen  the  phenomenologist's  natural 
attitude  rather  than  dislodge  it  completely.  Merleau-Ponty 
chooses  his  terms  carefully  to  convey  this  redefinition. 
"It  is  because  we  are  through  and  through  compounded  of 
relationships  with  the  world  that  for  us  the  only  way  to 
become  aware  of  the  fact  is  to  suspend  the  resultant  acti- 
vity,  to  refuse  it  our  complicity  (to  look  at  it  ohne  mit- 
zumachen,  as  Husserl  often  says),  or  yet  again,  to  put  it 
out  of  play.  "3 
The  movement  of  reduction  for  Merleau-Ponty  is  a 
"step  back"  to  bring  an  otherwise  common-sense  world  into 
1This  is  an  extremely  brief  description  of  Husserl's 
phenomenological  reduction.  We  shall  leave  it  this  way, 
anticipating  a  more  detailed  analysis  in  our  comparative 
chapter  on  Husserl  and  Merleau-Ponty  (Part  III,  Chapter  One). 
We  shall  also  leave  until  that  chapter,  the  issue  of  Merleau- 
Ponty's  regard  for  Husserl  as  the  father  of  Lebenswelt  phen- 
omenology. 
2From  Greek,  epechein,  to  hold  on,  check. 
3Merleau-Ponty, 
op.  cit.  p.  xiii. 81 
focus;  again,  the  eimche  "slackens  the  intentional  threads 
which  attach  us  to  the  world.  "1  Merleau-Ponty  puts  it  this 
way,  I  believe,  to  communicate  the  difference  between  his 
existentialist  use  of  the  reduction  and  Husserl's.  In  less 
dramatic  language  we'could  say  that  the  epoche  is  the  phen- 
omenologist's  critical  analysis  of  otherwise  uncritical 
experience;  it  is  reflection  upon  unreflective  experience, 
or  as  Merleau-Ponty  would  say,  the  "pre-reflective.  "  Mer- 
leau-Ponty  cites  Eugen  Fink,  "when  he  spoke  of  'wonder'  in 
the  face  of  the  world.  "2  The  phenomenologist  employs  the 
epoche_in  order  to  see  more  clearly  "the  forms  of  transcend- 
J  ence  fly  up  like  sparks  from  a  fire.  "3 
This  concept  of  reduction  is  considerably  different 
than  Husserl's.  First, 
. 
the.  foundati.  onäl  principle  differs: 
not  once  is  the  existence  of  the  lived-world  called  into 
question.  Merleau-Ponty  saw  that  such  a  reservation  of 
judgment  was  motivated  by  the  spurious  quest  for  certainty. 
It  led  Husserl  to  an  excessive  idealism.  Consciousness,  4 
in  Husserl's  tradition  represents  the  world  to  itself  through 
the  clear  light  of  reason;  in  Cartesian  Meditations 
.. 
1Ibid. 
2Ibid. 
31bid. 
4Ibid., 
p.  xi. 82 
consciousness  constitutes  the  world.  Husserl's  idealism  is 
argued  in  the  context  of  a  transcendental  subjectivism-- 
the  world  is  the  projection  of  a  pure  consciousness.  For 
Merleau-Ponty  such  a  doctrine  implied  that  experience  lost 
its  opacity  and  concrete  nature;  idealism  sacrifices  any 
effectiveness  in  elucidating  experience  because  it  is  com- 
mitted  to  a  philosophy  of  certainty.  Merleau-Ponty  did  not 
accept  the  notion  of  a  pure  consciousness;  one  finds  upon 
the  most  radical  reduction  a  "subject  destined  to  be  in 
the  world.  "1  The  reduction  thus  returns  the  phenomenologist 
to  pre-reflective  experience.  When  the  cords  of  judgment 
are  loosened  we  discover  a  vast  complex  of  intersubjective 
exchange  and  invovlement  with  objects.  The  reduction 
heightens  the  phenomenologist's  understanding  of  the  world. 
This  is  its  primary  result. 
In  addition,  the  reduction  results  in  a  new  under- 
standing  of  human  subjectivity.  It  must  be  admitted  that 
Merleau-Ponty's  phenomenology  is,  at  this  point  anti-sci- 
entific  in  a  broad  sense,  and  is  particularly  opposed  to 
11.  Ibid.  To  state  his  difference  with  Husserl,  AZer- 
leau-Ponty  cornrnents,  "the  most  important  lesson  which  the 
reduction  teaches  is  the  impossibility  of  a  complete 
reduction.  "  Ibid.  p.  xiv. 83 
a  rigid  empiricism-1  I2erleau-Ponty's  argument  is  that  sci- 
ence  mistakenly  explains  man  as  a  bit  of  the  world;  it  over- 
looks  his  subjectivity.  The  Pry  serves  to  correct  this 
view  for  to  employ  it  is  to  know  that  human  subjectivity  is 
operative  in  any  reflection.  The  Lebenswelt  phenomenologist 
is  aware  that  his  perspectives,  values,  and  perceptions,  play 
a  major..  part  in  philosophical  debate  as  well  as  everyday 
experience.  The  reflective  attitude  or  reduction  is  instru- 
mental  in  bringing  this  to  the  fore  of  his  thinking;  to  be 
a  philosopher  for  Nerleau-Ponty  means  to  encounter  anew 
one's  own  subjectivity.  But  by  this  he  does  not  intend  to 
repeat  Husserl's  error;  the  subjectivity  that  is  encountered 
is  not  a  transcendental  subjectivity.  There  is  no  such  thing. 
Subjectivity  is  rediscovered  as  being  at  root,  an  intersub- 
jectivity.  Articulating  this  one  insight  is  our  primary 
objective  in  the  first  part  of  this  study.  We  but  mention 
it  in  preparation  for  Chapter  Two  which  deals  with  that  sub- 
ject. 
It  is  appropriate  here  to  note  that  the  phenomenolog- 
1"I 
am  not  the  outcome  or  the  meeting-point  of  num- 
erous  causal  agencies  which  determine  my  bodily  or  psych- 
ological  make-up.  I  cannot  conceive  of  myself  as  nothing 
but  a  bit  of  the  world,  a  mere  object  of  biological,  psych- 
ological  or  sociological  investigation.  I  cannot  shut  my- 
self  up  within  the  realm  of  snience.  All  my  knowledge  of 
the  world,  even  my  scientific  knowledge,  is  gained  from  my 
own  particular  point  of  view,  or  from  some  experience  of  the 
world  without  which  the  symbols  of  science  would  be  meaning- 
less.  The  whole  universe  of  science  is  built  upon  the  world 
as  directly  experienced.  ..  ."  Ibid.  p.  viii. 84 
ical  reduction  tries  to  steer  between  both  rationalist 
and  empiricist  extremes  providing  a  credible  alternative 
to  both.  The  phenomenological  reduction  is  in  proper  hands 
he  says,  with  "existential  philosophy.  "' 
The  existential  appropriation  of  the  reduction  does 
not  mean  that  phenomenology  thereby  loses  its  field  of  con- 
centration,  the  study  of  essences. 
2  In  the  phenomenologist's 
reflection  on  raw  experience  he  is  opened  to  fields  of 
ideality.  The  exercise  of  developing  ideational  themes, 
Husserl  called  eidetic  intuition;  3  this  becomes  for  Merleau- 
Ponty,  the  second  principle  of  phenomenological  method.  The 
principle  can  be  described  briefly  as  the  phenomenologist's 
ability  and  determination  to  "bring  the  world  to  light.  "4 
Two  examples  show  how  the  eidetic  reduction  becomes  an 
appropriate  tool  for  Lebenswelt  phenomenology. 
The  first  example  concerns  the  assumptions  of  the  log- 
ical  positivists. 
5  At  least  two  themes  present  themselves  when  oni 
1The 
context  is  as  follows.  "Far  from  being,  as  has 
been  thought,  a  procedure  of  idealistic  philosophy,  phen- 
omenological  reduction  belongs  to  existential  philosophye 
Heidegger's  'being  in  the  world'  appears  only  against  the 
background  of  phenomenological  reduction.  "  Ibid.  p.  xiv. 
2Vide.  Merleau-Ponty,  M.,  op.  cit.  p.  vii  and  p.  xiv. 
3from  Greek  eidos,  idea. 
4Merleau-Ponty, 
M.,  op.  cit.  p.  xvi. 
5He 
refers  specifically  to  the  Vienna  Circle,  Ibid., 
p.  xv. 85 
reflects  upon  the  nature  of  human  consciousness.  The  first 
possibility,  positivists  assume,  is  that  consciousness  is 
described  adequately  by  orgainizing  our  language  about  it. 
Language  about  consciousness  is  conceived  of  as  being  a 
field  of  ideas  quite  separate  from  one's  experience  of  the 
world.  Logical  positivism  assumes  that  linguistic  meaning 
can  be  orgainized  to  form  correct  concepts  of  consciousness. 
Merleau-Ponty  observes  that  separating  language  about 
consciousness  from  man's  experience  of  self  and  world,  is 
superficial.  Positivism  overlooks  this  relation  in  its 
concentration  upon  language. 
An  important  task  in  phenomenology  is  to  scrutinize 
the  operation  of  consciousness  which  gives  rise  to  our 
language  about  it.  Certainly  phenomenology  must  study 
language,  but  it  does  so  in  the  context  of  its  being 
dependent  upon  man's  prereflective  experience  of  the  world. 
The  eidetic  reduction  asserts  that  the  philosopher  wrests 
ideality  from  "dumb  experience.  "1 
Cartesian  idealism  approaches  the  notion  of  con- 
sciousness  quite  differently:  knowledge  is  the  correlate 
to  a  pure  consciousness;  the  distinct  idea  is  the  flower 
of  consciousness.  Again,  human  perception  is  put  aside 
to  build  a  structure  of  ideas;  "truth"  is  comprised  of  the 
1Ibid., 
p.  xv. 86 
ideas  we  have  of  the  world.  Again,  the  lesson  of  the  eidetic 
reduction  is  clear.  Knowledge,  for  PJlerleau-Ponty,  is  not 
the  correlate  of  consciousness  or  a  capturing  of  the 
world  in  a  thought  form.  We  cannot  possess  the  world 
in  thought;  the  world  always  transcends  our  knowledge  of 
it.  1 
Moreover,  any  eidos  or  essence  is  an  abstraction  of 
experience.  Involvement,  or  being-in-the-world,  precedes 
our  ideas  about  that  involvement. 
If  we  recognize  these  limitations  upon  reason  we 
are  safe  in  our  efforts  to  conceptualualize  essences.  Not 
only  is  the  formulation  of  ideational  themes  "safe";  it  is 
necessary.  In  order  to  understand  the  pre-reflective, 
reflection  must  be  introduced.  The  sense  of  opacity  in 
experience  is  not  evident  apart  from  thematization;  wonder 
for  the  world  which  Merleau-Ponty  seeks  to  reawaken,  can 
only  come  with  the  rigour  of  describing  its  forms.  "Sparks 
of  transcendence"  may  incite  fascination  apart  from  eidetic 
reduction,  but  their  meaning  is  untouched  until  thematization 
is  applied.  Eidetic  reduction  given  its  appropriate  limita- 
tion,  is  not  only  a  viable  alternative  to  positivism  and 
idealism;  it  is  the  proper  exercise  of  reason. 
This  should  give  us  aid  in  clarifying  the  relation 
between  Merleau-Ponty's  existential  concerns  and  the  peculiar 
1Vide.,  ibid.  p.  xvii. 87 
role  of  phenomenology.  Existential  thought  does  not  exclude 
a  methodological  "program";  in  fact,  it  requires  one  if  the 
phenomenologist  is  to  be  something  other  than  a  prophet. 
Merleau-Ponty's  method  and  his  subject  matter  are  inter- 
dependent:  when  a  method  is  specified  that  depends  upon 
the  priority  of  experience  (Lebenswelt),  and  requires  fields 
of  ideality  to  scrutinize  and  interpret  its  structures, 
method  and  existential  concern  truly  inform  one  another. 
We  may  summarize  this  brief  outline  by  saying  that 
method  is  the  phenomenologist's  access--access  to  the  meaning 
of  the  experience,  of  truth.  If  this  summary  sounds  awkward, 
it  is  nevertheless,  a  fair  synopsis.  "Access"  is  paramount, 
in  that  methodology  is  used  to  serve  an  existential  pre- 
occupation'-the  nature  of  man's  involvement  in  a  world  of 
things  and  people.  "Access  to  the  meaning  of  experience" 
signifies  that  essences  are  derived  from  experience,  and 
that  the  philosopher  specializes,  so  to  speak,  in  the  sphere 
of  ideational  forms.  The  phrase,  "experience  of  truth" 
conveys  the  notion  that  phenomenological  method  couches 
the  question  of  truth  in  the  context  of  human  experience. 
Merleau-Ponty  does  not  so  much  ask,  "what  is  the  truth?  "  as 
if  truth  could  be  captured  apart  from  the  phenomenon  of 
human  interaction;  rather,  he  asks,  "what  in  experience 
is  encountered  as  true?  "  Experience  is  the  context  for 
truth  claims;  it  provides  for  our  questioning  and  affects 88 
our  answers. 
Lest  we  assume  that  this  notion  of  method  issues  in 
yet  another  form  of  subjectivism,  we  should  be  more  specific 
about  the  subject-matter  to  which  the  methodology  applies. 
This  takes  us  to  Merleau-Ponty's  concept  of  perception. 
The  "lived-world"  is  a  broad  and,  perhaps,  vague 
category,  similar  to  the  term  "experience".  Merleau-Ponty 
points  his  investigations  specifically  to  the  nature  of 
human  perception.  Dealt  with  phenomenologically,  the  prob- 
lem  of  perception  is  the  problem  of  the  in-itself-for-us. 
Using  Brentano's  dictum,  "all  consciousness  is  conscious- 
ness  of  something,  "1  Nierleau-Ponty  particularizes  the  phen- 
omenologist's  objectives;  "To  seek  the  essence  of  perception 
is  to  declare  that  perception  is,  not  presumed  true,  but 
defined  as  access  to  truth.  "2  From  the  particular  forms 
of  perception  which  give  access,  the  phenomenologist  pursues 
the  sense  which  is  revealed  where  the  paths  of  my  various 
experiences  intersect,  and  also  where  my  own  and  other 
people's  intersect  and  engage  each  other  like  gears.  It 
is  thus  inseparable  from  subjectivity  and  intersubjec- 
tivity,  which  find  their  unity  when  I  either  take  up 
my  past  experiences  in  those  of  the  present,  or  other 
people's  in  my  own.  For  the  first  time  the  philosopher's 
thinking  is  sufficiently  conscious  not  to  anticipate 
itself  and  endow  its  own  results  with  reified  form  in 
the  world. 
3 
1Ibid.  p.  xvii 
2Ibid.,  p.  xvi 
31bid.,  p.  xx. 89 
Though  this  affirmation  may  not  quiet  all  sus- 
picion.  of  subjectivism,  it  does  advise  us  to  acknowledge 
a  different  intention  on  B1erleau-Ponty's  part.  Because 
the  lived-world  provides  the  fundamental  subject-matter  for 
phenomenology,  and  that  world  is  never  confined  to  an  indi- 
vidual's  private  vision,  subjectivism  should  be  averted. 
The  lived-world  described  here,  is  an  intersubjective  sphere; 
his  descriptions  disciplined  by  method  attempt  to  make  that 
affirmation  philosophically  credible.  ' 
His  is  a  "grand  program";  I  ask  myself  if  such  a 
task  can  be  realistic.  He  has  set  before  himself  a  field 
of  investigation  which  is  supposed  to  encompass  the  forms 
of  human  perception  as  well  as  the  general  problem  of 
being-in-the-world.  Yet,  his  work  is  meticulous  if  not, 
at  times  repetitious,  and  from  this  we  can  learn  a  lesson; 
it  is  impossible  to  sel  bt  a'  topic'  such  as  intersubjectivity 
without  reviewing  those  topics  which  precede  and  surround 
it.  This  requirement,  however,  is  not  a  superfluous  one. 
We  cited  Buber's  failure  to  develop  a  phenomenology  of 
perception;  it  is  possible  that,  in  the  analyses  ahead, 
we  shall  see  that  it  is  this  which  makes-a  phenomenology 
of  intersubjectivity  understandable  and  credible.  That  is 
certainly  one  of  Merleau-Ponty's  aims.  We  go  now  to  his 
study  of  perception  particularly  as  perception  pertains  to 
the  subject's  knowledge  of  self. 90 
What  makes  Merleau-Ponty  so  interesting  to  us  will 
be  the  connection  he  sees  between  perception  and  a  theory 
of  intersubjectivity.  The  interrogation  of  human  perception, 
for  Merleau-Ponty,  calls  for  a  phenomenology  of  intersub- 
jectivity.  This  is  his  way  of  surmounting  what  had  become 
Husserl's  mistaken  preoccupation--the  problem  of  human 
, 
consciousness.  Perception  is  the  vantage  point  from  which  a 
theory  of  experience  can  be  expounded;  a  theory  of  perception 
calls  the  phenomenologist  to  concentrate  on  the  intersubjective 
as  a  cardinal  form  of  human  experience. 
1  It  is  far  too  early 
in  our  study  to  demonstrate  this,  but  it  can  be  anticipated 
in  the  later  chapters  that  Merleau-Ponty  is  notable  in 
modern  phenomenological  research  because  of  this  perspective. 
More  than  any  other,  I  believe,  he  will  be  seen  as  the 
phenomenologist  of  intersubjectivity--and  for  good  reason. 
Merleau-Ponty  did  not  explore  intersubjectivity  in 
the  narrow  topical  sense; 
notable  for  its  theories 
final  years  he  would  also 
What  we  will  see  below  as 
is  that  intersubjectivity 
connecting  thread  for  all 
his  phenomenology  is  just  as 
Df  freedom  and  history;  in  the 
write  the  beginnings  of  an  ontology. 
we  begin  to  apply  his  method 
was  his  guiding  interest  and  the 
his  endeavors. 
1His 
closest  ally  in  this  perspective  is  Gabriel 
Marcel;  why  Merleau-Ponty  did  not  speak  of  their  kinship 
in  thought  is  something  of  a  mystery.  We  shall  discuss 
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THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PERCEPTION: 
THE  THEORY  OF  THE  BODY 
Prior  to  investigating  Merleau-Ponty's  phenomenology 
of  the  corps  propre,  it  is  advisable  to  outline  how  he  poses 
the  problem  of  perception.  Omitting  this  would  give  the 
reader  the  impression  that  Merleau-Ponty's  philosophical 
opponents,  idealism  and  behavioristic  empiricism,  are  false 
constructs  rather  than  misunderstandings  of  real  problems. 
He  respects  these  two  positions  in  so  far  as  they  respond 
to  the  knotty  problem  of  perception;  they  are  wrong  not 
because  they  disregard  the  issue  but  because  they  draw 
wrong  conclusions  about  problems  inherent  in  the  act  of 
perception.  The  problems  are  illustrated  by  the  following: 
I  see  the  next-door  house  from  a  certain  angle,  but  it 
would  be  seen  differently  from  the  right  bank  of  the 
Seine,  or  from  the  inside  or  again  from  the  aeroplane: 
the  house  itself  is  none  of  these  appearance.  ...  I  am  trying  to  express  in  this  way  a  certain  manner  of 
approaching  the  object,  the  'gaze'  in  short,  which  is 
as  indubitable  as  my  own  thought,  as  known  by  me.  We 
must  try  to  understand  how  vision  can  be  brought  into 
being  from  simewhere  without  being  enclosed  in  its  own 
perspective. 
We  can  detail  this  by  focusing  upon  two  aspects  of 
perception,  first  its  spatial,  and  secondly,  its  temporal 
character.  To  see  the  house  is  to  see  it  from  an  angle, 
i.  e.  from  one  point  of  view.  Walking  about  the  house,  we 
1Merleau-Ponty, 
M.,  op.  cit.  p.  67. 92 
see  it  from  differing  angles,  "multiplying"  them  in  our 
exploration.  The  formal  expression  of  this  is,  every  per- 
ception  is  singualar  in  nature.  But  this  is  not  the  whole 
story.  Perception's  singular  focus  is  complicated  by  the 
experience  of  the  object  "in  context".  Each  angle  of  per- 
ception  brings  a  unique  scene;  when  we  focus  upon  the  roof, 
doors  and  windows  "recede".  When  a  view  of  the  entrance  is 
the  primary  focus,  roof  line  and  chimney  "recede".  The 
point  Merleau-Ponty  makes  is  that  every  spatial  focus  in- 
cludes  a  "horizon";  in  other  words,  every  singular  perspective 
has  a  context  and  this  alters  the  theme  of  singularity.  Both 
singular  focus  and  context  operate  in  the  act  of  perception. 
More  specifically,  every  singular  focus  calls  into  play  the 
importance  of  its  context,  or  horizon.  '  This  is  true  in 
the  spatial  sense;  it  is  also  true  in  the  temporal  sense. 
I  see  the  house,  as  an  object  which  is  "there". 
Without  critical  reflection,  I  assume  that  the  house  was 
there  yesterday  and  will  be  there  tomorrow;  as  an  object 
it  has  a  permanent  or  static  "thereness".  But  this  pre- 
reflective  assumption  is  called  into  question  when  I 
ask  about  the  house  in  the  past  or  the  future.  Perhaps  I 
cannot  remember  its  prior  condition,  or  presage  the  deter- 
1Later  in  his  discussion  he  refers  to  "horizon"  as 
a  "field"  of  perception.  The  Heideggerian  sense  of  horizon 
is  also  used;  we  shall  specify  when  that  is  the  case.  It 
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ioration  of  its  paint,  yet  these  "horizons"  are  part  of  the 
scene  in  the  present.  What  we  retain  concerning  the  past 
and  protend  about  the  future  are  involved  in  any  present 
perception.  The  "duration"  of  perceptual  fields  is  a  prob- 
lem  phenomenology  must  confront  as  well  as  spatial  contexts. 
When  the  thinker  brackets  the  immediate  perceptive  act,  the 
problems  of  space  and  temporality  emerge,  Merleau-Ponty 
argues  that  the  excesses  of  empiricism  and  rationalism  are 
born  at  this  point. 
Before  we  proceed  with  his  criticisms,  it  is  necessary 
to  mention  a  formidable  difficulty  in  making  our  critique. 
We  have  attempted  previously  to  use  specific  examples  of 
rationalism  and  empiricism  as  the  objects  of  Merleau-Ponty's 
criticism.  This  is  no  longer  possible  in  terms  of  his  expo- 
sition.  He  uses  these  terms  increasingly  in  an  unspecified 
manner;  names  or  schools  of  thought  are  seldi 
for  his  attack.  We  are  aware  that  there  are 
of  the  empiricist  and  rationalist  traditions 
specific  author  employs  the  insights  of  both 
his  writings.  Merleau-Ponty  gives  us  little 
fying  ''the  opposition". 
)m  singled  out 
different  forms 
and  often  a 
traditions  in 
help  in  identi- 
I  lament  this  condition  and  consider  it  a  shortcoming 
in  his  work.  One  small  consolation  is  that  Sartre,  Heidegger, 
Marcel,  and  Husserl  also  commit  the  same  mistake.  It  seems 
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to  generalize  about  the  traditions  they  oppose.  The  best 
we  can  do  with  Merleau-Ponty  is  to  risk  a  more  specific 
identification  on  the  basis  of  his  writings  taken  as  a 
whole. 
The  opposition  on  the  rationalist  side  is  the  easier 
to  identify.  Cartesian  philosophy  is  the  main  tradition  in 
France.  Husserl,  Merleau-Ponty's  mentor,  titled  one  of  his 
writings  Cartesian  Meditations,  and  consciously  attempted 
to  carry  the  Cartesian  method  to  its  logical  conclusions. 
Husserl  was  anti-Cartesian  in  only  two  respects:  he  dis- 
pensed  with  the  notion  of  substance  which  held  up  Descarte's 
metaphysics  and  he  radicalized  the  notion  of  the  cogito.  In 
Husserl's  version,  phenomenology  issues  in  a  transcendental 
idealism;  this  is  his  form  of  Cartesian  philosophy.  Merleau- 
Ponty  was  not  as  critical  of  Husserl  as  he  might  have  been, 
but  he  was  critical  of  the  Husserlian  notion  of  transcendental 
idealism  and  certainly  its  Cartesian  heritage.  The  ration- 
alism  or  "intellectualism"  which  Merleau-Ponty  criticizes 
should  be  identified  as  Husserl's  doctrine  of  transcendental 
subjectivity,  his  idealism,  and  the  notion  of  the  cogito 
as  expounded  by  Descartes.  Merleau-Ponty  is  fairly  explicit 
about  his  disagreements  with  Descarte's  cogito,  and  we 
believe  Husserl's  form  of  idealism  is  opposed  in  addition 
to  this.  We  shall  elaborate  the  disagreement  with  Husserl 
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Empiricism  is  harder  to  identify.  Merleau-Ponty 
seems  to  have  had  little  contact  with  contemporary  British 
empiricists.  His  training,  however,  included  a  systematic 
study  of  psychology,  particularly  of  behavioral  psychology 
and  clinical  experiments  in  America.  His  argument  with 
behaviorist  theory  is  that  the  stimulii  which  present  them- 
selves  to  human  consciousness  are  thought  of  as  being 
entirely  responsible  for  human  behavior.  Behaviorism,  he 
believes,  succumbed  to  the  sense-datum  theory.  Whether  he 
was  right  or  not  is  not  our  concern  here,  but  it  seems  most 
likely  that  the  term  "empiricism"  is  associated  with  his 
study  of  psychology,  and  particularly  with  behaviorist 
theory. 
Such  identification  of  the  opposition  on  our  part 
should  only  be  seen  as  an  attempt  to  provide  a  context  for 
argumentation  where  one  is  not  specified. 
Merleau-Ponty's  empiricist  treats  the  problem  of 
perspectivism  quite  literally,  attempting  to  correlate  the 
object  "there  with  sense  impressions  made  upon  the  eye. 
Space  can  be  objective  if  the  perceiver  is  merely  a  "receiving 
station"1  for  sense  data,  or  a  bit  of  the  world,  as  Merleau- 
Ponty  would  say.  The  excesses  of  empiricism  are  based  upon 
1Vide.  Marcel,  Gabriel,  M  ster  of  Bein  ,  London, 
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the  difficult  problem  of  how  p  ersp  ectivism  is  to  be  over- 
come;  bahaviorism  is  its  error.  Space  can  never  be  objec- 
tive  in  an  act  of  perception,  not  if  the  subject  is  projector 
and  actor  as  well  as  receiver.  Merleau-Ponty,  of  course, 
holds  this  position. 
Idealism  also  reacts  to  the  same  problem.  If  per- 
spectivism  is  to  be  overcome,  is  it  not  the  idea  of  the 
house  which  is  public  and  objective?  The  idealist  concen- 
trates  on  the  subject's  ideas  of  space  and  time  as  ways  of 
transcending  perspectivism.  Again,  the  explanation  is  offered 
because  of  problems  inherent  in  the  act  of  perception. 
Idealism's  solution,  however,  fails  to  account  for  the  bodily 
nature  of  perception;  one  cannot  assume  that  the  body  is  ever 
overcome  by  the  clear  and  distinct  idea.  Any  viable  solution 
to  perspectivism  must  deal  with  the  issue  of  bodily  perception. 
These  misunderstandings  initiate  the  following  state- 
ment  of  the  problem.  "We  cannot  remain  in  this  dilemma  of 
having  to  fail  to  understand  either  the  subject  or  the  object. 
We  must  discover  the  origin  of  the  object  at  the  very  centre 
of  our  experience;  we  must  describe  the  emergence  of  being 
and  we  must  understand  how,  paradoxically,  there  is  for  us 
an  in-itself.  "1  In  other  words  Merleau-Ponty  seeks  to  find 
1Merleau-Ponty, 
M.  ,  p.  cit.  ,  p.  71. Q7 
a  way  to  retain  a  notion  of  consciousness  for  the  human  sub- 
ject  which  does  not  borrow  the  problems  of  rationalism  and 
idealism. 
Consciousness  as  an  ideational,  form-making  process, 
will  play  a  central  role  in  his  theory  of  the  body.  The 
challenge  is  to  give  it  a  proper  role  apart  from  its  being 
considered  a  "constituting  spirit"  in  the  Cartesian  manner. 
Likewise  his  theory  must  retain  a  recognition  of  the 
givenness  of  experienced  objects  without  adopting  the  behav- 
iorist  notion  of  the  body  as  a  receptor  object.  His  theory 
of  perception  must  find  a  viable  alternative  to  the  sense- 
datum  theory.  The  "in-itself"  must  be  understood  in  terms 
of  its  meaning  "for  us";  the  "for  us"  must  be  part  of  an 
exchange  with  objects  and  others  that  are  truly  "there". 
The  theory  of  the  body  is  not  a  casual  choice  of 
topics  for  Merleau-Ponty.  "The  theory  of  the  body-image  is, 
implicitly,  "  he  says,  "a  theory  of  perception.  "1  It  will 
provide  a  foundation  for  the  entire  phenomenology  as  it 
speaks  to  the  extremes  of  idealism  and  behaviorism.  Merleau- 
Ponty  is  not  the  first  to  have  seized  upon  this  topic,  but 
his  theory  of  the  body  is  sufficiently  original  to  merit  a 
1Ibid., 
p.  206. 98 
place  of  respect  in  any  phenomenology. 
' 
+  +  + 
Three  important  concepts  comprise  his  concept  of 
the  body.  First,  we  shall  deal  with  his  picture  of  the 
body  as  a  sense-giving  organism;  secondly,  we  shall  address 
ourselves  to  his  notion  of  "corporeal  scheme".  Lastly,  we 
shall  deal  with  his  concept  of  the  arc  intentionnel.  2  In 
each  of  these  topics  we  remind  ourselves  of  the  purpose 
Merleau-Ponty  entertains:  the  theory  of  the  body  is  the 
foundation  not  only  for  his  theory  of  perception;  it  intro- 
duces  the  major  theme  of  his  philosophical  career.  Inter- 
subjectivity  is  introduced  at  every  turn. 
Merleau-Ponty's  first  topic  is  somewhat  peculiar, 
the  experience  of  one's  own  body.  The  experience  of  one's 
own  body  will  illustrate  the  sense-giving  nature  of  the 
human  organism. 
His  example  is  a  man  whose  limb  has  been  amputated. 
The  patient  claims  to  feel  the  limb;  when  a  stimulus  is 
1It  is  puzzling  that  Merleau-Ponty  mentions  Gabriel 
Marcel  but  once,  by  way  of  criticism.  Marcel's  studies  of 
the  body  are  the  pioneering  studies  of  the  now  familiar  theory 
of  the  corps  propre.  Richard  Zaner  remarks  that  the  absence 
of  recognition  seems  to  be  a  point  of  honor  with  both  Merleau- 
Ponty  and  J.  P.  Sartre.  Vide.,  Zaner,  Richard  M.,  The  Problem 
of  Embodiment,  New  York  Humanities  Press,  1964,  p.  1r7 
footnote. 
20ur  topical  arrangement  follows  Zaner'  s.  Ibid., 
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applied  to  the  neural  path  between  the  stump  and  the  brain 
the  patient  feels  a  pain  in  his  "leg".  Merleau-Ponty  calls 
this  phenomenon  the  experience  of  a  phantom  limb.  Stimulus- 
response  theory  would  explain  such  an  experience  in  physical 
terms,  but  when  a  local  anaesthetic  is  administered,  the 
patient  still  feels  the  phantom  limb.  Behaviorism  simply 
cannot  account  for  this.  The  patient  imagines  the  limb  in  the 
same  position  it  was  at  the  time  of  injury;  the  limb  retains 
the  same  intense  pain  experienced  originally.  Behaviorist  ex- 
planations  rapidly  erode  in  light  of  this  circumstance. 
The  rationalist  takes  over.  The  patient  supposedly 
thinks  or  imagines  his  pain,  and  the  limb.  But  this  explan- 
ation  encounters  severe  difficulties  as  well,  for  when  the 
nerve  path  to  the  brain  is  severed,  the  phenomenon  of  the 
phantom  limb  disappears.  A  physiological  alteration  affects 
the  supposedly  mental  retention  of  pain.  "What  has  to  be 
understood,  then,  is  how  the  psychic  determining  factors 
and  the  physiological  conditions  gear  into  each  other.  "1 
The  very  failure  of  the  traditional  explanations  suggest 
the  need  for  a  new  approach. 
Physiological  and  psychological  elements  of  the 
experience  Merleau-Ponty  says,  are  aspects  of  a  much  more 
fundamental  form.  They  both  play  a  part  in  the  patient's 
1Merleau-Ponty,  P.  Z.  ,  op.  Cit.,  p.  77. 100 
particular  "world",  his  environment,  but  they  indicate  the 
need  for  a  different  description  of  that  world.  The  major 
characteristic  of  the  patient's  world  or  environment  is 
his  "project".  The  project  of  the  subject  is  definitive  of 
the  lived-world,  and  it  provides  the  key  to  understanding 
both  psychological  maladjustments  and  physical  conditions. 
This  new  theme  does  not  deny  that  physical  stimulii 
are  "real".  Stimulii  are  seen  as  being  introduced  to  a 
particular  world,  they  are  not  thought  of  as  instrumental- 
ities  which  enter  a  vacuum.  Even  motor  reflexes,  share  this 
subscription,  he  says;  more  than  "blind  processes,  they 
adjust  themselves  to  a  'direction'  of  the  situation  and 
express  our  orientation  towards  a  behavioral  setting.  "1 
The  notion  of  project  will  play  a  fundamental  role  in  the 
description  of  physical  behavior. 
With  regard  to  pyschological  elements,  the  argument 
is  similar.  In  anosognosia,  where  the  patient  fails  to 
recognize  his  disability,  the  theme  of  project  again  corrects 
misunderstandings;  the  patient  does  not  represent  to  him- 
self  an  imaginary  limb.  On  the  contrary,  he  refuses  to 
recognize  his  disability  because  his  project  has  been  upset. 
He  cannot  carry  out  tasks  as  he  might  have;  he  is  not  yet  able 
1Ibid., 
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to  alter  his  intentions  and  desires.  Anosognosia  is  not  a 
mental  decision  or  failure  to  conceptualize;  it  is  the 
refusal  to  accept  the  new  project  world  which  has  limita- 
tions  because  of  the  amputation.  1 
The  priority  of  project  is  called  for  because  of  the 
inadequacies  of  alternate  explanations,  and  its  priority 
makes  it  a  fundamental  concept  of  experience  which  can 
guide  phenomenology.  The  phenomenologist  begins  his  inves- 
tigations  of  perception  with  the  testable  thesis  that  human 
activity  is  best  characterized  as  a  "project".  He  is  saying, 
in  effect,  that  this  concept  helps  explain  the  character  of 
one's  pre-reflective  perception  of  the  world. 
It  is  important  beyond  this  to  say  what  Merleau- 
Ponty  means  by  this  concept.  His  concern  is  not  to  say 
presently  what  projects  actually  are;  he  is  intent  on  empha- 
sizing  that  human  perception  has  the  character  of  a  project. 
His  term  for  this  is  mise  en  forme. 
lEdward  Ballard's  analysis  of  this  material  brings 
out  an  interesting  and  important  distinction.  We  shall 
make  use  of  it  later.  "The  rejection  of  mutilation  which 
the  equivocal  phantom  limb  signified  is  clearly  not  the 
consequence  of  a  decision.  It  is  rather  indicative  of  an 
attitude,  a  posture,  which  underlies  any  kind  of  conscious,  decision-making.  We  are  led  thus,  to  one  form  of  a  funda- 
mental  distinction  between  two  levels  of  bodily  functioning. 
These  are  the  habitual  and  actual  levels,  a  distinction  which 
parallels  that  between  the  'knowledge  of'  and  'knowledge 
about'.  ..  .  the  first  is  lived,  the  second  is  more  or  less 
abstractly  known.  "  Edward  G.  Ballard,  "The  Philosophy  of  Merleau  Ponty",  Tulane  Studies  in  Philosoph 
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First,  this  means  that  everything  we  perceive  bears 
the  mark  of  "project".  We  do  not  have  projects  in  the  same 
sense  that  we  have  jobs;  we  are  projects.  Everything  we 
see,  hear,  taste,  smell,  or  touch  is  indicative  of  our 
active  interchange  with  the  world. 
Secondly,  our  bodies  are  the  medium  of  the  human 
project. 
1  This  does  not  mean  that  bodies  are  chained  to 
what  Buber  called  the  Umwelt.  On  the  contrary,  Merleau- 
Ponty's  notion  of  the  body  can  now  be  seen  as  emphasizing 
its  sense-giving  characteristic.  Mise  en  forme  specifies 
that  the  human  organism  strives  to  "make  sense",  to  "make 
forms"  of  the  jumble  of  experience.  The  person  is  conscious 
and  self-conscious  as  we  shall  see  below. 
Third,  Merleau-Ponty  states  that  his  concept  goes 
beyond  subjectivism.  In  the  example  the  most  subjective 
of  all  experiences  was  given  a  new  context.  The  phantom 
limb  was  not  "manufactured"  nor  was  it  a  simple  reaction  to 
stimulii.  The  phenomenon  occurred  as  part  of  a  total  inter- 
action  between  subject  and  world.  Sense-giving  there,  was 
protracted  and  minimal;  the  patient's  adjustment  had  not 
yet  been  made.  But  it  showed  that  supposedly  subjective  or 
10ne  may  legitimately  ask  why  Merleau-Ponty  uses  the 
term  "body"  exclusively  in  describing  the  human  organism; 
we  have  seen  that  the  notion  of  consciousness  is  integral 
to  his  theory.  "Body"  is  an  appropriate  term  if  thought 
of  in  terms  of  the  Greek  word  soma;  consciousness  is 
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completely  private  experience  is  more  apparent  than  real. 
Even  in  pain  this  patient  vies  with  his  world.  His  healthy 
interaction  is  frustrated,  and  to  adjust  is  to  interact 
successfully  again,  with  the  limitation.  Project  or  mise 
en  forme  then,  is  interaction  with  the  world;  subjectivism 
is  combatted  effectively  in  the  sense  that  one  cannot  create 
a  world  of  his  choosing.  He  cannot  withdraw  from  that  which 
is  over  against  him,  apart  from  a  complete  psychosis. 
Merleau-Ponty  has  another  purpose  in  introducing 
this  concept.  Describing  the  body  as  a  sense-giving  organ-' 
ism  gives  him  a  way  of  articulating  the  relation,  or  better, 
the  interrelation,  of  the  "in-itself  ..  for  us.  "  To 
see  the  body  as  an  active  sense-giving  organism  is  to  lay 
the  foundation  for  a  theory  of  perception  with  regard  to 
external  objects  and  others.  In  this  case,  it  is  the  obser- 
vation  that  one's  own  body  cannot  be  divorced  from  one's 
project  or  worldly  interaction. 
One's  body,  in  sum,  is  not  just  a  tool  we  use  to 
view  the  world;  it  is  our  medium  for  being  in  the  world  in 
a  particular  way.  Our  bodies  are  mise  en  forme. 
Rlerleau-Ponty  amplifies  this  introductory  observation 
with  his  notion  of  the  "corporeal  scheme".  The  sense-giving 
element  is  but  the  first  step  toward  a  theory  of  the  body; 
next,  comes  inquiry  as  to  the  larger  context  in  which  sense- 
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analysis  of  the  experience  of  one's  own  body  in  terms  of 
its  movement  or  activity. 
....  it  is  clearly  in  action  that  the  spatiality 
of  our  body  is  brought  into  being,  and  an  analysis  of 
one's  own  movement  should  enable  us  to  arrive  at  a 
better  understanding  of  it.  By  considering  the  body 
in  movement,  we  can  see  better  how  it  inhavits  space. 
Bodily  movements  in  a  normal  person  exhibit  coordin- 
ation  of  the  senses.  For  instance,  we  swat  a  fly  on  our 
forehead,  or  light  our  pipe  without  conscious  attention 
being  required.  We  know  indubitably  where  the  pipe  is, 
where  the  fly  alights.  Merleau-Ponty  argues  that  this  is 
not  to  be  explained  in  terms  of  cognition.  We  learn  the 
"hereness"  of  our  body  apart  from  conceptualization.  The 
body  in  normal  persons  is  always  orientated  space. 
But  if  it  can  be  shown  that  this  kind  of  orientation 
exists  even  in  "abnormal"  subjects,  the  position  is  strength- 
ened.  To  introduce  the  theme  of  bodily  space  he  uses  the 
famous  Gelb-Goldstein  studies  on  brain  injury.  In  the 
example  we  see  that  the  mentally  deficient  subject  retains 
a  "corporeal  scheme". 
The  patient,  Schneider,  has  no  ability  to  carry  out 
simple  commands  to  touch  a  given  area  of  his  body.  He 
cannot  describe  the  position  of  his  head  or  lims,  nor  can 
he  identify  the  spot  touched  by  someone  else.  Merleau- 
Ponty  observes  that  psychology  traditionally  classifies 
1Merleau-Ponty,  M.,  op.  cit.,  p.  148. 105 
brain  lesions  as  a  kind  of  "psychic  blindness";  Merleau- 
Ponty  prefers  to  say  that  the  patient  is  unable  to  perform 
"abstract"  movements.  1  The  patient  is  as  capable  as  a  nor- 
mal  person,  carrying  out  movements  which  are  "concrete". 
Schneider,  has  no  difficulty,  for  example,  in  performing 
actions  which  require  coordination  and  agility  when  no 
conceptualization  is  required.  He  swats  the  mosquito,  or 
uses  his  handkerchief  with  little  difficulty. 
Here  is  the  opening  for  Merleau-Ponty's  concept  of 
corporeal  scheme;  idealism  fails  to  account  for  such  activity. 
We  have  to  create  the  concepts  necessary  to  convey  the 
fact  that  bodily  space  may  be  given  to  me  in  an  intention 
to  take  hold  without  being  given  in  an  intention  to 
know.  The  patient  is  conscious  of  his  bodily  space  as 
the  matrix  of  his  habitual  action,  but  not  as  an  objec- 
tive  setting;  his  body  is  at  his  disposal  as  a  means 
of  ingress  into  a  familiar  surrounding,  but  not  as 
the  mean  of  expression  of  a  gratuitous  and  free  spatial 
thought. 
The  term  corporeal  scheme  organizes  what  was  said 
about  sense-giving  and  it  adds  an  important  factor  to  the 
emerging  theory;  human  activity  is  characterized  as  ingression 
into  a  familiar  world  or  setting.  Pre-reflective  activi- 
ties  such  as  a  daily  routine,  are  known  by  their  constancy 
or  lack  of  surprise.  For  those  with  brain  lesions,  this 
kind  of  activity  is  the  only  kind  in  which  fluidity  and 
coordination  are  possible.  For  normal  subjects,  routine 
1Ibid.,  p.  103. 
2Ibid., 
p.  104. 106 
occupies  a  major  portion  of  the  day.  We  can  learn  from  both. 
Whether  normal  or  not,  systems  of  worldly  interchange  charact- 
eri  ze  man. 
What  takes  place  in  this  familiar  exchange  with  the  world 
is  the  development  of  schemata  or  personal  styles  of  activity. 
That  is,  the  familiar  world  is  appropriated,  or  "cleared"  as 
Heidegger  would  say,  by  the  development  of  styles,  habits, 
individual  preferences  and  prejudices.  A  viable  theory  of 
personality  is  based  upon  the  development  of  schemes;  what  we 
eventually  "know  about"  our  world  is  based  upon  the  constant 
pre-reflective-acquaintance  we  have  with  it.  Our  style  affects 
our  reflection;  our  personality  colors  our  observation. 
The  concept  of  corporeal  scheme  counters  a  possible  mis- 
understanding  of  the  previous  concept.  It  was  explained  that 
"project"  could  refer  to  the  various  jobs  we  perform.  That 
conscious  intentional  activity  is  included  under  the  heading 
of  project,  is  obvious;  but  the  concept  is  not  atomistic  at 
root.  The  notion  of  coporeal  scheme  assures  us  that 
".  project"  is  an  essential  form  of  human  activity,  the  mark 
of  personality,  and  not  simply  an  occasionally  perceived 
condition.  He  seeks  to  introduce  us  to  the  phenomenological 
significance  of  bodily  activity  and  movement. 
Two  features  can  be  further  distinguished.  The  grad- 
ual  development  of  a  corporeal  schemes  he  says,  exhibits 
the  "generalizing"  capability  of  the  human  being.  For 
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than  others,  and  they  are  retained;  others  are  less  so,  and 
are  not.  The  human  subject  is  most  surely  generalizing  and 
organizing  experience  as  he  develops  his  peculiear  style 
of  activity.  Also,  Merleau-Ponty  suggests  that  a  "sediment" 
accumulates  with  the  subject  and  is  utilized  in  ongoing 
experience.  Stybs  build  upon  a  past.  Self-conscious 
remembrance  may  not  occur,  but  a  kind  of  recognition  is, 
nevertheless,  integral  to  this  aspect  of  coporeal  scheme. 
One  "knows"  that  one's  habits  are  his  and  not  someone  else's. 
The  notion  of  a  developing  "fund  of  experience"  or  sediment, 
also  means  that  some  form  of  selection  is  going  on.  When 
tasks  are  performed  successfully,  they  are  used  more  fre- 
quently;  when  not,  they  are  discarded.  ' 
It  should  be  emphasized  that  Merleau-Ponty  is  not 
suggesting  a  cognitively  oriented  structure  with  his  notion 
of  the  corporeal  scheme.  The  "organizing"  form,  which  is 
a  good  label  for  the  above  characteristics,  is  a  form  which 
1A  lengthy  discussion  of  psychological  theory  could 
easily  ensue.  Merleau-Ponty's  interests  are  philosophical, 
so  the  relevance  of  his  statement  is  not  to  be  judged, 
primarily  on  psychological  grounds.  It  should  be  said, 
however,  that  the  development  of  corporeal  schemata  does 
not  depend  on  the  simple  principle  of  success  and  failure. 
Negative  structures  are  often  retained  because  the  world  is 
perceived  in  a  particular  way.  "Positive"  schemes  are  not  to  be  casually  identified  with  successful  performance  of  tasks.  To  discuss  the  full  import  of  the  notion  in  clinical  terms  would  take  a  separate  book.  Merleau-Ponty  contends  that 
a  personal  scheme  is  developed;  he  does  not  care  to  describe 
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gains  its  life  in  pre-reflective  activity.  It  is  not  a 
"mindless"  development  but  it  is  not  a  reflective  one. 
Corporeal  schema  become  sedimented  as  structures  in  acts 
of  the  most  common  nature.  The  Gelb-Goldstein  studies 
attest  to  that. 
The  philosophical  significance  of  the  body  as  mise 
en  forme  and  corporeal  scheme  can  be  put  in  general  terms 
now.  His  objective  has  been  to  show  an  interrelation  of 
the  "in-itself  ...  for  us".  The  body  is  always  "here" 
for  us;  it  is  "my  body".  This  has  been  implicit  in  every 
example  of  the  study  and  is  especially  important  in  the 
notion  of  mise  en  forme.  The  theory  of  the  body  amply 
illustrates  the  subjective  order,  the  sphere  of  "hereness". 
The  sphere  of  "thereness"  has  also  been  introduced  in 
every  discussion.  One  "knows"  his  own  body  primarily  in 
terms  of  project,  an  interaction  with  the  world,  one  that 
has  certain  limits.  "To  be  a  body  is  to  be  tied  to  a 
certain  world.  "'  The  subject  knows  his  body  as  being 
"there";  it  is  his  access  to  the  world.  2 
"hereness"  and  "thereness",  though  distinct  themes, 
are  not  mutually  exclusive  in  his  theory  of  the  body.  A 
theory  of  the  body  cannot  be  isolated  in  the  "subject" 
1Merleau-Ponty,  M.,  p.  cit.  p.  1L8. 
2Ibid., 
p.  149.  "Body  spatiality  is  the  deployment 
of  one's  bodily  being. 
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order;  nor  can  it  be  confined  to  the  "object"  order.  Sub- 
jective  consciousness  and  worldly  encounter  are  both  essen- 
tial  to  the  theory. 
This  is  to  put  Merleau-Ponty's  theory  in  simplified 
form;  but  it  does  some  justice  to  his  objectives. 
We  come  now  to  the  third  essential  concenring  bodily 
activity.  The  body  must  be  thought  of  as  intentional.  The 
body  transfers  itself  onto  things.  A  theory  of  the  body 
requires  a  theory  of  intentionality.  Describing  his  con- 
cept  of  intentionality  is  a  difficult  but  necessary  task.  1 
The  most  appropriate  means  of  gaining  understanding 
here  is  to  contrast  Merleau-Ponty's  concept  of  intention- 
ality  with  Edmund  Husserl's.  There  can  be  little  doubt 
that  Merleau-Ponty  borrowed  Husserl's  idea,  but  he  makes 
one  important  revision. 
Husserl  notes,  as  does  Merleau-Ponty,  that  we  see 
the  "same"  object  from  many  different  angles  or  perspectives; 
consciousness  is,  in  this  respect,  "a  consciousness  of 
something". 
2  Consciousness  is  indicative  of  intentionality. 
1Zaner  has  marshalled  a  most  coherent  explanation  of 
Merleau-Ponty's  concept  of  intentionality.  We  cannot  deal 
with  it  as  thoroughly  as  he  does,  but  we  are  indebted  to 
him  for  his  critique.  c.  f.  Zaner,  R.,  op.  cit.,  pp.  172- 
197 
2c.  f.  Husserl,  Edmund,  Cartesian  Meditations,  The 
Hague,  Martinus  Nijhoff,  1962,  pp.  39.  ff. 110 
But  the  intentional  structure  of  consciousness  merely  poses 
the  philosophical  problem  for  Husserl.  His  question  was, 
what  constitutes  "sameness"  in  the  objects  of  experience? 
His  answer  was  that  intentional  unities  are  results  of  a 
synthesis  made  by  pure  consciousness.  Intentionality 
serves  as  the  clue  to  a  pure  or  constituting  consciousness. 
That  is,  the  "I  think"  explains  the  intentional  structure 
of  consciousness;  the  principle  of  transcendental  conscious- 
ness  becomes  the  solution  because  it  explains  intentional 
activity.  Thus,  the  task  of  phenomenology  is  to  describe 
the  constituting  nature  of  consciousness  which  in  turn 
explains  intentional  activity-' 
This  brief  notation  should  allow  us  to  see  the  differ- 
ent  course  Nerleau-Ponty  takes  in  his  description  of  inten- 
tionality. 
Merleau-Ponty  is  interested  in  the  question  of  same- 
ness  also.  But  he  observes  that  the  sameness  of  experienced 
objects  is  rooted  in  the  notion  of  task  or  project.  We 
"know"  the  pipe  bes?.  de  us  both  visually  and  tactually.  By 
bodily  deployment  we  also  "know"  that  this  pipe,  seen  from 
differing  angles  or  touched  in  different  ways  is  the  same 
pipe.  The  emphasis  upon  bodily  deployment  marks  the  point 
at  which  TMierleau-Ponty  differs  from  Husserl.  His  notion  of 
lWe  discuss  this  in  detail  in  Part  Three,  Chapter  One. 111 
the  perceived  situation  as  being  the  subject's  project  leads 
him  to  claim  that  Husserl's  emphasis  upon  the  constituting 
process-  of  consciousness  is  needless  abstraction. 
'  One 
does  not  need  to  think  the  pipe  in  order  to  perceive  it; 
rather  one  "knows"  the  pipe  through  praxis;  the  human's 
medium  is  his  body. 
The  difference  between  the  two  can  also  be  illustrated 
this  way:  Husserl  argues  that  intentional  activity,  or 
consciousness  of  ...,  necessitates  the  positing  of  a  pure 
consciousness;  Merleau-Ponty  says  that  intentional  activity 
is  itself  the  primary  form  of  consciousness.  Whereas  Husserl 
believes  that  the  eidetic  reduction  necessitates  positing 
a  transcendental  consciousness,  Merleau-Ponty  argues  that 
the  eidetic  reduction  concludes  with  the  recognition  that 
intentionality  is  the  essence  of  experience.  We  are  a 
system  of  intentionality;  it  is  the  fundamental  form  of 
experience.  The  concept,  therefore,  becomes  the  phenomen- 
ologist's  most  important  tool.  Intentionality  is  the  eidos 
or  form  upon  which  the  whole  phenomenology  rests. 
Expressive  of  the  importance  of  this,  is  Merleau- 
Ponty's  notion  of  "general  synthesis".  Intentionality  is 
not  an  abstract  theme,  but  its  presence  does  force  the 
phenomenologist  to  observe  that,  "my  history  must  be  the 
1Vide.  Merleau-Ponty,  op.  cit.,  pp.  152-153. 112 
continuation  of  a  prehistory  and  must  utilize  the  latter's 
acquired  results.  "1  Every  person  expresses  this  unique 
heritage.  A  "general  synthesis"  has  been  made  for  him; 
man  is  man  because  he  shares  this  inheritance.  Merleau- 
Ponty  is  not  interested  in  explaining  how  intentionality 
came  to  be,  but  he  is  interested  in  emphasizing  its  per- 
vasive  nature.  Each  perception  is  indicative  of  this 
deeply  embedded  form;  once  the  phenomenologist  sees  how 
essential  intentionality  is  in  describing  experience,  he 
recognizes  that  the  synthesis  is  not  individual  but  his- 
torical  and  all  pervasive.  2  Intentionality  is  the  mark 
of  being  a  member  of  the  human  race. 
Husserl  has  nothing  of  this  in  his  phenomenology. 
Intentionality  is  the  clue  to  a  transcendental  consciousness. 
If  we  wish  to  call  Merleau-Ponty  an  existentialist,  we  are 
obligated  to  see  that  he  is  one  because  of  the  central 
importance  of  intentionality  in  his  phenomenology.  Inten- 
tionality  indicates  "a  communication  with  the  world  more 
1lbid., 
p.  254. 
2Merleau-Ponty, 
unfortunately,  does  not  detail 
this  concept.  It  is  mentioned  but  not  expounded.  Our 
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ancient  than  thought"  .1 
Such  is  Merleau-Ponty's  theory  of  the  body.  The 
viability  of  his  alternative  to  idealism  and  behaviorism 
rests  upon  the  concept  of  intentionality;  his  research  has 
led  him  to  submit  it  as  the  foundational  concept  in  phen- 
omenological  studies. 
OBSERVATIONS 
Concerning  P9lerleau-Ponty's  method,  two  themes  are 
most  important. 
First,  the  existential  preoccupation  so  well  expressed 
in  the  Lebenswelt  notion  is  given  focus  by  the  use  of  method. 
Discipline  is  brought  to  the  study  of  phenomena.  Though 
it  cannot  be  argued  at  this  point  that  Merleau-Ponty'  is 
successful  in  every  interpretive  effort,  it  can  be  said  that 
his  objectives  meet  the  standards  required  of  philosophical 
research. 
His  stated  aim  to  develop  philosophically  credible 
views  of  pre-reflective  experience  led  to  the  adoption  of 
1The  extended  quotation  deserves  our  recording.  "My 
personal  existence  must  be  the  resumption  of  a  prepersonal 
tradition  ....  This  captive  or  natural  spirit  is  my  body, 
not  that  momentary  body  which  is  the  instrument  of  my  per- 
sonal  choices  and  which  fastens  upon  this  or  that  world, 
but  the  system  of  anonymous  'functions'  which  draw  every 
particular  focus  into  a  general  project.  ...  Space  and 
perception  generally  represent,  at  the  core  of  the  subject, 
the  fact  of  his  birth,  the  perpetual  contribution  of  his 
bodily  being,  a  communication  with  the  world  more  ancient 
than  thought.  "  Merleau-Ponty,  op.  cit.,  p.  254. 114 
ground-rules;  phenomenological  reduction  and  eidetic  reduction 
specify  the  discipline  which  in  turn  opens-  the  door  to  philo- 
sophical  credibility.  We  can  be  more  specific,  however. 
Phenomenological  reduction  brings  to  an  existential 
interest,  the  discipline  of  objectivity.  Distance.  is  put 
between  the  philosopher  and  his  subject  matter.  He  cannot 
afford  to  exempt  pre-reflective  experience  from  constant 
questioning;  the  views,  beliefs,  and  relationships  of  daily 
experience,  the  physical-emotional  reactions  to  crisis  or 
routine,  are  all  brought  under  the  critical  eye.  This  is 
the  purpose  of'phenomenological  reduction.  Even  at  this 
early  point  we  can  see  a  distinct  difference  between  Mer- 
leau-Ponty  and  Buber.  Experience  for  one,  gives  occasion 
for  apologetics;  for  the  other  it  gives  occasion  for  an 
almost  clinical  investigation. 
Another  aspect  of  the  reduction  can  also  be  seen  if 
we  turn  the  coin.  Phenomenological  reduction  is  attempted 
with  the  realization  that  it  concentrates  on  the  pre-reflec- 
tive.  Its  subject-matter  is  experience,  not  the  operation 
of  the  understanding  or  our  ideas  about  experience.  We 
emphasize  this  because  it  is  so  appropriate  for  our  study. 
To  say  that  T4.1erleau-Ponty  has  an  existential  preoccupation 
is  to  say  also  that  he  intends  to  investigate  the  "encounter 
mode"  found  in  such  prominence  with  Buber.  In  fact,  this 
is  inferred  in  the  notion  of  Lebenswelt,  the  "lived-world". 115 
The  very  phenomena  which  matter  to  him  are  those  which  can 
be  specified  as  encounters;  the  "encounter  mode"  is  synony- 
mous,  I  think,  with  "the  pre-reflective".  We  have  seen  this 
in  his  study  of  the  body;  we  shall  see  it  more  in  his  work 
on  intersubjectivity.  Phenomenological  reduction  demands 
the  critical  approach  to  the  encounter  mode.  The  door  is 
at  least  open  to  gain  philosophical  credibility;  it  is 
fostered  by  the  adoption  of  method. 
Secondly,  it  should  be  observed  what  kind  of  cred- 
ibility  is  possible  in  light  of  method.  Eidetic  reduction 
helps  us  specify  it.  Eidetic  themes  do  not,  and  cannot 
claim  the  stamp  of  certainty.  The  quest  for  certainty  has 
been  put  away,  in  that  themes  are  checked  by  phenomenological 
reduction.  This  is  one  deterrent  to  the  quest  for  certainty. 
Another  is  that  eidetic  themes  are  seen  as  being  wrested  from 
the  lived-world;  they  have  no  independent  status. 
When  the  antipathy  towards  certainty  is  coupled  with 
the  concern  to  reachieve  a  philosophically  credible  view  of 
the  world,  we  can  see  what  Merleau-Ponty  means  by  philosoph- 
ical  credibility.  Credibility  is  confined  to  proximate 
judgments.  Proximate  judgments  are  sufficient;  we  can  only 
know  for  certain  that  we  are  involved  in  a  world.  We  need 
not  seek,  as  would  some  omniscient  observer,  absolute  know- 
ledge  about  the  world.  Method  dictates  that  proximate 
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Whether  this  will  remain  a  viable  goal  we  can  only  see 
through  his  continued  studies  of  perception,  but  it  should  be 
emphasized  at  this  early  stage  that  this  is  his  objective. 
Phenomenological  method  is  essentially  a  discipline  for 
research;  as  we  shall  see,  this  is  why  Merleau-Ponty  was 
such  a  reluctant  student  of  ontology.  He  was  constantly  on 
guard  to  protect  against  "high-altitude  thinking",  a  term 
used  frequently  in  later  years.  We  can  expect  eidetic  themes 
to  be  tested  and  modified  because  of  their  non-absolutistic 
character. 
' 
Merleau-Ponty's  theory  of  the  body  can  be  seen  as  his 
way  of  introducing  -a  theory  of  intersubjectivity;  it'will  play 
a  central  role  in  the  discussions  of  object  perception  and 
intersubjectivity.  Let  us  be  as  specific  as  possible  about 
its  importance. 
The  notion  of  human  consciousness  has  been  retained 
in  the  contest  with  behaviorism,  but  it  has  been  given  a  new 
structure.  Ballard's  comment  is  appropriate:  we  "know  about" 
the  world  primarily  because  we  "know"  it  pre-reflectively; 
this  is  the  fact  which  phenomenology  must  explicate.  Inten- 
17,  NNe  cannot  afford  the  space  to  discuss  whether  this 
characteristic  implies  that  :  rerleau-Ponty's  idea  of  reason 
is  adequate  or  not.  Thomas  Langan  has  a  fascinating  book 
which  concludes  negatively  on  . 
this  matter;  Langan,  Thomas, 
Merleau-Ponty's  Critique  of  Reason,  London,  Yale  Univ.  Press, 
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tionality,  corporeal  scheme,  and  mise  en  forme  are  attempts 
to  conceptualize  this  fact.  Most  important,  the  conscious 
being  knows  the  world  by  his  projects,  and  he  knows  primarily 
through  the  medium  of  his  body.  Merleau-Ponty's  idea  hinges 
on  the  proposition  that  consciousness  is  "embodied";  it  is 
activity;  it  is  intentionality. 
Such  a  doctrine  of  consciousness,  it  seems  to  me, 
provides  a  suggestive  context  for  making  the  experience  of 
others  philosophically  credible.  We  have  not  yet  looked  at 
that  experience  in  detail,  but  I  do  not  see  how  it  could  be 
articulated  apart  from  a  theory  of  the  body  which  found 
encounter  at  the  very  roots  of  all  experience.  In  other 
words,  a  phenomenology  of  intersubjectivity  is  groundless 
without  a  phenomenology  of  the  human  subject.  We  are  not 
concerned  at  this  early  point  to  say  that  Merleau-Ponty's 
specific  theory  answers  all  the  problems  that  we  found  with 
Buber,  or  any  other  encounter  oriented  phenomenology.  But 
we  are  benefitted,  I  think,  by  i  ierleau-Ponty's  insight  that 
a  theory  of  the  body  is  a  necessary  component  in  a  theory  of 
intersubjectivity. 
r"erleau-Ponty's  theory  of  the  body  "introduces"  the 
phenomenologist  to  intersubjectivity  in  another  sense  as  well. 
We  are  thrown  into  the  intersubjective  sphere  because  the 
theory  of  the  body  itself  puts  the  subject  in  a  world  of 
social  experience.  There  is  no  hint  of  solipsism,  given  the 118 
centrality  of  intentionality;  the  world  of  projects  is  a 
world  of  others.  His  theory  of  the  body  implies  that 
subjectivity  is,  as  he  says,  an  intersubjectivity.  1  The 
individual  is  always  in  contact  with  others.  We  shall  see 
below  how  this  is  articulated  but  it  is  important  here  to 
recognize  that  a  phenomenology  of  intersubjectivity  is 
being  protended  by  his  doctrine  of  the  body. 
The  distinction  made  between  knowledge  as  encounter 
and  knowledge  about  has  another  application  at  this  point. 
Ronald  Hepburn,  we  noted,  said  that  knowledge  about  the 
other  is  a  primp  factor  in  estimating  the  worth  of  encounters. 
His  aim  was  to  induce  the  encounter  oriented  thinker  to 
utilize  checking  procedures  instead  of  apologetics.  That 
effort  would  surely  correspond  to  Merleau-Ponty's,  with  one 
important  qualification.  Judgment  about  the  other  grows 
out  of  relationships  with  the  other.  Merleau-Ponty  can 
be  expected  to  reorder  the  priority  in  this  regard;  his 
major  objective  is  to  emphasize  the  impact  of  the  encounter 
mode  in  reflective  judgments.  Hepburn,  on  the  other  hand, 
argues  that  empirical  evidence  Must  be  developed  in  order 
to  judge  either  the  relation  or  the  other  person.  Distin- 
guishing  the  phenomenologist's  perspectives  this  way  may  not 
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solve  the  issues  raised  by  Hepburn,  but  is  does  show  us  a 
different  approach  to  analyzing  human  interaction.  It  high- 
lights  the  fact  that  phenomenology  will  attempt  to  defend 
the  primacy  of  the  encounter  mode  without  resorting  to 
apologetics. 
It  cannot  be  said  that  he  will  accomplish  his  task 
but  the  alternative  approach  is  worth  pursuing.  Intention- 
ality  is  the  central  concept  in  this  approach;  we  have  seen 
its  importance  in  the  foregoing.  It  may  well  be  the  key  to- 
a  viable  theory  of  intersubjectivity. CHAPTER  TWO 
MAN  AND  THE  OTN.  ER: 
THINGS  AND  PEOPLE 
We  proceed  to  the  area  of  Merleau-Ponty's  phen- 
omenology  which  is  central  to  the  issue  of  our  study,  the 
perception  of  external  objects  and 
, 
other  people.  If  the 
reader  asks  why  we  discuss'his  theory  of  object  perception, 
the  answer  can  be  stated  briefly.  What  Martin  Buber  called, 
the  sphere  of  "It"  is  ordinarily  associated  with  the  per- 
ception  of  objects,  though  the  form  is  not  confined  to  it. 
Knowledge  in  the  It  form,  however,  was  exclusively  "know- 
ledge  about".  Very  little  was  done  to  expel  the  supposition 
that  the  It  sphere  was  separate  from  the  mode  of  encounter. 
It  is  interesting  that  DIerleau-Ponty  deals  with  object 
perception  in  the  same  way  he  explicated  the  theory  of  the 
body;  that  is,  he  describes  object  perception  in  terms  of  a 
mode  of  encounter.  "Knowledge  about".  objects  is  dependent 
upon  "knowing"  as  an  intentional  activity.  Explication  of 
object  perception,  therefore,  further  introduces  what  rierleau- 
Ponty  will  say  about  intersubjectivity;  it  extends  the  foun- 
dation  laid  in  his  theory  of  the  body. 
"Primary  experience"  and  the  "perceptual  synthesis" 
are  the  organizing  themes  in  his  discussion  of  sense  exper-. 
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Primary  experience  refers  to  the  pre-reflective  "receiving" 
of  objects  by  the  subject  and  his  "taking  them  up"  in  inten- 
tional  activity.  We  can  assume  from  the  foregoing  chapter 
that  this  is  Tlierleau-Ponty's  fundamental  category  in  describ- 
ing  the  experience  of  objects.  If  one  is  to  understand 
experience,  however,  reflective  activity  must  also  occur. 
His  second  category,  perceptual  synthesis,  refers  to  our 
drive  to  understand  primitive  encounter.  Perceptual  syn- 
thesis  is  Merleau-Ponty's  alternative  to  idealist  and  behav- 
iorist  explanations  of  object  perception. 
Our  first  task  is  to  detail  the  aspects  of  "primary 
experience"  as  they  are  exposed  in  sense  perception.  Mer- 
leau-Ponty  uses  an  interesting  illustration  to  introduce  the 
concept. 
Just  as  the  sacrament  not  only  symbolizes,  in  sensible 
species,  an  operation  of  Grace,  but  also  the  real  presence 
of  God,  which  it  causes  to  occupy  a  fragment  of  space  and 
communicates  to  those  who  eat  of  the  consecrated  bread, 
provided  that  they  are  inwardly  prepared,  in  the  same 
way  the  sensible  has  not  only  a  motor  and  vital  signifi- 
canca,  but  is  nothing  other  than  a  certain  way  of  being 
in  the  world  suggested  to  us  from  some  point  in  space, 
and  seized  and  acted  upon  by  our  body,  provided  that  it 
is  capable  of  doing  so,  so  that  sensation  is  literally 
a  form  of  communion.  1 
The  paradin  is  used  for  the  sole  purpose  of  empha- 
sizing  the  intentional  character  of  sense  experience;  no 
theological  overtones  are  intended.  The  perceiving  body 
"knows"  objects  and  colors  in  a  mode  effectively  illustrated 
Ilbid., 
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by  Christian  communion.  Two  elements  are  in  turn  essential 
to  this  notion  of  primary  experience. 
' 
In  primary  experience,  the  subject  is  caught  up  in 
the  experience  of  the  "in  itself",  for  example  in  the  per- 
ception  of  the  blue  sky. 
As  I  contemplate  the  blue  of  the  sky  I  am  not  set  over 
against  it  as  an  acosmic  subject;  I  do  not  possess  it 
in  thought,  or  spread  out  towards  it  some  idea  of  blue 
such  as  might  reveal  the  secret  of  it,  I  abandon  myself 
to  it  and  plunge  into  this  mystery,  it  'thinks  itself 
within  me'.  ..  .  my  consciousness  is  saturated  with 
this  limitless  blue.  2 
The  perceived  thing  "presents"  itself  to  the  subject.  He 
finds  no  need  to  justify  this  notion  of  presentation;  such 
would  be  folly  in  a  phenomenology  of  pre-reflective  exper- 
ience.  One  assumes  this  is  because  the  subject's  conscious- 
ness  is  surely  encountered  in  the  lived-world.  The  notion 
of  presentation  is  integral  to  a  definition  of  "phenomenon". 
(In  later  years  he  will  make  much  of  "presentation"  for 
ontological  pprposes;  this  will  be  discussed  in  the  next 
chapter.  ) 
1  ''le  note  that  . 1lerleau-Ponty  discusses  perception 
of  objects  and  colors  concurrently,  i.  e.  he  does  not  ob- 
serve  the  distinctions  of  Locke  that  there  are  primary  and 
secondary  qualities  in  sense  perception.  The  whole  notion 
of  sense  qualities  comes  under  attack  by  P.  Terleau-Ponty, 
though  he  attacks  without  naming  the  opposition. 
2Merleau-Ponty,  :  ".  ,  R.  cit.,  p.  214.  In  a  foot- 
note  the  translator  appropriately  ; appends  the  words  of  Valery's  "Le  Cimetiere  marin"  : 
"Midi  1ä-haut,  P,:  idi  sans  mouvement 
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A  second  factor  compliments  and  clarifies  the  notion 
of  presentation;  the  subject  seizes  upon  or  "takes  up"  what 
is  presented.  "It  is  my  gaze  which  subtends  colour,  and  the 
movement  of  my  hand  which  subtends  the  object's  form,  or 
rather  my  gaze  pairs  off  with  colour,  and  my  hand  with  hard- 
ness  and  softness.  "1  As  was  true  with  the  perception  of 
one's  own  body,  the  perceiving  subject  is  not  passive.  In 
pre-reflective  intentional  activity,  the  subject  both  responds 
and  participates  by  "seizing"  the  object.  He  sees  the  blue 
sky  because  he  is  "sensitive  to  colours:,  and  not  only  for 
the  moment.  He  engages  the  object  because  he  is  the  inher- 
itor  of  a  primal  human  acquisition,  intentionality.  2 
Both  factors  in  primary  experience  work  together  to 
upset  the  idealist  and  behaviorist  arguments.  Sense  per- 
ception  cannot  be  confined  to  a  sense  datum  theory;  the  object 
is  seized  upon  by  bodily  activity.  "Sensation  is  not  an  inva- 
sion  of  the  sentient  by  the  sensible.  "3  Our  perception  is 
not  entirely  determined  by  the  thing;  the  body  becomes 
party  to  the  transaction.  At  the  same  time,  Merleau-Ponty 
says  that  it  is  not  the  mind  which  assi  s  qualities  to  the 
1lbid. 
21bid.,  pp.  215-216.  Ise  is  referring  again,  with  the  term  "primal  acquisition",  to  his  position  that  the  person  grows  and  develops  as  an  intentional  being;  note  our  dis- 
cussion  of  the  "general  synthesis"  in  Chapter  One. 
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sensation;  the  primitive  transaction  is  nothing  apart  from 
the  probing  eye  or  exploring  hand;  no  amount  of  thought 
can  prepare  the  subject  to  describe  the  object  out  there. 
Rather  the  body  heeds  the  presentation  of  the  "itself" 
and  perceives  it  "for  himself". 
Such  a  theory  is  suggestive  but  not  quite  convincing 
unless  further  refinements  and  qualifications  are  made 
which  deal  with  the  behaviorist  and  idealist  positions. 
He  says  that  the  communal  nature  of  sense  experience  is 
credible  on  two  accounts. 
First,  every  perception  of  the  thing  "takes  place 
in  an  atmosphere  of  general  ity.  `!  1  We  do  not  decide  to  see 
a  thing  or  hear  a  whistle;  our  perceptions  occur  apart  from 
the  necessity  of  a  conscious  act  of  will  or  intention. 
This  is  what  he  means  by  the  phrase  "atmosphere  of  gener- 
ality";  we  are  participants  because  we  are  of  that  genre-- 
we  cannot  help  but  perceive.  Presentation  is  also  associated 
with  his  notion  of  general  synthesis.  The  human  is  an  inten- 
tional  being  by  nature;  he  is  the  inheritor  of  the  primal 
acquisition  of  intentionality.  (This,  of  course,  makes  the 
notion  of  a  constituting  consciousness  unnecessary;  the 
primary  fact  is  that  we  are  perceivers  who  encounter  objects.  ) 
1lbid., 
p.  215.  "PMy  perception  even  when  seen  from 
the  inside,  expresses  a  given  situation:  I  can  see  because 
I  am  sensitive  to  colours,  whereas  personal  acts  create  a 
situations  I  am  a  mathematician  because  I  have  decided  to 
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Secondly,  presentation  is  credible  only  if  we  admit 
that  a  given  perception  is  "incomplete".  In  other  words, 
bodily  exploration  is  always  approximate  in  its  "knowing". 
Our  hands  and  eyes  explore  the  object,  but  they  do  not 
possess  it'  its  plentitude  escapes  us.  Or  better,  the 
object's  transcendence  becomes  evident  in  pre-reflective 
encounter.  Merleau-Ponty  admits  to  a  form  of  perspectivism 
here  but  only  in  one  senses  sense  perceptions  are  encounters 
which  can  always  be  improved,  enlarged  upon,  and  "refined": 
through  further  exploration.  Moreover,  we  are  never  in  full 
possession  of  the  thing;  the  succession  of  exploratory 
activity  necessitates  this  qualification.  "When  I  see  an 
object,  I  always  feel  that  there  is  a  portion  of  being 
beyond  what  I  see  at  this  moment,  not  only  as  regards  visible 
being,  but  also  as  regards  what  is  tangible  or  audible.  "1 
In  contrast  to  both  behaviorist  and  idealist  explanations, 
Merleau-Ponty's  theory  of  knowledge  will  be  continually 
critical  of  the  quest  for  certainty;  knowing  at  the  most 
primitive  level  is,  for  him,  approximate.  The  notion  of 
presentation  enforces  this  position. 
Primary  experience  can  be  capsuled  as  follows:  the 
object  presents  itself  to  an  intentional  subject;  the  subject 
explores  it  through  the  medium  of  his  body.  He  explores 
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because  he  is  by  nature  an  intentional  (perceiving)  being; 
the  object  is  explored  but  not  known  in  its  plentitude. 
This  brings  us  to  Merleau-Ponty's  theory  of  the  perceptual 
synthesis.  The  question  of  reflective  knowledge  has  not  yet 
been  directly  addressed,  but  the  foregoing  bears  fairly 
obvious  implications. 
Turning  to  the  nature  of  reflection,  he  says, 
When  I  say  that  I  have  senses.  and.  that.  they  give  me 
access  to  the  world,  I  am  not  the  victim  of  some 
muddle,  I  do  not  confuse  causal  thinking  and  reflection, 
I  merely  express  this  truth  which  forces  itself  upon 
reflection  as  a  whole:  that  I  am  able,  being  connat- 
ural  with  the  world,  to  discover  a  sense  in  certain 
aspects  of  jbeing  without  having  myself  endowed  them 
with  it  through  any  constituting  operation.  1 
The  resource  for  developing  adequate  descriptions 
of  sense  experience  is  the  primary  experience  itself. 
Reflection  is  born  of  the  drive  to  make  sense  of  the  ob- 
jects  we  perceive.  Stated  as  a  principle  of  method  this 
becomes:  eidetic  forms  can  be  wrested  from  the  lived- 
world.  Perceptual  synthesis  characterizes  an  aspect  of 
experience  as  did  "sensory  communion";  it  is  not  a  tran- 
scendental  category  in  the  ?  iusserlian  sense  in  that  it 
has  no  independent  status.  Its  credibility  is  based,  upon 
the  exDerierce  of  reflection.  ?.  7ith  this  as  a  guide,  perhaps, 
1Ibid., 
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we  can  make  clear  its  content. 
1 
He  introduces  perceptual  synthesis  by  noting  two 
forms  of  primary  experience,  the  distinctness  of  sensory,. 
activities  (touch  and  sight  modes  differ),  and  sensory 
cooperation  (sight  and  touch  "cooperate"). 
One  objective  is,  as  always,  to  demonstrate  that 
the  perceptual  synthesis  is  preferable  to  the  idealist 
and  behaviorist  explanations  of  sense  experience.  Con- 
cerning  sensory  distinctness,  patients  blind  from  birth 
who  gain  their  sight  by  surgery,  claim  to  experience  "space" 
for  the  first  time.  The  claim  makes  sense  as  a  personal 
attitude,  but  is  also  credible  in  that  spaces  are  still 
habitually  "learned"  by  the  patient's  touching  what  is  now 
seen.  The  world  of  sight  is  at  first  dependent  upon  the 
already  familiar  mode  of  touch.  ºMTerleau-Ponty  observes 
that  vision  is  facilitated  by  the  "quasi-spatial  tactile 
field,  into  which  the  first  visual  perceptions  may  be 
inserted.  "2  Touch  has  its  own  distinct  mode,  sight  per- 
ception,  its  ovum.  The  former  activity  is  more  limited  in 
1: 
":  erleau-Ponty  anticipates  an  objection  to  his  method 
i.  e.  does  the  reflective  consciousness  differ  significantly 
from  the  pre-reflective  experience?  He  says  "but  the  reflec- 
tive  I  differs  from  the  unreflective  at  least  in  having  been 
thematized,  and  what  is  given  is  not  consciousness,  or  pure  being;  it  is  as  Kant  himself  profoundly  put  it,  experience,  in  other  words  the  communication  of  a  finite  subject  with 
an  opaque  being  from  which  it  emerges  but  to  which  it  remains 
committed.  "  Ibid.,  p.  229. 
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its  movements,  sight  being  more  inclusive.  Space,  perceived 
tactually,  is  circumscribed  by  the  body's  actual  contact 
with  objects,  sight  subtends  "the  afar  off".  "The  whole 
significance-of  our  life.  ..  would  be  different  if  we  were 
sightless.  "1  Though  some  substitutions  for  each  mode  can 
take  place,  we  are  sure,  he  argues,  that  the  modes  of  touch 
and  sight  are  not  equivalent. 
Sensory  distinctness  does  not  threaten,  however,  the 
"co-existence"  of  modes  in  perception.  "Sight  would  never 
communicate  directly  with  touch,  as  in  fact  it  does  in  the 
normal  adult,  if  the  sense  of  touch,  even  when  artificially 
isolated,  were  not  so  organized  as  to  make  coexistences 
possible.  "2 
The  common  occurrence  of-sensory  cooperation'is 
expressed  this  way. 
"One  sees  the  weight  of  a  block  of  cast  iron  which 
sinks  in  the  sand,  the  fluidity  of  water  and  the  viscosity 
of  syrup.  In  the  same  way,  I  hear  the  hardness  and  uneven- 
ness  of  cobbles  in  the  rattle  of  a  carriage,  and  we  speak 
directly  of  a  'soft',  'dull'  or  'sharp'  sound.  "3  There 
expressions  may  seem  non-sensical  to  the  language  analyst 
llbid.,  p.  225. 
2Ibid., 
p.  223. 
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but  they  do  reveal  how  sensory  perception  operates  at  the 
pre-reflective  level.  A  subject  under  mescalin  reports 
that,  sounds  have  colors,  trees  grow  greener.  Plterleau- 
Ponty'says  that  a  synaesthetic  experience  is  being  under- 
gone,  and  mescalin  illustrates  dramatically  the  way  we 
ordinarily  perceive.  "Synaesthetic  perception  is  the 
rule  ..  .  "l  The  senses  do  intercommunicate. 
The  question,  of  course,  is  not  so  much,  "do  synaes- 
thetic  and  distinct  forms  of  sense  experience  exist?  "  It 
is  rather,  in  Merleau-Ponty's  mind,  "how  are  they  to  be 
explained?  "  Other  studies  of  perception  take  the  distinct 
forms  into  consideration,  but  they  do  not  give  credible 
accounts  of  the  synaesthetic  or  intentional  form  of  the 
operation.  The  notion  of  perceptual  synthesis  is  his  alter- 
native,  designed  to  explicate  the  drive  to  make  sense  of 
sensory  experience.  It  is  his  answer  to  behaviorism  and 
idealism;  we  must  look  again  at  the  experience  of  objects. 
For  example,  when  holding  the  hand  before  the  eye, 
as  we  look  at  an  object  some  distance  away,  we  see  a  double 
image  of  the  hand.  2  Whereas  the  image  of  the  remote  object 
is  single,  the  images  of  the  hand  are  double  or  "divergent". 
If  vision  is  directed  from  the  object  to  the  hand,  the  images 
1Ibid.,  p.  229. 
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gradually  "converge"  or  become  unified.  The  idealist  says 
that  an  a  priori  knowledge  that  the  hand  is  "one",  consti- 
tutes  or  "causes"  the  image's  unification.  That  is,  through 
a  mental  act  we  accomplish  the  convergence  of  the  images; 
apperception  shapes  perception.  Merleau-Ponty  counters 
that  thought  cannot  constitute  the  "fusion  of  images".  1 
Were  it  an  act  of  thought,  the  fusion  would  take  place 
immediately;  but,  he  says,  we  have  "to  wait".  2  The  images 
fuse  gradually.  The  idealist  cannot  account  for  this. 
The  behaviorist  attacks  the  problem  in  another  way: 
his  explanation,  is  based  upon  the  physical  or  anatomical 
arrangement  of  our  visual  apparatus  and  its  way  of  operating. 
Convergence  of  the  images  becomes  a  necessity  because  "focus" 
takes  place.  Focus,  then,  is  the  cause  of  the  unified  image 
of  the  hand,  and  this  is  because  the  anatomical  structure  of 
the  sight  organs  dictate  our  reception.  The  behaviorist 
says  that  physiological  conditions  support  the  stimulus- 
response  theory.  Merleau-Ponty  asks  if  the  notion  of 
"focus"  can  be  accounte?.  for  apart  from  intentional  activity. 
Of  course,  it  cannot;  "It  is  necessary  to  'look'  ý.  n  order  to 
see.  "ý  Focus  is  not  a  strictly  mechanical  adjustment  to 
1Ibid. 
2Ibid. 
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double  images.  Focus  occurs  because  the  subject  is  an 
intentional  being;  the  body  strives  to  "correct"  the  double 
vision  only  when  it  fastens  upon  the  phenomenon  as  a  project. 
We  must  be  careful  in  stating  the  case  for  "per- 
ceptual  synthesis";  the  spectres  of  rationalism  and  behav- 
iorism  are  but  inches  away  from  Merleau-Ponty's  alternative. 
The  question  again,  is  not,  what  can  we  know  about  the  single 
or  double  image  of  the  hand?  It  is,  what  can  we  know  of  the 
experience  of  divergence-convergence?  How  should  the  exper- 
ience  be  described?  01hen  this  question  is  properly  specified, 
it  is  obvious  that, 
The  unity  of  the  object  is  intentional.  But--and  this 
is  the  point  we  are  trying  to  make--it  is  not  therefore 
a  notional  unity.  We  pass  from  double  vision  to  the 
single  object  not  through  an  inspection  of  the  mind, 
but  when  the  eyes  cease  to  function  each  on  its  own 
account  and  are  used  as  a  single  organ  by  one  single 
gaze.  It  is  not  the  epistemological  subject  who  brings 
about  the  synthesis,  but  the  body,  when  it  e-acapes  from 
dispersion,  pulls  itself  together  and  tends  by  all  means 
in  its  power  towards  one  single  goal  of  its  activity, 
and  when  one  single  intention  is  formed  in  it  through 
the  phenomemon  of  synergy.  " 
An  important  clarification  of  intentionality  is  made 
here:  :.  serleau-Ponty's  concept  is  not  to  be  identified  with- 
willed  actions.  The  notion  of  perceptual  synthesis  is 
supported  by  the  subject's  primitive  drive  to  make  sense  of 
his  world.  In  fact,  we  may  say  that  the  synthetic  act  is 
1lbid.,  p.  232. 132 
the  drive  to  make  sense;  the  subject's  attendance  to  the 
hand  is  the  press  for  a  concrete  form.  The  action  does 
not  stem  from  a  mental  decision  to  seek  meaningful  forms; 
the  look  itself  is  the  act  of  pressing  for  meaning.  P.  ier- 
leau-Ponty  often  says,  we  look  in  order  to  see. 
One  way  of  explaining  the  concept  is  to  distinguish 
between  conscious  action  and  self-conscious  action.  In 
terms  of  the  above  example  Trlerleau-Ponty  holds  that  the 
act  itself  occupies  the  subject  so  that  he  cannot,  in  the 
act  of  striving,  be  self-consciously  aware  of  his  striving. 
That  is,  the  at  occupies  the  subject;  there  is  no  room 
within  it,  for  casual  reflection.  In  another  example  he 
says,  "my  act  of  perception  occupies  me,  and  occupies  me 
sufficiently  for  me  to  be  unable,  while  I  am  actually  per- 
ceiving  the  table,  to  perceive  myself  perceiving  it.  "1 
His  main  concern  in  this  important  distinction  is 
to  counter  the  rationalist  explanation  of  the  phenomenon, 
namely  the  synthesis  by  apperception  spoken  of  by  Descartes. 
If  perception  is  to  be  described  adequately,  that  solution 
must  be  eschewed.  To  separate  "consciousness  of  ..  .  11 
from  pure  sei  -consciouosness  is  i:  erleau-Fonty's  best  option. 
His  way  of  emphasizing  that  distinction  is  to  claim  that 
the  perceptial  synthesis  is  made  bfr  "the  body".  We  shall 
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return  to  this  in  our  evaluation. 
Secondly,  the  perceptual  synthesis  is  partial. 
"Being  supported  by  the  prelogical  unity  of  the  body  image, 
the  per-ceptual  synthesis  no  more  holds  the  secret  of  the 
object  than  it  does  of  one's  own  body.  "'  We  encounter 
objects  and  find  them  beyond  total  comprehension.  Our 
knowledge  of  anything  is  rooted  in  encounter;  therefore, 
"knowledge  about"  can  never  become  complete,  or  full.  The 
opacity  or  "density"  of  experience  is  affirmed;  the  per- 
ceptual  synthesis  is  incomplete  because  transcendencies 
are  never  absent. 
Merleau-Ponty  also  says  that  perceptual:  syntheses 
are  tenporal;  one's  own  history  is  brought  into  play  in 
each  experience.  The  significance  or  forms  of  sense  per- 
ception  are  conveyed  through  "the  medium  of  time".  2  At 
this  point  Merleau-Ponty  gives  very  little  attention  to 
what  is  meant  by  the  temporality  of  perceptual  synthesis. 
Temporality  and  transcendence  are  but  mentioned  in  these 
examples;  he  will  deal  with  them  at  a  later  point. 
With  these  structures  of  the  perceptual  synthesis 
1Ihid.,  p.  233"  Again,  in  this  passage,  he  refers 
to  the  body  image  as  the  inheritor  of  an  acquisition,  and 
what  he  means  is  that  it  cannot  be  described  apart  from 
the  corporeal  scheme,  a  kind  of  familiarity  that  is  more 
ancient  than  thought. 
2Ibid., 
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in  mind,  we  can  proceed  to  his  discussion  of  space  perception. 
We  need  not  detail  the  many  examples;  our  purposes  are  servod 
by  concentrating  on  the  forms  of  temporality  and  transcend- 
ence  which  are  mentioned  more  frequently  in  connection  with 
his  notion  of  lived-space.  We  shall  see  that  description 
of  these  two  forms  forces  the  all  important  discussion  of 
intersubjectivity. 
The  fundamental  category  for  discussing  space  is 
lived-space;  it  is  the  primary  mode  of  sf3atial  perception. 
For  exar...  ple,  when  we  look  casually  at  someone's  face  upside 
down,  there  is  at  first  nothing  odd  about  it.  But  if  we 
concentrate  upon  the  spectacle,  the  person's  facial  expres- 
sions  become  almost  frightening.  1  If  we  imagine  an  upside 
down  position  to  be  a  "natural"  position,  the  mouth  is 
where  eyes  ought  to  be,  the  "head"  is  hairless,  and  so  on. 
We  have  difficulty  making  sense  of  the  spectacle;  Merleau- 
Ponty  uses  the  French  word  lens,  which  translates  "signifi- 
cance"  or"direction".  "To  invert  an  object  is  to  deprive  it 
of  its  significance.  Its  being  as  an  object  is,  therefore, 
not  a  being-for-the-thinking  subject,  but  a  being-for-the 
gaze  which  meets  it  at  a  certain  angle,  and  otherwise  fails 
to  recopnize  it-"'  "P,  atural  space"  is  not  a  simple  orggan- 
'Ibid.,  p.  252. 
2Ibid. 
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ization  of  things,  unrelated  to  the  perceiving  subject.  The 
unnatural  spectacle  must  be  engaged  by  the  sense-making 
process  of  the  look  or  it  remains  non-sensical,  lacking 
significance.  In  one  sense  it  is  not  even  a  spectacle  apart 
from  the  look.  Natural  space  is  certainly  not  an  arrange- 
ment  constituted  by  the  subject's  thoughts;  it  is  the 
arrangement  of  things  as  perceived  or  lived. 
His  concept  of  lived-space  has  the  same  twofold 
characteristic  as  did  the  primary  sense  experience.  Objects 
present  themselves;  the  subject  seizes  and  makes  sense  of 
objects  according  to  his  project.  Lived  space  is  "orien- 
tated  space",  organized  in  terms  of  the  subject's  parti- 
cular  project. 
His  descriptions  of  lived  space  are  more  easily  under- 
stood  when  he  is  talking  about  "geometrical  space". 
Geometrical  space,  illustrated  in  drawings  of  three 
dimensional  figures  on  flat  surfaces,  is  perceived  first 
of  all,  by  "the  body".  The  rationalist  argues  that  we 
constitute  an  understanding  of  geometrical  figures  by  thought; 
the  behaviorist  argues  that  our  look  is  determined  by  phys- 
ical.  stimulii  emanating  from  the  fi 
. ire.  Both,  he  says, 
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Merleau-Ponty  suggests  that  Figure  one  "recommends" 
itself  as  a  cube  seen  either  from  below  or  above,  or  as  a 
"mosaic",  whereas  figure  two  is  quite  clearly  a  cube.  Figure 
three  recommends  itself  as  a  cube  even  with  the  squiggly 
lines  added.  This  mention  of  recommendation  is  synonomous 
with  his  notion  of  presentation;  it  simply  emphasizes  that 
the  perceptive  act  is  shaped  by  the  object's  presence,  and 
by  the  figures'  peculiar  structure  or  properties.  He  says, 
"the  circular  trunks  of  trees  had  already,  before  Euclid,  the 
properties,  that  Euclid  discovered  in  them.  "1 
But  "recommendation"  is  not  a  tip  of  the  hat  to 
behaviorist  theory.  The  impetus  to  perceive  a  cube  especially 
in  figure  one,  or  figures  two  and  three,  is  not  overriding. 
With  each,  we  must  attend  to  the  figures  in  terms  of  possible 
ambiguities;  the  drive  to  make  sense  of  them  as  three  dimen- 
sional  figures  requires  the  subject's  attention.  Figure 
one  may  look  like  a  square  surrounded  by  triangles;  or  it 
1lbid.,  p.  267. 
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may  "take  on  depth"  because  we  perceive  it  alongside  the  less 
ambiguous,  figure  two.  Merleau.  -Ponty's  point  is:  our  con- 
centrated  gaze  takes  up  what  is  presented  and  replies  to 
it.  Epistemologically  speaking,  we  think  of  the  figures 
as  cubes  in  terms  of  a  perceptual  synthesis.  We  strive 
to  see  them  organized  before  us;  the  figures  are  "lived"; 
this  is  what  gives  rise  to  concepts,  of  geometrical  space. 
The  mathematician  may  easily  forget  that  universal 
concepts  or  theorems,  are  dependent  upon  lived  experience. 
"The  vertical  and  the  horizontal,  the  near  and  the  far 
are  abstract  designations  for  one  single  form  of  being  in 
a  situation,  and  they  presuppose  the  same  setting  face 
to  face  of  subject  and  world.  "1  This  statement  makes 
explicit  his  criticism  of  the  rationalist  and  behaviorist. 
Space  is  not  merely  the  arrangement  of  objects,  and  we 
do  not  constitute  space  through  pure  reason.  The  most 
abstract  concepts  of  geometrical  space  are  rooted  in 
lived-experience. 
If  this  is  the  "beginning"  or  source  of  abstract 
knowledge,  we  must  reaffirm  what  was  sai.  d  in  the  discussion 
of  sense  experience;  the  mode  of  synthesis,  or  making  sense, 
'Ibid., 
p.  267.  Again,  he  says,  "Thus,  depth  cannot 
be  understood  as  belonging  to  the  thought  of  an  acsomic 
subject,  but  as  a  possibility  of  a  subject  involved  in  the 
world.  "  Ibid. 138 
is  a  perceptual  mode,  and  it  is  temporal.  1  Knowledge  about 
objects  depends  on  "knowing"  by  encounter,  encounter  is 
understood  as  the  subjects'  temporal  "living  of  the  object". 
The  notion  of  transcendence  is  further  introduced; 
our  partial  grasp  of  two  dimensional  figures  only  dramatizes 
the  fact  that  there  is  "more  to  be  seen"  in  the  figures  or 
in  three  dimensional  objects.  Objects  connot  be  captured 
in  perception  any  more  than  in  the  abstractions  which  arise 
from  perception. 
The  same  themes  hold  true  with  Merleau-Ponty's  inter- 
pretation  of  movement.  This  phenomenon  is,  perhaps,  the 
most  suggestive,  for  it  defies  "objectivism"  at  every  point. 
His  descriptions  are  particularly  directed  to  the  threat  of 
subjectivism,  for  that  seems  to  be  the  characteristic  feature 
of  the  phenomenon  of  movement.  Let  us  see  how  both  are 
countered. 
When  on  board  ship  near  a  shoreline,  we  perceive  the 
ship's  movement  by  focusing  upon  a  landmark.  On  the  other 
hand,  when  we  focus  upon  the  handrail  of  our  ship,  it  seems 
that  the  land  is  moving  while  the  ship  remains  stationary. 
Another  example:  when  we  are  sitting  in  a  train,  it  is 
1i';  °erleau-Ponty  conveniently  confines  his  discussion 
to  the  mathematics  of  geometry.  We  could  ask  if  the  same 
theory  would  apply  to  other  fields  of  mathematics  e.  g. 
algebra..  The  findings  might  be  much  different  when  a  thoroughly  abstract  field  is  interrogated. 139 
difficult  to  say  whether  it  is  our  train  that  is  moving  or 
the  one  on  the  adjoining  track.  We  can  "verify"  only  by 
fixing  upon  a  stationary  object.  It  seems  in  both  examples 
that  the  phenomenon  of  movement  depends  primarily  upon  the 
gaze  of  the  subject;  is  movement  determined  solely  by  the 
subject? 
Merleau-Ponty's  answer  draws  upon  two  conceptions. 
cited  in  chapter  One.  Movement  is,  first  of  all,  perceived 
within  a  given  setting  or  situation. 
1  Interestingly,  the 
setting  refers  first  to  a  notion  of  historical  importance, 
not  a  geographical  situation.  The  notion  of  setting,  points 
to  the  fact  of  past  experience;  the  one  who  sees  the  train 
or  shoreline  is  familiar  with  it  on  the  basis  of  his  percep- 
tual  history.  The  corporeal  scheme  becomes  an  "anchor", 
which  cannot  be  disregarded  in  a  given  situation.  "We  have 
been  led  to  bring  out,  as  the  condition  of  spatiality,  the 
establishment  of  the  subject  in  a  setting  and  finally  his 
inherence  in  a  world.  "2  Movement  and  spatiality  are  under- 
stood  not  as  isolated  perceptions  but  as  experiences  which 
elaborate  a  personal  environment.  That  environment  includes 
the  past;  every  present  occurrence  is  perceived  according  to 
our  history.  iý"erleau-Ponty  argues  that  temporality  itself 
1He 
also  calls  the  setting  a  "field". 
2? 
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is  a  sort  of  anchorage.  Note  that  personal  history  is  another 
word  for  temporality;  movement  is  perceived  in  the  context  of 
a  personal  history  of  perceptual  activity.  He  will  empha- 
size  this  aspect  when  he  turns  to  intersubjectivity. 
Movement  is  also  significant  in  terms  of  its  broader 
personal  geographical  setting.  The  movements  of  Paris  traf- 
fic,  -  for  instance,  have-significance-in  terms  of  the  city's 
"whole  being".  1  We  perceive  according  to  our  broader  exper- 
ience  of  the  city,  so  that  one's  perceptual  familiarity 
functions  not  only  in  terms  of  personal  history  but  also  in 
terms  of  other  geographical-personal  settings.  The  specific 
experience  is  perceived  according  to  the  general  familiarity 
we  have-with  the  city.  Quite  obviously,  there  is  the  possi- 
bility  of  being  unfamiliar  with  a  "whole:,  so  that  exper- 
iences  of  movement  or  space  can  be  "new".  The  ambiguity  of 
perceptions,  he  says,  has  to  do  with  the  nature  and  extent 
of  our  familiarity. 
As  was  true  in  the  preceding  discussion,  no  single 
experience  of  movement  can  be  complete;  no  "whole"  is  trans- 
parent,  so  no  particular  perception  can  be.  The  "new" 
form,  and  the  "familiar"  nercentions  sup;  ý,  *est  again,  the  notion 
1Sbid.,  p.  281. 141 
of  transcendence.  ' 
These'discussions  of  sense  experience,  space  and 
movement  have  provided  the  background  for  an  important' 
transition,  perhaps,  the  most  important  one  in  Phenomenology 
of  Perception.  One  is  quite  aware  that  each  area  of  human 
perception  has  a  common  form  or  theme.  Though  he  makes  the 
transition  quietly,  so  to  speak,  it  is  the  aim  of  the  book 
to  relate  all  topics  to.  the  fundamental  theme  of  human 
involvement,  and  as  we  shall  see,  social  existence. 
We  thus  find  ourselves  led  to  a  broadening  of  our 
investigation.  Once  the  experience  of  spatiality  is 
related  to  our  implantation  in  the  world,  there  will 
always  be  a  primary  spatiality  for  each  modality  of 
this  implantation.  Z 
The  immediftte  reason  for  broadening  the  discussion 
is  not  hard  to  figure  out;  "primary  spatiality"  refers  us 
to  the  involvement  of  man  in  the  world.  As  was  true  in 
his  discussion  of  sense  experience,  the  theme  of  Lebenswelt 
is  encountered  at  every  turn.  Now  it  must  become  a  specific 
topic  of  discussion;  he  will  concentrate  increasingly  on 
the  interpersonal  or  intersubjective  aspects  of  perception. 
A  brief  review  will  easily  show  how  !.  ierleau-Ponty  comes  to 
1At  this  point  he  leaves  behind  the  discussion  of 
movement.  It  does  not  seem  to  me  that  he  has  given  it 
adequate  treatment.  We  are  left  with  the  relativity  of 
movement  which  may,  in  the  end,  be  justified.  But  it  still 
seems  to  depend  on  the  domain  of  the  subject  and  is  not,  as  is  true  with  space  and  sense  experience,  an  adequate  dis- 
cussion  of  the  "in-itself-for-us",  the  problem  he  posed  in 
the  beginning. 
2  erleau-Ponty,  'ý.,  on.  cit.,  p.  283. 142 
ooncentrate  on  "human  space". 
' 
Both  sense  and  space  perception,  Merleau-Ponty 
argues,  must  be  characterized  as  communion,  a  kind  of  prere- 
flective  transaction  between  the  subject  and  the  object  of 
perception.  Objects  of  perception  present  themselves  as 
objects  in  depth,  movement,  etc.  The  factor  of  human 
orientation  and  object  presentation  go  together-in  his 
theory  of  object  perception.  Previously,  the  experience  of 
one's  own  body  revealed  that  the  human  subject  is  project 
oriented  and  is  the'inheritor  of  a  perceptual  history--a 
past.  In  object  perception  this  was  given  an  additional 
notation,  the  perceiver  is  one  who  perceives  objects  in 
terms  of  his  relation  to  a  total  environment.  At  each  level, 
the  account  points  to  the  broad  theme  of  the  lived-world. 
Each  subject  of  investigation  is  a  way  of  further  describing 
the  notion  of  the  lived-world.  In  the  preface  he  offered 
the  general  affirmation  that  phenomenology  studies  man's 
being-in-the-world;  his  problem  was  to  make  that  affirmation 
philosophically  credible.  In  the  preceeding  chapter,  the 
affirmation  wa^  given  specific  application  in  the  theory 
of  the  corps  pro-pre;  opre;  Lebenswelt  was  described  as  the  body's 
way  of  knowing  itself  in  terms  of  projects.  In  terms  of 
object  perception  there  is  further  specification  of  the 
lIbid 
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of  the  tern;  man  knows  objects  primarily  through  living 
with  them.  Knowing  oneself  and  things,  therefore,  forces 
a  discussion  of  the  history  and  environment  of  the  indivi- 
dual.  Historical  existence  becomes  the  next  logical  topic 
for  the  Lebenswelt  phenomenologist. 
Specifically,  the  two  themes  which  give  credibility 
to  the  lived-world  are  temporality  and  transcendence.  Object 
presentation  indicates.  a  plenitude  which  cannot  be  fully 
grasped.  The  subject  is  an  "explorer";  vision  and  tactility 
demonstrate  orientation  rather  than  full  comprehension. 
Transcendence  is  an  inescapable  theme  for  human  perception. 
About  temporality:  present  perceptions  call  upon  the  subject's 
past;  the  particular  calls  upon  a  sense  of  the  whole.  Human 
perception  is  described  as  being  pregnant  with  meaning  be- 
cause  it  utilizes  a  past.  Consequently,  if  we  are  to  under- 
stand  the  nature  of  perception  we  must  look  to  the  environ- 
ment  and  to  the  history  of  the  perceiver.  Merleau-Ponty 
will  describe  temporality  and  transcendence  as  dominant 
forms  of  man's  cultural  and  historical  existence. 
Lastly,  it  is  evident  that  the  very  notion  of  histor- 
ical  rootage  cannot  be  confined  to  the  perception  of  self 
or  object  perception.  The  term  itself  points  to  the  prob- 
lem  of  social  existence;  the  issue  of  intersubjectivity  is 
posed  the  minute  we  take  seriously  the  history  of  any  parti- 
cular  subject.  The  next  portion  of  our  study  will  show  how 144 
r:  Terleau-Ponty  attempts  to  demonstrate  this. 
Merleau-Ponty's  phenomenology  of  object  perception 
has  tried  to  preserve  the  distinction  between  "knowing" 
(as  encounter)  and  "knowledge  about".  He  has  done  so  with 
the  following  relationship  in  mind: 
Perceiving  is  pinning  one's  faith,  at  a  stroke,  in  a 
whole  future  of  experiences,  and  in  doing  so  in  a 
present  which  never  strictly  guarantees  the  future; 
it  is  placing  one's.  belief  in  a  world.  It  is  this 
opening  upon  a.  world  which  makes  possible  perceptual 
truth  and  the  actual  effecting  of  a  Wahr-Nehmung 
.  .  There  is  absolute  certainty  of  the  world  in 
general,  but  not  of  any  one  thing  in  particular.  1 
Knowing  in  the  encounter  mode  is  the  primary  form 
of  man's  experience,  and  makes  knowledge  about  possible. 
In  recognizing  this  structure  he  is,  at  the  same 
time  driven  to  state  that  knowledge  about  is  contingent 
both  because  it  is  derived  from  an  encounter  situation  and 
because  it  inherits  the  incompleteness  of  primary  experience. 
If  this  holds  true  in  the  sphere  of  object  perception,  how 
much  more  true  will  it  be  in  the  sphere  of  personal  and 
inter-personal  history!  O'le  can  expect  ::  erleau-Ponty's 
phenomenology  of  intersub  j  ec  ,  ivity  to  preserve  both  the 
primacy  of,  enco.  znter  and  the  partiality  of  "knowledge 
about"  . 
This  should  intro  duce  us  to  °'.  erleaii  pont  j'  s  most 
basic  concern;  it  is  a  primary  concern  of  this  study,  the 
description  of  human  perception  in  terms  of  life  with  others, 
his  phenomenology  of  intersubjectivity. 
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"THE  OTHER":  PEOPLE 
The  topic  is  posed  by  drawing  a  correlation  between 
the  world  of  nature  and  the  cultural  world. 
The  world  of  objects  has  within  it,  cultural  objects; 
the  latter  are  there  just  as  the  tree  or  the  sunset,  so 
that  the  world  I  live  in  is  a  mixture  of  the  human  and  the 
"natural". 
Just  as  nature  finds  its  way  to  the  core  of  my  personal 
life  and  becomes  inextricably  linked  with  it,  so  behav- 
iour  patterns  settle  into  that  nature,  being  deposited 
in  the  form  of  a  cultural  world.  Not  only  have  Ia 
physical  world,  not  only  do  I  live  in  the  midst  of  earth, 
air,  and  water,  I  have  around  me  roads,  plantations, 
villages,  streets,  churches,  implements,  a  bell,  a  spoon, 
a  pipe.  Each 
lone  spreads  round  it  an  atmosphere  of 
humanity  .. 
The  presence  of  a  human  world  implies  that  intersub- 
jectivity  must  become  a  phenomenological  problem.  It  is 
a  problem  in  this  sense:  the  presence  of  others  poses  the 
question  of  how  we  know  them,  and  they  us.  Merleau-Ponty 
is  clear  about  their  presence;  other  people  are  there  to  be 
known.  The  Lebenswelt  is  a  world  of  human  interchange. 
He  does  not  assume  that  his  affirmation  has,  as,  yet,  phil- 
osphical  value,  but  the  wort('  of  others  is  there;  how  are  we 
to  explicate  our  connection  with  it?  "The  cultural  world 
is  ambiguous,  but  it  is  alreaCy  present.  I  have  before  me 
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a  society  to  be  known.  "' 
In  a  more  obtuse  statement  of  the  issue,  he  says, 
"--how  can  the  word  'I'  be  put  into  the  plural,  how 
can  a  general  idea  of.  the  I  be  formed,  how  can  I  speak 
of  an  I  other  than  my  own,  how  can  I  know  that  there 
are  other  I's,  how  consciousness,  which  by  its  nature, 
and  as  self-knowledge,  is  in  the  mode  of  the  Ii  be 
grasped  in  the  mode  of  Thou,  and  through  this,  in 
the  world  of  the  'One'?  2 
The  clue  to  disentangling  the  problem  in  Phenomenology 
of  Perception  is  found  in  his  fundamental  category,  the  body; 
specifically,  it  is  his  interpretation  of  intentionality 
which  provides  the  opening  for  a  phenomenology  of  intersub- 
jectivity. 
This  observation  is  the  guide:  people's  form  of 
behavior  is  first  of  all  "childlike".  The  term  "childlike" 
should  remind  us  of  the  way  T,  Ierleau-Ponty  began  his  analysis 
of  sense  experience.  "Communion"  designated  the  subject's 
prereflective  transactions  with  sensible  objects;  it  was 
a  form  of  "faith",  the  unquestioned,  naive  form  of  perceptual 
experience.  The  present  term  is  parallel.  Bodily  conduct 
reveals  the  intersubjective  significance  of  intentionality 
and  its  childl*.  ke  form.  ,  erlea-u-Ponty  illustrate  an  T  -t. 
adult  playing  with  a  child  pretends  to  bite  the  child's 
hanc;  the  child  opens  its  mouth  in  imitation  of  the  act. 
"Biting",  he  says,  "has  immediately,  for  it,  and  inter- 
11bid., 
p.  348. 
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subjective  significance.  "'  The  intersubjective  impact  is 
the  immediate  conveyance  of  the  adult's  behavior  to  the 
child;  this  provides  the  clue  to  the  problem.  Merleau- 
Ponty  reviews  the  traditional  opposition. 
The  behaviorists'  interpretation  of  the  phenomenon 
is  that  perception  of  others  i's,  in  the  first  instance,  a 
behavioral  confrontation.  One  form  of  behavior  incites 
the  other's.  But  behavior  cannot  be  reduced  to  physical 
reflex;  the  child  does  not  pull  back  as  if  the  adult  will 
inflict  pain.  Merleau-Ponty  argues  that  the  adult's  inten- 
tion  is  perceived  by  the  child;  the  behaviorist  has  over- 
looked  this. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  adult's  intentions  are  not 
conceived;  there  is  little  sense  in  assuming  that  the  child 
makes  a  mental  note  of  the  biting  act  and  translates  it  as 
play  in  a  conscious  or  deliberative  manner.  Instead  of 
reaction  by  mental  association,  the  child  "reenacts"  the 
intentions  of  the  adult.  The  child's  body,  as  pre-reflec- 
tively  lived  by  him,  is  capable  of  biting  in  its  various 
modes  of  eating,  playing,  etc.  The  adult's  intentions  are 
perceived,  and  immediately  incite  the  response  of  the  other. 
The  adult's  world  slips  into  the  child's;  the  child  responds. 
An  important  concept  is  developed  to  express  the  notion 
1Ibid., 
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of  childlike  immediacy;  he  refers  to  it  as  the  "intentional 
vortex".  The  phrase  implies  that  a  given  individual's 
perceptual  field  swirls  outwards,  taking  other  people  into 
its  sphere  of  action.  The  world  for  us,  is  never  private; 
it  is  intersubjective.  The  intentional  vortex  should  remind 
us  of  . 
the.  notion  of  project;  the  individual  lives  in  a  world 
as  an  acting-interacting  being.  He  shapes  and  responds  to 
his  world  as  an  intentional  subject.  The  social  aspect  of 
intentionality  fills  in  the  meaning  of  project;  the  projects 
of  one  invade  those  of  another.  To  act  is  by  definition,  to 
interact  with  orthers. 
The  notion  of  vortex  infers  that  a  given  subject  is 
affected  by  others;  our  projects  are  influenced  and  modified 
by  the  presence  of  others.  Our  world  is  no  longer  merely. 
ours;  it  is  shared  by  others  and  their  projects  influence 
ours.  The  things  which  we  use  are  used  by  others.  A  fresh 
significance  is  added  to  the  notion  of  intentionality.  As 
we  elaborate  our  environment  so  others  become  involved  in 
and  interact  in  the  process  of  elaboration.  The  intentional 
vorte--  ip  a  notion  which  bear:  the  !  tann  of  plurality,  or 
better  yet,  of  sociality. 
These  prereflective  forms  of  e:  -per_ience  provire  I::  er- 
leau-Ponty  with  the  paradigm  for  dealing  with  the  problem 
of  knowing  others.  There  it  a  pre-established  system  of 
interaction  underlying  the  adult's  question,  "who  is  this 149 
other?  "  The  "basic  do  Kc-  "1  is  that  we  are  situated  in  an 
intersubjective  world,  where  interaction  is  the  norm.  The 
"adult"  question  of  knowing  others  is  dependent  upon  the 
fundamental  "childlike"  form  of  interaction.  Knowledge 
about  others  is  an  issue  only  because  we  encounter  others 
in  the  childlike  form.  Once  again,  as  we  found  with  the 
theory  of  the  body  and  object  perception,  pre-reflective 
intentionality  is  the  foundation  for  the  philosophical 
description. 
Moreover,  Merleau-Ponty  says,  "--in  reality,  it 
must  be  the  case  that  the  child's  outlook  is  in  some  way 
vindicated  against  the  adult's.  .  .,  and  that  the  unsoph- 
isticated  thinking  of  our  earliest  years  remains  as  an 
indispensible  acquisition  underlying  that  of  maturity,  if 
there  is  to  be  for  the  adult  one  single  intersubjective 
world.  "2 
There  can  be  little  doubt,  that  Merleau-Ponty  thinks 
the  encounter  form  is  central.  to  his  phenomenology.  What 
he  says  in  Phenomenoloy  of  Perception,  is  later  clarified 
and  developed.  :e  shall  review  hie  later  thought  to  see 
how  +':  is  suggestive  proposition  is  defended. 
1Ibid., 
p.  355. 
2Ibid. 
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resource  is  a  series  of  lectures  delivered  in  1960,  just  a 
year  before  his  death.  ' 
His  purpose  in  the  lectures  is  to  specify  the  phen- 
omenological  significance  of  intersubjective  experiences 
first  he  seeks  to  establish  an  adequate  relation  between  the 
intersubjective  forms  of  experience  and  his  theory  of  per- 
ceptual  activity;  secondly,  he  specifically  intends  to  see 
the  relation  between  intersubjectivity  and  the  acquisition  of 
language.  The  studies  utilize  experiments  in  psychology  but 
they  are  reviewed  for  the  sole  purpose  of  developing  an 
adequate  phenompnology. 
2  We  shall  see  that  the  intersub- 
jective  functions  as  more  than  an  appendage  in  phenomenology; 
it  operates  in  fact,  as  the  very  backbone  or  nerve  center 
for  the  whole. 
Else  Frankel-Brunswik's  article,  "Intolerance  of 
Ambiguity  as  an  Emotional  and  Perceptual  Personality  Variable", 
1These  lecturese  are  printed  in  the  followings  W  er- 
leau-Ponty,  °.  ".,  The  Primacy  of  Perception,  Edie,  James,  trans. 
Evanston,  T'orthwestern  Univ.  Press,  lo  t  pn.  a6  ff. 
20f  his  purpose  he  says,  ".  ..  recent  studies  have 
ten-'ed  to  --how  that  even  external  perception  of  sense  oual- 
ities  and  space--at  first  glance  the  most  disinterested, 
lea.  Fýt  e.  ffecti_ve  of'  all  the  functions--i, 
'  profoundly  modified 
by  the  personality  and  by  the  interner=tonal  relationships  in 
which  the  child  lives.  The  r,  ^cond  example  ha-)  to  do  with  the 
le_rnin7  of  language.  Certain  authors  show  that  there  is  a 
very  close  and  profound  relation  between  the  development  of 
language  and  the  configuration  of  the  human  environment  in 
which  the  child  develops.  "  Ibid..,  pp.  99-100.  The  points  he 
make:;  refine  the  theory  introciveed  in  Phenomenology  of  Per- 
ception;  his  thinking  here  is  at  its  finest,  most  mature 
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utilizes  experiments  made  on  fifteen  hundred  school-children 
between  the  ages  of  eleven  and  sixteen,  and  their  parents. 
This  clinical  study  is  I.  "erleau-Ponty's  prime  source.  1 
The  link  between  perceptual  activity  and  interper- 
sonal  environment  is  established  by  focusing  upon  the  con- 
dition  called  "psychological  rigidity".  Rigidity  is  described 
as  a  condition  in  which  the  subject  is  unable  to  make  fine 
distinctions  or  recognize  conflicting  conditions.  He  cannot 
accept  ambiguities  or  ambivalences  in  experience.  Rigidity, 
however,  is  but  the  symptom  of  an  underlying  difficulty;  it 
is  what  the  Freudians  call  a  "reaction  formation",  a  facade 
for  thinly  veiled  conflicting  attitudes  towards  parents, 
teachers,  or  peers.  To  illustrate:  when  given  question- 
aires  which  require  little  decision  making,  the  children's 
answers  indicate  that  parents  are  "perfect";  on  the  other 
hand  when  asked  to  list  who  they  would  take  with  them  to 
live  on  a  desert  island,  they  exclude  their  parents  from 
the  list.  Other  rigidity  traits  established  through  testing 
incluc'e  a  mania.  for  cleanliness,  the  acceptance  of  a  "dualism 
of  good  and  evil,  virtue  and  vice,  anal.  an  inflexible  con- 
ception  of  n  a:,  culinity  and  femininity.  "2 
1Vide.,  Elsa  Frankel-ßrunswik,  "Intolerance  of  Ambi- 
guity  as  an  Emotional  and  Perceptual  Personality  Variable", 
The  Journal  of  Personality,  Vol.  18,  Sept.,  1949,  pp.  108-143. 
2'ýerleau-Ponty,  rt".  ,  The  Primäcy  of  Perception,  p.  102. 152 
The  influence  for  such  rigid  perceptual  attitudes, 
Merleau-Ponty  believes,  comes  from  the  family  environment, 
and  indeed,  when  the  parents  were  tested,  traits  such  as 
authoritarianism,  excessive  reliance  upon  "training",  and 
strict  discipline,  were  characteristic.  The  correlation 
between  the  rigid  personality  traits  of  parents  and  those 
children  who  were  most  rigid  (one  hundred  twenty  were  "ex- 
treme"  cases)  is  easily  established.  There  is  he  thinks, 
a  link  between  the  affective  states  of  parent  and  child; 
the  correlations  are  convincing. 
rlerleau-Ponty  employs  this  correlation  in  asking, 
"how  the  type  of  personality  and  of  interpersonal  relations 
designated  by  the  term  'psychological  rigidity'  express 
themselves  in  the  anonymous  functions  of  external  percep- 
tion.  "1 
All  students  were  shown  films  in  which  the  image  of 
a  dog  is  slowly  transformed  into  that  of  a  cat.  The  severely 
rigid  children  saw  no  transforiiation;  subtle  changes  were  not 
recorded.  'v::  erleau-Ponty  observes  that  the  psychologically 
rigid  child  is  adverse  to,  or  incapable  of  altering  the  first 
established  mode  of  perception.  Other  torts  confirmed  this 
view.  Rigid  students  viere  given  probble:  ne  in  which  a  parti- 
cular  method  of  solution  was  recommended;  later,  they  were 
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given  problems  which  appeared  similar  but  could  be  solved 
more  easily  by  another  method.  The  students  did  not  alter 
their  techniques.  Psychological  rigidity,  he  concludes, 
is  linked  to  perception  in  problem  solving.  In  summary, 
the  more  rigid  the  "reaction  formation",  i.  e.  the  more 
emotionally  disturbed  the  child,  the  less  able  he  is  to 
alter  his  reasoning  techniques  or  accept  change  in  perceptual 
situations.  Manifestly,  "emotional  ambivalence  is  what 
demands  the  denial  of  intellectual  ambiguity.  "1 
Merleau-Ponty  is  careful  that  his  interpretation 
will  not  be  construed  as  affirming  a  causal  sequence  between 
the  interpersonal  and  the  perceptual  spheres.  He  does  not 
say  that  intersubjective  influences(parent-child)  "cause" 
loss  of  perceptive  agility;  neither  does  he  hold  that  per- 
ceptual  rigidity  causes  psychologically  rigid  relationships. 
The  studies  do  not  show  this.  What  they  do  show  is  the  inti- 
mate  connection  between  interpersonal  relations  and  percep- 
tual  abilities.  The  intersubjective  sphere  may  not  deter- 
mine  perceptual  activity,  but  it  cannot  be  separated  from 
trat  srýhore.  The  two  interrelate. 
...  there  is  no  moment  at  which  you  could  grasp,  in 
a  pure  state,  his  way  of  perceiving,  completely  apart 
from  the  social  conditioning  that  influences  him. 
Inversely,  you  can  never  say  that  the  way  the  child 
1lbid.,  p.  105. 151{ 
structures  (met  en  forme)  his  social  environment  is 
unrelated  to  the  hereditary  or  constitutional  dispo- 
sitions  of  his  nervous  system.  ie  himself  is  the  one 
who  structures  his  surroundings. 
From  this  we  can  see  that  the  personal  activity  and 
the  interpersonal  exchange  are  of  equal  importance  to  Mer- 
leau-Ponty  in  describing  the  lived-world.  2  He  does  not 
try  to  assign  each  form  a  "percentage  of  importance';  and 
this  is  by  design.  He  wants  to  say  that  the  individual 
and  the  interpersonal  elements  cannot  be  given  proportional 
status  in  describing  human  activity;  they  are  present  in 
every  activity,  and  they  are  tied  together. 
This  is  not  the  first  instance  in  which  Merleau- 
Ponty  has  emphasized  the  significance  of  the  intersubjective, 
but  it  should  be  noted  that  the  interpersonal  sphere  here 
plays  a  pivotal  function  in  his  phenomenology.  This  helps 
correct  a  possible  misunderstanding  of  the  earlier  exposi- 
tions.  His  theory  of  the  body  in  Phenomenology  of  Perception 
seemed  to  "anchor"  all  descriptions  of  the  interpersonal;  the 
theory  of  intentionality  was  characteristically  discussed 
in  terns  of  hir  theory  of  the  body.  From  the  immediate 
tucy  we  can  cee  that  the  conceit  of  intentionality  is 
f  orm1..,.  la  ted  by  two  i  m-oortent  factors.  The  interpersonal 
shapes  the  individual's  domain  anc'  visa  versa.  It  is  much 
1Ibid.,  p.  113. 
2". 
..  the  two  orders  are  not  distinct;  they  are 
part  and  parcel  of  a  single  global  phenomenon.  Ibid. 155 
more  evident  from  this  study  that  i  ,  ierleau-Ponty  recognizes 
the  fundamental  importance  of  both  elements  in  his  phenomen- 
ology  of  perception. 
Additional  descriptions  of  the  link  between  affectiv- 
ity  and  language  acquisition  provide  further  evidence  for 
this  position.  His  examples  are  introduced  by  the  generally, 
accepted,  psychological  observation,  that  the  second  year  of 
childhood  is  the  sensitive  period  for  learning  language.  If 
the  child  has  no  "linguistic  model  to  imitate,  "1  he  will 
have  difficulty  speaking  as  others  do.  Children  forcibly 
separated  from  parents  at  this  age  often  fail  to  gain  normal 
speech  habits  in  later  life.  "This  allows  us  to  presume  that 
there  will  be  a  profound  link  between  the  acquisition  of 
language  (which  would  seem  to  be  a  strictly  intellectual 
operation)  and  the  child's  place  in  the  family  environment.  "2 
His  example,  concerns  the  study  of  jealousy  in  a 
"middle"  child.  1,  W1hen  the  new  baby  is  brought  home  the  child 
shows  definite  signs  of  linguistic  regression.  Only  a  new 
icentification  with  the  olýer  brother  seems  to  counter  this 
remression;  the  older  brother  gives  him  a  new  sense  of  his 
role  in  the  family  by  teaching  him  to  be  the  "older"  brother 
1Ibid., 
p.  109.  Lis  resource  for  this  and  the  follow-  ing  illustrations  is  the  article  by  Francois  Rostand  "Gram- 
maire  et  affectivit4"  ,  Revue  Francais  de'Psychanalyse,  Vol.  14.,  April-June,  1950,  pp.  299-310. 
1. 
2i, 
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in  relation  to  the  new-born.  When  a  fourth,  even  older 
child  comes  to  stay  with  the  family,  the  middle  child  is 
further  aided  in  learning  the  relativity  of  "younger"  and 
"older"  roles  in  the  family.  He  learns  during  this  period 
to  talk  in  past,  present,  and  future  terms.  IJerleau-Ponty 
notes  with  interest  that  the  child's  linguistic  schema 
develop  markedly;  the  child  expresses  himself  in  new  terms: 
"I  have  been  the  youngest,  but  I  am  the  youngest  no  longer, 
and  I  will  become  the  biggest.  "1 
That  there  is  an  intimate  connection  between  inter- 
personal  environment  and  linguistic  acquistion  is  obvious 
to  IIerleau-Ponty.  The  child  learns  to  master  words  in  new 
ways  as  he  responds  to  his  new  environment.  Again,  there 
is  no  causal  pattern  suggested;  no  final  sorting  of  the 
interplay  between  environment  and  linguistic  development 
is  possible.  But  the  interplay  between  the  two  indicates 
that  language  acquisition  is  a  matter  of  more  than  intell- 
ection;  it  is  inserarable  fron  interpersonal  environment. 
sum,  the  irtellectu.,  -.  J.  elaboration  of  the  world  is 
cc  tantl;  T  ^u  porte  b;  r  the  affective  elalý  _orý, 
tion  of  r  f  o,,  i 
ii-iterhun,  an  relations.  7r  e  use  of  lin7ui_st3.  c  tools  is  TMas- 
tc  ýýec'  in  the  play  of  forces  t'  at  constilute  the  ubjcct'  s 
1Ibid.,  p.  113. 157 
relations  to  his  human  surroundings.  "1 
These  observations  lead  Merleau-Ponty  to  formulate 
a  personal,  historical  pattern  when  describing  human  per- 
ceptual  development.  He  believes  that  a  developmental 
pattern  can  be  explicated  that  makes  sense  of  the  above 
mentioned  interplay  of  forces.  Specifically,  he  addresses 
himself  to  the  relation  between  interpersonal  exchange  and 
self-awareness. 
Phenomenology  of  Perception  refers  to  the  interplay 
as  a  "system".  This  was  suggestive  but  we  found  little 
material  describing  that  "system".  As  we  said,  it  is  easily 
taken  that  his  theory  of  the  body  is  the  basis  for  a  theory 
of  intersubjectivity;  the  article  under  scrutiny  has  not 
enforced  that  view.  We  noted  that  intersubjectivity  is 
linked  to  the  development  of  bodily  perception  and  language, 
not  as  a  "cause",  but  as  an  important  factor.  The  "system" 
as  presently  elaborated,  gives  the  individual  and  the  inter- 
personal  equal  placement. 
"le  s:  -lall  see  in  the  following  discussion,  even  more 
weight  given  to  the  intersubjective  nexus.  It  becomes  the 
central  element  in  his  phenomenology  of  the  lived-world. 
This  does  not  mean  that  his  theory  of  the  body  is  replaced 
or  subordinated;  it  means  that  bodily  intentionality  is 
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itself  understood  as  being  infused  with  the  intersubjective 
element.  This  was  implicit  in  the  first  part  of  the  article; 
it  is  now  made  clearer. 
Periods  in  the  child's  development  can  be  organized. 
The  earliest  period  is  characterized.  by  a  state  of  "pre- 
communication";  the  new-born  child  is  unaware  of  itself  as 
being  a  separate  entity  in  the  world.  Its  attitude, 
... 
is  the  attitude  of  a  me  which  is  unaware  of 
itself  and  lives  as  easily  in  others  as  it  does  in 
itself--but  which  being  unaware  of  others  in  their 
separateness  as  well,  in  truth  is  no  more  conscious 
of  them  than  of  itself.  1 
'Syncretic  sociability",  a  term  used  by  Henri  Wallon, 
also  describes  this  period.  2  That  is,  the  child  does  not 
distinguish  himself  from  others.  The  consciousness  of  the 
body  is  at  first  fragmentary  and  is  only  gradually  inte- 
grated;  the  consciousness  of  others  is  at  first  a  sense  of 
well-being  in  the  baby  and  changes  only  with  the  beginnings 
of  the  exttoceptive  function.  This  first  period  is  important 
in  both  the  physiological  anc  phenomenological  sense.  Physi- 
ologically,  the  baby's  environment  is  shaped  by  the  care  it 
is  given,  v-armth,  milk,  anc  holding.  Phenorrenologica.  lly 
speaking,  the  baby's  life  is  incomplete  apart  from  the  care 
of  others;  it  never  lives  as  a  completely  independent  bein  a. 
Though  there  is  no  awareness  of  this  on  the  child's  part, 
the  intersubjective  field  raust  be  seen  as  a  fundamental 
1Ib?  d.,  p.  119. 
2Vide. 
,  Wallon,,  Henri,  Iles  on  dues  du  caractere  chez  l'  enfant,  Ta.  ris,  1040.  . 159 
factor  in  life-sustenance  and  influence. 
The  period,  generally  from  six  months  onwards,  is 
characterized  by  the  gradual  deliniation  of  self  as  a 
separate  entity;  it  is  also  described  as  a  period  of 
"incontenent  sociability",  a  term  coined  by  Henri  Wallon.  1 
This  term  for  sociability  refers  to  the  near  explosion  of 
the  child's  curiosity  about  others,  its  imitation  and  explor- 
ation  of  the  other's  body,  its  alertness  to  expressions  and 
general  environment.  The  importance  of  sociability  can  be 
seen  in  the  following:  the  experience  of  beholding  others 
in  a  mirror  teaches  the  child  about  his  own  body. 
let  us  begin  by  considering  not  the  child's  image  of  his 
own  body  in  the  mirror  but  instead  the  image  he  has  of 
other's  bodies.  One  notices,  in  effect,  that  he  acquires 
the  latter  much  more  rapidly,  that  he  distinguishes 
much  more  quickly  between  the  other's  specular  image 
and  the  reality  of  the  other's  body  than  he  does  in  the 
case  of  his  own  body.  Thus  it  is  possible  that  the 
experience  he  has  of  the  other's  specular  image  helps 
him  arrive  at  an  understanding  of  his  own. 
The  child  is  taught  gradually  be  means  of  intersub- 
jective  interchange  to  become  aware  of  his  own  body.  Using 
the  mirror  experiments,  Merleau-Ponty  argues  that  a  kind  of 
"reduction"  become  operative. 
3  The  child  first  distinguishes 
1Merleau-Ponty,  M.,  The  Primacy  of  Perception,  p.  125. 
2Ibid., 
p.  127.  He  refers  to  the  experiments  of  Henri  Wallon,  oE.  cit.  and  Thiery  Wilhelm  Preyer,  The  Mind 
of  the  Child,  trans.,  H.  W.  Brown,  New  York,  1893. 
3This  Husserlian  term  is  not  used  as  a  philosophical 
term  in  the  present  context;  "distinction"  would  have  been 
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between  the  image  in  the  mirror  and  the  other's  body.  He 
separates  "the  real  from  the  reflection"  first  with  others, 
then  with  himself.  The  important  point  is  that  in  this 
"intellectual"  operation,  contact  with  others  is  vital;  it 
is  the  intersubjective  encounter  which  aids  the  child's 
perception  of  his  own  body.  The  beginnings  of  self-aware- 
ness  are  intimately  tied  to  human  interchange. 
It  is  important  to  understand  that  the  child's 
"reduction"  or  act  of  differentiation  is  not  a  rational 
abstraction,  particularly  when  we  speak  of  it  with  refer- 
ence  to  the  development  of  self-awareness.  Contact  with 
others  should  not  be  understood  as  a  "context"  which  incites 
a  subsequent  intellectual  maneuver.  The  intersubjective 
environment  is  "an  actual  structure  in  its  own  right.  "' 
Namely,  it  is  more  than  a  condition  for  self-awareness; 
interchange  is  the  ay  that  self-awareness  comes  about. 
Self-awareness  is  doubtless  the  child's  own  accomplishment, 
but  he  accomplishes  it  with  another. 
A  helpful  illustrative  image  is  that  of  the  physician 
or  mid-wife  attending  a  birth.  The  mid-wife  aids  the  expec- 
tant  mother  in  delivery;  birth  is,  phenomenologically  speaking, 
a  cooperative  venture  of  all  concerned.  Without  interchange 
the  birth  is  in  jeopardy.  With  it,  there  is  the  prospect 
1Merleau-Ponty,  M.,  The  Primacy  of  Perception,  p.  140. 161 
of  a  healthy  child  and  mother.  So  with  the  development  of 
self-awareness.  Others  aid  what  the  child  does  to  gain  a 
conscious  perception  of  self.  The  reduction  is  the  acknow- 
ledgnnent  of  the  other  as  "over  there"  and  the  simultaneous 
recognition  that  "I  an  here".  The  exchange  not  only  provides 
a  context  for  perceptual  activity;  it  is  an  integral  part  of 
the  process  of  growing  self-awareness. 
Merleau-Ponty  adds  that  we  can  readily  see  why  the 
childhood  state  is  never  completely  put  away  or  replaced. 
The  "adult"  notion  that  consciousnesses  are  totally  isolated 
entities  is  betrayed  by  the  occurences  in  later  life  of  sym- 
pathy  or  transitivism.  Merleau-Ponty  describes  transitivism 
as  a  relapse  into  childhood,  the  point  being  that  we  never 
completely  put  away  the  syncretic  or  incontinent  sociability 
of  the  early  years.  In  a  similar  vein,  intersubjective 
environment  can  be  expressed  in  healthy  responses  of  sympathy. 
The  child's  growth,  his  distinctions  between  "me  and  the 
other"  are  as  "fragile  and  variable  as  are  our  affective 
relation;  t%rith  others  and  with  tl,.  c=  world.  1+1 
'his  doec  not  mean  that  gen.  ýine  intellectual  activity 
i  denigrated  by  'ý-'erleau-Poni;  y.  Intellection,  or  what  he 
calls  the  act  of  reduction,  is  the  bn7inning  of  sophisti- 
cation  and  will  be  develo-zýcd  . Tuch  further,  given  normal 
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growth,  and  its  development  goes  hand  in  hand  with  the  modes 
of  sociability,  or  intersubjectivity.  Intersubjectivity 
continues  to  play  a  structuring  role  in  the  development  of 
the  intellect. 
Reciprocity  is  a  structure  in  adult  life  as  well  as 
in  childhood;  his  comments  on  adult  love  illustrate  this 
beautifully. 
Could  one  conceive  of  a  love  that  would  not  be  an 
encroachment  on  the  freedom  of  the  other?.  ..  There 
is  a  paradox  in  accepting  love  from  a  person  without 
wanting  to  have  any  influence  on  her  freedom.  If  one 
loves  one  finds  one's  freedom  precisely  in  the  act  of 
loving,  and  not  in  vain  autonomy.  To  consent  to  love 
or  be  loved-is  to  consent  also  to  influence  somebody 
else,  to  decide  to  a  certain  extent  on  behalf  of  the 
other.  To  love  is  inevitably  to  enter  into  an  undivided 
situation  with  another. 
Intimacy  and  trust  are  adult  forms  of  intersubjective 
relations,  and  Merleau-Ponty  believes  they  play  a  major  role 
in  the  individual's  perception  of  himself.  Though  there  is 
preciously  scant  exposition  of  these  particular  forms  it 
should  be  obvious  that  intersubjective  modalities  continue 
to  shape  concepts  of  individual  consciousness. 
T_iis  can  be  seen  also  with  the  fo?..?  s  of  alienation. 
ýicparit  r  can  occur  between  per^ons  because  one  cannot  fully 
: cýorý  the  fcelin  s  of  the  other.  The  lack  of  "knot  lec'ge  about" 
however,  e:  -  ?  st.  s  onl'r  bee,  -.  USA'  one's  'nor^ona  i  sphere 
has  ^lrear5y 
been  invaded  by  the  other. 
1Jbid. 
i  ?.  94. 
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The  normal,  and  non-pathological  attitude  consists 
in  having  confidence  above  and  beyond  what  can  be 
proved,  in  resolutely  skirting  those  doubts  that  can 
be  raised  about  the  reality  of  the  other's  sentiments 
by  means  of  the  generosity  of  the  praxis,  by  means  of 
an  action  that  proves  itself  in  being  carried  out.  1 
The  adult  capacity  for  self-differentiation  is  not 
complete  in  itself;  the  intersubjective  is  not  only  a  struc- 
ture  shaping  the  child's  grasp  of  himself,  it  is  also  a  form 
in  which  adults  continue  to  know  themselves.  In  Merleau- 
Ponty's  terms,  the  childlike  forms  of  sociability  are  never 
put  away;  they  reassert  themselves  continually. 
The  intersubjective  form  is  a  primary  characteristic 
of  the  lived-world.  Individual  consciousness  is  infused  with 
the  forms  of  intersubjective  relationships.  Intentionality, 
therefore,  is  a  mixture  of  the  personal  and  the  interpersonal. 
It  is  evident  that  the  intersubjective  must  be  considered 
a  dominant  form  when  questions  about  adult  perception  are 
being  discussed.  The  interpersonal  is  a  major  form  of  living 
for  the  adult  as  for  the  child;  the  social  is  a  primary 
source  for  "knowledge  about". 
Taken  as  _,  _erleau-Ponty  presented  it,  this  latest 
position  rest,  upon  an  interpretation  of  human  growth  or 
evelo3-l  r:  °n  e  u-t3_lizes  ccc  t  ancý  clinical  e:  perimentc  to 
trace  the  ('evelopment  of  ri.  ýr~a.  ^  conscious  mess  from  childhood 
to  Maturity.  The  theory  of  the  intersubjective  form  is  presented 
1Ibid..  It  is  the  forms  of  trust,  love,  and  alienation 
we  shall  return  to  in  our  concluding  chapter.  Their  further 
exposition  is  an  important  key  to  a  phenomenology  of  the  inter- 
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as  a  dominant  form  because  human  growth  indicates  it.  Is 
this  an  effective  means  for  demonstrating  a  phenomenological 
position?  We  cannot  answer  that  question  fully  at  this  point, 
but  one  observation  should  be  made.  Any  theory,.  of  human 
consciousness  which  disregards  evidence  which  can  be  accrued 
from  the  study  of  human  development  would  face  the  indictment 
of  being  "high  altitude  thinking".  That  is,  it  would  pit 
phenomenological  theory  against  other  disciplines,  especially 
psychology  which  employs  theories  of  growth.  This  seems 
unnecessary.  Saying  this,  I  an,  aware  that  phenomenological 
theory  cannot  depend.  solely  upon  such  evidence  and  this  will 
be  emphasized  when  we  look  at  the  method  of  phenomenology. 
The  investigations  of  phenomenology  cannot  be  confined  to 
gaining  evidence  fron  ±sychology  or  any  other  discipline. 
But  neither  can  we  disrc,  aarý"  such  evidence.  The  question 
of  the  adequacy  of.  i'_erleau-Ponty's  theory  will  be  taken  up 
after  we  gain  further  perspectives  on  method. 
3.:.  J  ARY  A1,  ß.  Q:  ýS_,  RVATIOi  s 
Our  an.:  ý.  lysis  of  r.  rlea?.  z-ý  ontýý'  -  3tuf-y  of  the  relation 
belcween  --an  en(f  otherc  and  its,  Dhenomcrol_otrical  ^i_,  mni  ficance 
lea.  is  to  the  followin.;  ob,  %erve.  ti_ons.  '.  %Ten  v,  e  re-iiemher  that 
he  addressed  an  audience  of  philosophers  and  we  in  turn  sought 
to  obtain  a  more  philosophically  credible  view  of  the  inter- 
human,  guidelines  can  be  folloited  in  outlining  his  contribution. 165 
In  general  terms  Merleau-Ponty  demonstrates  that  social 
existence  plays  a  central  role  in  the  quest  for  knowledge. 
In  particular  he  aids  us  in  developing  a  credible  connection 
between  encounter  and  knowledge  about  encounter;  the  rela- 
tion  is  best  described  as  derivative;  and  can  be  summarized 
as  follows.  The  specific  character  of  experience,  which 
serves  as  the  foundation  for  reflection,  is  communion.  We 
suggest  that  encounter  is  an  equally  appropriate  term  even 
when  it  is  not  identified  with  Buber's  typology.  We  know 
about  others,  Tdierleau-Ponty  says,  because  we  interact  with 
or  encounter  them.  What  we  can  know  is  deeply  rooted  in 
the  kind  of  relationships  we  have.  It  is  this  aspect  of  his 
thought  that  is  so  instructive. 
It  infers  that  a  phenomenology  of  intersubjectivity 
must,  first  of  all,  be  attentive  to  the  phenomenon  of  en- 
counter  in  all  its  diversity  and  complexity. 
Early  works  of  Dt.  erleau-Ponty'  s  did  not  establish 
the  intersubjective  a.  a  primary  form  although  it  was  cer- 
tainly  a  component  in  his  notion  of  the  lived-world.  We 
outlined  the  early  po  lition  because  it  i^  evident  to  me 
that  a  rhenonenology  of  the  bogy  9.  s  important  in  building 
an  epistemology.  It  cannot  be  left  to  speculation  how  vie 
become  Self-aware.  gut  a  "erleau-Ponty's  thought  developed 
he  became  convinced  that  social  existence  and  the  human 
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between  subjects  came  into  the  limelight  increasingly  as 
he  studied  the  phenomenon  of  self-consciousness;  he  sought 
to  describe  how  the  two  related.  In  his  most  detailed  study 
of  human  growth  we  saw  how  the  intersubjective  became  a 
dominant  theme  in  the  development  of  self-consciousness. 
In  "The  Child's  Relation  to  Others"  the  human  sub- 
ject  is  described  as  a  social  creature,  and  this  is  so  in 
the  context  of  an  encounter  form  of  living.  Studies  of 
early  childhood  disclose  that  sociality  is  the  primary  form 
of  pre-reflective  activity;  intentionality,  as  well  as  t,  Ter- 
leau-Ponty's  broad  notion  of  the  lived-world,  become  infused 
with  the  theme  of  sociality. 
of  describing  the  lived-world. 
Sociality  becomes  a  major  way 
With  the  importance  of  human 
exchange  established  during  the  child's  first  years,  it  is 
described  as  remaining  a  fundamental  structuring  factor  for 
perception  in  later  years.  As  P.:  erleau-Ponty  sees  it,  the 
human  subject  is  always  party  to  exchanges  from  which  "know- 
ledge  about"  is  born. 
The  lesson  shoul?  be  clear.  If  one  is  to  attempt 
iArri'tin^  a  crec'ib1e  episte-rolo  y  he  rust  place  the  xiher_o_enon 
o"  hum  1n  e:  rchan  ;e  at  the  T"o,  u  Y'ation  level  of  reflective  know- 
led-97e.  In  terrlc  of  our  n»ore  3necific  oue;  -tion  it  becomes 
cleýirer  than  before  juxt  how  central  the  phenomenon  of 
interaction  is,  in  claims  to  know  about  others.  It  will  be 
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God  will  refer  back  to  our  life  with  others,  and  particu- 
larly  our  encounter  forms  of  living.  The  importance,  of 
the  encounter  mode  could  not  have  been  stressed  more  forcibly. 
I...  ierleau-Ponty  became  a  phenomenologist  of  intersubjectivity, 
certainly  in  his  later  work. 
But  Merleau-Ponty  was  never  able  to  write  the  parti- 
culars  of  a  phenomenology  of  intersubjectivity;  no  typology 
was  ever  created  which  articulated  various  forms  of  inter- 
action.  He  intended  to  write  on  this  as  we  shall  see  below, 
but  because  he  did  not  execute  the  particulars,  we  are  not 
able  to  construct  meaningful  comparisons  between  him  and 
Buber  or  Hepburn.  "_'his  limits  our  ability  to  say  e.  g.  how 
a  particular  mode  of  interaction  bears  upon  knowledge  about 
the  other.  We  should  remind  ourselves,  however,  that  we  did 
not  set  out  to  describe  exhaustively  a  particular  form,  such 
as  the  interhuman.  We  set  out  to  answer  whether  or  not  such 
a  form  bears  upon  our  l  owledge  of  others  and  upon  faith  in 
God,  and  if  so,  how  it  should  be  understood  in  philosophical 
ter-ms.  shall  hol:?  our  conrient  on  the  ontological  and 
t'ieoloMical  implications  for  the  ne:  -t  chapter  and  for  our 
conclud.  inr  chapter;  but  we  can  make  an  appraisal  of  the 
function  of  a  nhenomenology  of  intersubjectivity  for  know- 
lege  about  others  here. 
The  importance  of  social  encounter  so  well  cited  by 
L.  erleau-Ponty  teaches  that  description  of-forms  which  con- 
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chan  ge  is  both  necessary  and  instrumental  in  making  claims 
to  know  about  others.  We  are  taught  to  deal  with  knowledge 
about  others  in  a  fairly  specific  context,  I  think. 
Knowledge  about  others  has  a  derivative  or  subordin- 
ate  significance.  We  appreciate  L?  erleau-Ponty`  s  argument 
that  subjects  know  about  one  another  in  light  of  their  en- 
counters.  In  plain  terms,  knowledge  about  others  will  be 
described  in  terms  of  encounters  or  relationships  in  which 
we  play  a  part.  It  will  not  be  a  third-person  description, 
but  an  "I-other"  oriented  description.  This  does  not  pre- 
clude  a  "we-other"  context  but  the  requirement  in  any  des- 
criptiön  is  that  we  remain  party  to  the  description.  To 
say  that  knowledge  about  has  phenomenological  significance 
is  to  admit  that  it  grows  out  of  experiential  modalities, 
i.  e.  our  lived-world. 
The  first  inference  to  be  made  from  this  insight  is 
that  certainty  is  by  and  large  eschewed  in  any  description 
of  our  knowledge  about  othcrc.  Cn  the  one  hand  we  can  say 
wit,  Hepburn  that  i:  nowler-ge  : Wollt  coe'ý  have  "chocking  DZ  o- 
cep  urcc"  an'  he  avior  iS  certainly  a  norm  for  chc-ckinc  the 
nature  or  FAgmif'ic  nce  of  encounter..  ?  lit  we  cannot  rely 
ur,  o^ 
behavior  or  anýT  other  chcc'_  in?  -rrocedure  to  demon^trate 
for  certain  that  a  relationship  is  thus  and  so.  We  can  only 
look  to  it  as  an  expression  of  the  encounter  mo'?  e;  we  can 
not  conclude  that  o'ir  knowledge  about  the  other  is  in  any 169 
way  independent  of  pre-reflective  interaction. 
A  better  context  for  using  behavior  as  a  checking 
procedure  is  thus  suggested.  It  is  that  behavior  is  itself 
an  encounter  mode,  and  that  what  we  see  in  it  as  a  factor 
for  making  judgments  is  our  own  deep  involvement  with  others 
as  social  subjects.  Just  as  behavior  has  a  pre-reflective 
dimension,  so  it  also  has  a  reflective  one,  the  latter  is 
rooted  in  the  former.  This,  -At  seems  to  me,  is  a  correction 
of  Hepburn's  view  that  behavior  is  a  primary  way  of  asserting 
knowledge  about  the  other. 
With  regard  to  Buber's  typology  one  comment  should 
suffice.  Merleau-Ponty  leaves  room  for  such  a  typology 
and  its  credibility  with  one  important  qualification.  Buber's 
I-Thou  form  cannot  be  accepted  on  the  basis  of  its  sheer 
appeal,  and  it  should  be  viewed  critically  because  Buber 
failed  to  integrate  knowing  with  reflective  knowledge.  Spec- 
ifically  he  failed  to  put  encounter  into  a  perceptual  con- 
text.  Our  study  of  Merleau-Ponty  makes  that  quite  clear. 
Encounter  is  interaction  at  the  perceptual  level.  When  it 
is  seen  as  a  perceptual  interaction,  however,  it  neither 
loses  its  force  as  a  possibly  non-manipulative  form  nor  does 
it  face  the  threat  of  mystical  typing  so  easily  presumed  about 
Buber.  Merleau-Ponty,  I  think,  would  have  expanded  and  refined 
this  proposition  had  he  lived  to  write  of  the  particular". 
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effort  this  far.  As  we  shall  see,  this  phenomenology  is 
expressible  in  ontological  terms  and  aids  us  in  approaching 
our  main  concern. CHAPTER  THREE 
PI  NO!.  LNCLOGICAL  ONTOLOGY 
ACID  ITS  BEARING  ON  TP.  IS,  -)U_!:  OF  TRAIISCL;  T,?  D  'PLACE 
"In  the  dark  night  of  thought  dwells  a 
glimmering  of  Being.  "I 
We  shall  divide  this  portion  of  the  study  into  two 
segments:  first,  we  shall  describe  Merleau-Ponty's  ontology 
as  a  phenomenologically  rooted  endeavor;  secondly,  we  shall 
attend  closely  to  what  he  says  about  the  issue  of  transcen- 
dence,  a  topic  that 
.  was  merely  introduced  in  the  foregoing 
chapters. 
Concerning  the  first  segment,  the  ontological  re- 
flections  of  Merleau-Fonty  cannot  be  capsuled  easily--for 
two  reasons.  lie  was  a  reluctant  expositor  of  ontology, 
perhaps,  because  he  thought  that  ontological  specialization  C.  D 
would  take  him  away  from  his  primary  concern;  every  early 
piece  is  intent  upon  interpreting  pre-reflective  experience, 
the  distinctive  nh,  _enomFnon  of  the  T.  ehensweit. 
_erleau-Ponty's  early  reDictance  to  Oo  ontolo,  ýy,  I 
trink,  -may  -ter  fror  ,.  tong;  c+ion  that  the  interr,  uhjective 
3n!  z2re  could  become  a  suborci.  ýa.  1,  e  theme  in  the  effort  to 
elýzciý'  +te  Erin=f.  ,.  his  may  "-e  srecul_,  '-t  c$  ,  hit  it  i^  not 
1i,  erleau-Ponty,  '.  ,  ýiwl  s,  ..  cCleary,  R.  ,  trans. 
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speculation  that  he  believed  the  science  of  pure  ontology 
was  "high  altitude  thinking".  1  When  he  eventually  concen- 
trates  on  the  question  of  "Being",  it  will  be  by  retaining 
his  early  committment  to  phenomenology,  and  specifically 
to  the  intersubjective  nature  of  the  lived-world.  We  shall 
see  this  in  the  ensuing  analysis  of  "Eye  and  Mind",  the 
collection  of  writings  entitled  The  Visible  and  the  Invis- 
ible,  and  in  a  very  brief  comment  in  a  working  note  of 
February  1959.2  All  indicate  this  perspective.  His  ontology 
will  be  a  "phenomenological  ontology";  it  will  never  be 
construed  as  a  self-contained  sphere  of  discourse. 
One  consequence  is  that  there  is  no  system  to  his 
ontology.  The  ontology  arises  from  reflections  upon  the 
diverse  phenomena  in  experience,  and  what  structure  there 
is  in  his  thinking  cannot  be  called  systematic.  His'obser- 
vations  are  at.  best,  heuristic,  rather  than  systematic; 
the  reluctance  to  write  an  ontological  system  remained  to 
the  end.  Though  this  makes  his  thoughts  more  difficult  to 
analyze,  it  is  a  perspective  we  may  soon  appreciate. 
"1Vide.  ,  :,  »Ierleau-Ponty,  M.,  The  Primacy  of  Perception, 
pp.  160-161  and  rvlerleau-Ponty,  I.,  The  Visible  and  the  Invis- 
ible,  Lingis,  Alphonso,  trans.  Evanston,  Northwestern  Univ. 
Press,  1968,  the  Editor's  Forward,  Claude  Lefort,  ed.,  p.  XXV. 
2"Results  of  Ph.  P.  --Necessity  of  bringing  them  to 
ontological  explicitation.  "  Merleau-Ponty,  M.,  The  Visible 
and  the  Invisible,  p.  183. 173 
A  second  reason  for  difficulties  in  analysis  is  that 
i,!  erleau-Ponty  died  before  his  ontological  reflections  were 
ready  for  publication.  We  are  left  with  unfinished  texts 
and  working  notes;  only  "Eye  and  I"ind"  reached  publication 
before  his  death  and  it  cannot  be  taken  as  a  final  statement 
of  his  position.  1.  Such  a  circumstance  is  assuredly  lamentable 
for  the  analyst. 
Still,  the  material  now  published  does  present  the 
thought  of  T  rIerleau-Ponty'  sufficiently  to  permit  an  outline 
of  his  ontology.  We  shall  not  attempt  to  spell  out  what  he 
might  have  said,  had  he  lived  longer;  what  he  did  say  about 
phenomenological  ontology  will  aid  us  considerably  to  see 
its  bearing  upon  the  issue  of  transcendence. 
,:  erleau-Ponty  did  not  make  a  smooth  transition  to 
ontology  after  writing  Phenomenology  of  Perception;  there 
are  imaginative  and  provocative  articles  which  precede  "Eye 
and.  i,  1ind"  and  The  Visible  and  the  Invisible.  But  it  strikes 
the  reader  that  he  looked  back  to  that  first  major  work  in 
writing  these  last  pieces,  seeing  the  reed  for  further 
explication.  Charter  One  of  Part  Two  explained  t  erleau- 
ron-ur's  concern  to  interrogate  the  perceptive  act,  to  give 
a  pheno-  enologica1  answer  to  trr  problem  of  the  "in-itself 
I  "Eye  and  f,:  ind"  was  a  preliminary  statement  to  be  included  in  the  second  part  of  The  Visible  and  the  Invisible. 
See  Derleau-Ponty,  M.,  The  Primacy  of  Perception  p.  150 174 
for  us".  The  lived-world  is  fundamentally  a  pre-reflective 
transaction  between  the  seer  and  the  seen,  the  sentient  and 
the  sensible.  Verleau-Ponty  did  not  reject  this  notion  of 
transaction  in  the  ontological  writings  but  he  did  refine 
it.  The  effort  to  refine  his  phenomenology  partially  ex- 
plains  how  he  came  to  regard  his  phenomenology  as  having 
ontological  dimensions.  We  shall  explain. 
Whereas  we  may  characterize  the  early  notion  as  a 
"transaction"  between  the  perceiver  and  the  perceived,  his 
later  concepts  require  other  terms.  "Entrelacs  et  chia.  sme", 
the  title  of  a  most  important  chapter  of  ontological  writing, 
illustrates  his  effort  to  refine  the  early  phenomenology. 
Entrelacs  refers  to  the  patterns  of  knotwork  in  embroidery, 
chia.  sme  to  networks  or  crossed  lines;  both  are  metaphors 
suggesting  a  manifold  network  of  relationships  between  the 
perceiver  and  the  perceived.  1  By  this  title,  Merieau- 
Ponty  seeks  to  explicate  man's  relation  to  the  world  as  a 
subtle  complex  of  interchanges;  more  complex  than  a  trans- 
action,  it  is  the  perceiver's  many-faceted  participation  with 
things  and  others  in  the  world. 
Even  more  is  involved.  Though  the  human  subject  is 
always  distinguished  from  "the  other",  the  phenomenologically 
1Entrelacs  et  chiasme  is  translated  "intertwinings 
and  chiasm",  by  Alphonso  Lingis,  the  translator  of  The 
Visible  and  the  Invisible,  See  Chapter  IV. 175 
oriented  thinker  sees  that  the  orders  of  subject  and  object 
need  to  be  "broken  down".  Contrary  to  Sartre,  the  for-itself 
and  the  in-itself  are  not  completely  separate  structures  for 
V!  erleau-Ponty;  as  we  shall  see,  the  concept  of  networks 
illustrates  his  continued  effort  to  force  distinctions  in  concepts 
of  massive  being.  The  subject-object  typology  is  a  rigid 
categorization  which  crumbles  under  a  serious  examination 
of  experience. 
1  It  introduces  us  to  the  ontology. 
How  does  Merleau-Ponty  describe  intertwinings?  We 
shall  first  follow  his  discussion  of  the  relation  between 
the  toucher  and  the  touched.  Then  we  shall  see  the  networks 
he  seeks  to  explicate  between  the  seer  and  the  visible. 
Concerning  the  act  of  touching,  knowing  that  we  are 
beings  who  touch  is  a  primary  phenomenological  theme.  tier- 
leau-Ponty  still  calls  this  our  opening  onto  a  world.  He 
also  speaks  of  the  act  of  touching,  in  terms  of  our  being 
"touched"  by  the  object.  The  object's  course  or  smooth 
texture  is  given  to  u,  co  that  we  become  the  touched  as 
well  as  the  toucher.  Our  bor'iiy  activity  is  affected  by 
touching  the  hot  store,  or  the  furry  rug-.  Phenoraenolo^ically 
speaking,  we  are  "objects"  in  this  occult  transference.  ? 
1Vide, 
,: 
ible,  p.  130. 
,.  erleau-Fon-ey,  L_.  '  The  Visible  an,  -'  the  Invis- 
2This  notion  is  a  refinement  of  the  idea  of  "presen- 
tation"  introduced  in  Phenomenology  of  Perception. 176 
Thirdly,  he  speaks  about  the  experience  of  touching  as  a 
"touching  of  the  touch".  1  It  is  a  relation  illustrated  by 
the  action  of  the  right  hend  grasping  our  left  hand  as  it 
touches  an  object.  In  this  third  dimension  of  the  tactile 
act,  we-are  simultaneously  the  "touching  subject"  and  we 
are  the  one  who  is  touched.  These  three  elements,  he  says 
are  experienced  simultaneously;  they  are  networks  which 
exist  in  the  single  phenomenon  of  touching. 
These  networks  are  the  thematic  structures  which 
pertain  to  the  pre-reflective  act.  The  rigidity  of  the  for- 
itself  and  the  in-itself  orders  break  down  if  one  attends 
to  the  event.  Even  more  important,  Merleau-Ponty  is 
suggesting  with  his  notion  of  networks  that  the  experiences 
of  the  touched  and  touching  belong  together.  They  are  part 
of  one  world;  they  are  "two  halves  of  an  orange".  2  Much 
will  be  made  of  this. 
It  is  the  phenomenon  of  seeing,  however,  that  inter- 
e7ts  :,  erleau-Ponty  most.  -:  pit  before  focusing  upon  seeing 
it.  is  necessary  to  cite  the  connection  between  touching 
and  seeing.  äi,  ey  for:  n  another  network  if  we  understand  his 
intentions. 
1.  erleau-Fonty,  :..  ,  The  Visible  and  the  Invisible, 
P.  133. 
21bid. 177 
We  must  habituate  ourselves  to  think  that  every  visible 
is  cut  out  in  the  tangible,  every  tactile  being  in  some 
manner  promised  to  visibility,  and  that  there  is  encroach- 
ment,  infringement,  not  only  between  the  touched  and  the 
touching,  but  also  between  the  tangible  and  the  visible, 
which  is  encrusted  in  it,  as,  conversely,  the  tangible 
itself  is  not  a  nothingness  of  visibility,  is  not  with- 
out  visual  existence.  Since  the  same  body  sees  and 
touches,  visible  and  tangible  belong  to  the  same  world.  1 
Once  this  intimate  connection  or  "common  world"  is 
recognized,  we  can  pass  to  a  discussion  of.  "t-he  seer  and  the 
seen",  and  do  so  More  knowledgably.  The  experience  serves 
to  support  the  notion  of  networks  he  seeks  to  convey.  It 
will  help  in  the  following  discussion  to  keep  in  mind  what 
we  have  previously  called  "presentation". 
What  is  the  "virtue  of  the  visible",  he  asks,  "that 
makes  it,  held  at  the  end  of  the  gaze,  nonetheless  much  more 
than  a  correlative  of  my  vision,  such  that  it  imposes  my 
vision  upon  me  as  a  continuation  of  its  own  sovereign  exis- 
tence?  "2  Such  questioning  leads  "L-Ponty  to  discuss 
the  notion  of  aale,  so  common  in  C  . artesian  thought.  His 
concern  is  to  "pit  rack,  into  the  object,,,  the  dualities 
C11  te-iari  thoU.  t  -tint  se-Qaratýr_  fron  it.  }'e  contends  that 
cu^liti  er,  a.  re  modes  o  -r  rr.  e.  eý  ;  ý.  tior.  -.  n,  --,.  arc,  not  inter"cOiate 
entities,  which  He  )etwPen  te  rercei-%,  (r  and  th  e  nercei_vo-O. 
11bi(. 
,  i).  134. 
using  the  model  of  the 
strate  his  care.  This 
writing  that  it  hardly 
one  reference  to  the  b, 
not  surprise  us. 
i  o'G  e 
body 
is  so 
bears 
: )dy  as 
that  :  erleau-Ponty  is  again 
as  an  intentional  being  to  demon- 
obvious  in  his  ontological 
mentioning.  When  we  meet  his 
the  exemplar  sensible,  it  should 
2  erleau-Ponte,  The  Visible  an-1  -the  Invisible,  ;,.  1  1. 178 
Color:  one  cannot  separate  it  from  the  object,  color 
presents  texture;  it  creates  identities,  introduces  depth, 
and  line.  (He  is  speaking  of  painting.  )'  Depth,  likewise, 
is  object  locality,  not  a  third  dimension  abstracted  by 
determining.  height  and  width.  The  thing  is  sought  by  vision 
in  terms  of  its  locality;  in  depth  the  visible  "comes  to 
itself"  before  the  viewer.  Line  also,  is  not  an  imitation 
of  the  visible  thing;  rather  it  is  the  thing  rendering  itself 
visible  before  us.  The  gaze,  or  perception,  is  captured 
by  the  visible  world;  the  painter's  secret  science  is  to 
"render"  the  visible  on  canvass.  His  vision  has  been  cap- 
tured  and  he  works  to  put  that  experience  in  visible  terms.? 
Three  points  can  be  abstracted  from  this  odd  form  of  de- 
scription;  -  first,  the  thing  reveals  itself  in  different  manners 
simultaneously  i.  e.  in  form,  color,  depth,  etc.  In  contrast 
to  Sartre's  concept  of  "massive  Teing",  I.  "erleau-Ponty 
attempts  to  capture  the  variation,  diversity  and  inter- 
changeableness  of  the  object's  presentation  to  conscious- 
ness.  ?  ho  thing  is  not  sirrrolyy  "ther^"  in  one  sin=rle  manner. 
p.  132.  See  aiso,  -'erleau-I-onty,  :..  ,  Sirns, 
2---  `Tice.  ,  e_rleau-Ponty,  a  c:  tine  lnvi  jhle 
.  .. 
e  sa  elseere, 
, 
ithe 
- 
;ýi. 
P5"  no  ot'ner  technique  than  what 
his  eyes  and  hands  discover  in  seeing  and  painting,  he  persists  in  drawing  from  this  world,  with  its  din  of  history's  glories 
and  scandals,  canvasses  which  will  hardly  add  to  the  angers  or  the  hopes  of  man--and  no  one  complains.  "  i,:  erleau-Ponty,  M.  ,  Si=mss,  p.  161. 179 
Each  mode  invades  another,  and  so  on;  every  mode  of  presen- 
tation  belongs  to  each  other.  Secondly,  the  visible  exerts 
force  upon  the  seer.  In  other  words,  the  visible  invades 
and  shapes  perception;  the  in-itself  is  not  separable  from 
its  "magic"..  -power  upon  consciousness.  Objects  "belong"  to' 
consciousness. 
Lastly,  'the  visible  "radiates""beyond  itself.  The 
particular  visible  is  a  network,  not  compassable  through 
any  one  mode  of  its  presentation  and  is  also  not  fully 
understood  as  an  in-itself  separate  from  other  things.  It 
is  an  expression  of  the  total  lived-world.  Merleau-Ponty 
almost  reverts  to  poetry  to  make  his  point  in  the  following. 
The  red  dress  a  fortiori  holds  with  all  its  fibers  onto 
the  fabric  of  the  visible,  and  thereby  onto  a  fabric  of 
invisible  being.  A  punctuation  in  the  field  of  red 
things,  which  includes  the  tiles  of  roof  tops,  the  flags 
of  gatekeepers  and  of  the  Revolution,  certain  terrains 
near  Aix  or  in  Madagascar,  it  is  also  a  punctuation  in 
the  field  of  red  garments,  which  includes,  along  with  it 
the  dresses  of  women,  robes  of  professors,  bishops  and 
advocate  generals,  aný  also  in  the  field  of  adornments 
and  that  of  uniforms. 
He  is  talking  obviously,  of  an  experience  which  is 
reminiscent  and  evocative  of  other  experiences.  The  bold- 
ness  of  his  statement,  however,  is  not  so  simply  captured. 
The  thing,  seen  in  its  color  not  only  "refers"  to  like  others; 
it  participates  in  forms  of  visibility  beyond  itself,  i.  e. 
the  particular  belongs  to  the  whole  and  vice  versa. 
1Merleau-Ponty,  M.,  The  Visible  and  the  Invisible  p.  132. 180 
This  last  point  is  not  entirely  new;  we  saw  previously 
how  perception  both  opened  onto  a  total  world,  and  assumed 
it  in  each  particular  situation.  The  new  element  is  the 
notion  of  "networks";  it  says  that  there  is  an  essential 
connection  between  experiences;  a  notion  of  universal  patterns 
is  being  introduced.  His  phenomenology  is  leading  him  to  make 
ontological  observations. 
The  networks  between  the  seer  and  the  seen,  between 
the  sentient  and  the  sensible,  have  revealed  what  Merleau- 
Ponty  calls  the  form  of  reversibility.  He  does  not  expound 
the  term  in  detail  but  it  is  evident  that  it  pertains  to  the 
peculiar  way  the  orders  of  subject  and  object  are  broken  down. 
Reversibility  is  a  phenomenological  form,  an  eidos  which  is 
given  its  life  by  the  experienced  world.  If  "networks"  is 
a  general  term  for  perceptual  experience,  reversibility  is 
the  peculiar  form  of  those  networks  and,  hence,  experience, 
The  toucher  is  also  the  touched,  the  seer  is  also  the  seen. 
The  orders  of  subject  and  object  are  at  least  partially  inter- 
.  an.,  1 
1'!.  t  rust  he  adý.  eci  that  reversibility  parallels  the  con- 
c  ýýcrceptt..  al  sýn-t  ýeý  is  in  one  important  respect.  As 
perceptual  synthesi7-  wa^  partial,  so  "reversibility  (i-!  ) 
;  -nminen'i  never  z 
i.. 
- 
ý'  reali  ry  "ý  a.  c  .,.  "  erleau-Ponty  el 
l  :".,  The  Visible  and  the  Invisible,  p.  147.  The  form  of  rever- 
sibility  is  never  complete  experientially;  I  think  Merleau- 
Ponty  means  by  this  that  we  can  never  be  in  any  final  sense, 
both  object  and  subject  in  the  lived-world.  The  form  of  rever- 
sibility  is  credible  in  his  mind  because  the  subject-order 
is  invadec'.  by  the  object-order,  though  it  is  never  completely 
taken  over. 181 
Merleau-Ponty  has  discussed  the  emergence  of  this 
eidos  in  terms  of  man's  perception  of  the  natural  world; 
reversibility  is  the  fundamental  truth  of  man's  perception 
of  the  thing.  There  is  no  great  transition  required  to  say 
that  it  is-also  the  fundamental  form  of  man's  relation  to 
other  men.  The  importance  of  reversibility  is  clearly  evi- 
dent  in  this  domain  as  well.  1.2erleau-Ponty  does  not  discuss 
intersubjective  experience  in  connection  with  reversibility, 
but  were  it  described  it  would  be  highly  reasonable  to  think 
he  would  have  related  intersubjectivity  to  the  notion  of 
reversibility  explained  here.  We  mention  it  here  because  it 
is  not  an  oversight  on  his  part;  he  died  before  the  material 
was  writtnn. 
1 
In  working  notes  he  gives  us  some  idea  of  what  shape 
the  discussion  would  have  taken. 
It  is  through.  it(reversibility)  alone  that  there  is 
passage  from  the  'For-Itself'  to  the  For  the  Oth:  r--In 
reality  there  is  neither  me  nor  the  other  as  positive 
subjectivities.  There  are  two  caverns,  two  opiennesses, 
two  stages  where  something  will  take  place--and  which2 
both  belong  to  the  same  world,  to  the  stage  of  Being. 
This  suggestive  passage  cannot  be  construed  as  anything 
more  than  a  notation,  an  indication  that  reversibility  will 
1: 
"any  working  notes  refer  to  his  intention  to  write 
on  intersubjectivity.  See  especially  :  r:  erleau-Ponty,  TJ,. 
The  Visible  and  the  Invisible,  p.  165. 
2Ibid.,  pp.  263-264. 182 
call  for  a  full  ontology. 
It  is  completely  credible  that  his  position  on  the 
childlike  character  of  intersu'ojective  encounter  would 
have  been  used  in  the  above  context. 
'  The  point,  if  made, 
would  have  been  obvious:  reversibility-is  the  way  we  exper- 
ience  the  other;  his  world  invades  ours,  and  ours,  his. 
There  is  exchange;  we  see  the  other  and  are  seen  by  him, 
we  touch  and  are  touched.  Moreover,  we  share  the  sane  world, 
and  in  this  sense  belong  to  each  other. 
What  the  concept  of  reversibility  does  make  plain  is 
that  the  connection  between  seer  and  the  visible  is  not 
accidental.  Intertwining  is  possible  only  because  we  are 
present  in  the  world,  not  simply  beholders  from  the  outside. 
erleau-Ponty  makes  an  introductory  observation  as  to  the 
ontological  character  of  reversibility.  It  is  a  key  comment 
and  we  quote  it  in  full. 
:  ence  without  even  entering  into  the  implications  proper 
to  the  seer  and  the  visible,  we  know  that,  since  vision 
is  a  palpation  with  the  look,  it  -must  also  be  inscribed 
in  the  order  of  being  that  it  discloses  to  us;  he  who 
looks  r'iist  not  hir"1^elf  be  f.  orei,  ^  i  to  the  world  that  he 
loo's  at.  As  soon  as  T  see,  it  is  necessary  that  the 
vision  (as  iss  so  well  indicated  by  the  double  meaninr, 
of  the  worms)  'tie  =  oixble  -a  core  limentzry  vision  or 
with  another  vision:  riyself  seen  from  without,  such  as 
L,.  1-1  othc  r  vi01;  1"  :,  ",:;  E  rye,  in  .  falle.:.  in  the  midst  of  the 
visible,  ocerpied  in  considering  it  from  a  certain  snot. 
oý-  -  ire  !  orient  we  -hall  not  e,  Tami-.  Ze  how 
. 
far  this  identity 
of  the  seer  and  the  visible  goes,  if  we  have  a  complete 
1c.  f.  Ibid.,  p.  180  and  p.  26Q. 183 
experience  of  it,  or  if  there  is  something  missing, 
and  what  it  is.  It  suffices  for  us  for  the  moment 
to  note  that  he  who  sees  cannot  possess  the  visible 
unless  he  is  possessed  by  it,  unless  he  is  of  it, 
unless  by  principle,  according  to  what  is  required  by 
the  articulation  of  the  look  with  the  things,  he  is  one 
of  the  visibles,  capable,  by  a  single  reversal,  of 
seeing  them--he  who  is  one  of  them. 
The  sense  of  this  quotation  is  put  most  briefly, 
Pen  suis,  "I  belong  to  it".  He  has  been  preparing  for  this 
claim  in  every  description  of  intertwinings  and  reversibility. 
The  toucher  belongs  to  the  touched,  the  seer  to  the  seen.. 
Man  is  bound  to  his  world  at  every  level  of  experience;  to 
know  this  is  to  discover  the  meaning  of  man's  very  being. 
One  avenue  of  clarification  is  to  illustrate  this 
affirmation,  ''en  suis,  by  the  concept  of  a  "circuit". 
Merleau-Ponty  does  so  in  "Eye  and  Mind".  2 
The  painter  is  again  the  privileged  expositor  on  the 
truth  of  belonging  to  the  world.  There  is  that  which  reaches 
his  eye  directly,  (the  object  or  scene)  and  there  is  that 
which  ignites  his  imagination  (vision).  "Vision  encounters, 
as  at  a  crossroads.  all  the  aspects  of  Being.  "3  Eyes  and 
hands  respond  in  the  creative  act  to  render  this  world  on 
canvass.  No  one  can  say  of  a  painting,  where  "nature  ends" 
and  human  expression  begins.  The  work's  visibility  is  bound 
1Ibid., 
pp.  131-135. 
2Merleau-Ponty,  M.,  Signs,  pp.  159  ff. 
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to  the  painter  and  to  the  world;  a  circuit  is  formed  between 
the  painter's  vision,  his  creative  act  and  the  painting 
itself.  The  world  speaks  and  is  spoken  of  on  cenvass.  The 
painter  has  rendered  a  relation  between  himself  and  his 
world.  The  example.  reveals  the  magic  of  every  perception. 
Given  a  means  of  expression,  every  perception  is  a  rendering 
of  the  world  we  see,  hear,  or  touch,  and  it  is  so  because 
we  are  part  of  the  circuitry.  The  concepts  of  networks  and 
reversibility  express  the  particular  truth  that  man  belongs 
to  the  world. 
' 
Before  further  pursuing  the  ontological  dimensions 
of  his  phenomenological  studies,  it  is  appropriate  to  examine 
the  concept  Merleau-Ponty  proposes  as  the  principle  which 
explains  his  claims  thus  far  and  gives  him  direct  access  to 
the  ontological  issue. 
So  far,  we  have  said  that  the  networks  can  be  de- 
scribed  iA  terns  of  one  major  characteristic--reversibility. 
Reversibility  conceptualizes  the  circuitry  binding  human 
consciousness  to  its  world.  There  is  commonality  between 
1A  g-ain  our  exposition  is  cut  short  if  we  are  con- 
cerned  to  know  what  specific  role  human  consciousness  plays 
in  this  relationship  of  belonginq-.  1.:  erleau-ronty  was  either 
unconcernerl  with  giving  specific,  believed  that  he  had 
already  done  so  in  his  earlier  writings,  or  intended  to  and 
died  before  putting  things  down.  I  favor  the  second  possi- 
bility;  the  human  for-itself  was  characterized  in  detail  in 
Phenomenology  of  Perception.  The  only  addition  required  in 
his  mind  was  to  show  how  consciousness  "belongs"  to  the 
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subject  and  world,  and  there  is  a  connectedness  between 
various  forms  of  experience.  A  general  term  is  needed  to 
express  this  connectedness  and  commonality.  The  term  ,  "er- 
leau-Fonty  chooses  is  "flesh".  Flesh  is  the  "tissue  that 
lines  them  (networks),  sustains  them,  nourishes  them.  ... 
"Flesh"  is  obviously  not  a  literalistic  term;  its 
synonym  is  "element"  or  "general  thing".  2  'ierleau-Ponty 
says  that  flesh  is  designated  as  "midway  between  the  spatio- 
temporal  individual  and  the  idea,  a  sort  of  incarnate  prin- 
ciple  that  brings  a  style  of  being  wherever  there  is  a  frag- 
ment  of  being.  "3  In  other  words,  flesh  is  the  eidos  spec- 
ifying  the  commonality  of  perceptual  experience,  and  the 
connectedness  man  has  with  the  world  he  perceives. 
Perhaps,  it  is  best  to  dissect  this  notion  in  terms 
of  its  application  to  experience.  The  notion  of  flesh  attempts 
1Prerlea_u-Ponty,  ".  ,  The  Vi-  P,  -)le  and  the  Invisible  p.  132. 
2Ibi(I., 
r.  130.  "The  flesh  i:.  not  matter,  in  the  sense 
of  corrýu  cles  of  heir,  7  which  %  ovld  adc'  ur  or  continue  on  one 
another  to  form  hein=.  s.  ',  or  i:  -  the  vic'ihle  (the  things  as 
well  ac  my  o-:  rn  body)'  oc,  je  material  that  would  'cc-- 
Goc'  knows  howv--broup*b,,  t  into  beinnr  by  the  thins  factually 
an,  actý__ý  or  my  factual  body.  7r  q--nera1  it,  is 
rot  af  pct  or  a  starr  of  facts  'material'  or'  -spiritual'  .  ;  'or 
i  it 
_, 
ro,  -t  a'tion  : for'  3.  :  tlnd:  s.  _inr  coulc  not  re 
captured  by  its  own  representations;  it  vrould  rebel  a6ainst 
this  irccrtion  into  ,;  ihe  vi:  -ible  which  is  E  s-c,  en  tj  al  to  tic 
seer".  Ibic. 
3Ibid. 186 
to  guard  against  what  1,  «erleau-Ponty  calls  high-altitude 
thinking,  in  that  it  is  a  principle  required  in  the  analysis 
of  experience.  A  phenomenology  of  perception  indicates  for 
example,  that  seer  and  seen  belong  to  each  other;  it  does  not 
imply  that  they  are  interchangeable  in  any  final  sense.  The 
reason  is  simple:  analysis  of  perceptual  experience  does 
not  permit  such  a  conclusion.  Perceptual  experience:  '  shapes 
the  concept  of  flesh;  that  is  why  he  calls  it  an  "incarnate 
principle".  The  concept  of  flesh,  as  well  as  that  of  the 
networks,  strongly  infers  that  connectedness  is  not  acci- 
dental.  Reversibility  and  the  networks  only  conceptualize 
the  forms  of  perception;  his  position  is  that  experience 
itself  exhibits  connectedness.  "Flesh"  attempts  to  bring 
its  forms  under  one  heading.  Merleau-Ponty  maintains  his 
phenomenological  perspective  in  this  transition  to  ontology; 
the  principle  of  flesh  is  not  constructed;  it-emerges  oixt 
of  the  structures  of  experience. 
We  are  now  ready  to  eVarine  directly  the  ontological 
eir:  ension_:,  of  the  rhenorienolocy.  In  ,  sen!  -!  e,  the  for_eroing 
has  bor.  cieireý  on  ortolo-y  at  every  roint;  we  have  withheld  our 
diocussion  of  it  only  for  convenience.  There  are  a  number 
of  ways  we  could  describe  the  ontolo-y;  th'  most  suggestive 
approach  i;  given  in  "Eye  and  kind".  1  The  prose  there  is 
1i,: 
erleau-Ponty,  I.,  Signs 
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difficult,  but  if  we  keep  in  mind  the  title  of  his  posthumous 
collection,  The  Visible  and  the  Invisible,  the  task  may  be- 
come  easier. 
The  artists'  vocation  is  to  render  his  participation 
in  a  world  visible  to  all.  In  the  above  accounts,  we  indi- 
cated  a  circuit  in  which  world.,  vision  and  visibility  could 
not  be  neatly  separated.  The  network  we  described  pertained 
to  a  relation  between  a  particular  painter's  vision  and  the 
visible  work  of  art.  But  the  artistic  act  is  also  a  paradigm 
for  a  philosophical  view  of  existence. 
Every  visual  something,  as  individual  as  it  is,  func- 
tions  also  as  a  dimension,  because  it  gives  itself  as 
the  result  of  a  dehiscence  of  Being.  What  this  ulti- 
mately  means  is  that  the  proper  essence  (le  propre)  of 
the  visible  is  to  have  a  layer  (doublure)  of  invisibility 
in  the  strict  sense,  which  it  makes  present  as  a  certain 
absence.  "l 
,.  his  bold  claim  can  be  organized  in  two  ways.  First, 
JMIerleau-Ponty  is  saying  that  perceptual  experience  cannot 
be  confined  to  a  simple  relationship  between  the  perceiver 
a-nd  the  perceived.  .  'et:,  rorhs  are  particular,  but  the  per- 
ceiver  is  a1ýo  1är'  to  "coýrýýý  nicýte  -i,  ': -'roi  h  those  thingz  'to 
p.  11  -Erier_,  'tion  of  the  c  are  arivi;  el  to  mite 
"eriou.  sly  "irre  myth  of  t-ic-  w  iri,  owws  of  the  soul_.  '':  he  eye  c 
the  wir  do',  v,  o,?  er,  s  the  -o,,  1  1  "to  what  IF  rot  the  Üou]..  "%  r  he 
'Ibid.,  P.  187. 
21bid.,  r.  18r. 
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painter  paints  in  the  conviction  that  the  visible  thing 
discloses  not  only  itself,  but  presents  a  dimension  of 
universal  meaning.  That  is,  particular  circuits  relate  to 
the  whole,  the  world  and  Being.  Vision  opens  us  to  a  world 
in  general,  a  universe  of  "sun  and  stars",  he  says.  The 
visible  shows  forth  the  sphere  of  invisibility.  1 
That  leads  us  to  a  second  way  of  organizing  his  con- 
cept  of  the  ontological  dimension  of  the  phenomenology.  The 
vision-visible  network  opens  one  to  invisibility;  that  state- 
ment  should  be  taken  alrcost  literally,  and  when  so  taken,  it 
is  not  indicative  of  "reversibility"  in  the  strict  sense. 
That  is,  perception  and  vision  do  lead  to  confrontation  with 
the  invisible,  but  there  is  no  suggestion  that  there  is  a 
1At  this  point  it  is  wise  to  interrupt  our  exposition 
for  the  following  observation.  Just  what  the  terms  "invisi- 
bility"  and  "being"  mean  specifically.  cannot  be  stated.  Ner- 
leau-Ponty  is  fond  of  suggestive  terms  which  remain  undefined, 
but  a  few  observations  can  be  mace.  :  rhether  we  talk  of  nat- 
ural  things  or  social  phenomena,  the  particular  visional 
"openir_7s"  indicate  a  sphere  of  wholeness  in  which  man  lives. 
One  gets  the  distinct  impression  that  the  I"ebenswelt  is 
telyy  conceives'  o"  j.  s  a  totelity  of  networks;  its  unity 
remains  mysterious.  Our  author  is  certainly  not  a  theologian 
in  this  respect;  he  Fives  no  na-  --  to  this  sense  of  wholeness 
or  unity;  there  is  no  Go-'  vo-ite'  a-  __o 
the  ein.  disclosed 
through  t}bi_nrs.  Invisibility  roints  to  the  mystery  of  the 
world,  and  not  necessarily  to  a  creator.  Invisibility  is  a 
descri  rtive  term  and  is  not  to  be  ý;  ýýJ  en  literally;  itý  means 
iirý?  ;  of  all,  tI,  at  the  whole  is  presented  through  the  parti- 
cular.  The  whole  is  "there"  before  him,  yet  it  is  not  avail- 
able  for  definition;  it  is  in  a  certain  sense,  an  absence. 
By  this,  he  means,  it  is  not  to  be  possessed.  Wholeness  or 
invisibility  is  a  mystery  to  the  one  who  grasps  it  and  is 
part  of  it.  When  we  take  up  the  issue  of  transcendence  we 
should  be  aware  of  this  perspective. 189 
confrontation  with,  or  conception  of  invisibility  which  gives 
access  to  the  particular.  No  "reverse"  is  possible  if  we  are 
to  retain  his  notion  of  phenomenology  as  an  opening  to  ontology. 
Perception  opens  onto  vision,  vision  to  the  whole;  perception 
is  still  the  lynch-pin.  Phenomenology  leads  the  thinker  to 
ontological  observations.  It  is  a  one-way  thoroughfare; 
ontology  takes  its  life  from  an  interpretation  of  experience. 
This  structure  should  not  be  construed,  however,  as 
limiting  Merleau-Ponty's  concept  of  ontology.  Though  phen- 
oznenology  is  -.  access  to  ontology  and  supports  it,  we  can  say 
that  the  world  does  open  itself  as  a  totality  through  the 
particular  perceptual  event.  '?.  The  world  is  in  accordance 
with  my  perspective  in  order  to  be  independent  of  me,  is  for 
me  in  order  to  be  without  me,  and  to  be  the  world.  "1 
Me  acknowledge  that  the  thing  is  "given"  to  us.  It 
is  there  "  for  us"  because  it  can  be  "  without  us".  This  is 
to  say  that  vision  is  responsive  to  the  thing  beheld,  in  its 
inderenc1ence;  we  recognize  that  what  comes  to  view  does  so 
because  it  ha.  -  its  own  Vi7ion  for  r"erlean.  -Fonty  is 
not  entirely  subjective  or  projective;  vision  jr  a.  response 
to  the  perceived  world. 
or.  cover  the  q  1lotat  .  on  atte'np"ts  to  e-"preýs;  s  the  exn  r- 
lencc  of  invisi-aility.  `-hat  this  means  was  never  fully 
1:: 
erleau-Ponty,  -K.  ,  SiF-4n 
,  p.  187. 190 
explicated  by  Merleau-Ponty  but  one  observation  is  warrented. 
Invisibility  has  to  do  with  the  being  of  the  world;  the  mys- 
terious  even  awesome  nature  of  the  experience  is  that  the 
mystery  of  the  world's  being  is  opened  to  the  viewer.  "That 
it  is  there",.  this  is  what  fascinates  the  thinker.  We  shall 
return  to  this  theme  below  and  in  our  conclusions. 
This  formulation  is  not  a  complete  change  from  the 
early  Phenomenology  of  Perception,  but  there  is  one  important 
new  emphasis.  In  terms  of  the  above  observation  that  invis- 
ibility  affects  the  vision,  a  new  idea  of  consciousness  is 
being  forged.  It  is  one  he  intended.  Briefly,  human  con- 
sciousness  is  no  longer  thought  of  as  being  solely  a  "seizing 
operation". 
1  The  ontological  insight  is  that  the  worlds 
wholeness  shapes  consciousness  and  vision,  as  well  as  the 
other  way  around.  For  example,  what  is  not  present,  strictly 
speaking,  in  a  given  perception,  does  affect  consciousness. 
The  person  is  aware  that  what  is  before  him  does  have  its  own 
1Speaking  of  the  problems  left  unresolved  in  Phenomen- 
ology  of  Perception,  he  says,  "they  are  due  to  the  fact  that 
in  part  I  retained  the  philosophy  of  consciousness.  "  I,.  erleau- 
Ponty,  M.,  The  Visible  and  the  Invisible,  working  note,  Feb- 
ruary  1959,  p.  16-3.  One  of  the  specific  problems  was  that 
the  opposition  considered  consciousness  as  eithor  a  consti- 
tuting  operation  or  as  a  "receptor  station".  In  responding 
to  these  alternatives  7,,  7erleau-Ponty  did  not  consider  other 
philosophical  options.  Hence,  he  may  have  believed  that  his 
theory  of  that  time  was  a  compromise  theory  and.  not  a  full 
exploration  of  the  place  consciousness  would  have  once  onto- 
logy  was  possible.  This  new  series  of  reflections  would 
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Being,  and  is  part  of  a  broader  environment.  Consciousness 
in  this  new  posture,  "asks"  the  thing  to  reveal  itself  as 
it  truly  is. 
In  sum,  ontology  has  no  autonomous  status;  phenomen- 
piogy  is  the  conduit  which  opens  us  to  Being.  That  is  why 
we  call  it  phenomenological-ontology.  But  once  Being  is 
confronted  via  perception,  we  must  acknowledge  that  conscious- 
ness  has  not  constituted  it.  Being  has  priority  as  a  non- 
thetic  dimension,  discovered  in  the  act  of  perception.  This 
conception  is  a  unique  contribution  to  ontological  studies. 
No  notion  of  apperception  is  required  to  aclmowledge 
the  presence  of  Being;  Merleau-Ponty  holds  that  the  world's 
totality  is  encountered  rather  than  anticipated  or  apperceived. 
His  position  keeps  us  in  touch  with  phenomenological  method 
and  interpretation. 
It  is  now  left  for  us  to  spell  out  as  far  as  is  poss- 
ible  with  the  existing  material,  how  relations  with  others 
functions  as  a  fundamental  opening  to  the  mystery  of  Being. 
As  always,  he  begins  with  the  body.  The  established 
truth  of  one's  own  body  is  that  it  is  the  exemplar  sensible.  1 
;  'fie  have  seen  that  reversibility  is  the  peculiar  form  of  all 
v 
personal  existence;  the  subject  touches  and  is  touched,  sees 
and  is  seen.  t'`erleav-Ponty  first  discussed  this  with  the 
1T'erleau-Ponty,  The  Visible  and  the  Invisible,  p.  135. 102 
individual  in  mind.  Everything  about  the  subject  suggests 
that  touch  and  sight  interact  with  each  other  and  with  "the 
thing".  In  this  connection  we  concluded  that  human  conscious- 
ness  was  "responsive"  as  well  as  "intrusive".  It  works  with 
particulars  in  a  context  of  wholeness.  Consciousness  is 
synergetic;  it  works  with  its  world  in  order  to  discover 
its  own  significance  and  the  meaning  of  its  world.  Merleau- 
Ponty  now  suggests, 
Why  would  not  the  synergy  exist  among  different  organ- 
isms,  if  it  is  possible  within  each?  Their  landscapes 
interweave,  their  actions  and  their  passion  fit  together 
exactly:  this  is  possible  as  soon  as  we  no  longer  make 
belongingness  to  one  sa`ne'consciousness'  the  primordial 
definition  of  sensibility,  and  as  soon  as  we  rather 
understand  it  as  the  return  of  the  visible  upon  itself, 
a  carnal  adherance  of  the  sentient  to  the  sensed  and  of 
the  sensed  to  the  sentient.  1 
He  is  speaking  of  perception  in  the  presence  of  an- 
other.  What  one  touches  and  what  one  sees  is  not  only  his 
ovm.  It  is  better  that  we  sneak  of  objects  perceived  with 
another;  the  perceived  world  of  one  becomes  shared  with  the 
other's;  it  "passes  into  him".  2  The  visible  is  then  perceived 
in  terms  of  an  "intercorporeality"  and  not  just  by  a  single 
body;  it  is  truly  a  "for  us". 
3  This  notion  of  intercorpor- 
lIbid.,  p.  142. 
0 
21bid. 
3Merleau-Ponty  did  not  live  to  give  full  exposition 
to  the  notion  of  intercorporeality.  It  is,  to  my  mind,  the 
most  suggestive  term  yet  in  illustrating  the  significance 
of  intersubjectivity.  We  shall  utilize  it  in  our  concluding 
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eality  becomes  much  clearer  when  we  discuss  it  in  terms  of 
seeing  Brother  person.  ,  'That  occurs  there  exposes  the  heart 
of  man's  openness  to  "eireg,  and.  it  exposes  most  boldly  what 
Lerleau-Ponty  believes  true  of  the  visible-invisible  network. 
The  lesson  of  seeing  things  with  another  is  not  totally 
different  than  if  we  saw  it  by  ourselves,  but  the  ine::  - 
haustible  depth  of  the  visible,  whiTh  is  its  proper 
essence,  is  made  far  more  apparent. 
In  the  presence  of  another  the  subject  really  begins 
to  see  that  he  is  a  seer;  the  other  person  confronts  him 
with  his  own  vision,  In  this  experience  the  subject  is 
redirected  from  beholding  "the  thing"  directly,  to  the  other 
person.  In  other  words,  his  own  vision  is  discovered  to  be 
incomplete;  he  turns  to  the  other  for  the  completion  of  an 
otherwise  "individual"  exchange.  The  other's  vision  of  the 
thing  becomes  a  neces,  -nary  factor  in  there  being  an  authentic 
perception. 
"_'his  turning  towards  another  also  seems  to  have  its 
own  sphere  of  value  for  _erleav-Ponty.  The  two  perceivers 
bcco  -(:  c  preoccup2iec'  wit',  eacl.  other  r  ch  the  sane  as  two 
lovE:  r  i:  0  1  t.  6:  'I  ZOY  c  each  other.  r.  CE  rt  r.  ew  horia  takes 
21 
1!  12.  ".  "hat  is  Vieroper  to  the  visible  is,  we  said,  to  be 
the  surface  of  an  inexhaustible  depth;  this  is  what  makes 
it  able  to  be  open  to  visions  other  than  our  own.  "  Ibid. 194 
For  the  first  time,  the  body  no  longer  couples  itself 
up  with  the  world,  it,  clasps  another  body,  applying 
(itself  to  it)  carefully  with  its  own  e  tension,  forming 
tirelessly  with  its  hanc-s  the  strange  statue  which  in 
its  turn  gives  everything  it  receives;  the  body  is  lost 
ou  aside  of  the  world  and  its  goals,  fascinated  by  the 
unique  occupation  of  floating  in  Being  with  another 
life,  of  making  itself  the  outside  of  the  inside,  and 
the  inside  of  its  outside.  1 
''o  more  poetic  means  of  expression  than  this  could 
be  found  in  philosophical  writing.  The  exchange  of  look, 
the  experience  of  reversibility,  reminds  us  of  the  communal 
nature  of  intersubjectivity  in  Phenomenology  of  Perception. 
Kerleau-Ponty's  point  is  that  the  world  of  one  is  intimately 
shared  by  another,  and  is  shared  as  an  interpersonal  explor- 
ation.  But  in  addition  to  the  euphoria  of  sharing  there  is 
the  experience  of  seeing  things  as  they  are. 
Beyond  the  euphoric  sharing  of  vision  (reversibility), 
the  subjects"pass  definitvely  beyond  the  circle  of  the  vis- 
ible.  "2  The  experience  of  reversibility  brings  us  to  the 
rrvlorl('  tja  silence",  or  invi.  ^-]  :; 
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was  to  return  us  to  wonder  in  face  of  the  world.  We  are 
left  with  a  series  of  references  to  encounter  with  Being  which 
were  never  fully  elucidated. 
We  emphasize  here  the  extent  to  which  encounter  with 
Being  is  affirmed  as  a  phenomenological  truth.  The  per- 
ceiver  is  never  an  autononous  being;  he  is  bound  to  his 
world  and  he  is  bound  to  others  who  rake  him  aware  of  his 
belongingness.  The  aware  person  is  inescapably  a  social 
person;  there  is  no  other  way  to  describe  him.  To  be  bound 
to  others,  however,  does  not  preclude  the  experience  of 
being  thrown  open  to  Being.  In  fact,  the  very  nature  of 
man  is,  in  a  sense,  fulfilled  in  his  exposure  to  Being. 
C) 
In  the,  perhaps,  rare  experience  of  encounter  with  others, 
man  faces  the  mystery  of  Being. 
Put  in  technical  terms  we  conclude  that  inter-sub- 
jectivity  forms  the  backbone  of  the  ontology.  -,  ýn_counter 
experience  provides  a  major  access  to  ontological  reflections. 
Intercorporeality,  in  his  terms,  is  a  peculiar  conduite  to 
the  sphere  of  Being. 
We  are  fully  aware  that  Terleau-Ponty  never  describes 
the  sphere  of  Being.  We  have  mentioned  this  frequently. 
7  For  the  purposes  of  analysis,  therfore,  it  is  risky  and 
unwise  to  force  a  description  at  this  juncture.  .  le  are  given 
help,  however,  in  his  occasional  discussions  of  transcen- 
dence.  If  we  are  to  achieve  some  clarification  on  what  Tier-- 196 
leau-Ponty  meant  by  "3eing"  it  is  adviseable  to  see  what 
he  meant  by  the  term  transcendence.  Once  that  is  accom- 
plished  we  may  be  able  to  specify  more  closely,  the  meaning 
of  such  terms  as  "invisibility",  "mystery",  and  Being. 
We  can  proceed  with  strong  indications  that,  what- 
ever  his  view  of  transcendence,  the  intersubjective  phen- 
omenon  will  play  a  central  role  in  uncovering  its  meaning. 
He  will  say  little  about  its  importance  in  the  ensuing 
discussions  but  we  can  assume  that  his  ontological  reflec- 
tions  will  inform  his  views  on  transcendence.  It  remains 
for  us  to  say  how. 
PHEN0_:  3  OLOGI  CAL-  ON  TOLO  GY  AND 
ITS  BEARING  ON  THE  ISSUE  OF  TRANSCENDENCE 
As  in  the  previous  study,  we  shall  outline  the  growth 
of  T:  Ierleau-Ponty's  thought;  we  hope  that  this  is  understood 
as  a  patient  approach  and  not  an  overly  laborious  one.  The 
growth  of  the  thinker,  in  this  case,  shows  us  subtle  changes 
which  directly  affect  our  appraisal  of  his  concept  of  trans- 
cendence. 
Three  periods  can  be  discerned  with  regard  to  his 
notion  of  transcendence.  The  first  period  centers  about  his 
first  two  works,  The  Structure  of  Behavior  and  the  Phenomen- 
ology  of  Perception.  We  can  be  brief  here  in  light  of  the 197 
earlier  investigation. 
Phenomenology  of  Perception  stated  his  conviction 
that  trag  cenicnce  is  to  be  thought  of  as  a  "movement"  inte- 
gral  to  the  perceptive  act,  a  structure  of  consciousness. 
First,  man  "transcends"  his  ov,  -n  isolation  by  seeing  other 
things  and  people;  he  knows  himself  as  a  subject  in  a  world. 
He  is  a  being  in  traffic  with  those  over  against  himself. 
!  'an  in  the  perceptive  act  overcomes  the  sphere  of  private 
subjectivity.  He  makes  the  movements  of  transcendence.  The 
first  notation  we  must  make,  therefore,  is  that.  man'is  identi- 
fied  with  transcendence  in  that  he  is  the  one  who  "transcenc's" 
his  own  subjectivity. 
The  same  concept  of  perception  also  led  ''erleau-Ponty 
to  conclude  that  "the  other"  is  always  more  than  we  can  know 
of  it.  ae  transcend  our  su-.  jcctivityy  to  gain  communal  contact 
and  interchange,  but  we  are  constantly  faced  with  the  fact 
trat  the,  world-  n'c  inve  _t^;  '''  cencc  our  '.  ino:  ýwleca  ;e  of  it. 
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phenomenology,  a  philosophy  of  ambiguity.  1  It  becomes 
relevant  to  ask  if  the  two  notions  mentioned  above  are 
adequately  explained  in  that  early  period;  or,  was  not 
ambiguity  left  as  the  major  theme  of  perceptual  knowledge? 
My  belief  is  that  Merleau-Ponty  did  not  attempt  to  resolve 
the  ambiguity  until  the  period  of  his  ontological  reflections. 
We  shall  see  that  below. 
Merleau-Ponty  did  address  himself  to  the  issue  of 
transcendence,  however,  after  Phenomenology  of  Perception 
and  before  the  time  of  his  ontological  writings;  it  is 
quite  useful  to  review  those  expositions.  They  explain 
in  detail  the  issue  he  sought  to  resolve  in  the  period 
just  before  his  death.  We  shall  label  this  his  second  or 
middle  period;  it  is  a  period  of  transition. 
Merleau-Ponty  writes  of  Christianity  in  an  article 
entitled  "Foi  et  Bonne  Foi";  he  is  considering  an  argument 
about  social  ethics  in  Catholicism.  2  Father  Herve  had  said 
that  Catholic  tradition  as  a  whole,  encourages  conservative 
social  attitudes.  Merleau-Ponty  agrees  but  holds  that 
Catholic  tradition  does  not  explain  the  condition;  he 
suggests  a  theological  reason  for  the  conservatism. 
1Vide.,  deWhaelhens,  Alphonse,  "M.  Merleau-Ponty  et  la 
Philosophie  de  L'ambiguite",  Pensee,  No.  68,  July-August,  1956. 
2The  issue  was  suggested  to  him  in  an  article  by 
Father  Pierre  Herve,  "Action",  Dec.  144,1945. 199 
There  must  be  an  ambiguity  in  Catholicism  as  a  spirit- 
ual  way  of  life  to  correspond  to  its  ambiguity  as  a 
social  phenomenon. 
Catholicism  posits  a  belief  in  both  an  interior  and 
an  exterior  God.  This1is  the  religious  formulation 
of  its  contradictions. 
The  notions  of  interior  and  exterior  God,  he 
believes,  expose  a  double  standard  in  Catholic  teaching. 
In  Augustine,  the  theme  of  interiority  is  evident;  "turn 
inward  ...  truth  dwells  within  the  inner  man.  "2  God 
is  discovered  in  the  inner  recesses  of  man's  spirit;  the 
experience  of  God  is  self-authenticating  and  adequate  for 
faith.  But  Catholicism  also  teaches  an  "exterior  God",  a 
God  learned  through  dogma  and  institution.  The  Incarnation 
and  Pentecost  are  not  only  teachings  which  express  one's 
faith;  they  are  doctrines  which  call  for  blind  obedience. 
The  standard  is  that  God  has  already  decided  how  to  make 
Himself  known;  one  need  only  conform. 
Quite  obviously,  Merleau-Ponty  decries  the  latter 
form  in  Catholic  teaching;  but  it  is  negative  only  in  greater 
degree  than  the  former.  The  latter  he  calls  "bad  faith", 
1Merleau-Ponty,  M.,  Sense  and  Non-Sense,  Dreyfus 
Herbert  L.,  trans.  Evanston,  Northwestern  Univ.  Press, 
1964,  p.  173.  Catholicism  was  Merleau-Ponty's  heritage. 
In  his  youth  he  had  been  a  faithful  adherant.  Under- 
standably,  Christianity  and  Catholicism,  are  interchangeable 
terms;  they  are  synonomous  for  him. 
2Ibid. 200 
the  former,  simply  "faith".  "ac'_  faith  has  the  look  of 
borrowed  values,  and  authoritarianism;  "faith"  has  the 
sense  of  sincerity  or  reliance  upon  one's  o_wn  inclinations. 
The  important  point  is  that  a  Christian  is  not  able  to 
choose  between  the  two  forms;  he  floats  between  them.  This 
is  why  his  social  stance  is  amnbigLiov,,  .  If  the  Christian 
senses  the  need  for  revolution  as  a  private  individual,  he 
is  restrained  by  the  Church's  value-.  If  he  holds  to  the 
Church's  position  he  is  plagued  by  guilt  and  the  need.  to 
right  wrongs.  "He  is  a  poor  conservative  and  an  unsafe  bet 
as  a  revolutionary.  "1 
We  need  not  go  on  with  .  -erleau-Ponty'  s  judgments; 
in  light  of  Catholic  teaching  in  1945  he  was  probably  correct.  2 
:  ost  important,  i,  `erleau-Ponty  believed  that  theology  gets  in 
the  way  of  responsible  human  action  and  comrrnittment.  It 
keeps  us  from  recognizing  the  need  for  decisive  action.  In 
o?  lr,  hristii.  iý_it  keeps  men  suspen  -U.,  whereas  what  is 
'_'or  i  c:  -or  ;;  '.!  o  will  not  relinquish  their  responci- 
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cause  of  their  suspension;  in  this  sense,  they  are  incap- 
able  of  self-transcendence.  In  sum,  the  Christian  notions 
of  transcendence  get  in  the  way  of  authentic  self-transcen- 
Bence. 
We  interrupt  exposition  for  one  observation.  Is 
2]ierleau-Ponty's  brief  critique  consistant  with  his  ovm  early 
teaching  on  transcendence?  blany  commentators  have  seen  an 
inconsistancy.  1  I-ierleau-Ponty  was  sympathetic  to  Marxism 
at  the  time  and  though  this  need  not  discount  his  criticism 
of  Christianity,  it  does  indicate  that  he  leaned  toward  a 
revolutionary  stance  regarding  social  movements.  Particu- 
larly,  his  espousal  of  _ý°_arxism  may  explain  his  impatience 
at  remaining  content  with  the  ambiguities  of  experience 
so  well  documented  in  Phenomenology  of  Perception.  Merleau- 
Ponty  never  fully  embraced  MM:  arxism,  2  but  in  this  period  he 
turned  somewhat  from  his  earlier  notion  that'-there  are  ainbi- 
gui--ý;  ies  involved  in  describing  man's  perceptual  history. 
1Vide. 
,  Kviant,  Remy,  the  Phenomenolocj.  cal  Philos 
Pont;  and  Rabil,  Albert,  '.:  erleau-Ponty:  xistentiali  s-t 
the  : ]ocia.  l  World,  New.  York,  Columbia  Univ.  Press,  1967, 
Chapter  7. 
2"If  the  individual  goes  along  with  the  party  and 
against  his  own  private  opinion,  it  is  because  the  party  has 
proven  its  worth,  because  it  has  a  mission  in  history,  and 
because  it  represents  the  proletariat.  There  is  no  such 
thing  as  an  unmotivated  committrnent.  "  i,  "erleau-Ponty,  D.  7.0 
Sense  and  Pon-Sense,  p.  180.  c.  f.  his  article  concerning 
i'arxism  ibid.,  pp.  99  ff.  Eventually,  such  a  critical 
reflection  would  lead  him  to  turn  away  from  the  party. 
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ti:  critique  of  Christianity  may  hold  but  it 
read  that  he  is  not  sympathetic  with  the  man 
flicting  perceptions  about  transcendence.  ; -' 
counseled  such  a  position  in  his  formulation 
meaninTs  of  transcendence. 
is  a  bit  odd  to 
who  holds  con- 
a  had  earlier 
of  the  two 
One  other  article  of  this  reriod  records  what  he  is 
most  concerned  to  criticize  about  concepts  of  transcendence, 
and  it  reveals  more  directly  his  then  current  concept  of 
transcendence. 
In  the  "I.:  etaahysical  in  Lan"  ,  ä;  Lerleau-Ponty  reasserts 
the  earlier  notion  of  ambiguity  in  human  experience.  But 
this  time  he  is  clear  that  the  contingency  of  perceptual 
knowledge  opens  Man  to  the  "metaphysical". 
Fetanhysics  is  the  deliberate  intention  to  describe 
this  parado.  of  consciousness  an  truth,  exchange  and 
communication,  ...  From  the  moment  I  recognize  that 
r,  y  e;  _rcrience  preciý.  ely  in  so  far  as  it  is  riy  own,  makes 
me  accessible  to  what  is  not  myself,  that  I  am  sensitive 
to  t''ie  worlrl  em  to  o*'k.:  i:  rs  ...  all  the  beings  which 
objective  thou  ght  olaceO  at  a  ý_,  t  nce  dray  singularly 
Ä::  ar  to  me.  _y  lip  e  seems  absolutely  inc  ividual  and 
absoli..  tel  ,  t?  ý1_ý.  vor  :  al  to  r:  ýe  .1 
'ý.  i  is  a  fine  e;  _r,  ression  of  I  is  iöeas  in  terry  of 
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of  his  own  capacities  for  knowledge.  '  This  interpretation 
of  the  human  situation,  much  akin  to  the  Phenomenology  of 
Perce-pti  on  e.  rcli  d.  es  any  acceptance  of  absolutes,  especially 
God.  "Such  a  metaphysic~  cannot  be  reconciled  with  the  mani- 
fest  content  of  religion  anc'  with  the  positing  of  an  abso- 
lute  thinker  of  the  vrorlc?.  "2  Acceptance  of  a  transcendent 
God  necessitates  positing  a  world  as  man  would  like  it  to 
be.  To  introduce  transcendence  is  to  posit  a  force  behind 
consciousness.  "Vertical  transcendence"  cancels  the  essen- 
tials  of  "horizontal"  or  self-transcendence. 
3  He  obviously 
rejects  all  concepts  of  transcendence  which  dilute  the  human- 
ist  notion  of  self-transcendence. 
In  this  context  it  is  a  bit  odd  to  read  his  comment 
that  Christianity  can  be  viewed  positively.  Ehri  ý;  tianity, 
he  say,  also  rejects  the  "^o,  of  the  nhilosop  ers"  and 
teaches  a  "Go'9  who  take-  or  the  human  condition.  " 
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3,  le.  rleauz-P-onty  will  use  these  two  terms,  "vertical" 
anc'  "horizontal"  trans  ceneerice  in  Sims;  it  is  convenient 
to  introduce  them  here. 
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it  has  positive  value.  Any  doctrine  which  contains  a  humanist 
element  is  viewed  with  respect. 
In  an  interesting  footnote  he  clarifies  the  position 
further;  he  refers  again  to  the  conflicts  between  horizontal 
and  vertical  transcendence,  and  rejects  the  concept  of  "trans- 
cendence  in  immanence",  which  he  attributes  to  i.  usserl.  The 
explanation  for  his  rejection  is  simple:  "for  I  am  not  God, 
and  I  cannot  verify  the  co-existence  of  these  two  attributes 
in  any  indubitable  experience.  "1  He  excludes  at  this  point, 
a  notion  of  transcendence  which  would  compromise  its  human 
origins. 
The  concluding  article  in  Sense  and  Non-Sense,  written 
especially  for  the  collection,  should  fill  out  Lerleau-Ponty's 
position  adequately.  2  It  corrects  our  suspicion  that  Mer- 
leau-Ponty  had  opted  for  a  militant  hu:  -nanis?  ,  leaving  behind 
the  gnawing  question  of  transcendence  put  forth  in  Phenomen- 
ology  bf  Perception. 
The  models  that  one  first  considers  when  thinking  of 
1lbid., 
p.  96.  The  same  footnote  is  interesting  in 
another  context.  The  phrase  "tranocend.  ence  in  immanence" 
so  emphatically  rejected  here  is  an  appropriate  label  for 
his  conception  of  transcendence  in  the  period  off  ontological 
reflections.  We  need  not  say  more  about  this  at  present; 
i.!  erleau-Ponty's  view  in  1947  specifies  that  this  title  still 
smacks  of  postulational  thinking.  A  God  who  transcends 
consciousness  in  any  respect  is  not  acceptable  to  the  Lebens- 
welt  phenomenologist. 
2ýierleau-Ponty,  'ý:.  ,  Sense  and  Non-Sense,  pp.  182  ff. 205 
heroism  are  those  of  Hegel  and  Nietzsche.  Hegel's  hero 
engaged  in  struggle  to  attain  self-consciousness;  he  is  the 
slave  in  the  first  instance,  an  unhappy  consciousness  in  the 
second,  and  so  on.  p`an's  vocation  is  the  struggle  to  gain 
absolute  truth,  but  for  Hegel  the  end  is  always  in  sight. 
He  struggles  only  to  "realize"  the  Spirit  guiding  him;  his 
destiny  is  assured. 
1  Nietzsche's  hero  on  the  other  hand, 
has  no  such  assurrance,  but  he  also  struggles.  Social 
morality  must  be  overcome;  death  is  the  final  opponent. 
His  hero  is  the  master,  the  overman,  who  overcomes  all  by 
the  strength  of  his  will. 
These  models,  i..  'erleau-Ponty  says,  are  the  heritage  of 
every  contemporary,  but  they  d.  o  not  live  for  us.  Men  today 
do  not  have  Hegel's  assurance,  nor  do  they  in  light  of  the 
war,  have  Nietzsche'  s  choice  of  raw  power.  They  ask  Neit- 
zsche's  questions  about  death,  but  they  cannot  accept  the 
answers  embodied  in  his  model.  17hat  are  the  viable  models 
for  heroism? 
Robert  Jordan,  the  hero  in  ^or  ;  Vhom  the  Bell  Toll.  -,, 
lies  wounded.  He  tells  ?.:  aria  he  must  die  alone,  but  his 
acceptance  of  death  comes  not  from  a  sense  of  the  Hegelian 
pre-determined  destiny.  Nor  does  his  sense  of  purpose  center 
1This  is  ,:  erleau-Ponty'  s  vision  of  Hegel  to  be  sure,  but  an  apt  one.  Ibid.,  pp.  183-184. 206 
about  the  1%ietzschean  concentration  on  transcending  all  oppon- 
ents.  He  will  die  alone  but  he  loves  life;  his  life  is  em- 
bodied  in  his  relätion  with  ::  aria.  In  this  he  is  loyal  "to 
the  natural  movement  which  flings  us  toward  things  and  toward 
others.  "i  The  viable  Model  is  the  man  who  attempts  no  final 
escape  from  solitary  death.  through  religion  or  the  exercise 
of  will.  He  is  also  unlike  the  egoist  in  that  he  rejoices 
in  the  rare  experience  of  being  with  others.  Merleau-Ponty's 
humanism  is  neither  a  militant  individualism  nor  a  blind  utop- 
ianism.  He  says  it  is  a  humanism  "without  illusions". 
No  transcendent  being  exists  to  shape  human  expecta- 
tions;  nevertheless  a  kind  of  faith  is  suggested.  The  hero's 
faith  centers  upon  "that  very  movement  which  unites  us  with 
others,  our  present  with  our  past,  and  by  which  we  make 
everything  have  meaning  ...  .  "2  Faith  is  an  attitude  of 
confidence  that  this  life  has  meaning;  assuredly,  we  bear 
the  responsibility  for  making  that  claim  and  for  realizing 
it,  but  we  claim  specifically,  that  life  lived  with  others 
is  worthwhile.  In  other  words,  faith  is  confidence  in  the 
worth  of  human  interchange.  The  sphere  of  meaning  is  not 
the  individual;  it  is  the  interpersonal.  This  5,  s  the  focus 
for  a  faith  "stripped  of  its  illusions";  the  hero  has  no  God, 
1Ibid., 
p.  186. 
2Ibid., 
p.  187. 207 
but  he  does  have  others. 
A  sumriation  of  this  period  is  now  in  order.  Any 
notion  of  vertical  transcendence  is  rejected.  i:  erleau- 
Ponty  firmly  opposes  any  notion  that  would  take  away  from 
man  the  responsibility  for  his  own  destiny.  "Vertical 
transcendence"  has  been  replaced  by  "horizontal  transcen- 
dence".  The  peculiar  character  of  self-transcendence  is 
that  it  is  not  individualistic;  it  is  social  and  interper- 
sonal.  In  short,  man  transcends  himself  by  seeing  the  social 
world  as  the  center  of  meaning. 
Social  concerns  were  not  forgotten  during  Merleau- 
Ponty's  final  years  of  writing  but  they  were  complimented 
by  a  renewed  interest  in  phenomenological  method  and  aes-,. 
thetics.  1  is  thoughts  about  the  concept  of  transcendence 
during  that  tin-,  e  also  shifted.  :  =e  no  longer  sought  to  spell 
out  the  differences  between  himself  and  theologians.  The 
feýv  he  speaks  of  religion  it  is  with  a  sense  of  appre- 
ciatio",  accompanied  by  his  long-standing  distaste  for 
17's',  7  ;ý  onaý  'ractlces. 
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to  a  traditional  Christian  idea  than  before.  We  must  keep 
in  mind  all  that  was  said  in  the  first  segment  of  this  chap- 
ter  as  we  review  this  issue. 
Two  brief  sources  show  the  shift  on  transcendence. 
The  first  is  an  exploration  of  the  relationships  that  are 
possible  between  philosophy  and  Christianity.  1  Merleau- 
Ponty  reviews  several  alternativest  philosophy,  as  Maritain 
and  Gilson  conceive  it,  can  have  a  Christian  status;  that 
is,  thought  can  so  mingle  with  faith  in  the  thinker  that  it 
becomes  integrated.  Merlea.  u-Ponty  observes  that  it  need 
not  become  so;  'philosophy  has  no  one  essence  that  dictates 
such  an  integration;  the  integration  is  a  matter  of  praxis. 
But  this  leaves  the  theoretical  questions  of  a  relationship 
unansý"r^red.  '"_alehra.,  '!  cýhe  saýr  there  is  an  identity  between 
rhiiosopr_y  and  Christianity;  what  the  philosopher  "sees" 
is  really  "natural  revelation". 
"Fatural  rhilo=:  Ohy'  :3  concept,  invac'o  -theology; 
roll`..  ou  -  tonte-)tr_  invade  iLat  ral  irnowlocl  '"?  i.  ",  alebranc?  )e, 
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3Aur  ustine  is  auotec  :  "true  reli7ion  is  true  phi.  l- 
oeophy;  and  true  philosophy  in  turn  i^  true  religion.  " 
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of  our  rational  being  by  religious  reversals,  introducing 
into  it  the  paradoxical  thought  of  a  madness  which  is  wisdom, 
a  scandal  which  is  peace,  a  fight  which  is  gain.  "1  !  Reason 
and  faith  are  manifestly  not  identical;  neither  are-phil- 
osophy  and  Christianity. 
i.  Laurice  Elondel  is  considered  last.  Briefly,  '  he 
holds  that  philosophy  "asks"  while  Christianity  "answers". 
Philosophy  introduces  the  need  for  its  own  reversal;  it 
questions  what  it  cannot  answer;  its  "negative"  is  ful- 
filled  by  religion's  "positive".  I;  erleau-Ponty  asks  how 
philosophy,  if  it  is  an  authentic  field  of  discourse,  can 
yield  its  conclusions  to  theology.  Of  course,  it  cannot. 
At  this  point  he  suggests  a  surprising  alternative 
of  his  own;  at  least  it  is  surprising  in  one  aspect.  "Phil- 
osophy's  relationship  to  Christianity  cannot  be  simply  the 
relationship  of  the  positive  to  the  negative,  of  questioning 
to  affirmation.  Philosophical  questioning  involves  its  own 
vital  options,  and  in  a  sense  it  maintains  itself  within  a 
religious  affirmation.  "2  He  does  not  explain  what  the  "reli- 
gious  affirmation"  is  which  exists  in  philosophy,  and  he 
goes  on  to  say  that  presently,  the  two  disciplines  "play  the 
1Ib  d. 
21bid.. 
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role  of  warring  brothers".  1  ;  Nevertheless,  there  is  a  sur- 
prising  notion  of  intimacy  which  was  not  present  before. 
Religion  and  philosophy  cannot  have  a  neat  boundary  between 
them  because  their  concerns  are  common.  The  common  ground 
cannot  be  explained  by  the  question-answer  pattern  or  the 
theory  of  identity,  or  just  by  praxis.  But  philosophy 
and  Christianity  do  share  a  common  task.  They  both  seek, 
when  practiced  wisely,  to  relate  men  to  the  truth. 
One  qualification  is  added  to  this  otherwise  general 
relationship.  Theology  must  take  upon  itself,  without 
reserve,  the  "task  of  mediation".  Again,  he  does  not 
explain  the  terms,  but  his  sentiment  is  fairly  evident. 
As  always,  he  looks  askance  at  "externalized  faith",  the 
faith  that  is  no  faith  at  all  but  blind  obediance  to  dogma. 
There  is  no  "mediation"  in  this  form;  he  thinks  of  it  more 
as  a  form  of  propaganda.  :  1ediation  is  that  function  in 
philosophy  of  e:  _ploring  with  openness  the  forms  which 
emerge  in  human  experience;  we  cannot  be  far  afield  in 
saying  that  this  is  the  vocation  he  commends  to  the  theo- 
logian. 
Elsewhere  he  elaborates  the  term  mediation;  in  it 
O 
we  catch  the  shift  in  his  concept  of  transcendence. 
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ro  philosophy  has  ever  consisted  in-choosing  between 
tray:  scendences--for  example  between  that  of  God  and 
that  of  a  human  future.  They  have  all  been  concerned 
with  mediating  them  (with  understanding,  for  example, 
how  God  makes  Himself  man  or  how  man  makes  himself 
God).  "? 
Mediation  is  the  peculiar  effort  of  confronting  gran 
with  the  false  extremes  of  vertical  and  horizontal  trans- 
cendence.  Neither  extreme  serves  to  give  the  truth  about 
existence. 
In  saying  this,  I.?  erleau-Ponty  tacitly  admits  a  charge 
in  his  thinking;  whereas,  vertical  transcendence  had  been 
the  mal  genie  of  the  middle  period,  he  now  adds  to  it, 
horizontal  transcendence.  2  Both  blind  faith,  external 
faith,  and  self-transcendence  are  singled  out  as  obstacles 
to  truth.  In  light  of'his  massive  studies  on  human  perception, 
this  is  indeed,  an  important  change. 
In  the  same  passage  he  speaks  about  Christianity. 
ýnr',  this  ti-:  e  'he,  sa=tes  positively  what  he  believes  its 
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subordination  ....  There  is  a  sort  of  impotence 
of  God  without  us,  and  Christ  attests  that  God  would 
not  be  fully  God  without  becoming  full  man.  1 
When  we  see  this  in  contrast  to  the  preceeding  period 
a-marked  change  is  evident.  He  has-not  given  up  hic  critique 
of  external  faith  which  would  promulgate  a  God  who  had 
decided  how  man  should  believe.  But  he  claims  now,  that 
there  is  a  deeper  essence  to  Christianity.  It  makes  an 
authentic  contribution  to  man's  understanding  of  himself; 
Christianity  is  not,  as  we  first  suspicioned,  captive  to 
the  theologian's  errors.  It  teaches  with  regard  to  trans- 
cendence  that  man  "becomes,  strangely,  its  privileged 
bearer.  "2 
i-lerleau-Ponty's  work  is  not  a  detailed  description 
of  the  issue  of  transcendence,  but  it  gives  an  indication 
where  we  might  begin  in  stating  it,  and  how  we  might  under- 
stand  its  relation  to  i:  erleau-Porty's  ontology.  Philosophy 
and  theology,  both  center  upon  mediation.  The  task  of 
-niec'iacion  Foes  bear  u,  o.:  the  nuectio  ol  transcendence; 
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it  also  indicates  that  man's  self-transcendence  cannot  em- 
body  all  that  is  meant  by  the  term  in  question.  The  concept 
of  mediation  specifies  that  transcendence  would  involve  a 
relationship  between  man  and  God.,  one  that  does  justice  to 
man's  responsibility  and  to  the  affirmation  of  meaning 
beyond  his  own  creative  capacities. 
The  terra  that  is  faithful  to  these  guidelines  is  the 
very  one  ferleau-Ponty  had  rejected  during  his  middle  period; 
it  is  the  term  "transcendence  in  inmanence"  .1 
O73  S-JRVATI0i? 
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To  demonstrate  the  appropriateness  of  the  term, 
"transcendence  in  it  anence",  we  need  to  return  to  the  form 
of  his  ontology.  'Specifically,  men,  in  some  encounters, 
are  exposed  to  the  mystery  of  Being.  They  are  opened  to 
each  other,  and  through  the  other's  presence,  are  opened 
to  a  new  aiiarenesc  of  self.  The  experience  may  be  termed  a 
c  isc].  o￿1ýr.  e  of  o7_E'  s  own  true  net>>.  re  or  Lein  the  disclosure 
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c.  f.,  Rabil,  Albert,  on.  cit.  Chap.  seven.  This  term 
is  used  by  Rabil  also  to  describe  1,  'erleau-Ponty's  position. 214, 
perhaps  we  can  understand  what  is  meant  when  Yerleau-Ponty 
says,  "-rnan  becomes  strangely,  its  (transcendence)  privileged. 
bearer.  " 
A  person  comes  to  know  himself  through  the  intersub- 
jective  experience  as  one  who  opens  and  is  opened  by  others 
to  transcendence.  The  parties  encounter  each  other  and  them- 
selves  as  being  instruri:  ental  in  disclosing  the  meaning  of 
their  existence.  The  parties  also,  in  Merleau-Ponty's 
conception,  participate  in  disclosing  the  mystery  of  Being; 
people  in  genuine  interaction  are  the  conduites  to  the  exper- 
ience  of  transcendence. 
This  is  a  different  conception  than  was  indicated  in 
the  early  concentration  on  self-transcendence;  the  emphasis 
on  the  intersubjective  exchange  has  grown  in  importance. 
an  does  not  so  much  transcend  himself;  he  becomes  aware 
that  he  offers  and  is  offered  "what  is  not  himself,  "  i.  e. 
a  new  sense  of  belonging  to  another  an-'  to  the  whole  worlýý. 
This 
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truth  is  broader  and  more  mature;  t?  be  new  element  is  that 
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to  himself.  He  is  -?  participant  in  a  relationship  which 
discloses  new  meaning  about  himself,  others,  and  the  whole 
of  worldly  existence;  as  such  he  has  become  party  to  some- 
thing  greater  than  self-transcendence  or  self-awareness. 
The  focus  is  upon  intersubjectivity  itself  and  the  aware- 
ness  is  that  the  interhuman  is  an  important  opening  to  the 
meaning  of  his  existence,  and  to  the  mystery  of  the  world's 
being. 
The  emphasis  is  still  upon  worldly  existence;  the 
realization  of  being  a  participant  or  mediator  does  not 
betray  its  humanist  context.  But  the  application  of  the 
term  "transcen'.  ence  in  immanence"  is  none  the  less  appro- 
priate.  It  is,  because  the  doors  have  been  thrown  open  so 
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shortly,  mediation  opens  the  participants  to  What  is  not 
themselves.  It  omens  them  to  the  mystery  or  the  world's 
being;  it  opens  them  to  wonder  and  awe. 
If  we  remember  this  lesson  from  the  ontology  we  can 
then  say  that  transcendence  cannot  entirely  be  identified 
as  the  act  of  interhuman  exchange.  It  would  be  much  more 
appropriate  to  say  that  interhuman  exchange  is  a  conduite 
to  transcendence.  .  xchange  cannot  be  bypassed,  as  man  does 
know  himself  in  it  as  mediator.  But,  as  mediator  he  cannot 
confine  the  question  of  Being  to  himself  or  to  the  exper- 
ience  of  another.  l+'he  mystery  of  Being  is  the  mystery  of 
transcendence;  the  two  terms  are  interchangeable. 
When  we  say  this  vie  realize  very  little  has  been 
done  to  define  the  term  rein,  _,  or  transcendence.  But  re- 
flection  yields  this:  does  not  pertain  solely  to 
the  "fact"  that  the  world  e:  rists,  or  as  7erleau-Ponty  sale, 
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term  'ein.  means  this  also;  :  being  is  e,  --,,  -)erienced 
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to  ask  about  the  meaning  of  the  world,  it  faces  them  with 
its  apparent  mystery.  i'erleau-Pontýr  hay'  something  quite 
intimate  in  mind  when  he  described  men  in  exchange  as 
floating  on  the  waves  of  Peing.  At  least  he  meant  that 
men  truly  sensed  the  mystery  of  their  own  existence  and. 
the  world's.  The  wonder  that  summarizes  the  philosophical 
vocation  is  an  experience  of  awe,  not  simply  the  questioning 
of  an  onlooker.  Lierleau-Ponty  did  not  have  the  opportunity 
to  detail  this  aspect  of  his  philosophy  but  it  is  quite 
evident  in  The  Visible  and  the  Invisible  that  man  confronts 
the  mystery  of  transcendence  or  Being.  The  philosophical 
questioner  brings  one  thing  to  that  experience:  he  inter- 
rogates  the  experience  reflectively;  he  seeks  to  know  mystery. 
We  have  su.  g  ested  two  ways  of  viewing  ?  erleau-Ponty's 
concept  of  transcendence.  Poth  drew  heavily  upon  the  fore 
and  content  of  his  ontology,  and  are  compatible  components 
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osoahica.  l  credibility  about  the  experience  of  Being? 
Je  shall  save  this  for  our  concluding  chapters. PART  Ti  R-E 
CO:.  'PARATIV.  L:,  sTUDI=,  S riusS3RL"  S  TRAN  SC-,  *  ID  NTTAL  PI-ENO  ENOLOGY 
ITS  BEARING  ON  THE  STUDY  OF  INTERSUBTECTIVITY 
The  method  of  i,  erleau-Ponty  was  outlined  briefly  in 
an  earlier  chapter;  but  it  was  impossible  to  trace  the  devel- 
opment  of  the  phenomenology's  content  and  the  methodology  at 
the  same  time.  Phenomenological  method  tends  to  become  a 
subject  in  its  own  right. 
We  asked  immediately  above  if  L_erleau-  'onty'  s  ontology 
had  lost  touch  with  the  earlier  emphasis  upon  perception; 
we  were,  indeed,  asking  a  question  which  involves  method- 
ological  discipline.  It  is  an  example  which  should  illus- 
trate  why  we  are  taking  space  to  discuss  the  function  of 
methodology  in  phenomenological  analysis. 
Put  briefly,  it  is  often  difficult  to  tell  why  "Iler- 
leau-Ponty  is  making  a  particular  point.  When  he  speaks  of 
the  tre-ref'lecti.  ve  as  the  unique  resoi  rce  for  philosophical 
juc?  nentý-  ,  why  cons  he  do  -o?  The  ar.  wir  can  be  found  in 
the  prlnci  r  l'e￿  Of  r;  1E'  orie  oý  o  is 
.i  ('1`=C  l_''').  lne.  Or  '!  when  he 
, flea  of  the  lr  t.  :  ',  -.  ib  j_-c  tine  a, 
- 
th  ro  'inan  thE,  rn  of  i;  'Ie 
lived  vior1d,  why  does  ne  ýreal.  of  it  ac,  a  the-e  or  "e  4once". 
':.  tic  an  ,,,,  zGr,  again,  is  fol'nc  in  nnoviin,  -  t'-.  e  -principles  of 
phenomenological  analysis.  j`::  erleau-lonty  often  uses  the 
terms  common  1o  methodology  but  he  does  not  inform  the  reader 
how  he  has  reached  his  conclusions  or  observations. 220 
If  this  is  a  fault  in  his  work,  we  are  obligated  all 
the  more  to  know  the  tools  of  phenomenological  method.  A 
disciplined  application  of  method  may  help  us  decide  that 
particular  truth  claims  are  appropriate.  Or,  particular 
themes  may  seem  more  questionable  when  evaluated  from  a 
methodological  viewpoint.  The  proper  function  of  method  is 
an  issue  when  evaluating  I'erleau-Ponty's  work;  to  under- 
stand  its  function  in  his  phenomenology-  is-our  .  first  objective. 
The  best  access  we  have  to  Merleau-Ponty's  peculiar 
use  of  mod  is  through  Husserl.  There  is  no  doubt  he 
fashioned  his  method  from  a  close  reading  of  the  father 
of  phenomenology.  As  a  young  philosopher  Merleau-Ponty 
spent  a  year  at  the  archives  in  Louvain  where  Husserl's 
work  was  being  collected  and  translated.  1  His  interest  in 
Husserl  was  rekindled  in  the  early  fifties  and  his  peculiar 
interpretation  of  him  was  argued  more  forcibly  than  before. 
We  shall  concentrate  on  ierl.  eau-Fonty's  use  of  Husserl's 
discipline.  His  modification  of  Husserl  is  of  special 
interest  to  us. 
Secondly,  it  is  al^o  i  mnort-ant  that  runserl'  s 
description  of  intersubjectivity  come  into  focus.  Vie  shall 
attend  to  his  view  of  how  we  can  speak  about  intersubjectivity 
with  credibility;  this  is  also  a  matter  dictated  by  method. 
1The  Husserl  Archives  are  under  the  direction  of  Fr. 
Herman  Leo  VanBreda. 221 
Because  Husserl  is  primarily  a  methodologist,  we  shall  ask, 
does  his  discipline  promote  credibility  in  descriptive 
analysis;  or  must  ideas  be  'altered  to  retain  sensibility  in 
analysis?  Our  first  concern  is:  what  is  the  proper  func- 
tion  of  method  in  describing  the  intersubjective  phenomenon? 
Related  to  this  is  the  issue  of  Husserl's  position  on  inter- 
subjectivity:  is  a  position  adopted  because  of  a  method- 
ological  dictum,  or  does  the  phenomenon  of  human  interaction 
inform  method?  Should  the  lived-world,  as  tierleau-Ponty 
said,  act  as  the  prime  resource  for  reflection?  If  so,  on 
what  basis?  Can  there  be  a  way  of  relating  the  lived-world 
concept  to  methodological  procedure?  The  objective  is  to 
gain  insights  into  method  and  its  relation  to  intersubjectivity. 
In  order  to  get  at  the  issue  of  intersubjectivity 
found  in  Husserl,  we  undertake  first,  the  more  general  task, 
the  exposition  of  his  method.  Husserl's  method  is  his  phil- 
osonhy  in  one  sense;  he  never  ceased  refining  and  expounding 
it.  is  objectives  are  easily  stated.  Husserl  was  a  self- 
conscious  inheritor  of  the  Cartesian  tradition.  Not  only  is 
his  most  thorough  exposition  of  Method  entitled  Cartesian 
:  editations;  his  statements  of  purpose  sound  like  passages 
directly  from  the  Master. 
Philoso?  hy  is  the  supremely  personal  affair  of  the  one 
who  philosophizes.  It  is  the  question  of  his  sapientia 
universalis,  the  aspiration  of  his  knowledge  for  the 
universal.  In  particular,  the  philosopher's  quest  is 
for  truly  scientific  knowledge,  knowledge  for  which  he 
can  ssume--from  the  very  beginning  and  in  every  sub- 222 
sequent  step--coi!:  plete  responsibility  by  using  his  own 
absolutely  self-evident  justifications 
"1 
'she  purpose  of  his  reflections  is  properly  found  in 
the  last  three  words,  "absolutely  self-evident  justifications". 
rierleau-Ponty  remarked  appropriately,  that  Husserl  saw  phil- 
osophy  as  a  "rigorous  science"  and  would  strive  to  make  phen- 
omenology  its  most  confident  expositor.  His  goal,  as 
Descarte's,  is  to  construct  a  complete  structure  upon 
self-evident,  -apodigtic  truth. 
For  Husserl,  this  meant  that  philosophy  was  to  be 
"presuppositionless".  This  is  the  driving  force  behind  his 
method.  His  conviction  was  that  philosophy  differed  from 
the  other  sciences,  notably  psychology  and  logic,  in  that 
it  entertained  no  assumptions  about  the  world  or  man.  On 
the  contrary,  philosophy  could  be  the  universal  science  in 
that  it  discovers  a  unitary  and  primal  fact  about  thinking- 
its its  essential  structure  or  essence. 
To  make  this  understandable  we  should  translate  a 
bit.  Husserl  did  court  a  presupposition;  it  was  that  phen- 
omenology  rests  upon  an  unquestionable  truth;  when  he  says 
philosophy  must  be  "presuppositionless",  this  is  what  he  means. 
His  watchword  is  the  oft  repeated  statement,  "to'the  things 
'Husserl,  Edmund,  The  Paris  Lectures,  The  Hague,, 
:  'artinus  ý'i  jhoff,  1063,  p.  4.  An  expanded  version  o?  '  this 
quotation  is  given  in.,  Husserl,  Edmund.,  Cartesian  °.  -.  editati3ns, 
The  ,.  ague,  :  'artinus  ivi  jhoff,  1060,  pp.  2-3. 223 
themselves"  (zu  Sachen  Selbst).  `'7'nen  this  dictum  is  followed, 
he  contends,  no  presupnositionc  are  needed  or  permitted.  And 
yet,  the  watchword  itself  involves  a  presupposition  about-the 
goal  and  capability  of  phenomenological  discipline.  .  'le  shall 
elaborate  the  content  of  this  particular.  pr.  esuppositiof 
later  in  the  discussion. 
Though  Husserl's  objectives  are  clear,  his  method  is 
not  always  so.  As  with  many  other  thinkers,  his  thought  is 
a  changing  and  developing  phenomenon.  We  cannot  afford  the 
space  necessary  to  elucidate  the  changes  which  occur  between 
Logical  Investigations  (1900),  and  The  Crisis  of  European 
Sciences  and  Transcendental  Phenomenology  of  1Q314-37.  We  can 
only  indicate  the  changes  germane  to  our  topic;  it  should 
be  assumed  that  others  occurred  and  are  not  mentioned  due 
to  practical  considerations.  We  shall  stress  those  points  of 
method  which  remainec'  more  or  less  constant  in  his  development. 
. 7;  oreover,  .11  .c  --  r1'  1  1anýýa_e  is  not  always  preci  se. 
Ric'-iari  Schmitt  ha  documented 
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e  '_`,  oC-  in  ar  sir  1  if?  °Cý.  a  ?  'Or  as'  ro  r$bZF.  This  1  rol 
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"'iý,  e.  ,  iUichar.  =,  "Transcendental  Fhenoiien- 
ologys  'Fuddle  or  "ystery?  "  Journal  of  the  British  Society 
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because  we  think  the  confusions  are  unimportant;  they  do 
incite  objections.  But  our  main  argument  with  Husserl  does 
not  concern  the  preciseness  of  his  language;  it  concerns 
his  concept  of  method  and  its  conclusions.  Our  criticism 
can  be  made  effectively  without  dealing  with  the  issue  of 
confusing  terminology. 
Husserl's  method  is  founded  upon  his  execution  of 
"the  phenomenological  reduction".  It  is  the  first,  and 
perhaps,  most  essential  of  the  three  reductions  which  he 
employs. 
1  He  is  much  more  e:  Tplicit  than  r-lerleau-Ponty  ever 
was  about  it. 
What  1,1ierleau-Ponty  called  the  "pre-reflective", 
Husserl  calls  "the  natural  standpoint".  When  we  are  engaged 
in  hunting  for  a  red  -oencil  anii  st  the  shuffle  on  our  desk, 
we  are  completely  occia-ried.  rte  never  stop  to  glAcstion  the 
act  of.  earchin  ';  we  invariably  go  abo>>t  the  hunt  believing 
that  te  ereil  c  :  iý-ts.  In  ro_:  e  genera].  terns,  the  d.  esl.,  our 
LIaT)ax.:  ',  oc'2'-',  etc.  ,  re  "there"  as  well.  ''The'  world,  as 
a  ?.  ':  '..  C  l4  12 
.  'Orr  '  ýlF 
.Ei  C7ý^Ci  ='_1.021  r  it  l;  >  i?  ^l  }:  X  21  othC 
1  ￿e  c:  ýoo^^.  'to  i;  ý_ti  sýeriý  sr  , ý￿c  tý  o»:  GS 
1,3.011  C-  6 
re  Ci'_i  C  Lip  the  1  ran  c  r,  '-  rt  le(.:  1  Cl  pi  "  11  1. 
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reduction.;  "  .  rlc  t:  ink  se-pa.  rate  naming  aids  clarification, 
for  there  are  different  forms  of  reflection  which  will  become  evident. 225 
I  supposed,  ..  .  "1  This  natural  attitude  characterizes 
all  experience;  we  invariably  accept  the  eyistence  of  the 
world. 
This  attitude  also  applies  to  the  sciences:  the 
object-world  is  studied  by  the  natural  sciences;  the  exper- 
ience-world  is  investigated  by  psychology.  2  Hence,  all 
sciences,  save  philosophy  are  referrer1  to  by  Husserl  as 
"sciences  of  the  natural  standpoint.  "3  In  their  descriptions 
and  formulations  these  sciences  automatically  rely  upon  the 
presupposition  that  the  world  is  "there".  It  is  this  stand- 
point  that  'Husserl  proposes  to  alter. 
Insteaý  now  of  remaining  at  this  standpoint,  we  propose 
to  alter  it  radically.  Our  aim  must  be  to  convince 
ourselves  of  the  poss*bility  of  this  alteration  on  the 
ground's  of  principle. 
, Iha  this  "alteration"  involves  must  be  stated  care- 
fully;  it  is  easy  to  misunderstand.  remember  that  Husserl 
seeks  an  unquestionable  foundation  fo_"  philosophy;  this  means 
that  if  e1':.  rence  for  truth  claims  is  i 
la  any  way  partial  or 
in_cor:  _pl6t:.,  it  must  be  put  out  of  p12.  .  Perfection  of 
1_  Berl,  ý  r1-rvnd  ,,  Gir  .  ,  W.  R.  -,  oyce, 
?,  onroi'?,  ^E..  -  .  Allen  an("  'Tnwir_  L_t'  .,  1c  ',  p.  n4. 
2".  '.  i.  --cirrce  refers  to  tr,  e  and  before  that, 
OrC'I  t  Ii  fE,  a  Ir.  FP.  ---  , 
ý,  "-lleý:,  re  '-  ce  to  it.  Trat  th 
being  of  t.  _e  eiorlrl  precede-  everythin,  -  else  is  so  obvious 
that  no  or,  ý-  thinks  to  articulate  it  j'  a  sentence.  "  Husserl, 
;.,  The  Faris  Lectures,  p.  6. 
3  T--id. 
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evidence  yields  apodicticity  for  Husserl,  and  this  is  what 
he  is  after. 
We  are  advised  to  reconsider  our  acceptance  of  the 
fact-world.  Is  it  not  true  that  we  suffer  from  illusions 
about  the  existence  of  particular  things?  The  red  pencil 
may  not  be  there;  certainly,  my  failure  to  find  it  opens 
the  door  to  doubt.  If  doubt  is  possible  with  regard  to  a 
particular  sensible  thing,  the  evidence  for  its  existence 
cannot  be  apodictic.  And  if  this  is  true  of  particulars 
it  can  also  be  true  of  existence  in  general. 
It  sounds  as  if  Husserl  is  employing  the  familiar 
tool  of  Descartes--methodic  doubt.  But  once  we  amplify 
what  he  means  by  "altering"  the  natural  attitude,  the  unique- 
ness  of  his  method  becomes  apparent.  The  natural  stand- 
point  is  "suspender";  we  "disconnect"  ourselves  from  it. 
Husserl  means  that  judgments  about  the  object-world  are  going 
to  be  withheld.  '..  c  say  neither,  "ycsi,  there  is  my  desk", 
nor  "no,  I  doubt  t' 
.  '+.  t  it  is  tigere".  This  is  different  than 
:  fescart.  =,  '  rct:...  oc  i_  doubt;  escartes,  -Ploy  was  to  cxerci  ý-,  e 
scti  C  _.  ,  ý.  E  17.  Ci  . it 
.  -t  Coui  ,  'CCCO"".  E 
,  rour_c'e  in  certai  i'  rcvotly,  !  ý;  SC  C'1  COitý!  ':  E;  ý  s 
1ýhe  r;  ford  l,  ýr  to  drain  fro' 
N.  i1Ci  t 
involve  a  p.  _Ie.  urr.  o  . ion 
Li7r  p}  iJ_o  op".  Or 
LIn 
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is  the  truly  disinterested  one;  only  in  that  disinterest 
will  objectivity  become  attainable. 
The  natural  attitude  is  "bracketed";  Husserl  views 
our  ready  acceptance  of  the  world  as  "an  unacceptably  naive 
belief.  We  can  no  longer  accept  the  reality  of  the  world 
as  a  fact  to  be  taken  for  granted.  It  is  a  hypothesis  that 
needs  verification.  "1  Bracketing  serves  to  neutralize  our 
acceptance.  The  phenomenological  reduction  is  an  epoche, 
an  abstention.  Once  existence  is  placed  in  brackets,  it 
may  be  considered  cooly  and  "objectively";  at  least  this  is 
Husserl's  intention.  This  is  the  purpose  of  the  phenomen- 
ological  reduction. 
We  can  save  our  main  critism  until  we  have  described 
the  other  reductions,  but  I  think  it  is  wise  to  bring  up  one 
thing  here.  Husserl's  phenomenological  reduction  invloves 
somethin_:  quite  different  than  it  did  for  rerleau-Ponty. 
It  would  appear  the  two  agreed  that  suspension  of  judgment 
abort  e-  otence  merely  seckE  to  uproot  the  pr.  esuppositiorIs 
we  1);  _.  v,  e::  peria  ce.  '.,  lit  r'oe:  ',  i.  r'o  so  hE.  re,  as  with 
doubt  r_-.;..  tence  is  We 
ul, 
T  iýl.  ý  1'E  3_n  t-C  v 
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l:  -usserl,  E.  ,  The  Faris  T_ectures,  p.  F.  Elsewhere 
he  says,  "in  spite  of  the  continual  experiencedness  of  the 
world,  a  non-being  of  the  world  is  conceivable.,,  Husserl, 
ý:.  ,  Car.  `  sinn  r'editati.  ons,  p.  17. 228 
ii.  erleau-Ponty,  in  order  to  sharpen  our  knowledge  about 
experience,  or  does  it  move  in  a  different  direction? 
A  different  direction  is  implicitly  given  with 
Husserl's  notion  of  the  world.  as  "hypothesis".  That  we 
could.  regard  existence  as  a  hypothesis,  carries  with  it 
an  idea  which  will  blossom  in  the  next  reduction,  that  is, 
Husserl's  concentration  upon  pure  consciousness.  We  shall 
explain  this  below,  but  it  is  evident  even  at  this  early 
stage,  that  the  phenomenological  reduction  is  not  employed 
to  put  man  back  in  touch  with  raw  experience.  It  is  not 
used  to  increase  our  knowledge  of  experience,  or  to  reopen 
our  wonder  at  the  world.  Rather,  it  is  used  to  strip  away 
a  partially  certain  world,  to  gain  a  "scientifically  cer- 
tain"  one. 
'ghat  we  discover  upon  using  the  oheno;  nenologieal 
reduction  ia  lesson  of  central  importance  to  Pusserl. 
''dt,  l  the  Sllt.  iý(n  io;  '  of  aot  everything  out  there, 
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standpoint  becomes  clear. 
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study  the  ways  in  which  this  thesis  operates  e.  g.  in  per- 
ception  or  imagination,  as  did 
. 7erleau-Ponty  and  Sartre. 
Or  he  can,  as  Russen  did,  concentrate  on  finding  principles 
innate  to  the  subject  which  seem  to  explain  how  man  comes 
to  a.  ffir_r_  a  world.  The  search  for  the  pencil  illustrates 
these  alternatives.  The  existentially  oriented  philosopher 
seeks  to  describe  the  subject's  search  in  terms  of  its 
experiential  modes;  he  concentrates  on  the  ways  we  search 
for  the  pencil.  His  focus  inevitably  involves  dealing  with 
the  subject's  acceptance  of  the  world;  it  describes  and 
interprets  the  various  ways  that  acceptance  is  carried  out. 
This  is  not  so  with  Husserl's  alternative.  We  are  advised 
to  extract  the  meaning  of  searching  from  the  phenomenon  of 
searching.  Finding  what  is  essential  in  the  phenomenon 
of  searching  does  not  involve  dealing  with  the  subject's 
"world-thesis.  "l  Teliefs,  actions,  and  memories  are  phen- 
oMenal  "ors!!,  wh  cl-  rniýst  loe  hrac__e-'.;  er.  1  he  only  thing 
essential.  'i;  o  ""9archif31º  is  that  te  5￿1_-jeet  initiates  it 
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subjectivity. 
1 
This  is  the  meaning  Husserl  assigns  to  the  eidetic 
reduction.  The  structures  of  subjectivity  become  increas- 
ingly  evident  through  the  persistant  use  of  eidetic  reduction; 
the  eidos  is  invariably,  the  "constituting"  activity  of  the 
subject.  The  meaning  of  experience,  rests  upon  this  invar- 
iable  structure;  it  is  certain,  that  "I  think  I  see  a  house" 
even  though  it  is  not  certain  that  "I  see  a  house"  or  that 
"a  house  is  there".  Experienced  objects  have  been  bracketed, 
even  the  certainty  of  perceptions  has  been  suspended;  what 
remains  is  the  "I  think".  This  is  the  specific  conclusion 
of  the  eidetic  reduction;  it  is  the  certainty,  the  apodicticity 
of  the  ego  cogito. 
How  Husserl  interprets  the  eZo  cogito,  takes  us  to 
the  final  reduction;  it  represents  his  most  radical  break 
with  Descartes.  He  did  not  rest  his  case  with  the  Cartesian 
concept  of  the  ego.  Descartes  believed  that  his  discovery 
signaled  the  "end"  of  methodic  doubt.  For  Husserl,  it 
signaled  the  call  to  an  even  more  radical  discovery. 
In  relation  to  this  we  must  under  no  circumstances 
take  for  -granted  that,  with  our  apodictic  and  pure 
ego,  we  have  salvaged  a  small  corner  of  the  world  as 
the  single  indubitable  fact  about  the  world  which  can 
;  'Je  disagree,  but  it  is  wise  to  be  patient  with 
Husserl  on  this.  Vie  are  indebted  to  Frank  Tillman  for  the 
illustration.  Vide.,  Solomon,  Robert,  C.,  ec.  Phenomenology 
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be  utilized  by  the  philosophizing  ego.  It  is  not  true 
that  all  remains  to  be  done  is  to  infer  the  rest  of 
the  world  through  correct  deductive  procedures  according 
to  the  principles  that  are  innate  to  the  ego.  1 
- 
Husserl  holds  that  the  Cartesian  formula,  cogito  er7o 
sum,  (fie  -pense,  donc  'exist)  utilizes  the  notion  of  causality 
to  reconstruct  the  existential  domain.  2  Descartes'  ergo, 
Husserl  would  say,  attempts  to  connect  a  transcendental 
cogito  to  an  existential  fact-world.  If  the  reduction  is 
faithfully  employed,  Descartes'  connection  must  be  denied. 
The  suspension  of  existential  claims  rightly  includes  the 
"I";  as  an  exitential  entity  it  cannot  be  inferred  if  the 
reduction  is  to  be  complete.  Descartes'  had  come  to  the 
edge  of  a  great  discovery  but  he  failed  to  press  the  reduction 
to  its  rightful  conclusion.  Husserl  employs  the  reduction 
with  a  rigorous  singlemindedness;  every  existential  judgment 
is  being  bracketed.  How  Husserl  conceives  the  ego  can  now 
be  specified.  "By  phenomenological  epoche  I  reduce  my 
natural  human  Ego  and  ? my  psychic  life--the  realm  of  my 
psychological  self-experience--to  my  transcendental-phen- 
or"7enological  self-experience.  "3 
The  ego,  under  the  transcendental  reduction,  is  not 
a  concrete  ego,  a  self;  it  is  a  "purified  Ego",  "a  consciousness 
sý  usserl,  'ý.  ,  r-he  Paris  Lectures,  p.  c. 
2Ibid. 
;  vide.  ,  Husserl, 
.  Cartesian  :  ',  editationr, 
pp.  25-26. 
3itusserl,  L.,  Cartesian  -.  edi-ta  pions  ,  p.  26. 232 
fror:  1  which  all  transcendencies  have  been  rerloved.  We  quote 
his  rather  surprising  conclusion. 
This  :  ego,  with  his  ago-life,  who  necessarily  remains 
for  rye,  by  virtue  of  such  e-oochb,  is  not  a  piece  of 
the  world;  mid  if  he  says,  'I  exist,  SI,  7o  conto'  ,  that 
no  longer  signifies,  -  'I,  this  man  exist'.  No  longer 
am  I  the  man  who,  in  natural  self-experience  finds 
himself  as  a  man  and  who,  with  the  abstractive  restriction 
to  the  pure  contents  of  'internal'  or  purely  psychological 
self-experience,  finds  his  own  pure  mens  sive  animus  sive 
intellectus;  nor  am  I  the  separately  considered  psyche 
itself. 
The  consciousness  that  Husserl  has  in  mind  is  a 
"pure"  or  "flowing"  -Ego. 
His  ego  is  not  the  experiencing, 
valuing,  doing  ego,  that  is  a  self  in  touch  with  the  world; 
it  is  conceived  of  as  an  ego  which  remains  after  all  these 
elements  are  extracted.  What  is  left  over,  he  calls  the 
transcendental  ego. 
It  is  not  easy  to  find  illustrative  material  for 
Husserl'  s  notion.  Flow  can  we,  in  principle  use  any  worldly 
example?  The  closest  we  can  co-..,.  e  is  by  using  an  idea  which 
Husserl  himself  rejected,  the  idea  of  substance  so  often 
found  in  the  scholastics.  2  Substance  is  properly  contrastec' 
with  material  existences;  it  is  a  "general  thing",  a  concep- 
tual  expression  or  -principle  underlying  the  material  world. 
Husserl's  consciousness  is  a  principle  or  ranifled  "entity" 
which  is  supposed  to  explain  a  given  ego's  experience  of  the 
1Ibid., 
p.  2j. 
2Ibid.,  p.  24. 233 
world.  (I  would  not  want  to  push  the  parallel  further.  ) 
By  pressing  the  reductions  to  their  ultimate  con- 
elusion,  E'usserl  believes  he  has  uncovered.  the  one  self- 
evident  truth.  Only  consciousness  as  a  transcendental  con- 
sciousness,  a  disembodied  ego,  can  observe  disinterestedly, 
the  experienced  world  and  the  psychic  or  individual  ego.  1 
The  objective  of  phenomenology  has  been  reached;  the 
value  of  the  attainment  is  as  follows.  The  philosopher 
can  now  speak  with  certainty.  Our  world  is  subjectively 
constituted,  both  things  and  ourselves.  Given  this  obser- 
vation  the  thinker  can  base  all  else  on  certainty.  The 
method  has  yielded  its  intended  function,  apodictic  truth. 
We  are  tempted  to  say  that  Husserl  has  chosen  an  odd 
way  of  justifying  the  claim  that  our  experience  of  the  world 
is  subjective.  But  this  does  not  go  far  enough. 
The  transcendental  spectator  places  himself  above  him- 
self,  watches  himself',  an.,  -3  sees  ... 
im^eJ  f  as  the  pr  eviously 
work'  imr,  ersed  ego.  In  othsr  words  he  discovers  that 
he,  c^.  _a  being,  e;  ";  i  Sts  v:,  '  t  in  himself  as  a  co  %"- 
i  through  the  cor:  s-:  ýo:  --:,  in  co-r3_ta.  ,  iones  , 
r,  c  -  iscovc_-s  the  tran.  scenc1er_tel  li.  feýan-,  reing  which 
r.  ',  ake  ,,  p  (t'_ie)  to  talit;  r  o'  t'ze  ý;  orl  '. 
Te  e_°'"ect  of  thi-  is.  '  ,,  ý':  ?:.  7.10r)-5  ärnear  to  man 
o'  ýc  t-.,  as  ý.  -6,.  01-.  S'  ..,  -o  `,  _  c-.:,  a  t!  -lought  e!,  -`er- 
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enocb-b.  e,  co-irists  in  that  T  reach  e  u1__timate  e  erientia1 
L-nc  cognitive  persnec  rive  thinkable.  In  it  I  become  the 
disinterested  .1  ectator  of  my  natb!  ral  end  Avorldly  ego 
and  its  life.  "  Husserl,  ..:.  ,  Faris.  {Leectures,  p.  15. 
?:  _Lasscrl,  .,  The  Faris  1  ectý-,.  rcz  ,  p.  16. 23L. 
tained  and  possessed  in  the  transcendental  sphere.  Ian's 
thought  of  himself  must  also  be  included;  the  ego  is  a 
thought  possessed  by  a  transcendental  ego.  Husserl's 
idealism  is  unrestrained. 
1  His  method  has  taken  him  to 
the  limits  of  radical  reflection;  it  now  deserves  interpre- 
tive  comment. 
Husserl's  first  proposal,  to  alter  the  natural  atti- 
tude,  is  a  necessity  if  one  attempts  description  in  a  reflec- 
tive  manner.  Whether  we  speak  of  this  as  an  "alteration  of 
the  natural  attitude",  or  not,  it  is  still  necessary  to 
recognize  that  the  experienced  world  is  being  thrown  into 
question  with  the  advent  of  reflection.  '?  hen  the  ordinary 
language  philosopher  asks  "what  do  you  mean  ...  ?"  he 
is  challenging  us  to  interpret  experience,  to  stand  apart 
fron  it  for  a  duration  to  become  critical  of  it  and  our 
language  about  it.  When  the  e:  -istential-phenomenologist 
counsels  the  phenomenological  reductio_ý,  he  is  also  asking 
i,  s  to  withdraw  fro:  )  the  raivete  of  'r  ,  erier_ce,  to  look 
,  ix-or  ;.  t  critic,  -ill.;,  T.  Car  -..  ---ar-  ncthoý':  i.  c  rolint  i;  l  pcrha.  p 
t'  e  Cl".  '  sic  e,  -a.  rnrlc3  0,  Is  r,  cv  ,.  T  that  the 
ro  oncl_;  ý-ical  ct  .  o::  i:  J:  ý`ý  ,-  -i  ic  objective  of. 
-0  A. 
1"Carrie,  ]  out  v!  i.  th  this  systematic  concreteness, 
pheno:  r,  enolo  y  is  co  ipso  'transcend.  Fnta1.  idealirr'". 
riusscr1,  ; 
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practitioners  of  philosophy;  it  is  more  a  call  to  the  crit- 
ical  attitude,  and  is  shared  by  all  who  undertake  to  do  phil- 
osophy.  Husserl  cannot  be  thought  of  as  an  original  thinker 
at  the  level  of  his  first  proposal,  the  phenomenological 
reduction. 
A  small  indication  of  Husserl's  direction  was  given 
in  that  first  move,  however;  it  did  infer  that  the  world's 
existence  must  be  a  "hypothesis"  for  the  phenomenologist. 
The  outcome  was  further  suggested  in  his  second  move,  the 
eidetic  reduction.  Few  existential  phenomenologists  would 
deny  Husserl's  contention  that  forms  of  consciousness  become 
clear  with  the  eidetic  reduction.  Merleau-Ponty  would  agree 
with  Husserl  on  this.  But  Merleau-Ponty  held  fast  to  the 
position  that  the  eidos  which  was  discernible  pertained  to 
our  experience  of  objects  and  others,  and  not  to  the  singular 
idea  that  the  human  subject  constitutes  perceptions,  actions 
and  valuations.  Husserl  and  "_erleau-Ponty  part  ways  at  this 
point.  L:  erleau-Ponty  held  that,  although  consciousness 
"belongs"  to  the  subject,  it  is  alý,  wways  a  consciousness  of 
other  things  and  -people.  Husserl  failed  to  make  this  obser- 
vation;  it  is  easy  to  see  how  subjective  constitution  became 
his  preoccupation.  It  stood  out  as  an  independent  truth.  Its 
evidence  was  indubitable,  whereas  "consciousness  of  ..  ." 
indicated  truths  which  could  not  claim  certainty  as  their  norm. 
When  we  come  to  the  final  and  radical  reduction,  the 26 
transcendental  reduction,  1usserl's  choice  to  concentrate 
on  human  subjectivity  becomes  clear.  It  strikes  me  as  a 
choice  for  two  reasons.  The  first  is  Husserl's  conception 
of  phenomenology;  he  conceived  of  it  as  a  transcendental 
discipline.  He  calls  his  method  a  "transcendental  pheno:  en- 
ology".  The  guiding  principle  behind  this  is  the  conviction 
that  phenomenology  must  rest  on  indubitable  truth;  its 
findings  must  be  apodictic.  He  believed  because  of  this, 
that  study  of  subjective  consciousness  was  the  only  meaning- 
ful  topic  for  phenomenology. 
The  second  reason  is  that  Husserl  had  to  contend  with 
a  major  finding  in  his  own  work.  With  the  eidetic  reduction 
we  could  see  clearly  that  man  "intends"  his  experience  of 
the  world;  it  is  his  consciousness  of  ...  things  that 
characterizes  all  experience.  That  this  is  an  activity  of 
consciousness  seems  clear  to  both  the  existential  and  the 
transcer_c'ental  rhenome_roJ.  oýistt.  .  v.  t  ýserl  held  that  this 
activity  0-7  cox  cio  A  mess  w.  -.  co:  lýle'ýel;  r  "w;  thin"  conryc3.  o  is- 
nec  ^;  it  1￿a.  ý'  'ro  rE--er  -nec  to  -',  e'  \.  orlr-  "o,,  th  r".  A 
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reality  are,  e-,  c----r-'-s  the  nc  e  by 
which  consciousness  is  interrogated.  r11.  lC  Cartesian 
:..  ecitations  draw  all  the  consequences  of  such  a  dc- 
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return  to  the  ego  leads  to  a  monadism  according  to 
which  the  world  is  primordially  the  sense  that  my 
ego  lays  out. 
The  turn  toward  the  subject  did  involve  a  choice  for 
ýHusc3erl.  We  think  it  was  a  wrong  one,  one  which  excludes 
all  sense  of  interaction  with  a  world,  but  it  should  be 
appreciated  in  light  of  his  first  decision.  If  phenomen- 
ology  is  to  be  apodictic,  then  the  reduction  must  be  taken 
as  Husserl  outlined.  There  is  a  certain  logical  strength 
in  his  persistence.  By  refraining  from  all  existential 
judgments  the  phenomenologist  is  limited.  to  what  is  "left 
over".  And  it  is  quite  clear  that  the  human  subject  is 
and  remains  conscious,  once  the  world  is  put  in  brackets. 
His  consciousness  is  all  that  is  left  over. 
But  should  this  excuse  us  fro-,,  -,  i  seeing  the  mistake 
of  his  decision?  Need  phenorlenology  employ  self-evidence 
or  apoclicticity  as  the  only  measure  of  truth?  If  it  is 
not  coy  :  -_.  ttec'  to  his  first  choice  th  n  the  eidetic  reduction 
r  e'  not  si  nr:  1e  out  trans  cei-uientalism  the  one  truth  about 
J  na  ure  of  coin  sciousr  ess  . 
In  Ot?:  f  1  WOY  rl,  slf  we  are 
].?.  'ý_  2tc  fron  t' 
_ 
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Consciousness  is  consciousness  "in"  the  subject  in 
a  real  sense.  Our  perception  of  objects  or  others  is  always 
ours;  it  can  not  Üe  identified.  with  arother's  consciousness 
or  intentional  activity.  nut  equally  true  and,  perhaps,  more 
important,  consciousness  always  behoi  is  others  and  interacts 
with  the  world;  if  it  is  not  the  same  as  another's,  it  is 
nevertheless,  always  related  to  others  and  things.  The 
truth  of  this  claim  is  as  evident  as  Husserl's.  "Consciousness 
of  ..  ." 
is  as  primordial  a  'truth  about  consciousness  as 
"consciousness  in".  The  difficult  but  necessary  course  for 
the  phenomenologist  is  to  show  this  by  using  Hussorl's  own 
tool,  the  eidetic  reduction. 
The  dual  truth  about  consciousness  cannot  be  shown 
effectively  by  merely  stating  it;  it  can,  however,  be  uncov- 
ered  in  every  effort  to  "reduce".  äerleau-Ponty  attempted 
to  express  this  when  he  said.  the  main.  truth  about  phenomen- 
ological  reduction  is  that  it  can't  be  completed.  He  could 
have  stated  his  case  another  ww:  ay;  namely,  the  eidetic  reduc- 
tion  when  faithfully  employe(,  does  show  that  there  are  two 
"sides"  to  consciousness,  i.  e.  "consciousness  in"  and  "con- 
sciousness  of". 
1  It  is  through  the  second  reduction  that 
fror  etrample,  the  subject's  claim  to  "be  conscious" 
holds  within  it  the  very  exercise  of  consciousness  toward  an 
"object";  i.  e.  it  is  a  consciousness  of  the  self.  The  claim 
to  have  a  consciousness  of  anything  (even  if  we  make  no  judgment 
about  its  existence)  is  eo  ipso,  a  claim  c1enonstrating  inten- 
tionality.  In  the  same  sense,  consciou5neUs  of  the  world  can- 
not  be  bracketed  even  when  judgment  about  its  existence  is. 240 
one  comes  to  understand  the  nature  of  consciousness.  The 
counter  argument  to  :?  usserl's  is  best  formulated  by  using 
his  own  method  ,  partic,  ý,.  _larly 
the  first  two  reductions. 
A 
.  certain  "price"  is  paid  when  phenomenological 
method  is  conducted  this  way.  The  notion  of  "self-evidence" 
may  pertain  to  the  phenoinenologict's  demonstrations  of  two 
sides  of  consciousness,  but  with  that,  certainty  ceases  to 
be  an  inportant  measure  in  phenomenological  reflection. 
That  is,  once  intentionality  becomes  justified  as  the  staple 
for  a  concept  of  consciousness,  we  enter  the  sphere  of 
describing  phenomena.  The  element  of  contingency  is  intro- 
duced.  We  can  be  certain  about  being  conscious  of  the  world 
but  we  cannot  be  certain  about  the  "objects"  which  conscious- 
ness  intends.  "erlea,  i-Fonty  made  this  abundantly  clear  in 
Phenorenology  of  Fercertior.;  t',  e  conti.  ngency  of  our  "kno:  a- 
ledge  about"  the  world  is  a.  necessary  counter-cart  to  op.  r 
certain  in  i.. 
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existentially  oriented  phenomenologist  to  follow  him  in 
the  third  reduction  to  transcendentalism.  We  are  restrained 
because  we  take  the  conclusions  of  the  eidetic  reduction  ser- 
iously.  Merleau-Ponty  did  this,  but  quite  often  he  neglected 
to  explain  his  procedure.  If  eidetic  forms  are  to  be  con- 
sidered  c1edible  the  procedure  should  be  explained;  there  is 
no  merit  in  the  philosopher  hiding  his  method. 
And  the  conclusions  are  important  when  the  eidetic 
reduction  "ends"  with  consciousness  of  the  lived-world.  If 
consciousness  of  the  lived-world  cannot  be  put  out  of  play, 
there  is  no  such  thing  as  a  "pure  ego",  and  there  is  no  such 
thing  as  a  purely  transcendental  sphere  of  reflection. 
Oddly,  we  agree  with  Husserl's  comment  that  "transcendental 
subjectivity  is  an  intersubjectivity"  but  we  interpret  it 
quite  differently;  the  intersubjective  nature  of  conscious- 
ness  dictates  that  we  put  quotation  marks  over  the  term 
transcendental  in  his  quotation.  Merleau-Ponty's  work 
does  serve  to  make  us  aware  of  that  requirement. 
Before  we  proceed  to  analyze  Husserl's  notion  of 
intersubjectivity,  two  topics  should  be  discussed  briefly. 
It  is  important  that  we  understand  Husserl's  peculiar  use 
of  the  concept,  intentionality.  Once  we  catch  the  signi- 
ficance  of  that  usage,  his  work  on  intersubjectivity  becomes 
more  understandable.  Secondly,  we  need  to  comment  further 
on  Husserl's  notion  of  the  "split  ego",  his  distinction 242 
between  the  transcendental  Ego  and  the  concrete  ego. 
Repeatedly,  Husserl  stresses  the  importance  of 
intentionality  for  carrying  out  his  method.  This  occurs 
in  Ideas,  is  maintained  in  Cartesian  Meditations,  and  is 
heavily  emphasized  in  the  "Crisis  Lectures".  Merleau-Ponty 
claimed  that  Husserl's  concept  of  intentionality  led  him 
to  tacitly  give  up  transcendentalism  in  the  last  years  of 
his  writing. 
1  We  disagree  with  this  view;  we  hold  that 
intentionality,  whether  nominally  observed  or  strongly 
emphasized,  always  functioned  as  "the  clue"  to  a  transcen- 
dental  phenomenology.  2  Admittedly,  the  experienced  world 
incites  Husserl's  reflections--it  did  so  for  his  forerunner, 
Descartes.  Intentionality,  for  him,  is  a  phenomenon  which 
must  be  explained  and  made  philosophically  credible.  But 
when  Husserl  undertakes  an  explanation  of  intentionality, 
he  is  driven  by  his  objective  to  obtain.  a  "first  phil- 
osophy",  and  that  is  fulfilled  only  by  clinging  to  the  rule 
of  apodicticity.  Intentionality,  because  it  cannot  obtain 
the  element  of  certainty,  must  be  put  aside;  it  can  function 
1Vide.,  Merleau-Ponty,  M.,  Primac  of  Perception, 
pp.  88=89,92-03. 
2Vide.,  Cartesian  Meditations,  pp.  47-53.  He  uses 
the  term  "the  clue"  there  to  justify  his  studies  of  inten- 
tionality;  his  position  as  we  have  noted  is  an  extreme  idealism.  The  following  illustrations  for  this  same  con- 
cept  come  from  the  "crisis"  period  in  order  to  show  that 
he  retained  the  goal  of  transcendentalism  even  when  he 
turned  to  an  extensive  study  of  the  lived-world. 243 
as  an  opening  to  "transcendental  reflection",  but  no  more. 
That  Husserl  remained  faithful  to  this  position  is 
evident  even  in  the  last  period  of  his  writing.  It  is  not 
always  clear,  however,  that  the  earlier  call  to  certainty 
was  heeded  unequivocally;  Husserl  strugLled  in  the  "Crisis 
Lectures"  to  bridge  the  gap  between  the  problems  posed  by 
a  concept  of  intentionality  and  his  life-long  quest  for 
apodictic  truth. 
The  life-world  is  the  world  that  is  constantly  pre- 
given,  valid  constantly  and  in  advance  as  existing, 
but  not  valid  because  of  some  purpose  of  investiga- 
tion,  according  to  some  universal  end.  Every  end 
presupposes/it;  even  the  universal  end  of  knowing  it 
in  scientific  truth  presupposes  it,  and  in  advance; 
and  in  the  course  of  (scientific)  work  it  presupposes 
it  ever  anew,  as  a  world  existing  in  its  own  way  (to 
be  sure),  but  existing  nevertheless.  1 
This  emphasis  upon  the  life-world,  new  certainly  when 
viewed  in  light  of  his  Cartesian  Meditations,  would  seem  to 
exclude  the  transcendental  reduction  and  a  concept  of  tran- 
scendental  consciousness.  The  a  priori  is  the  lived-world 
and  it  cannot  be  put  out  of  play.  But  Husserl  also  believed 
that  a  conflict  occurs  when  the  above  emphasis  is  not  balanced 
by  an-understanding  of  the  philosophical  vocation.  He  did 
not  give  up  transcendentalism  for  a  philosophy  of  intention- 
ality  and  the  Lebenswelt,  because  of  his  acute  awareness 
for  the  following  form  of  questioning. 
1Husserl,  E.,  The  Crisis  of  European  Sciences  and 
Transcendental  Phenomenology,  Carr,  D.,  trans.,  Evanston, 
Northwestern  Univ.  Press.,  1970,  p.  382. 244 
But  now  the  paradoxical-question:  can  one  not  (turn) 
to)  the  life-world,  the  world  of  which  we  are  all 
conscious  in  life  as  the  world  of  us  all,  ...  can 
one  not  survey  it  universally  in  a  changed  attitude, 
and  can  one  not  seek  to  get  to  know  it,  as  what  it 
is,  and  how  it  is  in  its  own  motility  and  relativity, 
make  it  the  subject  matter  of  a  universal  science, 
but  one  which  has  by  no  means  the  goal  of  a  universal 
theory  in  the  sense  in  which  this  wap  sought  by  his- 
torical  philosophy  and  the  sciences? 
The  immediate  question  was  not  answered  fully  in 
this  last  period;  the  "Crisis  Lectures"  were  never  finished. 
But  the  alternative  form  of  inquiry  suggested  above  is 
that  of  transcendental  subjectivity.  The  passage's  "changed 
attitude"  infers  his  acceptance  of  the  transcendental  reduc- 
tion.  The  fact  that  he  eschews  the  metaphysics  of  historical 
philosophy,  does  not  preclude  the  introduction  of  the  science 
of  pure  consciousness.  2  Husserl  emphasizes  that  his  alterna- 
tive  is  different  from  previous  philosophies,  and  is  different 
also  from  other  sciences.  Transcendentalism  is  a  necessity 
if  one  seeks  to  fulfill  the  philosophical  vocation.  That 
vocation  is  to  explain  how  man  comes  to  understand  his  own 
order  of  consciousness.  Merleau-Ponty's  appraisal  failed  to 
emphasize  Husserl's  persistant  objective. 
What  is  new  in  the  crisis  period  and  must  be  recog- 
nized  in  light  of  Merleau-Ponty's  interpretation  is  that 
Husserl  struggles  to  expose  the  necessity  for  transcendent- 
lIbid.,  p.  383. 
2Ibid. 
9  p.  389-395. 245 
alism  on  a  different  plane  than  before.  In  his  reacquaint- 
ence  with  intentionality  Husserl  realizes  that  "the  phil- 
osopher,  ... 
is  in  the  position  of  not  being  able  to  pre- 
suppose  any  pregiven  philosophy,  his  own  or  another,  since 
the  possiblility  of  a  philosophy  as  such,  as  the  sole  phil- 
osophy,  is  to  be  his  problem.  "1 
Intentionality  poses  difficult  problems  when  the 
objective  is  developing  a  doctrine  of  transcendental  sub- 
jectivity;  Husserl  recognized  them.  Although  we  think  the 
obstacles  along  the  way  are  insuperable,  and  do  preclude 
any-notion  of  a'pure  consciousness,  for  Husserl  they  did 
not.  "Later  it  will  be  understood,  "  he  says,  "that  none 
of  the  expositions  of  this  work  are  dispensable  to  it  and 
its  task  of  leading  up  to  a  transcendental  phenomenology.  "2 
As  Husserl  saw  it,  the  immediate  task  of  the  phenomenologist 
is  to  expose  the  structures  of  intentionality;  but  the  on- 
goirflg  task  is  to  establish  intentionality  as  "the  clue"  to 
transcendental  subjectivity.  Everything  about  intentionality 
must  be  read  with  that  in  mind.  This  consideration  alters 
Iiierleau-Ponty's  appraisal  and  shows  that  the  two  thinkers 
are  farther  apart  than  iverleau-Ponty  assumed. 
About  the  egology:  Husserl  devised  the  notions  of 
1Ibid.,  p.  351  (underlinkng  mine) 
2Ibid. 246 
a  pure  ego  and  a  concrete  ego  to  satisfy  the  demands  of 
transcendental  logic.  The  "split"  of  the  egos  was  the  last 
essential  step  in  formulating  a  purified  transcendentalism.  1 
It  also  set  the  stage  for  dealing  with  the  problem  of  others; 
that  is,  the  transcendental  ego  and  the  empirical  ego, 
being  separate,  pose  the  problem  of  a  transcendental  solipsism. 
His  concept  of  the  transcendental  (purified)  ego  was  reached 
only  through  a  persistant  exercise  of  the  reduction  which 
cut  it  off  from  every  transcendence,  even  Descartes'  "I". 
The  transcendental  ego  is  "alone";  Husserl's  critical  eye 
misses  very  little  here.  Solipsism  is  a  real  problem  for 
the  transcendental  phenomenologist.  2  And  the  first  step 
towards  reconstructing  the  world  phenomenologically,  is  to 
reconstruct  the  relation  between  the  transcendental  ego 
and  its  "I". 
The  way  Husserl  reconstructs  this  relation  must  be 
understood,  for  the  phenomenological  reconstruction  of  the 
relation  between  self  and  others  is  managed  in  the  same  way. 
1"If  the  Ego  as  naturally  immersed  in  the  world, 
experientially  and  otherwise,  is  called  'interested'  in  the 
world,  then  the  phenomenologically  altered--and  so  altered, 
continually  maintained--attitude  consists  in  a  splitting  of 
the  Ego:  in  that  the  phenomenological  Ego  establishes 
himself  as  disinterested  onlooker,  above  the  naively 
interested  Ego.  "  Husserl,  E.,  Cartesian  Meditations  p.  35. 
2"When  I,  the  meditating  It  reduce  myself  to  my 
absolute  transcendental  ego  by  phenomenological  eýýoche  do 
I  not  become  Solus  ipse;  and  do  I  not  remain  that,  as  long 
as  I  carry  on  a  consistant  self-explication  under  the  name 
phenomenology?  "  Husserl,  E.,  Cartesian  Meditations  p.  89. 247 
Heretofore  we  have  touched  on  only  one  side  of  this 
self-constitution,  we  have  looked  at  only  the  flowing 
cogito.  The  ego  grasps  himself  not  only  as  a  flowing 
life  but  also  as  I,  who  live  this  and  that  subjective 
process  who  liver  through  this  and  that  cogito  as  the 
same  I., 
' 
He  is  again  making  use  of  intentionality  as  the  clue; 
but  now  it  is  the  clue  to  a  reconstruction  of  the  "I".  The 
effect  of  this  move,  made  in  the  context  of  a  "purified" 
ego,  is  that  the  thinker  retains  both  the  certainty  of  his 
transcendental  ego  and  the  "possibility"  of  being  a  self. 
2 
Why  does  he  say  that  the  concrete  ego  is  a  "possibility"? 
Because  certainty  pertains  only  to  the  completely  reduced 
or  transcendental  ego.  He  has  opened  the  door,  he  believes; 
the  concrete  "I"  is  a  possibility  because  the  association 
is  made  solely  by  the  transcendental  ego.  The  j'pure  I" 
sees  itself  as  being  associated  with  a  self;  the  foundation 
of  certainty  has  thus  far  been  retained. 
There  are  two  ways,  he  says,  of  making  this  associations 
active  genesis,  and  passive  genesis.  Active  genesis  is  the 
purified  ego's  intentional  activity;  it  is  "productively 
constitutive";  in  this  form  "belong  all  the  works  of  practical 
1Ibid., 
p.  66. 
2lbid.,  p.  71. 248 
reason.  "1  Active  genesis  can  never,  of  itself,  yield  cer- 
tainty.  It  is  an  inference.  Intentionality  belonged  to 
the  same  genre;  all  it  could  account  for  was  the  possibility 
of  there  being  an  empirical  ego.  But  the  occurrence  of 
active  genesis  must  be  explained  and  this  cannot  be  done 
on  its  own  terms.  "It  is  owing  to  an  essentially  necessary 
genesis  that  I.  the  ego,  can  experience  a  physical  thing 
and  do  so  even  at  first  glance.  "2 
Husserl  suggests  that  it  is  inescapable  and  certain 
that  there  are  eidetic  laws  ! governing  active  genesis.  Those 
laws  are  "passive  genesis",  or  passive  synthesis.  The  ego 
knows  itself  as  a  predicating  ego;  this  is  an  immediate, 
self-evident  truth,  discovered  passively--without  infer- 
ence; 
3  Hence,  passive  genesis  is  the  form  of  the  ego's 
activity.  This  is  an  essential  eidos;  the  world  has  been 
bracketed  along  with  the  self,  but  the  Ego  persists  in 
knowi  itself  as  a  constituting  or  predicating  Ego.  In 
terms  of  the  immediate  topic,  it  is  the  law  of  passive 
genesis  that  explains  the  association  between  the  pure  Ego 
llbid.,  p.  77.  His  allusion  to  Kant  is  suggestive. 
Kant  held  that  the  sphere  of  practical  reason  was  outside 
the  sphere  of  knowledge  or  theoretical  reason.  Of  course, 
Husserl  will  agree;  he  is  interested  in  demonstrating  the 
certainty  of  the  association. 
21bid., 
p.  74. 
31bid.,  p.  80. 249 
and  the  concrete  "I",  the  self. 
The  principle  of  passive  genesis  is  supposed  to  be 
the  certainty-bearing  form  of  association  between  a  disem- 
bodied  ego  and  a  self. 
1 
Does  this  mental  association  produce  the  certainty 
of  an  empirical  ego?  Not  so  by  his  own  definitions.  Once 
the  transcendental  reduction  has  been  made,  the  philosopher 
cannot  revert  to  purely  existential  judgments.  That  is, 
the  reconstructed  self  is  contained  as  a  thought  in  the  pure 
consciousness;  it  is  a  self  which  makes  sense  only  as  a 
constituted  self,  a  self  given  credibility  by  the  transcen- 
dental  Ego.  "Precisely  thereby  every  sort  of  existent  itself, 
real  or  ideal,  becomes  understandable  as  a  'product'  of  trans- 
cendental  subjectivity,  ..  .  "2 
Husserl  must  be  admired  for  following  his  adopted 
method  so  rigorously;  he  has  not  made  the  Cartesian  leap 
from  transcendental  principle  to  existential  judgment.  The 
"I"  is  a  thought  product  of  the  pure  Ego.  Husserl  claims, 
of  course,  that  this  association  amounts  to  an  authentic 
remarriage,  a  philosophically  important  one.  When  passive 
1"The 
universal  principle  of  passive  genesis,  for 
the  constitution  of  all  objectivities  given  completely  prior  to  the  products  of  activity,  bears  the  title  association.  " 
Ibid. 
2lbid., 
p.  85. 250 
genesis  is  established  as  the  element  of  certainty  in  assoc- 
Tation,  it  can  provide  the  foundation  for  an  understanding 
of  others  as  well  as  self.  The  I  conceived  of  as  a  self 
is  the  opening  wedge  to  a  "transcendental  intersubjectivity". 
But  it  seems  to  me  that  the  remarriage  between  pure 
and  concrete  ego  is  a  peculiar  one  at  best.  The  concrete 
ego  is  not  "empirical"  at  all,  if  we  take  Husserl's  method 
seriously.  The  self  is  given  sense  only  as  a  thought-object. 
Apart  from  its  being  thought,  it  has  no  certainty  and  cannot 
be  used  as  the  springboard  for  understanding  the  life-world. 
Again,  Husserl  is  aware  of  this  problem,  even  though  he 
settles  upon  a  solution  we  deem  inadequate.  His  method 
dictates  that  the  outside  world  is  always  a  "thought  for 
us"  and  never  an  "in  itself  for  us".  We  hold  that  Husserl 
will  never  succeed  in  developing  the  criterion  of  certainty 
in  his  reconstruction  of  the  life-world.  The  notion  of 
association,  whether  sustained  as  an  eidetic  law  or  not, 
is  still  a  second-order  law  when  compared  to  the  self- 
evidence  which  establishes  the  transcendental  ego. 
A  great  effort  is  made  to  counter  our  evaluation 
and  we  shall  follow  him  closely.  The  law  of  association 
explained  above  is  also  used  to  obtain  an  understanding  of 
others.  Particularly  when  he  deals  with  the  question  of 
how  others  also  "constitute",  the  law  of  association  is 
cast  in  its  most  radical  form.  Husserl  is  acutely  aware 251 
at  that  point  that  his  phenomenology  encounters  an  obstacles 
if  everything  is  self-constituted,  how  can  there  be  consti- 
tuting  by  others?  For  there  to  be  any  convincing  doctrine 
of  intersubjectivity,  the  reality  of  the  other's  conscious- 
nesses  must  be  dealt  with.  But  he  does  not  attempt  to 
explain  the  issue  at  this  point.  This  to  me,  is  a  most 
serious  shortcoming;  he  delays  any  solution. 
First,  he  addresses  himself  to  another  problem,  the 
problem  of  constituting  others  as  objects.  Are  other 
people  to  be  construed  as  thought-objects?  Consistent 
with  the  transcendental  objective,  the  first  requirement 
to  be  met  is  the  reduction  of  the  sphere  of  others,  to 
"ownness".  1  This  term  again  refers  to  the  bracketing  of 
all  transcendence  ,  leaving  the  residuum  as  a  transcendental 
truth.  Other  subjects  and  all  data,  which  emanate  from 
others  (e;..  g.  sense  data)  are  suspended.  "We  disregard  all 
constitutional  effects  of  intentionality  relating  immediately 
or  mediately  to  other  subjectivities.  "2 
The  result  of  this  reduction  is  similar  to  the 
remarriage  of  the  two  egos.  All  sense  data  are  alien  to 
1Vide.,  Husserl,  E.,  Cartesian  Meditations,  pp.  92  ff. 
"Ovmness"  is  a  new  term  in  the  text.  It  is  synonomous  with 
the  transcendental  reduction. 
2Ibid.,  p.  93. 252 
ownness,  as  are  all  judgments  pertaining  to  the  existence 
of  others.  But  it  cannot  be  denied  that  the  Ego-self 
retains  in  its_  consciousness,  "a  unitarily  coherant  stratum 
of  the  phenomenon  world.  "1  With  all  existential  claims 
bracketed,  he  observes  it  is  still  true  that  consciousness 
sees  itself  as  constituting  a  world  of  others.  And  this 
stratum  of  consciousness  accounts  for  the  possibility  of 
an  actual  experienced  world.  He  stresses  that  the  objectiv- 
ity  of  this  truth  is  not  to  be  found  in  immediate  claims 
for  the  existence  of  others  and  their  consciousnesses. 
The  claim  is  still  circumscribed  by  "ownness";  or  the  trans- 
cendental  reduction. 
Husserl  is  making  two  moves;  the  first  is  the  brack- 
eting  effort  which  propels  us  into  the  sphere  of  ownness. 
All  "objectivities"  become  constituted  objectivities--"I 
know  I  think  the  table  is  there".  Every  bracketed  existen- 
tial  becomes  the  possession  of  one's  own  consciousness.  But 
with  this  comes  the  other  side  of  that  truth;  what  is  in 
the  possession  of  one's  own  consciousness  is  a  consciousness 
of  the  other,  or  the  world.  On  the  one  hand,  consciousness 
of  .... 
(intentionality)  has  been  brought  home,  so  to 
speak,  to  its  proper  sphere,  transcendentalism.  But  trans- 
cendentalism,  he  believes,  has  been  taken  out  of  solipsistic 
1lbid., 
p.  96. 253 
captivity. 
The  logic  is  somewhat  convincing.  If  the  stratum 
of  pure  consciousness  :  includes  a  consciousness  of  others, 
we  are  not  solus  ipse.  The  transcendental  sphere  is  not 
divorced  from  the  sphere  of  the  consciousness  of  others. 
It  must  be  remembered,  however,  that  the  merging  of  these 
spheres  is  understood  transcendentally;  the  knowledge  of 
others  is  not  yet  a  shared  knowledge;  it  is  self-constituted. 
But  the  latter  move  to  "reconstruct"  is  nevertheless  important. 
Husserl's  attempt  to  prove  that  the  two  spheres  are  insepar- 
able  has  taken,  us  one  step  closer  to  his  transcendentally 
disciplined  existential  claims. 
The  first  claim  is  found  in  the  following  passage. 
Where  and  so  far  as,  the  constituted  unity  is  insep- 
arable  from  the  original  constitution  itself,  with 
the  inseparableness  that  characterizes  an  immediate 
concrete  oneness,  not  only  the  constitutive  perceiving 
but  also  the  perceived  existent  belongs  to  my  concrete 
very-ownness.  ...  Within  this  'original  sphere'  (the  sphere  of  original  self-explication)  we  find 
also  a  'transcendent  world'.  1 
The  obstacle  we  referred  to  as  the  less  serious 
obstacle,  Husserl  believes  is  overcome.  Residing  in  con- 
sciousness  is  the  consciousness  of  an  external  world.  Trans- 
cendencies(existent  things)  have  been  re-introduced  in  the 
meditations. 
We  need  not  emphasize  that  the  world  for  Husserl, 
lIbid.  p.  104-105. 254 
is  a  constituted  world,  a  world  held  in  one's  own  conscious- 
ness.  For  us  this  priority  makes  the  world's  existence  a 
mere  thought-form  and  not  an  authentically  external  phen- 
omenon.  But  Husserl  has  struggled  mightily  to  give  conscious- 
ness  of  others  a  place  in  the  transcendental  sphere. 
The  obstacle  of  there  being  other  constituting  con- 
sciousnesses  now  looms  as  the  final  problem  of  transcendental 
phenomenology.  His  program  to  solve  this  problem  is  patiently 
and  meticulously  worked  out;  he  knows  he  must  explain  how 
the  other  is  truly  "another  consciousness  for  me".  Failing, 
he  would  be  caught  in  a  world  devoid  of  intersubjective 
exchange. 
The  argument  which  attempts  to  explain  how  we  can 
be  certain  of  another's  consciousness  is  a  critical  one. 
The  other  is  present  as  an  "immanent  transcendency".  1 
Nothing  in  the  sphere  of  our  perception  of  him  can  be  cer- 
tain;  at  the  same  time  we  can  know  that  our  perception  of 
him  is  based  upon  the  certain  principle  of  constitution; 
Husserl  terms  that  principle  appresentation  or  apperception. 
As  before,  the  transcendentally  reconstructed  ego  derives 
sense  about  perception  from  the  principle  of  apperception; 
in  order  to  perceive  another,  he  must.  have  thought  the  other 
to  be  like  himself.  The  principle  of  apperception  is  given 
',  Ibid.,  p.  110. 255 
the  title,  "analogizing  transfer".  1  Its  pattern  is  as 
follows:  "I  am  a  constituting  consciousness  and  a  concrete 
'I';  I  perceive  another  as  a  constituting  subject;  as  a 
matter  of  principle,  that  body  could  be  a  constituting 
subject  or  consciousness.  "  This  is  how  one  makes  the  analogy 
between  self  and  others. 
Several  elements  in  this  argument  are  questionable 
and  deserve  comment.  "Analogizing"  involves  a  transfer. 
He  admits  this  and  it  is  a  revealing  fact.  If  analogizing 
is  a  transfer  from  thought  about  one's  self  to  thought 
about  another,,  certainty  about  it  is  not  attainable.  He 
admits  that  knowing  other  consciousnesses  involves  a  "cer- 
tain  mediacy  of  intentionality";  appresentation  is  a  "making 
'copresent".  2  The  very  principle  he  has  chosen  to  point 
to  the  self-evidence  of  others  lacks  certainty.  How  then 
can  he  hold  that  knowing  others  is  as  self-evident  as  the 
truth  of  one's  own  constituting  consciousness? 
He  attempts  to  cover  this  problem  by  saying  that 
apperception  is  not  a  thinking  act,  and  that  "analogizing" 
is  not  an  inferential  process. 
3  To  say  this  borders  on 
nonsense.  The  other  is  thought;  analogizing  is  a  mental 
1Ibid., 
p.  111. 
2Ibid.,  p.  109. 
3Vide.,  Husserl,  E.,  Cartesian  Meditations,  p.  111. 256 
transfer.  If  the  term  "analogizing"  is  to  retain  any  of 
its  ordinary  meaning,  we  cannot  accept  Husserl's  redefin- 
ition.  But  this  objection  must  be  coupled  with  his  admission 
concerning  the  mediacy  of  intentionality.  If  the  analogizing 
transfer  is  a  mark  of  intentionality,  it  is  difficult  to 
see  how  it  can,  at  the  same  time,  be  non-inferential.  We 
shall  return  to  this  below.  Most  certainly,  there  is  some 
confusion  in  his  notion  of  appresentation. 
The  second  slip  in  his  argument  is  more  serious. 
It  occurs  when  he  says,  "To  the  extent  that  there  is  a 
givenness  beforehand,  there  is  such  a  transfer.  "Z  He  is 
giving  away  his  case  if  this  is  taken  seriously. 
"Givenness"  is  illustrated  by  the  child's  play  with 
scissors;  he  "sees  scissors  at  first  glance  as  scissors.  "2 
The  analogizing  process  is  immediate,  he  says;  no  infer- 
ence  is  involved;  the  subjects'  relation  to  things  is 
supposed  to  serve  as  an  illustration  of  the  immediacy  or 
self-evidence  of  the  apperceptive  process.  But  the  illus- 
tration  speaks  of  something  else.  It  witnesses  to  the 
immediacy  of  perception  and  this  throws  the  apperceptive 
process,  as  a  necessary  principle  into  question. 
\Tny  is  apperception  necessary?  The  real  a  priori 
llbid. 
2Ibid. 257 
is  "everyday  experience";  he  admits  it  is  the  necessary 
factor  in  providing  opportunity  for  the  analogizing  transfer. 
If  that  is  so,  the  lived-world  has  not  been  bracketed  in 
any  final  sense.  Merleau-Ponty  would  observe  that  this 
notion  of  "givenness"  leads  us  first  to  affirrniand  then  to 
interrogate  perception  and  not  the  constituting  consciousness. 
If  the  world  cannot  be  totally  subsumed  under  a  transcen- 
dentalism,  the  principle  of  apperception  has  failed  as  a 
phenomenological  fondement. 
Though  the  scissors  illustration  seems  inappropriate 
in  Husserl's  argument  for  recognition  of  other  conscious- 
nesses,  a  better  interpretation  of  it  can  be  made.  The 
process  whereby  we  recognize  others  as  being  like  ourselves, 
is  not  dependent  solely  upon  ourselves.  We  recognize  the 
other  at  first  glance  because  he  presents  himself  to  us  as 
"other".  Perception  is  the  givenness  which  makes  analogies 
possible--if  analogies  are  made  at  all. 
Husserl  has  seriously  crippled  his  argument;  the 
life-world  has  not  been  completely  bracketed.  The  world  is 
there;  a  true  in-itself  for  us.  Husserl  has  confused  his 
case  considerably  by  alluding  to  the  priority  of  a  "given- 
ness",  and  he  has  given  the  lived-world  phenomenologist 
an  opportunity  to  offer  a  better  argument. 
It  goes  without  saying  that  Husserl  does  not  share 
our  view  of  his  conclusions.  The  process  of  appresentation, 258 
made  by  the  subject,  is  elaborated  by  the  term  "pairing". 
"Pairing  is  a  primal  form  of  that  passive  synthesis  which 
we  designate  as  association.  "1  The  "universal"  character 
of  pairing  is  that  two  data  are  given  simultaneously  to 
consciousness,  ourselves  and  the  other;  a  unity  in  con- 
sciousness  is  founded  because  of  this  simultaneous  appresen- 
tation.  This  is  Husserl's  description  of  "a  pair",  and  what 
follows  is  his  peculiar  application  of  pairing  to  the  way 
we  know  others  as  conscious  subjects. 
Again,  intentionality  is  his  clue. 
As  a  suggestive  clue  to  the  requisite  clarification, 
this  proposition  may  suffice:  the  experienced  animate 
organism  of  another  continues  to  prove  itself  as  actu- 
ally  an  animate  organism,  solely  in  its  changing  but 
incessantly  harmonious  'behavior'.  Such  harmonious 
behavior  (as  having  a  physical  side  that  indicates 
something  psychic  appresentatively)  must  present  itself 
fulfillingly  in  original  experience,  and  do  so  through- 
out  the  continuous  change  in  behavior  from  phase  to 
phase.  2 
Behavior  is  perceived  and  perception  is  a  mark  of 
intentionality;  this  much  is  familar  to  the  method. 
It  is  peculiar  that  pairing  is  specifically  defined 
as  the  presentation  of  "harmonious"  behavior.  Obviously 
he  has  in  mind  that  human  behavior  is  distinct  from  animal 
behavior,  and  whereas,  animal  behavior  cannot  be  "harmon- 
ious"  with  human  behavior,  harmonious  behavior  is  possible 
1lbid., 
p.  112. 
2lbid. 
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between  two  humans.  This  seems  to  be  Husserl's  reason  for 
the  terminology,  but  he  does  not  say  so.  We  are  left  with 
the  following  possibility. 
A  being  over  there  must  prove  himself  through  his 
behavioral  patterns  to  be  "harmonious"  with  us.  Then  and 
only  then  are  we  able  to  apperceive  that  he  has  a  conscious- 
ness.  But  Husserl's  requirement  for  harmonious  behavior 
could  also  stand  in  the  way  of  the  apperceptive  association. 
A  psychopath  could  easily  mislead  the  lay  observer, 
or  even  a  psychiatrist;  behavioral  patterns  are  often  diver- 
gent.  A  deaf-mute  would  certainly  not  be  given  credit  for 
possessing  a  consciousness  if  our  sole  criterion  for  such  a 
judgment  were  harmonious  behavior.  These  circumstances  are 
possible  given  Husserls  terms;  the  "proof"  of  behavior 
could  just  as  well  lead  us  to  conclude  that  the  other 
over  there,  indeed,  has  no  consciousness.  l 
Husserl  is  willing  to  accept  such  a  possibility: 
"the  organism  becomes  experienced  as  a  pseudo-organism, 
precisely  if  there  is  something  discordant  about  its  behav- 
jor.  "2  The  god  of  rmrmality  is  in  full  sway  here.  It  is 
1The 
requirement  of  harmonious  behavior  might  not  be 
so  bizarre  if  it  were  balanced  with  other  requirements.  But 
it  is  an  odd  stipulation  when,  for  instance,  the  physical 
appearance  of  the  other  is  disregarded.  Husserl's  case,  to 
be  convincing,  would  have  to  utilize  the  perceptual  realm 
much  more  effectively  than  he  has.  This  again  shows  that 
his  interest  in  intentionality  was  marginal. 
2Husserl,  E.,  Cartesian  Meditations,  p.  114. 260 
difficult  to  see  how  contemporary  psychoanalysis  could 
function  if  such  a  stipulation  were  followed  seriously. 
Perhaps,  this  is  not  a  serious  critism  philosophically, 
except  to  say  that  Husserl's  transcendentalism  remains 
uninformed  by  other  disciplines. 
The  more  serious  criticism  is  that  Husserl  has  adopted 
a  way  of  understanding  the  problem  of  others  which  satisfies 
neither  his  own  demands  for  certainty  nor  the  insights  of 
existential  phenomenology. 
Concerning  his  own  demands,  he  has  constructed  a 
process  which  leads  progressively  to  the  realm  of  the 
uncertain.  Harmonious  behavior  is  the  necessary  beginning; 
in  other  words  a  "presentation"  must  occur  prior  to  any 
apperception.  This,  as  we  commented  earlier,  is  a  give- 
away  to  existential  phenomenology.  Perception  yields  apper- 
ception  and  apperception  is  an  associational  pairing;  when 
finally  we  "arrive"  at  the  principle  of  pairing,  we  are  a 
long  way  from  the  desired  goal  of  apodicticity.  Association 
is  a  second-order  criterion  for  knowing  others;  it  makes 
little  sense  to  call  "association"  a  self-evident,  transcen- 
dental  truth.  He  fails,  therefore,  to  reach  his  own  objective 
of  certainty.  Solipsism  may  well  be  the  unhappy  finale  for 
transcendental  phenomenology. 
The  claims  he  makes  naturally  dissatisfy  the  phen- 
omenologist  of  the  lived-world.  When  he  says  that  inten- 261 
tionality  is  a  clue  to  transcendental  subjectivity,  we 
should  take  him  at  his  word.  His  efforts  to  reconstruct 
a  transcendentally  purified  intersubjectivity  succeed  only 
in  convincing  us  that  it  is  a  transcendentalism,  and  not 
a  serious  theory  of  intersubjectivity.  Husserl's  transcen- 
dental  subjectivity  is  not  an  intersubjectivity  as  he  intended; 
his  very  persitance  in  employing  the  transcendental  reduction 
denied  him  his  goal. 
Nevertheless,  one  must  give  due  respect  to  this 
methodologist.  The  rigour  he  exercises  in  pursuing  his 
goal  is  staggering.  One  cannot  reject  his  thinking  by 
disagreeing  selectively  with  either  his  presuppositions 
or  with  his  "conclusions";  a  critique  of  Husserl  necessi- 
tates  dissecting  his  entire  method  as  patiently  as  he  devised 
it. 
The  lesson  is  obvious.  It  is  that  phenomenological 
method  is  critical  for  understanding  the  problems  of  inter- 
subjectivity.  Husserl's  failure  was  ironically,  a  failure- 
of  method;  the  transcendental  reduction  is  not  a  requirement 
imposed  by  the  eidetic  reduction.  We  emphasized  that  it 
should  not  be  employed  in  light  of  the  findings  of  the 
second  reduction. 
The  different  course,  one  which  rtierleau-Ponty  so 
well  exemplifies,  is  to  pursue  the  experiential  modes  in 
which  we  come  to  understand  our  world.  And  the  phenomenon 262 
exemplar  is  that  of  relating  to  others  i.  e.  the  social  and 
interpersonal  realm.  Phenomenological  method  confronts 
us  with  these  very  problems.  It  does  not  "solve"  the 
problem  of  others  as  Husserl  thought,  but  it  does  take  us 
to  a  place  where,  through  consistent  use  of  phenomenological 
and  eidetic  reductions,  we  are  confronted  with  the  mysteries 
of  inter-human  encounter.  Metleau-Ponty  cannot  be  faulted 
for  overlooking  this  interpretation  of  the  philosophical 
vocation.  He  followed  it  faithfully. 
The  only  criticism  we  have  of  Merleau-Ponty  in 
light  of  our  study  of  Husserl,  is  that  he  did  not  stress 
the  methodological  steps  which  permitted  him  to  retain  an 
existential  phenomenology.  Two  articles  are  devoted  to 
establishing  his  case  for  an  existential  phenomenology.  l 
The  other  analyses  of  the  political  and  social  conditions  of 
his  day  were  performences  of  his  method=  brilliant  analyses 
they  are,  but  they  remain  questionable  for  some  as  philosoph- 
ical  pieces  because  the  phenomenological  method  in  them  is 
covert. 
This  is  a  characteristic  of  existential  writing. 
1Vide.,  Merleau-Ponty,  "n.,  The  Phenomenology  of 
Perception,  preface;  also,  Yerleau-Ponty,  IV.,  Signs,  pp.  159- 
1  1.  T  These  are  the  main  efforts  to  establish  his  peculiar 
method.  Method  is  argued  throughout  his  work  but  the  refer- 
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Sartre-;  used  drama  and  political  journalism  to  exercise 
his  phenomenological  interpretation  of  the  lived-world. 
Gabriel  Parcel  is  another  example  of  one  who  brought  phen- 
omenological  analysis  to  journal  and  theatre.  This  trait 
is  a  mixed  blessing.  On  the  one  hand  there  is  no  good 
reason  why  phenomenological  analysis  should  be  confined  to 
the  dry  academic,  "philosophical  piece".  Phenomenology  is 
supposed  to  reacquaint  us  with  the  lived-world  and  there 
are  many  ways  to  accomplish  the  task.  But  when  method 
becomes  covert,  it  is  difficult  to  see  the  philosophical 
importance  of  the  writing.  There  must  be  those  who  wed 
phenomenological  method  and  existential  analysis;  they  need 
not  be  separate  endeavors.  A  conscious  and  constant  expo- 
sure  of  method  in  the  performance  of  phenomenological 
analysis,  is  a  needed  vocation;  we  shall  pursue  this  task 
in  our  concluding  chapters. CHAPTER  TWO:  PART  THREE 
HEIDEGGER"S  MITSEIN; 
ITS  BEARING  ON  THE  ISSUE  OF  TRANSCENDENCE 
We  have  seen  how  Husserl  influenced  Merleau-Ponty 
on  the  matter  of  method.  A  new  form  of  analysis  was  born 
as  the  rejection  of  the  transcendental  reduction  became  a 
positive  principle  for  Lebenswelt  phenomenologists.  The 
pioneer  in  this  form  of  analysis  is  without  doubt,  Martin 
Heidegger.  His  book,  Sein  und  Zeit  is  a  kind  of  "first 
fruit"  for  existential  phenomenology.  He  had  his  own 
view  of  the  purpose  of  phenomenological  interpretation, 
but  his  analysis  of  human  and  interhuman  modalities  is 
classic.  If  we  were  to  cite  the  one  philosopher  who  most 
influenced  Merleau-Ponty's  phenomenology,  it  would  be 
Heidegger. 
This  does  not  imply  that  tv.  erleau-Ponty  borrowed 
Heidegger's  system;  the  differences  between  the  two  are 
fundamental  especially  with  regard  to  our  topic.  The  most 
basic  difference  lies  in  their  respective  conceptions  of 
the  intersubjective  sphere.  With  Heidegger,  the  contrasts 
occur  not  so  much  over  method;  Heidegger  uses  phenomenology 
similarly  to  Merleau-Ponty,  to  address  experiential  problems, 265 
and  to  gain  access  to  the  ontological  dimension  of  the  lived- 
world.  The  more  critical  differences  occur  with  Heidegger's 
phenomenological  findings  i.  e.  the  essences  he  selects  as 
being  interpretative  of  the  Lebenswelt.  There  could  have 
been  a  much  more  frank  statement  of  differences  on  both  sides, 
but  both  thinkers  were  more  concerned  to  develop  their  own 
doctrines  than  to  engage  in  critical  dialogue;  it  is  left  to 
the  student  interested  in  comparative  studies  to  draw  the 
lines  of  their  "argument".  That  is  my  intention. 
This  interpretive  effort  should  clarify  two  aspects 
of  a  phenomenology  of  intersubjectivity.  First,  it  should 
emphasize  the  critical  function  a  doctrine  of  intersubject- 
ivity  has  for  the  whole  of  phenomenology.  Heidegger's 
contribution  is  notable;  intersubjectivity  is  the  key 
which  unlocks  the  full  range  of  phenomenological  discousrse.  1 
If  the  philosopher  understands  the  modes  of  intersubjective 
existence  he  will  see  how  the  question  of  man's  own  being 
must  be  posed;  who  man  is,  is  largely  determined  by  his 
relationship  to  others.  This  is  evident  in  Being,  and  Time; 
phenomenology  begins  with  the  social  phenomenon.  Whether 
we  agree  or  not  with  his  analysis  of  the  social  realm,  its 
pivotal  function  must  be  recognized. 
iThis  appraisal  implies  that  Heidegger  was  quicker 
to  see  the  importance  of  the  intersubjective  sphere  than 
Merleau-Ponty.  It  does  not  imply  that  his  doctrine  of  intersubjectivity  is  superior.  Quite  the  opposite  is  true. 266 
A  second  contribution  Heidegger  makes,  concerns  the 
relationship  of  his  phenomenology  of  intersubjectivity  to 
ontology.  Heidegger  believed,  as  did  1%Ierleau-Ponty,  that 
phenomenology  was  the  access  to  ontology.  We  should  state 
the  relation  more  strongly,  however.  For  Heidegger,  phen- 
omenology  determines  the  question  of  Being.  When  we  add 
that  Heidegger's  phenomenology  is  shaped  by  his  character- 
ization  of  intersubjectivity,  its  critical  function  for 
ontology  becomes  clearer.  Intersubjectivity  is  the  key  to 
his  understanding  of  ontology.  Not  many  interpreters  of 
Heidegger  take  this  position,  but  we  believe  that  a  patient 
examination  of  Mitsein  will  show  that  intersubjectivity* 
shapes  the  ontology  he  seeks  to  write.  Heidegger  eventually 
teaches  that  solitary  thought  opens  Being  to  man,  and  man 
to  Being.  This  notion,  coming  as  late  in  Heidegger's 
career  as  it  does,  is  nevertheless,  presaged  by  his  pecu- 
liar  conception  of  the  intersubjective  sphere.  The  direction 
his  ontology  takes  is  the  natural  outgrowth  of  his  early 
doctrine  of  intersubjectivity. 
One  final  introductory  remark:  Heidegger  is  noted 
for  having  created  a  new  philosophical  language.  His  word 
studies  are  fascinating  and  we  intend  to  make  use  of  some; 
but  it  is  impossible  in  this  relatively  short  space  to  do 
justice  to  his  complicated  terminology.  We  propose,  there- 
fore,  to  use  familiar  ordinary  language  when  it  is  at  all 267 
possible. 
A  description  of  Heidegger's  conception  of  phenomen- 
ological  method  beautifully  illustrates  his  peculiar  way 
of  doing  philosophy;  description  of  it  will  also  introduce 
us  to  his  concept  of  Mitsein,  the  intersubjective  sphere. 
The  question  which  Heidegger  intends  to  treat  is 
the  question  of  the  "meaning  of  Being".  "With  the  question 
of  the  meaning  of  Being,  our  investigation  comes  up  against 
the  fundamental  question  of  philosophy.  This  is  one  that 
must  be  dealt  with  phenomenologically.  "1 
Heidegger  claims  to  go  beyond  the  traditional  defin- 
ition  of  phenomenology  as  a  "scinece  of  phenomena",  i.  e. 
a  science  which  he  believes  employs  special  devices  or 
techniques.  2  Heidegger's  way  of  delineating  phenomenological 
method  is  to  rediscover  the  terms'  original  meaning.  No 
"devices"  need  then  be  employed;  the  philosopher,  when  given 
an  understanding  of  the  word  "phenomenology",  will  automat- 
ically  know  the  appropriate  method.  Here,  his  word  study 
is  the  one  means  of  gaining  his  methodological  perspective. 
The  term  phenomenology  has  two  components,  phenomenon 
and  logos.  The  Greek  noun 
oovo 
vo  v  is  a  form  of  the 
1Heidegger,  Martin,  Being  and  Time,  Tv:  acquarrie,  J., 
and  Robinson,  E.,  trans.,  London,  S.  C.  M.  Press,  1962,  pp.  49-50. 
2Ibid. 268 
verb  4rl-oJ  t-  G  a%,  which  means  "to  show  itself".  1  The 
stem  of  that  verb,  ýct 
,  means  "bright",  and  is  synonomous 
with  "visible"  or  "!:  ianifest".  When  we  reconstruct  the 
noun  with  this  in  mind,  phenomenon  means  "that  which  shows 
itself,  the  manifest".  2  Heidegger  argues  that  this  redefin- 
ition  supplants  the  current  dictionary  definition;  there, 
"phenomenon"  is  the  appearance  or  mere  appearance  of 
entities.  The  dictionary  definition  is  encrusted  with 
wrong-headed  philosophical  traditions  that  Heidegger 
believes  must  be  overcome. 
He  argues  that  the  "positive  and  primordial  signi- 
fication"  is  philosophically  more  significant  than  the  trad- 
itional  notions  of  semblance  and  appearance.  To  say  that 
a  phenomenon  is  a  "mere  appearance"  means  that  we  think  it 
is  not  a  manifestation.  To  be  a  manifestation,,  it  must  be 
more  than  a  semblance  of  something;  the  notion  of  semblance 
divorces  "the  thing"  from  its  self-manifestation.  Heidegger's 
reconstruction  of  the  term  indicates  that  a  phenomenon  is 
a  presentation;  specifically,  "the  thing"  is  accessible  to 
human  beholding.  If  distortions  or  illusions  occur,  they 
are  not  to  be  attributed  to  the  thing  but  to  the  beholder. 
The  phenomenological  dictum,  "to  the  things  themselves" 
1Ibid., 
p.  51. 
2Ibid. 269 
(Husserl's  zu  Sachen  Selbst)  is  possible  now  because  phen- 
omena  announce  themselves. 
The  term  ý\dy  o,  5  is  dealt  with  similarly;  its  meaning 
has  been  distorted  philosophically  to  connote  reason  or 
judgment,  but  its  original  signification  is  the  more  general 
idea  of  "discourse".  Taken  as,  discourse,  %öyoS  is  assoc- 
iated  with  Jýqsovv 
.  Its  meaning  can  then  be  specified: 
"to  make  manifest  what  one  is  'talking  about'  in  one's 
discourse.  "1  In  other  words,  discourse  lets  the  objects 
being  discussed  become  evident  to  the  listener;  discourse 
points  out  "the  thing".  Discourse  is  a  vehicle  which 
uncovers  what  is  beheld  by  the  thinker;  one  might 
say  that  %öyof  is  fundamentally  a  form  of  expression.  2 
The  purpose  of  the  redefinition  is  obvious:  dis- 
course  recovers  the  phenomenon.  It  is  a  vehicle  for 
pointing  it  out,  thereby  making  it  communicable.  Heidegger 
emphasizes  that  authentic  discourse  lets  the  phenomenon 
"be"  what  it  is,  and  this  is  the  essence  of  phenomenology. 
When  we  envisage  what  we  have  set  forth  in  our  inter- 
pretation  of  'phenomenon'  and  'logos',  we  are  struck  by  an  inner  relationship  between  the  things  meant  by 
these  terms.  The  expression  'phenomenology'  may  be 
formulated  in  Greek  as  XLyEty  -rq  OaLvo/4  i  vc6  where  x  er  ckv  means  a+ýofý  0.  vGa  ý0.  ý  Thus  phenomenology 
1Ibid.,  p.  56. 
2Theoretically  this  redefinition  could  pertain  to 
expressive  acts,  e.  g.  Merleau-Ponty's  handshake,  as  well 
as  to  verbal  exp-session,  but  he  does  not  say  so. 270 
means  4'Ro#a"v  EG  Day  'm  0awol+EVcý  to  let  that  which  shows 
itself  be  seen  from  itself  in  the  very  way  in  which 
it  shows  itself  from  itself.  This  is  the  formal  meaning 
of  that  branch  of  research  which  calls  itself  phenomen- 
ology.  1 
Once  a  formal  redefinition  of  phenomenology  is  esta- 
blished,  its  real  task  can  be  elucidated.  So  far,  he  has 
told  us  how  phenomenology  must  work;  he  proceeds  to  tell  us 
of  the  specific  problems  encountered  when  the  new  definition 
is  accepted.  The  main  problem  it  seems,  is  that  phenomena  do 
not  always  show  themselves.  Particularly,  when  we  ask  what 
a  phenomenon  really  "is",  we  are  often  puzzled;  what  it  "is" 
or  means,  is  not  always  evident.  Given  Heidegger's  objective 
to  interrogate  the  meaning  of  Being,  this  is  a  serious 
obstacle.  The  meaning  or  Being  of  entities  remains  hidden 
to  the  questioner,  at  least  in  the  initial  stage  of  interro- 
gation.  He  must  first  rediscover  the  Being  of  entities  in 
order  to  pose  the  more  general  question  about  the  meaning 
of  Being.  2 
lIbid.,  p.  58.  Introduction  of  the  verb,  >ttv 
serves  to  get  at  the  etymological  rootage  of  X  6y  as  .  As 
the  translators.  point  out,  the  purpose  of  citing  this  rootage 
is  twofold.  Discourse  is  a  vehicle;  as  such  it  addresses 
the  phenomenon.  Discourse  is  always  about  something.  A 
second  sense  is  also  discerned;  it  is  the  phenomenon  which 
incites  expression,  i.  e.  discourse  arises  because  of,  and  is 
dependent  upon  the  phenomenon.  Other  nuances  are  also  cited 
but  do  not  seem  germane  to  Heidegger's  purpose. 
2de  cannot  enter  into  a  long  discussion  of  the 
difference  between  his  endeavor  to  interpret  the  Being  of 
entities  and  the  meaning  of  Being  per  se.  Suffice  it  to 
say  that  Being  and  Time  is  devoted  to  the  task  of  redis- 
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The  peculiar  entity  which  brings  home  this  problem 
for  phenomenological-ontological  discourse  is  man.  One 
reason  is,  briefly,  that  man  has  been  thought  of  as  a  dual- 
istic  entity;  the  traditional  Cartesian  formula,  the  body- 
soul  typology,  leaves  the  real  issue  of  man's  being  unan- 
swered.  That  man  is  a  body  with  a  soul,  is  an  unsatisfying 
answer  to  the  question  "who  is  man". 
1 
Heidegger  suggests  a  different  way  of  getting  at 
the  question  of  the  being  of  man.  It  is  introduced  by  a 
unique  and  imaginative  redefinition  of  the  term,  "man". 
"Being-there",  or  "there-being'  19  (Dasein),  is  Heidegger'  s 
label  for  man.  The  term  does  not  seek  to  deny  that  man  is 
an  entity,  but  it  reminds  us  that  man  is  an  entity  in  the 
world.  Man,  the  object,  is  always  "there",  in  the  world. 
More  important,  the  new  term  specifies  that  man's 
essential  nature  is  found  by  coming  to  understand  the  ways 
he  lives  in  the  world;  behavior  and  social-life  will  be  the 
essential  resources  for  an  adequate  answer  to  the  "who  ques- 
introduction  to  asking  about  the  meaning  of  Being.  "Re 
cause  phenome-a,  as  'understood  phenomenologically,  are 
never  anything  but  what  goes  to  make  up  Bein;,  weile  Being 
is  in  every  case  the  Being  of  some  entity,  we  must  first 
bring  forward  the  entities  themselves  if  it  is  our  aim 
that  Being  should  be  laid  bare;  and  we  must  do  this  in  the 
right  way.  "  Heidegger,  M.,  Being  and  Time,  p.  61. 
llbid.,  p.  72.  This  page  reference  contains  a  brief 
but  effective  criticism  of  Descartes. 272 
tion".  1  Ironically,  these  are  the  same  resources  which 
non-philosophical  man  actually  uses  in  estimating  his  own 
worth;  he  looks  to  his  behavior  and  his  social  relationships 
to  provide  an  answer  to  the'question  of  the  meaning  of  his 
existence.  And  this  is  where  his  problems  begin.  By 
accepting  the  answers  which  society  provides  concerning 
behavior  and  social  life,  the  thinker  is  misguided  rather 
than  enlightened.  This  is  why  Heidegger  says  the  phenomena 
remain  "hidden";  the  existing  interpretations  of  human  inter- 
action  withhold  the  truth  from  men. 
To  uncover  an  authentic  answer  to  the  meaning  of 
man's  existence  Heidegger  must  undertake  a  phenomenological 
reinterpretation  of  his  being-there.  If  experiential  modes 
of  behavior  and  sociality  are  essential  to  an  answer  and 
can  be  uncovered  for  what  they  really  are,  then  an  answer 
can  be  given  to  the  "who  question".  In  sum,  a  phenomen- 
ological  interpretation  of  man's  actual  existence  is  the  only  way 
to  uncover  the  issue  of"his  being".  2 
1"If  a  being  the  kind  of  Dasein  is  said  to  be  'in' 
something,  the  relationship  is  not  primarily  'spatial'  but 
means  'to  dwell'  to  'sojourn'  to  'stay'  in  the  sense  of 
the  Latin  Habitar_e,  e.  g.  a  match  is  in  a  box  in  the  plain 
spatial  sense,  but  if  a  man  is  in  his  home  or  in  a  seaside 
resort,  obviously  this  relationship  is  not  primarily  spatial.  " 
Heidegger,  Existence  and  Being.  Intro.  by  Werner  Brock,  p.  42. 
2The  boldness  of  this  position  cannot  be  overlooked. 
Heidegger  does  not  intend  to  make  use  of  other  disciplines 
in  shaping  his  reinterpretation.  In  all  of  Being  and  Time 
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Comment  at  this  point  is  not  premature,  for  Heidegger 
has  set  his  program  in  motion  with  these  redefinitions. 
Though  his  language  is  obtuse,  it  must  be  said  that 
Heidegger  has  rendered  an  effective  argument  for  constructing 
an  existential  phenomenology.  The  effectiveness  is  evident, 
not  so  much  in  the  way  he  deals  with  the  Cartesian  heritage 
or  Husserl's  reductions,  but  in  the  reasonableness  of  his 
redefinition. 
For  example,  it  is  worth  asking  whether  "phenomenology' 
is  the  science  of  "what  appears"  or  what  "presents  itself"; 
the  difference-is  one  of  emphasis  but  it  may  be  an  important 
difference.  A  conclusive  answer  may  not  be  obtainable  but 
Heidegger  has  doen  well  to  say  that  we  could  not  study 
what  appears  unless  there  were  an  element  of  presentation. 
Heidegger  is  unique  in  his  suggestion  that  behavioral 
patterns  open  up  the  question  of  meaning  rather  than  explain 
it.  Interpretation  of  behavior  is  necessary  if  phenomenology 
is  to  get  beyond  a  superficial  view  of  man.  In  this  respect, 
Merleau-Ponty  did  not  make  his  case  for  existential  phen- 
omenology  quite  so  clearly.  He  used  Heidegger's  notion  of 
presentation  boldly  but  he  did  not  take  time  to  explain  it 
useful  data  concerning  social  existence.  Such  disregard 
could  prove  his  undoing.  Unlike  Merleau-Ponty,  Heidegger  is 
his  o'bm  sociologist  and  psychologist;  it  would  be  interesting 
to  see  how  his  reinterpretation  is  evaluated  in  those  disciplines. 
Space  prohibits  such  an  endeavor  here. 274 
with  reference  to  his  phenomenological  method.  For  Heidegger 
interpretation  of  behavioral  patterns  is  an  essential  of 
method. 
But  Heidegger's  appeal  for  an  existential  hermeneutic 
presents  as  many  problems  as  it  solves.  Once  we  are  intro- 
duced  to  the  necessity  of  interpreting  personal  and  social 
modes  of  interaction,  we  are  opened  to  an  unbelievable 
variety  of  "data".  We  are  especially  aware  of  this  from  our 
reading  of  Merleau-Ponty.  Phenomenology,  for  him,  risked 
openness  to  such  experiential  variety  in  the  confidence  that 
lines  of  interpretation  were  available  that  would  do  justice 
to  the  variety  of  lived-situations.  His  phenomenology  could 
therefore  be  judged  on  the  way  it  interpreted  diverse  and 
intricate  material.  That  lesson  should  also  apply  to  Heidegger. 
Philosophical  themes  are  being  sought  in  the  intricacies  of 
human,  social  interaction;  we  are  asked  to  look  at  the  "being- 
there"  of  man  which  is  by  definition,  an  inclusive  sphere. 
We  shall  remain  watchful  to  see  if  Heidegger's  themes  are 
attentive  to  the  broad  ranges  of  intersubjective  experience; 
it  is  always  possible  that  he  will  "select  his  material", 
i.  e.  fashion  an  interpretative  theme  which  slights  the 
full  range  of  human  existence. 
Especially,  we  intend  to  see  how  phenomenology's 
"hidden  essences"  shape  ontology;  it  is  certain  that  there 
will  be  some  influence.  If  man's  being-there  gives  access 275 
to  the  question  of  his  Being  and  to  the  issue  of  Being  in 
general,  phenomenology  plays  the  central  role  in  shaping 
ontology.  More  particularly,  if  the  forms  of  social  inter- 
action  pose  the  issue  of  Being  for  man,  a  phenomenological 
interpretation  of  those  forms  is  critical  in  shaping  the 
ontological  "answer".  How  he  characterizes  the  forms  of 
interaction  is,  therefore,  not  only  an  issue  of  phenomen- 
ological  importance;  it  becomes  in  his  own  program  outline, 
an  issue  for  ontology.  The  conception  of  Being  which  he 
spent  a  lifetime  interpreting,  is  prefigured  in  his  inter- 
pretations  of  , 
Mitsein. 
We  begin  our  analysis  of  Mitsein  by  recognizing  its 
level  of  importance  in  the  design. 
By  directing  our  researches  toward  the  phenomenon 
which  is  to  provide  us  with  an  answer  to  the  question 
of  the  'who',  we  shall  be  led  to  certain  structures 
of  Dasein  which  are  equiprimordial  with  Being-in-the- 
world:  Being-with  and  Dasein-with  (Mitsein  and  Mit- 
dasein).  In  this  kind  of  Being  is  grounded  the  mode  of 
everyday  Being-one's-Self.  1 
Mitsein  is  going  to  provide  the  clue  to  man's  being, 
and  we  note,  it  is  the  only  clue  he  will  cite. 
Being  with  others  is  distinguished  from  man's 
encounter  with  things.  Phenomenologically  speaking,  things 
1Heidegger,  N.,  Being  and  Time,  p.  149.  The  quoted 
passage  does  not  fully  clarify  Heidegger's  intention.  Mit- 
sein  is  identified,  for  the  most  part,  with  inauthentic 
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are  encountered  as  object-entities;  they  are  there  "before  us"-- 
Vorhanden.  And  they  are  encountered  as  utensils  "ready  to  use"# 
Zuhanden.  Heidegger  emphasizes  the  latter  characteristic.  for 
man,  objects  are  there  primarily  to  be  used  in  work  or  leisure. 
As  utensils,  objects  indicate  a  social  world;  the  tool  indi- 
cates  a  maker  and  user,  the  pan  a  cook,  and  so  on.  Man  easily 
distinguishes  the  tool  and  its  use  from  the  user,  objects  are 
objects  whether  just  "there",  or  ready  to  be  used.  They  are 
not  the  same  as  the  people  who  use  them.  The  main  factor  in 
man's  ability  to  set  apart  objects  so  easily  is  the  fact  that 
objects  evince  no  "concern";  other  people  do.  That  man  is 
concerned  is  evident  from  the  tools  he  makes;  tools  are  made 
to  facilitate  human  objectives.  Man,  is,  -of  all  beings,  con- 
cernful,  and  this  is  especially  evident  in  direct  social  inter- 
action--where  we  come  into  contact  with  others. 
1 
We  find  it  hard  to  distinguish  ourselves  from  others 
because,  no  matter  what  particular  concerns  we  or  they  may  have, 
we  are  like  them  in  that  we  live  in  the  world  "concernfully". 
Heidegger  pinpoints  this  element  as  the  thread  which 
binds  the  interhuman  or  social  sphere.  His  word  game  is  a 
bit  bizarre:  "with"  and  "there  too"  are  not  simply  descrip- 
tive  terms  for  location;  e.  g.  we  are  not  only  with  others  in 
a  given  place.  We  are  here,  as  others  are  "there",  or 
1In  general,  this  description  of  object  perception  was 
used  by  Merleau-Ponty.  We  cited  it  as  his  introduction  to  a 
phenomenology  of  intersubjectivity.  Heidegger's  thought  was, 
evidently,  an  influence  on  Merleau-Ponty  in  this  instance. 277 
"yonder",  because  we  are  with  others  in  concern.  "Concern", 
therefore,  is  a  most  important  theme  phenomenologically, 
and  gives  proper  perspective  to  the  facts  of  location  or 
particular  tasks.  1  If  the  question  is  the  autonomy  of  man's 
existence,  it,  too,  is  qualified  by  his  being  with  others. 
Man  can  be  described  as  being  alone  or  by  himself  only 
because  he  is  describable  as  one  who  lives  primarily  with 
others. 
2  In  other  words,  man's  being-with  constitutes  the 
primary  form  of  his  existence;  "being-with"  is  the  essential 
mode  of  being-there.  Understanding  the  social  in  terms  of 
concern  is  our,  one  clue  to  understanding  man's  everyday 
existence.  3 
Once  "concernfulness"  is  established  as  the  essence 
of  Being-with  in  man's  everyday  existence,  it  is  left  for  us 
to  see  the  particular  expressions  of  concern.  Fürsorge  or 
solicitude,  is  the  umbrella  term;  the  particular  expressions 
of  it  form  the  typologies  Heidegger  wants  to  emphasize,  so 
it  is  advisable  to  define  Fürsorge. 
Fürsorge  is  associated  with  the  care  of  a  social  agency 
1Ibid.,  pp.  154-155. 
2lbid.,  pp.  155-157. 
3The  term  concern  will  have  other  significant  appli- 
cations.  What  we  have  said  here  Is  but  an  introduction  to 
its  importance  as  an  existential  form;  it  will  be  used  later  to  uncover  the  form  of  "care"  which  is  essential  in 
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for  its  constituents;  the  soup  kitchen  or  the  hospital  illus- 
trate  his  idea.  The  notion  conveys  the  existence  of  a  social 
arrangement  in  which  personal  intimacy  or  committment  are 
misplaced  sentiments.  Man's  everyday  existence  is  charact- 
erized  as  Being-with  others  in  a  convenient  arrangement  to 
get  things  done  or  to  solve  problems.  Everyday  solicitude 
is  a  form  of  social  indifference. 
Heidegger  then  speaks  of  "positive"  modes  of  solici- 
tude;  why  he  terms  them  "positive",  I'm  not  sure.  The  first 
form  is  einspringen,  or  leap-in;  this  mode  of  solicitude  is 
where  one  takes  care  of  the  other's  concerns.  One  attends  to 
the  matter  so  that  the  other  person  will  not  have  to  bother 
with  it.  Heidegger  says  that  this  can  lead  to  domination  or 
dependence;  we  either  take  control  of  the  other  or  accept 
his  control  over  us.  This  should  remind  us  of  the  way  we 
deal  with  utensils;  the  other  is  an  object  which  we  use. 
This  mode,  again,  "is  to  a  large  extent  determinative  for 
Being  with  one  another  ..  .  111  Treating  others  as  objects 
is  normative  in  everyday  existence.  Indifference  and 
manipulation  as  we  shall  see,  account  for  the  major  themes  of 
everyday  existence. 
The  second  "positive"  mode  of  solicitude  is  the  "leap- 
1lbid.,  p.  158.  Heidegger's  notion  of  einspringen 
comes  very  close  to  Buber's  I-It  typology,  but  Heidegger 
does  not  pursue  this  mode  even  as  much  as  Buber  did  his. 279 
ahead"  (vorauss-oringen).  Heidegger  says  that  it  pertains 
to  "authentic  care";  it  is  intended  as  a  category  which  indi- 
cates  an  answer  to  the  who  question.  The  mode  is  obviously 
of  central  importance.  The  surprising  thing  is  that  his 
discussion  of  it  covers  little  more  than  a  short  paragraph. 
He  gives  one  brief  explanation:  a  common  cause  or  project 
is  possible  only  because  one  has  been  "taken  hold  of".  l  He 
does  not  say  what  that  state  of  being  amounts  to,  but  in 
light  of  what  follows,  he  is  evidently  thinking  of  a  theme 
he  calls  "resolve".  Later,  we  shall  detail  that  concept, 
but  the  passage  is  misleading  if  Heidegger's  concept  of 
resolve  goes  unmentioned.  "Anxious  resolve"  is  Heidegger's 
title  for  authentic  being-in-the-world;  if  one  has  secured 
that  mode  as  his  own,  then  it  is  possible  to  engage  in  this 
positive  form  of  solicitude.  Resolve  is  the  prerequisite 
for  authentic  Being-with. 
Vorausspringen  is  Heidegger's  single  category  for 
authentic  personal  and  social  relations.  Its  importance 
becomes  more  evident  when  Heidegger  cites  its  practical 
effects,  i.  e.  what  the  mode  means  for  the  one's  who  live 
by  it.  "It  helps  the  Other  to  become  transparent  to  himself 
in  his  care  and  to  become  free  for  it.  n2 
1Heidegger,  M.,  Being  and  Time.,  p.  158. 
2Ibid.  The  resemblance  between  this  concept  and 
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The  authentically  "resolved"  person  shows  the  other 
his  potential'.  The  Other  beholding  this  exemplar  of  authen- 
ticity  can  then  see  his  own  way  towards  self-fulfillment  or 
resolve.  "They  thus  become  authentically  bound  together.  "1 
Resolve  provides  for  the  conditions  of  authentic  interper- 
sonal  and  social  relationships,  and  the  main  effect  is  the 
individual's  own  freedom.  This  is  the  clue  to  Heidegger's 
view  of  authentic  Mitsein;  individual  freedom  is  its  pre- 
requisite  and  its  fulfillment. 
Other,  more  directly  intersubjective  themes  such  as 
trust,  compassion,  or  love  are  not  mentioned.  We  shall  see 
why  this  is  so  in  the  following  discussion  but  it  bears 
mentioning  now,  in  that  this  is  the  one  place  he  discusses 
"authentic"  intersubjective  relationships. 
For  the  thoughtful  reader  of  Heidegger  a  question 
emerges;  why,  when  he  has  specified  that  Mitsein  is  the  key 
which  unlocks  the  issue  of  man's  being,  is  his  discussion 
so  brief?  2  Heidegger  gives  us  no  reason  in  the  present 
passage  and  yet  we  believe  there  is  a  reason.  The  remainder 
of  the  phenomenology  provides  the  explanation. 
1  Ibid. 
20ne  of  Heidegger's  most  thoughtful  interpreter's, 
remarks  that  Heidegger's  description  of  authentic  Mitsein 
is  "truncated".  Vide.,  Richardson,  Wm.  J.,  Heideggeýr: 
Through  Phenomenolo  to  Thought,  The  Hague,  Martinus 
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The  study  thus  far,  has  characterized  the  ways  man 
may  interact  with  others;  the  negative  and  positive,  or  in- 
authentic  and  authentic  modes,  each  have  a  place.  The  next 
task  of  phenomenological  investigation  is  to  see  which 
forms  predominate  in  actual  everyday  existence.  Heidegger 
believes  it  is  essential  to  focus  upon  actual,  social  forms 
of  behavior  in  order  to  make  phenomenological  discourse 
credible.  We  are  about  to  hear  a  portrayal  of  everyday 
Mitsein;  it  is  supposed  to  open  up  the  issue  first  posed-- 
the  question  of  who  man  truly  is.  The  relevant  phenomenon 
is  what  men  actually  do  in  human  interaction,  for,  "they  are 
what  they  do,  (sie  sind  das,  was  sie  betrieben).  "1 
Ordinary  man  sees  either  that  he  lags  behind  others 
in  their  social  concerns,  or  that  he  has  power  to  influence 
others.  No  matter  which  form  this  self-appraisal  assumes, 
a  certain  distance  comes  between  self  and  others. 
The  state  of  distentiality  expresses  the  fact  that 
others  are  remote  from  us  in  our  own  quest  for  meaning.  The 
effect  Heidegger  says,  is  that  others  are  not  known  and  are 
viewed  as  a  neuter,  "they".  The  distance,  however,  is  over- 
come  in  one  sense;  a  certain  kind  of  communication  takes 
1Heidegger,  DI.,  ;  ging  and  Time,  p.  158.  Again  we  em- 
phasize  that  Heidegger  will  not  employ  sociological  psych- 
ological  insights  or  data.  Heidegger  is  singularly  unwilling 
to  relate  his  interpretation  to  other  disciplines.  His 
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place. 
Social  values  dominate  man;  everyday  man,  for  Heidegger, 
is  entirely  other-directed.  Characteristic  of  the  crowd,  is 
"averageness".  Its  influence  upon  individuals  is  to  level 
personal  values.  The  "they"  tells  man  what  he  should  do  and 
how;  "every  kind  of  priority  gets  noiselessly  surpressed".  1 
The  label  for  society's  averageness  and  manipulation  is 
"publicness";  everyday  man  is  a  product  of  public  values. 
Not  only  is  the  conduct  of  individuals  affected  by 
the  crowd;  man's  self-image  is  also  stamped  with  the  norms 
and  values  of  the  herd's  morality.  Because  man  is  captive 
to  the  crowd,  Heidegger  says  that  he  is  a  not-self;  a  "they- 
self".  2  He  is  both  estranged  from  others,  and  is  not  his  own 
man;  he  is  the  pawn  of  social  pressures.  In  the  context  of 
the  ontological  issue  "who  is  man",  a  preliminary  answer  is 
possible.  Everyday  Dasein  is  a  "nobody".  3 
As  a  critique  of  social  morality  and  conformity, 
Heidegger's  phenomenological  hermeneutic  is,  indeed,  effective. 
The  pathos  of  Nietzsche's  commentary  is  not  present,  but 
Heidegger's  observations  are  cooly  and  concisely  enumerated; 
a  sense  of  the  demonic  nature  of  herd  morality  and  its  effects 
1Ibid.,  p.  165. 
21bid. 
,  p.  167.,  "The  Self  of  every  dasein  is  the 
They-self".  Ibid. 
31bid.,  p.  166. 283 
upon  individual  life  is  progressively  heightened.  We  can 
see  clearly  the  alienated  man  who  is  sick  himself  because 
of  his  mindless  conformity.  Heidegger's  picture  of  "social- 
ibility"  is  stark. 
But  Heidegger  does  not  merely  intend  to  criticize 
social  mores  and  personal  conformity;  his  critique  is  sup- 
posed  to  give  access  to  the  ontological  issue.  When  he  says 
that  everyday  man  is  a  nobody,  he  makes  an  all-inclusive 
statement;  man's  life  in  the  everyday  form  specifies  who  he 
is.  His  state  of  being  is  to  be  a  nobody,  and  everyday  Mit- 
sein  is  the  specific  factor  which  makes  him  a  nobody. 
With  this  Interpretation  of  Being-with  and  Being- 
one's  Self  in  the  'they',  the  question  of  the  'who' 
of  the  everydayness  of  Being-with-one-another  is 
answered.  These  considerations  have  at  the  same  time 
brought  us  a  concrete  understanding  of  the  basic 
constitution  of  Dasein:  Being-in-the-world,  in  its 
everydayness  and  its  averageness,  has  become  visible. 
l 
Heidegger's  conclusion  is  familiar:  everydayness 
in  society  has  kept  man  from  the  real  issue  of  his  own 
Being.  Mitsein  is  a  prime  example  of  man's  condition  and 
his  problem.  Phenomenological  interrogation  has  but  uncov- 
ered  it;  in  this  sense,  Heidegger's  commentary  is  a  contri- 
bution  to  existential  analysis. 
But  it  is  seldom  recognized  that  Heidegger's  inter- 
pretation  of  Mitsein  specifies  the  ontological  issue. 
As  such,  one  should  ask  if  Heideggers  phenomenology 
1lbid.,  p.  168. 284 
is  as  representative  or  interpretative  of  the  full  range  of 
experience  as  it  claims  to  be.  If  we  were  to  restrict  the 
idea  of  Mitsein  to  social  influence  on  the  part  of  the 
"crowd",  and  to  borrowed  values  on  the  part  of  the  individual, 
a  much  more  convincing  case  could  be  made  for  its  pervasive- 
ness.  But  Heidegger  is  not  talking  about  borrowed  values 
only,  or  propoganda;  he  is  talking  about  all  forms  of  human 
interaction.  All  forms  of  social  contact  rob  man  of  his 
identity. 
If  human  experience  is  interpreted  as  being  completely 
other  directed,  has  not  Heidegger  introduced  a  bias  that 
distorts  rather  than  uncovers  man's  true  state  of  being? 
Has  he  not  unwisely  telescoped  the  focus  of  phenomenolog- 
ical  discipline?  Is  this  form  of  everydayness  the  only 
aspect  of  Mitsein  to  be  taken  seriously? 
Heidegger's  program,  I  suggest,  is  a  systematic 
narrowing  of  the  interhuman  sphere,  fashioned  to  meet  his 
individualistic  conception  of  man's  true  being.  He  has 
structured  his  phenomenology  to  introduce  a  peculiar  onto- 
logy.  Though  this  is  contrary  to  his  stated  definition  of 
the  discipline,  i.  e.  phenomenology  "lets  be  what  shows  it- 
self";  there  is  no  argument,  if  his  phenomenology  is  truly 
representative.  This  is  where  we  take  exception.  Mitsein 
is  not  given  interpretative  latitude;  it  is  one-sided.  If 
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cannot  afford  to  neglect  whole  segments  of  human  exchange 
without  explaining  w  they  must  be  thought  of  as  inauth- 
entic.  "Common  causes"  were  not  distinguished  from  the 
everyday  mode;  personal  relationships  such  as  parent-child, 
husband-wife,  and  lover  to  lover  were  totally  disregarded. 
These-sorts  of  relationships  may  have  a  social  as  well  as 
a  personal-private  domain,  and  it  seems  a  bit  farfetched 
to  assume  they  are  completely  other-directed  forms.  In 
any  case,  Heidegger's  error  is  that  he  failed  to  deal  with 
them  in  his  discussion  of  everyday  man.  His  rush  to  expli- 
cate  the  concepts  of  care  and  resolve  has  led  him  to  bypass 
experiential  modes  which  may  have  modified  his  phenomenology. 
His  fault  is  that  of  narrow  singlemindedness,  and  his  phen- 
omenology  loses  credibility  because  of  it. 
The  case  we  are  making  becomes  stronger  as  we  follow 
Heidegger  in  his  phenomenological  explication  of  "Being- 
in".  This  theme  is  Heidegger's  way  of  resolving  the  issue 
of  man's  being,  i.  e.  of  describing  how  man  comes  to  confront 
his  everyday  state  of  being,  and  reshape  it  into  an  authentic 
of  being-in-the-world.  1 
-- 
Heidegger  uses  three  sub-themes  which  serve  to  introduce 
1The  term  "reshape"  is  chosen  with  Heidegger's  con- 
cept  in  mind.  "Authentic  Being-one's-Self  does  not  rest 
upon  an  exceptional  condition  of  the  subject,  a  condition 
that  has  been  detached  from  the  'they';  it  is  rather  an  exis- 
tential  modification  of  the  'they'--of  the  'they'  as  an 
essential  existentiale.  "  Heidegger,  M.,  Being  and  Time,  p.  168. 286 
the  issue.  The  first  theme,  man's  state  of  mind,  is  dis- 
covered  through  the  phenomenon  of  fear.  Fear  is  the 
specific  form  that  reveals  a  general  condition  or  state  of 
mind.  So  the  phenomenon  does  have  ontological  significance; 
the  mood  of  fear  illustrates  how  man  is  "there"  and  this 
in  turn  opens  us  to  the  issue,  of  his  "being". 
' 
State  of  mind  is  made  more  specific  by  observing 
that  man  is  aware  of  his  "thereness";  he  cannot  say  why 
he  is  "there",  or  where  he  is  going.  He  is  in  the  world; 
that  much  is  a  certain  fact.  This  "fact"  has  as  its 
theme,  "thrownness";  man  resides  in  the  world  as  an  entity, 
but  more  important,  he  is  thrown  into  relationships  with 
others.  "Thrownness"  connotes  man's  immersion  in  society 
and  his  loss  of  self-identity.  Fear  illustrates  this 
condition  of  mind  in  that  our  thrownness  cannot  be 
explained-away.  Hence,  being-there  is  threatening  to  us. 
The  second  theme  builds  upon  the  first;  the  condi- 
tion  of  thrownness  also  indicates  that  one  understands 
himself  in  terms  of  his  potential.  In  the  negative  sense, 
thrownness  incites  the  understanding  that  one  has  passed 
up  his  potential  by  surrendering  himself  to  social  manipu- 
lation.  Man  sees  that  he  has  not  confronted  the  issue  of 
1Ibid. 
,  p.  173,  and  pp.  179-181.  The  analyses  of 
fear  are  fascinating;  we  do  not  detail  them  because  their 
main  purpose  is  to  show  the  connection  between  a  phenomenal 
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an  authentic,  inner-directed  life. 
Heidegger's  third  theme  is  "Interpretation";  it 
serves  to  drive  home,  specifically,  how  man  is  exposed 
to  this  new  self-understanding.  It  is  the  extension  of 
his  work  on  everyday  Mitsein,  and  is  Heidegger's  way  of 
"demonstrating"  the  above  themes.  Social  discourse  is 
the  primary  vehicle  which  incites  an  individual's  self- 
interpretation,  and  discourse  in  the  everyday  sense  is  idle- 
talk.  The  state  of  mind  of  the  "they"  is  publicness; 
idle  talk  and  gossip  predominate.  Both  are  "groundless"; 
that  is,  they  are  superficial,  and  the  effect  is  that  the 
"thereness"  of  individuals  is  bypassed.  There  is  a  kind 
of  restlessness  in  social  discourse,  so  that  an  individual 
comes  to  see  himself  as  "floating"  and  "uprooted".  1  Idle 
talk  breeds  this  sense  of  floating;  personal  values  are 
disregarded  so  that  the  individual  does  not  receive  the 
satisfaction  of  being  taken  seriously., 
Heidegger  begins  explaining  the  emergence  of  self- 
awareness  by  saying  that  man's  curiosity  about  things 
continues  in  face  of  social  discourse;  he  cannot  remain 
casually  indifferent;  he  watches  others  and  sees  that  the 
apparent  "being-for-one-another"  so  often  advertised  in 
discourse  really  masks  man's  "being-against-cane-another".  2 
1lbid",  p.  213. 
2Ibid.,  p.  219. 288 
Because  the  individual  is  immersed  in  this  mode,  he  sees 
himself  as  "falling".  This  has  no  negative  connotation 
for  Heidegger;  it  is  the  birth  of  self-understanding. 
He  sees  himself  floundering  in  the  midst  of  groundless 
idle  talk;  being  passed  by,  he  is  now  a  nobody  in  his  own 
eyes. 
The  progress  of  the  program  should  be  made  explicit 
at  this  point.  Everyday  Mitsein  is  not  only  the  general 
form  of  social  living;  it  is  a  personal  form  in  that  it 
affects  every  individual.  Phenomenological  hermeneutic 
has  uncovered  the  destructive  interaction  in  its  specific 
effects  upon  the  person  who  seeks  enlightenment. 
Much  like  Nietzsche,  Heidegger  can  now  play  the  role 
of  missionary.  The  philosopher  has  exposed  a  new  access 
for  gaining  of  self-identity,  and  the  reader  or  listener 
is  expected  to  heed  the  call  to  authenticity  by  following 
the  next  steps  the  philosopher  prescribes.  Phenomenological 
description,  for  Heidegger,  has  a  mission;  we  are  advised 
to  accept  his  interpretation  as  the  one  way  which  can 
prepare  man  for  authentic  Being-there. 
I  use  this  form  of  critique  advisedly,  but  it  is 
difficult  to  avoid  the  missionary  fervor  in  his  writing. 
The  facade  of  cool  objective  analysis  is  there,  but  the 
call  to  Heidegger's  special  notion  of  self-understanding 
is  unmistakable.  Two  things  become  clear  when  his  phen- 
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is  a  call  to  a  new  way  of  life,  based  upon  a  particular 
appraisal  of  intersubjective  encounters.  Everyday  Mitsein 
has  not  been  "left-behind";  rather,  its  demonic  features 
have  given  birth  to  the  individual's  self-understanding. 
What  remains  to  be  done  is  to  change  this  condition  so 
that  a  positive  form  of  life  can  emerge.  There  can  be 
no  hesitations;  man  remains  a  nobody  if  he  does  not  respond 
as  Heidegger  outlines.  1 
We  emphasize  that  everyday  Mitsein,  when  intern- 
alized  as  one's  self-understanding  remains  a  negative  form. 
There  is  no  positive  intersubjective  exchange  of  which 
one  can  claim  to  be  a  part.  The  negative  influence  of 
intersubjective  encounters  is  pervasive  even  as  regards 
one's  thought  of  himself.  Though  this  may  be  manifestly 
true  of  much  human  interchange,  Heidegger's  error  lies  in 
making  it  the  sole  norm  for  self-appraisal.  Mitsein  is 
determinative  of  man's  total  existence.  We  can  therefore, 
expect  that  some  "divorce"  will  occur  between  the  indi- 
vidual  and  intersubjective  exchange  in  Heidegger's  reso- 
lution  of  the  "being  issue";  it  is  obvious  that  intersub- 
jectivity  will  play  no  positive  part  in  one's  recovery  of 
there-being. 
The  acceptance  of  fallenness  becomes  pointed  when 
1This  activism  in  Heidegger  is  responsible  in  part,  for  a  particular  view  of  "existentialism",  a  view  we  find 
objectionable.  We  note  it  here  and  will  discuss  it  in  our 
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it  is  seen  that  man  really  cares  about  his  existence.  That 
he  cares  is  attested  to  by  the  phenomenon  of  anxiety  (Angst).  1 
Whereas  falling  is  understood  as  one's  reaction  to  social 
influence,  anxiety  shows  that  man  cares  about  the  issue  of 
his  own  being.  Though  man  is  still  very  much  immersed  in 
social  modalities,  he  now  sees  that  "the  world  can  offer 
nothing  more  and  neither  can  the  Dasein-with  others.  i2  The 
individual  begins  to  understand  that  his  own  potentiality 
for  authentic  Being  must  take  place  apart  from  the  social 
sphere.  He  gains  the  uncanny  feeling  of  "not  being  at  home".  3 
Whether  'he  still  attempts  escape  from  these  realiza- 
tions  or  succeeds  in  living  with  them,  a  unique  form  of 
existence  has  been  brought  into  the  open.  "Care"  (Sorge) 
is  the  ontological  structure  of  man's  new  awareness;  no 
matter  how  he  actually  lives,  it  is  now  evident  that  he 
cares  about  living. 
The  obstacle  to  man's  care  is,  of  course,  his  state 
of  immersion  as  it  conflicts  with  his  quest  for  meaning. 
He  is  tranquilized  by  the  they  and  he  is  individualized 
by  his  new  self-awareness.  The  either/or  character  of  the 
1V'ide.,  Heidegger,  N.,  Being  and  Time,  p.  227. 
2lbid. 
1,  p.  232. 
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"being  issue"  is  firnly  established. 
1  Man  may  either  acknow- 
ledge  his  care,  or  he  may  continue  in  the  attempt  to  escape. 
The  analysis  of  care  is  concluded  by  citing  the  one 
"phenomenon  which  provides  the  ontological  support  for  the 
unity  of  care.  "2  That  phenomenon  is  death,  and  it  serves 
to  hold  Heidegger's  whole  program  together.  Death  is  both 
a  fact,  and  it  is  an  "existentiale";  that  is,  man  is  a 
being  who  exists  in  face  of  death.  His  care  is  focused 
upon  caring  about  death.  To  detail  Heidegger's  analysis 
would  take  far  too  much  space,  but  we  are  obliged  to  outline 
this  most  important  part  of  the  phenomenology.  Its  relation 
to  Mitsein  is  especially  important. 
In  the  condition  of  "fallenness"  man  avoids  'the 
issue  of  death;  he  is  distracted  by  the  "they".  Death, 
however,  has  factual  certainty,  even  though  that  certainty 
is  hidden  by  gossip  and  idle  talk.  The  curiosity  of  man  is 
both  heightened  and  surpressed  by  the  crowd.  Heidegger 
observes  that  man's  anticipation  of  death,  which  is  an 
authentic  mode  of  living,  is  just  as  possible  as  is  indiff- 
erence  to  the  issue. 
lEither/or  as  a  term  is  an  appropriate  term  in  this 
context,  if  not  associated  with  Kierkegaard.  If  we  restrict 
our  usage  to  the  way  man  faces  existential  alternatives-- 
i.  e.  "modes  of  life",  the  term  is  helpful. 
2Heidegger,  M.,  Being  and  Time,  p.  241. 292 
Anticipation  of  death  (Being-towards-death)  is  the 
authentic  form  of  care.  Anticipation,  however,  is  not  a 
morbid  death-wish  or  a  pathological  fear;  it  is,  for  Hei- 
degger,  the  acceptance  of  death  as  being  certain.  One 
knows  that  he  came  into  the  world  as  one  "thrown",  and  that 
he  will  die  alone.  The.  idea  of  accepting  death  goes  hand 
in  hand  with  a  resolve  to  live  apart  from  the  illusions 
promulgated  by  society,  i.  e.  "explanations",  myths,  or 
beliefs.  The  effect  is  to  become  free  for  death's  advent, 
to  be  anxiously  resolved  to  meet  it  whenever  it  may  occur. 
Again,  the  mode  of  anxious  resolve  is  a  life-affirming 
modality;  life  is  now  accepted  as  a  finite  existence. 
It  is  not  necessary  to  detail  Heidegger's  descriptions 
of  finitude  and  temporality.  In  terms  of  the  phenomenology, 
finitude  is  synonomous  with  temporality;  man  is  a  finite 
being.  The  meaning  of  his  existence  is  temporal  and,  the 
issue  of  his  Being  is  resolved  by  accepting  temporality. 
He  lives  in  anxious  resolve  before  death  as  a  temporal 
Being.  This  is  the  authentic  answer  to  the  "who"  of  Dasein, 
the  capstone  of  the  program  in  Being  and  Time. 
Man's  new  relation  to  others  is  mentioned  briefly 
in  the  following: 
Anticipation  reveals  to  Dasein  its  lostness  in  the 
they-self  and  brings  it  face  to  face  with  the  possibil- 
ity  of  being  itself,  primarily  unsupporrtted  concernful 
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freedom  toward  death--a  freedom  which  has  been  released 
from  the  illusions  o  the  'they'  and  which  is  factical, 
certain  of  death  and  anxious. 
No  intersubjective  exchange  bears  upon  the  indi- 
vidual's  anticipation,  even  tangentially.  Death  antici- 
pation  is  a  possibility  only  for  one's  self,  and  is  carried 
out  one's  self.  William  Richardson  aptly  terms  anxious 
resolve,  "finite  transcendence".  2  In  the  solitary  acceptance 
of  death-anticipation,  man  transcends  the  social  sphere 
and  its  myths;  his  resolve  is  centered  on  the  unique  fact 
that  he  is  a  finite,  temporal  creature.  We  are  reminded 
of  Merleau-Ponty's  thought  during  the  late  forties;  "hori- 
zontal  transcendence"  is  an  appropriate  term  for  Heidegger's 
concept  of  resolve. 
Individualism  is  the  backbone  of  Heidegger's  onto- 
logical  dictum.  We  must  acknowledge  that  his  theme  of 
death-anticipation  does  "fit"  the  individual  context,  at 
least  to  a  certain  extent.  Death  is  a  unique  phenomenon 
which  pertains  to  solitary  man;  it  is  "private"  and  an 
understanding  of  it  may  rest  upon  the  individual's  solitary 
grasp.  Heidegger  has  struck  an  impressive  note  by  focusing 
upon  death  as  an  individual's  personal  affair. 
The  strange  philosophical  language  he  employs  does  not 
entirely  mask,  however,  a  very  serious  misconception  of  the  human 
1Ibid., 
p.  311.  (underlining  mine). 
2Richardson,  Wm.  J.,  off.  cit.,  pt  I. 294 
situation.  That  misconception  was  brought  to  our  attention 
by  reading  Merleau-Ponty's  phenomenological-ontology. 
Namely,  the  anticipation  of  death  may  be  one's  own  personal 
issue  but  it  is  not  necessarily  worked  out,  understood,  or 
anticipated  in  a  sphere  apart  from  the  social,  as  Heidegger 
suggests.  The  mystery  of  death  as  well  as  of  life  can  be 
opened  to  us  through  human  interaction. 
We  do  not  intend.  to  write  an  alternative  phenomenology 
to  counter  Heidegger,  but  we  suggest  that  his  phenomenology, 
and  his  ontological  formulation  is  severely  handicapped  by 
insisting  that  everyday  Mitsein  must  be  transcended  in  order 
to  authentically  anticipate  death.  This  is  why  he  never 
returns  to  a  concept  of  "authentic  Mitsein*  at  the  conclu- 
sion  of  Being  and  Time.  The  fact  is,  his  phenomenology  is 
complete  with  the  portrayal  of  an  individual's  resolve. 
Interhuman  exchange  cannot  affect  resolve;  intersubjectivity 
is  finally  put  aside  because  it  is  replaced  by  a  militant 
individualism. 
Were  he  to  have  returned  to  explicate  the  notion  of 
authentic  Mitsein  what  would  he  have  said?  We  are  forced 
to  put  some  words  into  his  mouth,  but  what  we  say  is  not 
speculation;  it  is  an  extension  of  what  is  inherant  in 
the  program.  His  earlier  reference  about  being  "bound 
together"  can  now  be  made  specific.  One  reference  aids  our 
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Dasein's  resoluteness  towards  itself  is  what  first 
makes  it  possible  to  let  others  'be'  in  their  own 
most  potentiality-for-Being,  and  to  co-disclose  this 
potentiality  in  the  solicitude  which  leaps  forth  and 
liberates.  When  Dasein  is  resolute,  it  can  become  the 
conscience  of  Others.  Only  by  authentically  Being- 
their-Selves  in  resoluteness  can  people  authentically 
be  with  one  another--not  by  ambiguous  and  jealous 
stipulations  and  talkative  fraternizing  in  the  'they' 
and  in  what  'they'  want  to  undertake. 
Heidegger  is  the  advocate  of  a  militant  individual- 
ism  in  that  resolute  man  is  a  conscience  for  others.  Man 
is  his  own  measure  and  the  teacher  of  others.  Put  more 
boldly,  he  is  both  conscience  and  judge.  Being  "bound 
together"  is  reminiscent  of  Hegel's  master-slave  dialectic. 
But  Hegel's  intriguing  dialogue  between  labor  and  lordship 
is  not  necessary  for  Heidegger.  The  resolute  man  is  the 
master,  pure  and  simple;  he  alone  provides  freedom  for 
another,  as  he  has  provided  it  for  himself. 
The  above  allusion  to  authentic  Mitsein  seems  aca- 
demic,  and  unnecessary.  Heidegger's  brief  reference  shows 
that  it  is  an  afterthought  in  his  program.  The  only  essential 
is  hard-won,  individual  resolve.  We  are  left  with  a  program 
which  was  given  life  by  a  phenomenology  of  intersubjectivity, 
and  which  essentially  does  away  with  its  importance  in  the 
end.  The  reason:  intersubjective  encounter  is  an  obstacle 
to  self-knowledge;  his  ontology  is  based  solely  upon  the 
necessity  of  overcoming  the  bad  effects  of  intersubjective 
1Heidegger,  M.,  Being  and  Time,  p.  344. 296 
encounter. 
What  about  the  relation  between  Mitsein  and  "finite 
transcendence"?  Phenomenologically  speaking,  there  is  none. 
Individual  man  is  the  source  and  executor  of  finite  trans- 
cendence;  in  the  view  of  Being  and  Time,  man  is  finite- 
transcendence.  Heidegger's  early  claim  that  Mitsein  is 
the  one  access  to  authentic  Being-there  is  somewhat  mis- 
leading.  As  an  "access"  it  is  at  best  labyrinthine;  it 
offers  no  real  direction  of  its  own.  One  must  see  Mitsein 
as  counter  productive,  negative,  and  enslaving.  The  order 
is,  separate  your  self  from  others.  That  movement  becomes 
the  opportunity  for  the  transcending  act.  Individual 
finitude  has  no  reference  to  positive  modalities  of  life 
with  others. 
This  structure  indicates  a  radical  difference  with 
the  ontology  of  Merleau-Ponty. 
We  have  made  it  clear  that  intersubjectivity  is  an 
access  to  ontological  thought  in  Merleau-Ponty's  thought. 
One  of  the  reasons  is  that  "the  other"  is  fundamental  in 
confronting  the  ontological  issue;  people  in  encountering 
each  other  can  experience  the  "wave  of  Being".  The  differ- 
ence  with  Heidegger  is  striking.  Mitsein  is  not,  in  its 
inauthentic  form,  a  presentation  of  otherness.  The  notion 
of  "immersion"  or  of  man  as  a  they-self,  makes  that  plain; 
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transcendence. 
Concerning  "authentic"  Mitsein,  the  same  is  true. 
Transcendence  is  confined  to  the  individual's  resolve;  an- 
other  person  can  only  witness  a  resolute  person,  imitate  his 
transcending  act,  and  finally  initiate  his  own  self-trans- 
cendence.  To  say  that  intersubjective  exchange  plays  a  part  in 
this  response  would  be  to  distort  Heidegger's  position.  The 
exchange  may  influence  the  transcending  act  but  only  because 
it  is  understood  as  an  obstacle.  Man  is  left  to  himself; 
intersubjectivity  never  functions  as  an  "opening".  in  the 
creative  sense. 
The  contrast  between  the  two  thinkers  indicates  the 
vastly  different  roles  a  phenomenology  of  intersubjectivity 
plays  in  shaping  concept  of  transcendence.  In  our  con- 
cluding  observations  we  shall  evaluate  them. 
Our  interpretation  of  Heidegger  does  bring  up  the 
question  of  Heidegger's  later  work,  and  especially  the  changes 
in  his  perspectives  on  the  problem  of  transcendence.  An 
adequate  survey  of  the  material  would  involve  an  inordinate 
amount  of  space,  so  what  is  said  here  should  not  be  taken 
as  a  full  scale  analysis  of  his  position,  but  as  a  suggestion 
for  the  study  of  the  "later  Heidegger". 
It  is  quite  evident  that  Heidegger  altered  his  view 
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first  noted  in  the  1929  essay,  "Was  ist  Metaphysik?  "1  where 
he  observes  that  "nothingness"  is  responsible  for  the  human 
act  of  negation.  In  confrontation  with  "the  nothing",  man 
is  influenced  to  make  the  transcending  act  of  resolve.  Much 
in  this  essay  is  an  extension  of  the  views  in  Being  and  Time, 
but  there  is  a  new  element.  "The  nothing"  is  revealed  to 
man;  it  is  not  produced  by  him  but  is  the  occasion  for  his 
response.  Later,  in  1943,  Heidegger  amplifies  the  concept 
of  nothingness. 
2  The  peculiar  experience  of  what-is-not,  is 
the  occasion  for  an  encounter  between  man  and  Being.  Noth- 
ingness  is  portrayed  as  the  "veil  of  Being".  That  affirm- 
ation  certainly  contains  a  new  notion  of  transcendence. 
Man  responds  to  a  disclosure.  William  Richardson's  study 
of  Heidegger  titles  the  new  conception,  "dehiscience  of 
Being".  In  ordinary  terms,  it  means  that  Being  presents 
itself  to  man;  that  revelatory  aspect  is  the  key  to  under- 
standing  Heidegger's  later  views  on  Being. 
Heidegger  also  developed  a  somewhat  different  view 
of  the  activity  of  man  as  he  sought  to  interrogate  the 
meaning  of  Being.  Reference  to  death  anticipation  was, 
for  the  most  part,  dropped  in  the  later  essays.  In  "Essays 
in  Metaphysics:  Identity  and  Difference",  he  observes 
1Heidegger,  Martin,  'IWhat'  is  Metaphysics?  "  Existence 
and  Being,  Intro.  by  Werner  Brock,  Chicago,  H.  Regnery  Co, 
199. 
'Heidegger,  Martin,  The  Question  of  in  g,  Trans. 
William  Kluback  and  J.  T.  ', Ili  e.  London,  Vision  Press  Ltd. 
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that  the  disclosure  of  Being  brings  with  it  the  experience 
of  "enthrallment".  1  In  the  "pervading  luminosity"  which  is 
Being's  mode  of  presentation,  Being  is  experienced  as 
enshrouded;  man  cannot  directly  experience  Being  itself  but 
he  can  think  it.  The  concept  carrying  the  weight  of  his 
explication  is.  Logos;  it  becomes  Heidegger's  most  mature 
expression  of  the  meaning  of  Being  for  man.  Being,  though 
concealed,  is  nevertheless,  effectively  thought  about. 
Moreover,  Logos  teaches  that  man's  thought  is  his  corre- 
spondence  with  Being.  He  learns  in  meditation  that  he 
belongs  to  Being.  The  notion  of  belonging  is  carried  home 
by  what  Heidegger  calls  a  reciprocal  "challer;  ge".  Being 
challenges  man  in  its  presentation  as  a  pervading  lumin- 
osity;  man  challenges  Being  also  by  the  leap  of  reason. 
The  conclusion  is,  he  says,  that  man  and  Being  are  alienated; 
at  the  same  time--they  belong  together. 
This  new  pattern  of  the  relation  between  man  and 
Being  we  take  to  be  Heidegger's  answer  to  the  question  he 
asked  in  the  beginning  of  Being  and  Time,  i.  e.  what  is  the 
meaning  of  Being?  It  would  seem  that  an  entirely  new 
ontology  has  been  written  which  could  change  our  conclusions. 
But  is  this  so? 
'Heidegger,  Martin,  Essays  in  Metaphysics,  Identity 
and  Difference,  Trans.  Kurt  Leidecker,  New  York,  Philosoph- 
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Heidegger's  new  emphasis  upon  meditative  thought 
as  the  access  to  confrontation  with  Being  does  not  change 
our  position  for  these  reasons:  the  "leap"  of  reason  is 
characterized  as  an  experience  of  "keeping  aloof"  from 
the  traditional  modes  of  thought,  particularly  represen- 
tational  thinking.  More  important,  it  is  a  solitary  act 
made  for  the  purpose  of  experiencing  "in  our  own  person" 
the  relation  we  have  with  Being.  Being  is  domiciled  in 
the  private  meditative  man.  The  term  which  illustrates 
man's  leap  is  the  same  one  used  in  Being  and  Time,  concern. 
It  may  not  now  refer  to  the  anxious  resolve  cited  earlier 
but  it  is  never  related  to  the  notion  of  life  with  others. 
Mitsein  is  never  brought  into  the  picture  of  man's  way  of 
confronting  the  movement  of  Being. 
Heidegger's  essay,  "Holderlin  and  the  Essence  of 
Poetry"  makes  our  point  quite  clearly.  1  Man's  correspon- 
dence  with  Being  is  demonstrated  or  actualized  in  langu--.  ge. 
He  takes  Holderlin's  line,  "since  we  have  been  a  conversa- 
tion",  to  mean  that  each  man,  that  is,  the  individual,  is 
a  conversation  with  the  mystery  of  Being.  The  poet  and 
the  thinker  have  this  in  common;  they  stand  before  the 
gods  as  privileged  recipients  and  spokesmen.  Because  the 
1Vide. 
,  ..  Heidegger,  T.  lartin,  Existence  and  Being 
Intro.  by  Werner  Brock. 
2Ibid., 
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thinker  does  confront  Being,  he,  along  with  the  poet,  can 
pass  the  word  of  Being  to  others.  Of  course,  he  does  not 
say  that  this  sets  the  philosopher  or  the  poet  above 
ordinary  mortals;  but  the  parallel  with  the  man  of  Being 
and  Time  is  striking.  The  philosopher  need  never  refer 
to  conversation  with  others  in  this  experience;  rather  he 
stands  alone  between  Being  and  the  crowd  as  the  supplier 
of  wisdom  and  truth.  It  is  this  picture  of  reason,  func- 
tioning  to  inform  the  masses,  which  makes  Heidegger's 
new  position  consistant  with  that  of  Being  and  Time.  He 
has  not  reconsidered  the  intersubjective  sphere  as  affecting 
the  voaation  of  the  philosopher. 
Why?  We  suggest  that  the  early  phenomenology  was 
never  altered  in  the  midst  of  all  the  alterations  concerning 
transcendence  and  meditative  thought.  It  remained  the 
same;  intersubjectivity  played  no  creative  part  in  shaping 
his  conception  of  finite  transcendence  and  it  played  no 
part  in  his  later  conception.  The  man,  whether  one  of 
anxious  resolve  or  of  meditative  thought,  is  still  solitary. 
Could  it  be  that  Heidegger's  own  life  influenced 
such  an  intellectual  position?  We  must  not  view  him  as 
a  pawn  of  the  age,  for  his  brilliance  is  unquestionably 
rare,  but  this  man  who  writes  in  his  forest  retreat  is 
truly  a  man  of  solitude,  if  not  of  isolation. 
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Heidegger's.  It  would  seem  that  the  two  concur  in  their 
characterization  of  Being:  Merleau-Ponty  uses  the  terms 
"silence",  "absence",  and  "mystery";  Heidegger,  the  term 
"luminosity".  For  both,  Being  cannot  be  described  or 
effectively  known  about;  Being  is  confronted.  Man  challenges 
to  know  its  secrets;.  but  no  answers  are  forthcoming.  In 
this  much  the  two  are  alike.  'Both  say  that  man  "belongs" 
to  Being;  that  man  encounters  the  mystery  and  is,  somehow, 
part  of  its  mystery.  Both  argue  that  interpretation  of  living 
modes  is  the  primary  instrument  for  developing  this  claim; 
both  seek  a  phenomenologically  grounded  ontology. 
But  the  similarities  end  here.  Intersubjectivity 
plays  a  major  and  positive  role  for  Merleau-Ponty.  Encounter 
is  a  social  thing  and  is  -a  conduite  to  a  disclosure  of  .. 
Being.  Man's  interaction  also  leads  Merleau-Ponty  to  say 
he,  man,  bears  the  weight  of  transcendence.  For  Heidegger, 
interaction  simply  gets  in  the  way  of  Being's  disclosure. 
We  suggest  that  man's  encounter  with  Being  is  a 
very  different  phenomenon  for  the  two  thinkers.  For 
Heidegger,  the  place  of  meeting  is  solitariness;  for  Mer- 
leau-Ponty  it  is  the  rare  experience  of  intersubjective 
encounter.  Will  not  that  difference  play  an  important  role 
in  man's  claim  to  confront  Being?  If  phenomenologists  are 
to  risk  an  affirmation  of  transcendence,  it  must  follow  that 
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in  a  direct  way. 
One  lesson  from  this  study  seems  especially  important. 
It  is  incumbent  upon  the  thinker  to  examine  the  phenomenal 
forms  which  can  be  relied  upon  to  effectively  open  the  issue 
of  Being.  It  simply  cannot  be  true  that  all  forms  of  living 
bear  the  same  significance.  A  phenomenology  which  claims 
to  be  an  opening  to  the  issue  of  Being  must  delineate  which 
forms  emerge  as  conduites.  This  means  comparing  the  various 
forms  so  that  we  may  estimate  their  function, 
In  a  modest  way,  we  accept  that  task,  and  will 
attempt  to  delineate  those  forms  in  our  concluding  chapter. PART  FOUR 
CONCLUDING  OBSERVATIONS THE  FUNCTION  OF  METHOD  IN  DEVELOPING  A 
PHENOMENOLOGY  OF  INTERSUBJECTIVITY 
Our  objectives  in  these  final  two  chapters  can  be 
outlined  briefly.  The  present  chapter  will  concentrate  on 
describing  how  a  credible  phenomenlogy  of  intersubjectivity 
is  developed.  We  shall  argue  that  by  remaining  attentive 
to  the  discipline  of  method,  a  phenomenology  of  intersub- 
jectivity  which  focuses  upon  encounter  is  both  possible  and 
credible.  In  arguing  this  approach  we  shall  confine  our- 
selves  to  the  function  of  method  in  guiding  a  phenomenology 
through  the  complex  materials  necessary  for  a  coherent 
portrayal  of  intersubjective  experience.  Chapter  two  will 
build  upon  this  foundation;  the  relation  between  experience 
and.  method  will  show  that  intersubjective  exchange  not  only 
opens  the  issue  of  transcendence,  it  leads  the  thinker  to 
consider  again  the  appropriateness  of  theological  affirmation. 
emphasis  there  will  be  upon  the  phenomenological  forms  them- 
selves,  that  is,  the  specific  themes  of  love  and  trust  which 
can  be  utilized  in  posing  the  issue  of  transcendence.  We 
will  argue  that  Buber's  insights  need  not  be  disregarded. 
Our  main  contention,  however,  will  be  that  of  the  I-Thou 
form  must  be  formulated  differently  to  be  Dhilosonhically 
credible. 
The 
We  shall  proceed  as  patiently  as  possible  in  this 3o4 
chapter  to  apply  phenomenological  discipline  to  encounter 
experience. 
First,  we  should  review  our  criticism  of  Buber  as  a 
philosopher.  Buber's  conviction  that  intersubjective  encouthter 
provides  the  foundation  for  truth  about  man's  world  was 
quite  plain.  His  unwillingness  to  submit  that  phenomenon 
to  phenomenological  critique  was  also  quite  evident.  It 
left  the  truth  of  it  questionable  for  us;  specifically,  he 
was  reticent  to  utilize  any  methodological  form  of  reduction 
or  eroche  to  demonstrate  the  credibility  of  the  I-Thou  form. 
Perhaps,  he  should  not  be  criticized  for  failing  to  employ 
a  phenomenological  reduction  as  it  was  conceived  by  Husserl; 
if  he  was  acquainted  with  it,  he  surely  knew  that  it  led  to 
transcendentalism,  and  that  would  have  prevented  its  use. 
Buber  was  committed  to  characterize  concrete  experience. 
But  this  does  not  excuse  the  shortcoming;  intersubjective 
encounter,  apart  from  a  methodologically  informed  attack, 
remains  a  fascinating  but  vague  phenomenon. 
We  observed  in  our  study  of  Buber  a  more  personal 
reason  for  the  reaction  against  method;  the  fact  that 
transcendence  provided,  a  priori,  the  foundation  for  the 
I-Thou  form  of  encounter,  helped  explain  why  encounter  exper- 
ience  was  never  interrogated.  We  found  that  the  affirmation 
of  a  graceful  God  did  indeed  complicate  hi.  6,  desire  to  be  viewed 
as  a  philosopher.  He  assumed  that  a  methodologically  gov- 305 
erned  interrogation  would-somehow  distort  the  contribution 
he  sought  to  make.  He  chose  the  path  of  apologetics  and  of 
poetry,  and  we  believe  that  choice  affected  Iris  credibility 
as  an  otherwise  brilliant  phenomenologist. 
If  we  were  to  state  our  criticism  in  one  sentence 
it  would  be  that  Buber's  forms  failed  to  gain  credibility 
because  he  employed  no  method  to  preserve  the  critical 
function  so  essential  to  all  philosophical  inquiry.  If  one 
is  to  pursue  the  description  of  phenomenal  forms  as  a  phil- 
osopher,  method  and  discipline  are  essential. 
Heidegge,  r  teaches  important  lessons  in  this  regard. 
Heidegger  embraced  method.  As  a  methodologically  oriented 
thinker  Heidegger's  early  prominence  cannot  be  argued.  He 
proposed  to  use  the  phenomenological  reduction  in  a  (then) 
new  and  important  way;  Being  and  Time  began  with  the  argu- 
ment  that  phenomenological  method  could,  of  itself,  uncover 
the  truth  of  man's  condition.  The  phenomenological  reduc- 
tion  was  supposed  to  be  a  way  of  getting  at  the  question  of 
man's  true  being.  Our  study,  however,  uncovered  an  unusual 
and  questionable  management  of  method. 
Once  his  chosen  themes  were  introduced  the  function 
of  phenomenological  reduction  was  for  the  most  part,  for- 
gotten.  Our  criticism  is  that  he  was  not  sufficiently 
rigorous  in  his  use  of  the  er  oche.  We  demonstrated  this  by 
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Heidegger  had  no  answer.  He  never  questioned  his  selection 
of  phenomenological  themes;  bracketing  was  all  too  soon 
discarded  in  the  progress  of  his  system.  Specifically, 
once  alienation  and  other-directedness  are  introduced  by 
Heidegger,  he  settles  upon  them  as  the  only  relevant  themes 
for  phenomenology  and  ontology.  Building  his  system  solely 
upon  these  themes,  his  ontology  became  captive  to  individ- 
ualism.  We  did  not  contest  Heidegger's  insights  about 
alienation  or  otherdirectedness.  We  did  say,  however,  that 
his  phenomenology  progressively  lost  sight  of  the  use  of 
phenomenological  reduction;  method  gave  way  to  proclamation. 
Heidegger's  program,  when  evaluated  from  this  angle, 
is  curiously  enough,  akin  to  Buber's.  They  saw  different 
things  in  the  existential  sphere,  but  they  both  failed  to 
submit  their  themes  to  reduction.  Heidegger's  systematic 
narrowing  of  the  intersubjective  to  otherdirectedness,  and 
the  authentically  human  to  that  radical  of  individuality,  is 
strangely  like  to  Buber's  apologetics  when  the  issue  is 
that  of  employing  a  methodological  tool.  Both  Buber  and 
Heidegger  failed  to  compare  their  chosen  themes  with  others. 
Interrogation  which  would  show  the  significance  of  the  chosen 
themes  as  compared  to  others,  was  never  undertaken.  This  is 
a  shortcoming  which  teaches  and  important  lesson  about  phen- 
omenological  method--specifically  the  use  of  the  reduction. 
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of  Fauber  and  Heidegger,  is  a  relevant  corrective. 
Not  only  did  Merleau-Ponty  embrace  the  principle  of 
phenomenological  reduction,  he  employed  it  constantly  in 
his  descriptions  of  the  phenomenal  sphere.  His  antipathy 
towards  the  scientific  method  did  not  stand  in  the  way  of 
his  emphasizing  the  proximate  character  of  all  eidetic 
themes.  There  was  never  an  attempt  on  his  part  to  finalize 
or  formalize  the  forms  of  interhuman  relationships  in  the 
development  of  a  phenomenology.  On  the  contrary,  his  effort 
was  usually  directed  towards  opening  the  interpretive 
options  rather  than  investigating  one  theme.  For  example, 
when  the  question  is  the  type  of  humanism  he  espouses,  he 
remains  critical  of  both  the  Nietzschian  warrior  and  the 
Hegelian  man  of  destiny.  He  submits  a  different  observation; 
the  humanist  is  he  who  knows  of  interhuman  support  and  is 
willing  to  die  alone.  No  one  form  dominates.  Though  his 
method  is  discreetly  hidden,  it  does  bear  upon  his  unwilling- 
ness  to  decide  between  philosophical  extremes.  ""ethod  dic- 
tates  that  where  evidence  of  phenomenal  forms  exists,  they 
must  be  dealt  with  rather  than  excluded  from  phenomenological 
critique.  His  "hero"  is  a  fine  example  of  the  blending  of 
themes  and  the  proximate  nature  of  forms.  When  il':  erleau- 
Ponty  studies  the  relation  between  an  individual's  perceptual 
characteristics  and  his  environment,  he  finds  both  operative. 
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the  human  sphere  are  thoughtfully  analysed  and  compared. 
Secondly,  use  of  the  reduction  requires  comparisons  and 
contrasts  of  differing  modalities  in  its  effort  to  specify 
dominant  themes.  The  thinker  asks,  "why  this  theme  and  not 
another?  "  because  he  seeks  to  differentiate  levels  of 
importance.  In  so  doing  the  significance  of  one  theme  can 
be  demonstrated. 
We  emphasize  the  comparative  function  in  the  use  of 
phenomenological  reduction  not  so  much  as  a  guideline  for 
method,  but  as  its  essential  characteristic.  Reduction 
requires  comparison.  Without  comparative  critique  of  the 
various  modes  of  human  interaction,  it  makes  little  sense 
to  say  we  know  which  themes  are  phenomenologically  signi- 
ficant.  If  the  phenomenologist  proposes  to  demonstrate  a 
particular  view  about  experience  he  must  compare  it  to 
other  views  to  make  his  case  credible. 
This  comparative  function  is  especially  meaningful 
when  applied  to  the  development  of  intersubjective  themes. 
A  phenomenology  of  intersubjectivity  must  heed  this  norm  if 
it  is  to  gain  credibility.  Had  Ruber's  typology  been  worked 
out  in  relation  to  socio-cultural  factors  or  perceptual 
patterns,  to  name  only  two,  its  potential  for  credibility 
would  have  been  greatly  enhanced. 
The  work  of  Merleau-Ponty  again  stands  as  an  illus- 
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constrained  to  pin-point  one  form  and  exclude  another.  The 
essence  of  phenomenological  reduction  is  its  characteristic 
openness  to  evidence.  As  we  proceed  we  shall  see  why. 
The  exercise  of  blending  themes  is  not  indicative  of 
indecisive  thinking  or  an  effort  to  please  both  existential- 
ist  and  scientific  analyst;  it  is  an  expression  how  the 
phenomenological  reduction  disciplines  and  affects  descrip- 
tions  of  the  phenomenal  world.  The  one  sure  discipline  is 
that  phenomenological  reduction  necessitates  the  question  "why 
this  form  and  not  something  else".  The  reason  is  that  forms 
are  proximate;  because  they  arise  from  our  experience,  they 
are  never  final.  The  effect  should  be  a  critical  philosophy, 
instead  of  apologetics.  The  alternative  Merleau-Ponty  opens 
is  an  important  one  if  phenomenology  is  to  remain  within 
the  historic  guidelines  of  philosophy. 
Use  of  phenomenological  reduction  in  existential  analysis 
provides  a  specific  perspective  especially  useful  in  the  study 
of  intersubjectivity:  intersubjective  themes,  once  introduced 
through  use  of  the  epoche,  are  the  result  of  comparative  analysis. 
We  should  review  why  this  comes  to  be.  Lebens- 
welt  phenomenology  is  clear  in  its  affirmation  of  the 
"presence  of  the  world";  because  of  this  it  must  remain 
attentive  to  the  diversities  of  human  experience.  The 
affirmation  that  experience  is  the  proper  subject  for  inter- 
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the  human  sphere  are  thoughtfully  analysed  and  compared. 
Secondly,  use  of  the  reduction  requires  comparisons  and 
contrasts  of  differing  modalities  in  its  effort  to  specify 
dominant  themes.  The  thinker  asks,  "why  this  theme  and  not 
another?  "  because  he  seeks  to  differentiate  levels  of 
importance.  In  so  doing  the  significance  of  one  theme  can 
be  demonstrated. 
We  emphasize  the  comparative  function  in  the  use  of 
phenomenological  reduction  not  so  much  as  a  guideline  for 
method,  but  as  its  essential  characteristic.  Reduction 
requires  comparison.  Without  comparative  critique  of  the 
various  modes  of  human  interaction,  it  makes  little  sense 
to  say  we  know  which  themes  are  phenomenologically  signi- 
ficant.  If  the  phenomenologist  proposes  to  demonstrate  a 
particular  view  about  experience  he  must  compare  it  to 
other  views  to  make  his  case  credible. 
This  comparative  function  is  especially  meaningful 
when  applied  to  the  development  of  intersubjective  themes. 
A  phenomenology  of  intersubjectivity  must  heed  this  norm  if 
it  is  to  gain  credibility.  Had  Ruber's  typoloFy  been  worked 
out  in  relation  to  socio-cultural  factors  or  perceptual 
patterns,  to  name  only  two,  its  potential  for  credibility 
would  have  been  greatly  enhanced. 
The  work  of  Merleau-Ponty  again  stands  as  an  illus- 
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forms  counselled,  he  actually  undertook  comparative  analysis 
to  arrive  at  the  dominant  themes  in  his  phenomenology. 
What  emerged  from  his  study  was  the  point  Buber  had  sought 
to  establish;  encounter  is  the  ground  upon  which  interpre- 
tations  of  human  exchange  are  constructed.  Philosophical 
truth  claims  do  not  arise  by  confining  analysis  to  what  we 
know  hbout  another.  Quite  the  contrary,  he  says,  what  we 
know  about  an  other  is  developed  from  forms  of  encounter. 
This  important  conclusion  could  not  have  been  reached  had 
different  forms  of  man's  relation  to  the  world  been  disre- 
garded.  The  problem  of  focusing  upon  the  significance  of 
encounter  modalities  depended  upon  the  phenomenologist's 
ablility  to  deal  with  them  in  relation  to  the  traditional 
assumption  that  "knowledge  about"  was  the  prime  source  for 
estimating  worth  and  importance.  Through  comparative 
description  Merleau-Ponty  argued  effectively  for  the  primacy 
of  encounter  modes.  The  inadequacies  of  the  opposition,  I 
suggest,  could  never  have  been  made  apparent  if  he  had  failed 
to  compare  and  contrast  the  encounter  forms  with  the  ration- 
alist  and  behaviorist  alternatives.  The  method  of  reduc- 
tion  functioned  mightily  in  this  endeavor. 
The  epoche  also  functions  to  produce  another  result. 
:::  erleau-Ponty  made  a  valuable  suggestion  when  he 
said  that  phenomenological  reduction  is  a  "loosening  of 
the  threads"  which  bind  us  to  our  world.  Proper  conduct  of 311 
the  epoch?  is  one  way  of  developing  an  alternative  concept 
of  objectivity;  phenomenological  reduction  is  the  key.  The 
reduction  constrains  the  thinker  from  simply  affirming 
a  particular  view  of  encounter  or  the  lived-world.  For 
instance,  if  Buber's  forms  are,  indeed,  relevant  for  a 
phenomenology,  they  will  be  so  because  evidence  is  developed 
in  their  favor.  The  proximate  nature  of  the  forms  need 
not  be  a  deficit;  on  the  contrary,  the  evidence  which  is 
gathered  and  compared  gives  the  thinker  access  to  viable 
judgments  about  them.  Judgments  are  possible  because  there 
is  no  effort  to,  obtain  a  completely  detached  version  of 
experience.  The  phenomenologist  seeks  judgments  which 
admit  to  the  factor  of  subjective  involvement;  they  are 
proximate  and  they  rely  on  the  force  of  evidence.  "loos- 
ening"  is  the  by-word,  not  a  complete  separation  of  the 
reflective  process  from  lived-experiences. 
The  drive  for  a  pure  objectivity  is  put  away  in 
Lebenswelt  phenomenology.  The  contingency  of  experiential 
forms  is  implied  in  the  very  notion  of  diversity  already 
cited;  it  is  also  indicated  because  the  thinker  acbiowledaos 
his  own  ties  with  the  world.  The  reduction  attempts  to 
bring  this  involvement  under  scrutiny  but  does  not  pretend 
to  obliterate  it.  The  sensitive  use  of  the  reduction  does 
away  with  the  notion  of  absolute  truth(s).  This  balance 
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especially  important  for  our  study.  By  respecting  this  bal- 
ance  the  thinker  may  gain  a  more  accurate  description  of  the 
subject-world  relation.  It  is  vital  he  recognizes  that  he 
is  part  of  that  relation. 
In  sum,  phenomenological  reduction  is  a  microcosm 
of  phenomenological  method.  It  is  the  critique-oriented 
side  of  the  discipline,  and  it  shows  the  stance  of  the 
discipline  towards  its  own  theorizing  activity. 
We  have  not  exhausted  the  question  of  the  conduct 
of  phenomenological  reduction;  it  will  come  up  again  as 
we  discuss  the  second  phase  of  phenomenological  method, 
eidetic  intuition,  or  eidetic  reduction. 
We  saw  in  our  survey  of  Husserl  that  it  is  necessary 
to  follow  his  reductions  only  where  they  acknowledged  a 
primal  relation  between  subject  and  world.  Use  of  phen- 
omenological  method  does  not  lead  to  transcendentalism; 
it  leads  elsewhere.  Faithful  use  of  the  eidetic  reduction 
redirects  the  thinker's  efforts  to  question  the  subject- 
world  relation.  As  part  of  this,  we  also  saw  that  the 
eidetic  reduction  leads  the  phenomenologist  to  develop  a 
phenomenology  of  intersubjectivity. 
Merleau-Ponty  demonstrated  the  former  point,  though 
he  did  not  make  plain  its  mechanics.  We  attempted  to  do 
that  in  our  analysis  of  Husserl.  The  mechanics  are  simply 
that  one  cannot  separate  the  I  from  self-consciousness  or 313 
from  his  world  of  experience;  to  attempt 
to  reintroduce  evidence  which  comes  from 
nexus.  Phenomenological  discipline  when 
sibly  is  eo  ipso  "existential  phenomenol, 
ably  bound  to  the  subject-world  relation 
survival. 
that  maneuver  is 
the  lived-world 
practiced  respon- 
Dgy".  It  is  incur- 
for  its  continued 
A  more  specific  focus  was  found  in  the  application 
of  method;  the  predominant  form  emerging  from  a  study  of 
the  Lebenswelt  was  the  intersubjective  theme.  We  followed 
Merleau-Ponty's  patient  effort  to  show  how  social  and 
interpersonal  forms  continually  emerge  in  the  most  intell- 
ectual  of  maneuvers.  Merleau-Ponty's  position  was  argued 
effectively  in  "The  Child's  Relation  to  Others"  .  That 
argument  not  only  precludes  a  transcendentalism;  it  suggests 
the  predominance  of  the  intersubjective  form  in  the  subject- 
world  relation.  Mothod  was  instrumental  in  bringing  such  a 
focus.  That  focus  came  because  the  forms  of  interpersonal 
living  were  continually  found  in  modes  of  intellection  and 
perception.  They  emerged  as  being  operative  in  the  most 
abstract  forms  of  perception.  The  interpersonal  ai:  nply 
could  not  be  disregarded  in  a  phenomenology  of  perception. 
Significant  for  the  philosopher,  concentration  upon  the 
intersubjective  sphere  was  not  chosen  through  personal 
preference;  it  was  highlighted  because  the  method  presented 
such  forms.  Eidetic  reduction  brings  the  intersubjective 314 
to  light. 
If  we  ask,  as  we  have  sought  throughout,  how  phen- 
omenology  poses  the  issue  of  transcendence,  a  third  impor- 
tant  function  of  eidetic  method  is  found. 
Merleau-Ponty's  procedure  in  developing  eidetic 
forms,  contrary  to  Buber,  precludes  the  right  to  use  a 
particular  concept  of  transcendence  as  a  presupposition. 
This  is  germane  to  our  issue:  ideational  structures  are 
abstractions  of  experience,  they  are  ggthered  and  built 
in  response  to  experience  and  this  means  that  the  phenomen- 
ologist  can  never  presume  a  factor  which  a  priori,  serves 
to  explain  that  experience. 
This  restriction  applies  only,  however,  when  a  par- 
ticular  concept  of  transcendence  is  used  as  a  presupposition. 
There  is  a  sense  in  which  Lebenswelt  phenomenology  employs  a 
general  concept  of  transcendence  in  its  investigations. 
The  concept  of  the  lived-world  contains  a  notion  of  tran- 
scendence;  it  is  that  man  confronts  a  world  which  is  "al- 
ready  there".  The  lived-world  concept  pertains  to  the  con- 
frontation  of  man  with  transcendence 
,  with  things  and 
other  people.  But  this  notion  cannot  be  understood  as 
falling  under  the  afore-mentioned  restriction.  Lebenswelt 
is  not  a  particular  concept  of  transcendence  concerning 
God  or  Being;  it  is  not  a  presupposition  which  explains 
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Whereas  specific  presuppositions  about  the  nature  of 
transcendence  are  not  permitted,  the  objective  of  eidetic 
research  is  to  develop  concepts  which  clarify  the  exper- 
ience  of  confrontation.  This  is  how  our  question  can  be 
answered;  eidetic  research  does  not  exclude  themes  of 
transcendence  if  such  are  developed  within  the  context 
of  phenomenological  reduction.  That  is,  the  discipline 
presses  to  develop  ideational  forms  concerning  the  subject- 
world  relation  and  does  not  exclude  concepts  of  transcendence 
unless  they  are  presuppositional.  To  exclude  concepts  of 
transcendence  which  emerge  in  research  would  be  as  one- 
sided  as  would  employing  them  as  presuppositions.  Develop- 
ment  of  concepts  which  bear  upon  the  issue  of  transcendence 
is  a  specialty  in  eidetic  research. 
Merleau-Ponty  understood  that  intersubjective  ex- 
change  was  a  primary  resource  in  this  constructive  endeavor. 
He  understood  that  a  phenomenology  which  was  shaped  in 
large  degree  by  the  intersubjective  sphere,  would  have 
ontological  levels  of  tonte-tualization.  Eidetic  formula- 
tion  does  not  evRde  the  issue  of  transcendence;  its  drive 
to  bring  the  world  to  light  necessitates  coming  to  grips 
with  the  questions  of  universal  meaning.  The  Lebenswelt 
phenomenologist,  though  wary  of  "high  altitude  thinking", 
is  nevertheless  brought  face  to  face  with  the  question  of 
Being.  For  Merleau-Ponty  interhuman  networks  of  experience 316 
open  the  question  of.  Being. 
+  +  + 
If  these  observations  on  phenomenological  reduction 
and  the  eidetic  function  are  pressed  further  and  brought 
into  conversation  with  other  methods,  the  question  of  the 
conduct  of  reason,  arises.  The  method  we  have  outlined,  is 
not  itself,  beyond  criticism.  What  are  its  strengths,  and 
weaknesses?  How  does  this  method  contribute  to  philosoph- 
ical  debates  about  perception  and  experience? 
Mary  Warnock's  book  Existentialism  makes  a  strong 
case  for  being  skeptical  about  Lebenswelt  phenomenology 
and  its  conception  of  reason. 
1  Hers,  as  Hepburns,  is  a 
thoughtful  interpretation  of  the  contributions  of  Kierke- 
gaard,  Husserl,  Heidegger,  Merleau-Ponty  and  especially 
Sartre;  in  the  following  quotation  we  can  see  her  apprecia- 
tion  for  them  and  the  seed  of  her  criticism. 
There  is  an  inescapable  fact  about  the  world,  which  is 
that  Beings-for-themselves  are  separate  from  the  rest 
of  the  world;  and  part  of  what  they  understand,  in 
understanding  the  gap  between  themselves  and  the 
things  around  them  is  that  the  world  is  not  wholly 
manageable,  and  might  in  the  end  turn  and  submerge 
them. 
This  is  the  truth  which  Sartre  seeks  to  expose  by 
the  Concrete  Imagination.  No  account  of  Existentialism 
IVide.,  Warnock,  Mary,  Existentialism,  London,  Oxford 
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which  failed  to  emphasize  this  imaginative  and  descrip- 
tive  aspect  'could  possibly  be  complete.  ... 
This  may  have  been  the  strength  of  the  Existentialist 
movement,  which  has  sometimes  seemed  a  desirable  refuge 
from  the  aridities  of  other  philosophy.  But  it  has,  I 
believe,  also  been  its  dovmfall.  There  is  no  real 
possibilility  of  argument  with  the  deliverances  of  the 
concrete  imagination. 
Though  her  criticism  points  to  Sartre,  her  case 
against  "concrete  imagination"  is  also  directed  to  the 
phenomenologists  we  have  surveyed.  Their  concentration  on 
intuition  and  existential  insight  forces  their  work  into 
the  category  of  oracularism;  no  real  debate  can  take  place, 
she  believes,  because  the  tools  for  investigation  find 
their  home  in  subjective  imagination,  and  not  reason.  The 
drive  to  develop  concepts  which  portray  the  "ultimate 
meaning  of  existence"  is  not  an  appropriate  task  for 
philosophers.  2 
She  does  not  elaborate  in  this  short  essay  what  the 
appropriate  task  of  philosophy  is,  but  her  criticism  does 
not  necessarily  depend  on  having  an  alternative.  It  con- 
cerns  the  method  of  phenomenology;  is  she  correct  in  speci- 
fying  imagination  as  its  singular  characteristic?  If  not, 
is  the  method  we  have  described  truly  capable  of  aiding 
philosophical  debate. 
1Ibid.,  p.  139. 
2lbid., 
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As  to  the  first  issues  it  is  not  simply  insight 
or  intuitional  sensitivity  that  led  Merleau-Ponty  to  the 
eidetic  formulations  outlined  in  our  research.  Intention- 
ality,  for  example,  was  not  regarded  as  a  self-evident 
truth  of  experience;  it  was  regarded  as  a  thesis  which 
called  for  the  gathering  of  evidence.  In  other  words,  it 
had  to  be  argued  and  demonstrated. 
Phenomenological  reduction  was  also  employed  in  his 
investigations  to  guard  against  criticism  such  as  Warnock'sa 
Without  compromising  the  Lebenswelt  thesis,  Merleau-Ponty 
sought  to  demonstrate  it  through  the  use  of  the 
_epoche. 
His  case  may  be  weak  as  Warnock  argues  quite  well,  but  he 
is  not  a  candidate  for  her  major  ctiticism.  There  are  no 
"oracular"  affirmations  which  remain  immune  from  the  disci- 
pline  of  reduction. 
Another  factor,  already  mentioned,  is  that  Merleau- 
Ponty  contests  the  various  philosophical  theories  of  per- 
ception  and  not  necessarily  the  data  they  utilize.  Ad- 
mittedly,  he  is  convinced  that  evidence  is  gained  from  the 
pre-reflective,  but  he  argues  particularly  with  those  who 
theorize  about  experience  and  this  marks  his  thoery,  it 
seems  to  me,  as  being  within  the  traditional  arena  of  phil- 
osophical  debate.  He  claims  no  unique  access  to  the  truth 
of  experience;  he  seeks  rather,  to  demonstrate  that  his 
interpretation  is  more  adequate  than  others.  The  idea 319 
that  experience  dictates  a  theory  of  contingent  "knowledge 
about"  illustrates  this  well.  His  is  no  first  philosophy 
as  Husserl's  sought  to  be;  r'Ierleau-Ponty  is  at  least  one 
"existentialist"  whose  method  constrains  promulgation  of 
concepts  about  the  ultimate  meaning  of  existence. 
These  two  points  are  preliminary,  however,  to 
answering  the  question  of  the  method's  adequacy  in  forwarding 
philosophical  debate.  I  have  no  final  answers  bu.  t  mould 
offer  observations. 
If  one's  philosophical  concern  is  to  develop  themes 
about  intersubjectivity,  phenomenological  method  has  certain 
advantages.  Where  method  leads  to  a  concentration  upon 
intersubjectivity,  it  can  be  looked  upon  as  a  discipline 
which  gives  direction  to  study  and  debate.  This  was  seen 
by  every  phenomenologist  studied,  even  by  Husserl  who 
realized  the  intersubjective  question  was  a  key  one.  Method 
does,  indeed,  lead  to  concern  for  concepts  about  intersub- 
jective  experience.  Method,  in  this  instance,  specified 
a  key  issue  for  investigation;  it  was  more  than  a  general 
discipline  for  thinking. 
If  the  inclination  of  the  philosopher  ion  broadly 
speaking  "existential",  phenomenological  method  is  an  indis- 
pensable  tool  for  acquiring  critical  perspective.  It  con- 
strains  the  thinker  from  simply  affirming  truths  about 
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granted;  phenomenological  method  forces  the  distinction 
between  encounter  experience  and  theoretical  knowledge. 
Its  objective  is  to  draw  an  adequate  relation  between  the 
world  we  know  by  encounter  and  the  theories  we  have  about 
it.  This  is  a  traditional  venture  in  philosophy,  and  should 
be  obvious  in  light  of  Merleau-Ponty's  studies  of  perception. 
What  makes  phenomenological  method  particularly 
helpful  in  debate  is  that  it  argues  against  the  separation 
of  the  physical  and  rational  in  human  activity.  Warnock 
cites  the  rejection  of  the  Cartesian  typology  as  a  major 
contribution  of  existential  thought.  We  would  go  further. 
The  constructive  or  eidetic  aspect  of  phenomenology  is  not 
there  by  chance.  Ifý'man  should  not  be  dealt  with  as 
a  dualistic  entity,  a  constructive  role  becomes  necessary. 
Particularly,  it  is  incumbent  upon  those  who  recognize  the 
failures  of  Cartesian  theory  to  weave  concepts  which  do 
justice  to  a  holistic  conception  of  man.  I11erleau-Ponty's 
concept  of  intentionality  is  a  serious  alternative  in  the 
attempt  to  overcome  the  deficiencies  of  Descartes'  theory. 
Phenomenological  method,  I  suggest,  is  right  in 
risking  itself  with  constructive  theories  about  the  subject- 
world  relation.  To  remain  inactive,  convinced  that 
theory  is  broken,  is  to  fail  in  genuine  philosophical 
debate.  If  Descartes'  typology  falls  short,  is  it  not 
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Merleau-Ponty  attempts  to  meet  the  challenge;  for  that  he 
cannot  be  judged  as  insensitive  to  philosophical  debate. 
In  one  sense,  Warnock's  criticism  about  phenomenology's 
anti-scientific  bias  should  be  appreciated.  1  We  argued  it 
was  a  shortcoming  when  Merleau-Ponty  insisted  his  method  was 
anti-scientific.  His  claim  to  be  anti-scientific  is  a  bit 
hollow;  he  strived  to  develop  concepts  while  utilizing  and 
integrating  clinical-experimental  data.  To  say  he  is  anti- 
scientific  given  such  a  condition,  is  to  court  popular 
opinion. 
His  real  argument  with  science  is  directed  towards 
absolutistic  doctrines  and  not  to  what  is  generally  called 
scientific  method.  He  seldom  argues  with  the  data  emplyed  in 
idealism  or  behaviorism;  his  critique  concerns  their  assump- 
tions  and  conclusions.  This  is  where  he  is  right,  it  seems 
to  me,  to  espouse  an  "anti-scientific"  bias.  Idealism's 
failure  is  the  assumption  that  man  generates  ideas  without 
benefit  of  experience.  Behaviorism  sees  man  as  totally 
governed  by  physical  stimulii.  Neither  view  provides  room 
for  each  other.  If  these  views  are  given  the  aura  of  being 
scientific,  then  an  anti-scientific  bias  is  commendable. 
But  that  is  a  poor  description  of  the  issue.  Phen- 
omenological  method  is  a  valuable  contribution  because  it 
looks  to  both  sides  of  the  debate  to'  gain  its  own  per- 
spectives.  It  sees  the  rational  and  the  environmental 
11bid.,  Chapter  7.,  pp.  131  ff. 322 
aspects  of  the  subject-world  relation  as  being  important 
aspects  in  a  holistic  conception. 
It  is  also  a  valuable  contribution  because 
method  dictates  continual  attentiveness  to  the  diversities 
of  experience  and  to  the  drive  for  conceptual  coherence.  In 
terms  of  our  problem  area  this  seems  entirely  appropriate. 
Human  relationships  provide  a  'staggering  range  of  diversity 
for  philosophical  investigation.  If  one  sees  the  inter- 
human  as  a  source  of  philosophical  problems,  then  attentive- 
ness  to  diversity  is  essential. 
This  need  not  cancel  the  drive  for  unitary  structures. 
Phenomenological  method  is  a  press  in  this  direction;  it 
seeks  to  integrate  diverse  fields  of  experience.  If  themes 
are  seen  as  proximate  and  diversity  is  attended  to,  there  is 
no  reason  why  unitary  themes  should  be  excluded.  The  drive 
for  conceptual  coherence,  when  properly  disciplined  is  the 
philosopher's  specialty.  In  phenomenological  method  the 
constructive  function  is  given  ample  room  for  expression; 
ontological  reflections  are  permitted  to  compliment  a  cred- 
ible  phenomenology. 
This  is  one  reason  we  chose  to  look  at  Buber  from  a 
phenomenological  perspective.  What  he  tried  to  do  was 
frustrated  by  absence  of  method;  we  have  suggested  that  presence 
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lation. 
Stated  methodologically,  the  value  of  phenomenolog- 
ical  research  is  found  in  the  tension  between  the  e  poche 
and  eidetic  formulation.  This  has  been  implicit  in  the  above 
observations.  The  suspension  of  judgment  about  theories 
of  experience  in  order  to  see  encounters  more  clearly  always 
stands  in  tension  with  the  drive  to  develop  new  conceptual 
structures.  Bracketing  balances  the  constructive  effort, 
and  the  constructive  effort  deepens  the  critical  function. 
If  phenomenological  method  is  seen  this  way,  then  phenomen- 
ology  carries  on  its  own  internal  debate.  It  is  a  debate 
between  the  critical  and  constructive  sides  of  philosophy; 
it  gives  expression  to  two  necessary  functions.  in  philosophy. 
As  an  internal  debate  it  nurtures  methodological  refinement 
and  maturity,  and  as  a  specific  method  it  aids  the  debate 
in  other  fields  of  philosophy. 
We  have  taken  time  to  state  some  specific  advantages 
of  the  phenomenological  method  in  developing  concepts  of 
intersubjective  experience;  though  no  final  specification 
of  what  those  themes  are  has  yet  been  dealt  with,  a  found- 
ation  has  been  laid.  Phenomenological  method,  attentively 
applied,  cancels  -the  assumn-tion  that  apologetics  will  yield 
a  credible  phenomenoloSy.  It  also  teaches  that  transcenden- 
talism  is  neither  necessary  nor  warranted  in  the  development 
of  themes.  Lastly,  it  suggests  that  the  constructive  func- 324 
tion  in  philosophy  be  taken  in  hand  as  a  disciplined  and 
appropriate  task. 
If  we  are  ever  to  get  beyond  the  "aridities  of  other 
philosophy"  without  falling  prey  to  the  temptations  of 
oracularism,  it  will  be  because  a  method  has  disciplined. 
and  guided  us.  Phenomenological  method  used  as  a  critical 
taskmaster  and  initiator  of  unitary  themes  can  help  us 
pursue  the  intricasies  of  lived-world  encounter  and  remain 
credible  as  conceptualizers. 
In  our  last  chapter  we  shall  attempt  to  demonstrate 
this  with  reference  to  our  specific  topic. CHAPTER  II 
A  PHENOMENOLOGY  OF  THE  INTERHUMANs 
ITS  BEARING  ON  THE  ISSUE  OF  TRANSCENDENCE 
If  method  is  not  only  advisable  but  necessary  for 
phenomenology,  its  most  important  function  is  its  appli- 
cation  to  the  constructive  effort  in  research.  Our  study 
asks  if  and  how  a  phenomenology  of  intersubjectivity  opens 
the  issue  of  transcendence.  We  are  now  ready  to  utilize 
the  preceeding  research  in  attacking  the  question  directly. 
In  so  doing,  we  undertake  a  constructive  effort. 
We  readily  admit  that  our  research  question  was  not  dealt 
with  systematically  by  PMerleau-Ponty.  But  the  research  did 
demonstrate  that  his  efforts  in  phenomenology  and  ontology 
do  affect  the  issue.  That  in  itself  is  an  important  contri- 
bution  worthy  of  consideration  for  constructive  attempts. 
Suggestive  and  viable  alternatives  have  been  submitted  in 
P.,:  erleau-Ponty's  work  on  the  question  we  raised. 
To  some  extent  we  shall  have  to  tailor  what  Merleau- 
Fonty  said,  to  our  stated  issue.  As  we  said  before,  this  will 
add  to  his  observations,  but  will  not  stray  from  his  inten- 
tions  or  conceptualizations.  We  intend  to  use  his  method 
and  formulations  in  discussing  our  specific  issue.  To 
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Martin  Buber. 
His  major  contribution  was  to  conceptualize  an  area 
of  experience  between  persons  that  had  been  left  in  the 
background  of  philosophical  inquiry.  He  asserted  that  the 
description  of  interpersonal  meetings  could  not  be  confined 
to  psychological  explanations  or  behavioral  actions.  Phil- 
osophical  inquiry  had,  in  his  mind,  consistantly  attempted 
to  reduce  interpersonal  exchange  to  subjective  dimensions  or 
objectivistic  (behavioral)  interpretations.  In  this  crit- 
icism  we  agreed. 
We  accepted  his  intention  to  construct  a  concept- 
ualization  of  exchange  which  encouraged  phenomenological 
interpretation,  one  which  preserved  its  unique  character- 
istics  and  forced  subsequent  inquiry  to  recognize  its  central 
importance.  This  would  call  for  a  new  form  of  discourse 
and  a  redirection  for  theological  observations.  Again,  we 
appreciated  his  objectives. 
In  the  execution  of  his  task,  questions  arose.  Gen- 
erally  speaking,  he  was  reluctant  to  relate  the  notion  of. 
encounter  to  any  theory  of  knowledge  about  others.  Spec- 
ifically,  he  was  unwilling  to  interpret  encounters  as  per- 
ceptual  experiences;  he  left  himself  swide  open  to  the  indict- 
ment  of  mysticism,  or  prophetism,  because  he  would  not  explain 
the  connection  between  knowledge  about  and  knowing  as 
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between  pre-reflective  experience  and  the  reflective  process, 
between  direct  awareness  and  ratiocination,  but  he  gave  us 
no  way  of  explaining  the  difference.  So  we  were  left  in  a 
quandry  with  Buber.  How  could  his  insights  about  intersub- 
jective  meeting  be  retained  while  at  the  same  time  relating 
them  to  a  theory  of  perception?  If  his-objective  is  to  be 
respected,  we  must  attempt  a  description  of  the  interhuman 
that  affectively  relates  to  forms  of  perception. 
More  serious,  however,  was  Buber's  failure  to  expli- 
cate  the  relation  between  intersubjective  encounters  and 
the  acknowledgment  of  transcendence.  Double-think  was  not 
intended,  but  became  evident  despite  his  efforts.  We  con- 
cluded  that  the  acknowledgement  of  transcendence  was  a  prior 
requirement  for  understanding  the  I-Thou  form,  as  well  as 
being  an  affirmation  which  emerged  from  one's  understanding 
of  I-Thou  meeting.  Though  Buber  saw  no  conflict  in  this 
twofold  structure,  I  did.  One  cannot  claim  to  be  a  phil- 
osopher  and  utilize  a  theological  presupposition  unless  he 
is  willing  to  justify  that  theological  claim  on  philosophical 
grounds.  Because  Buber  did  not  attempt  a  phenomenological 
argument  for  his  typology,  and  because  he  utilized  a  theo- 
logical  presupposition,  we  became  progressively  suspicious 
that  his  theology  was  the  determing  factor  in  shaping  the 
character  of  the  I-Thou  phenomenology.  This  relation  between 
theology  and  phenomenology  must  be  revised  if  we  seek  a 328 
philosophically  credible  account  of  the  interhuman. 
Merleau-Ponty's  early  phenomenological  research  bears 
on  the  first  problem  we  had  with  Buber. 
The  first  point  is  that  Nerleau-Ponty  chose  to  interro- 
gate  perceptual  forms.  In  doing  this,  he  made  it  abundantly 
clear  that  perception  would  not  be  dealt  with  in  tradtional 
terms.  He  set  out  to  describe  it  without  yielding  to  the 
Cartesian  postion  on  a  priori  thought  forms;  he  also  asserted 
that  behavioristic  interpretations  failed  to  do  justice  to 
the  perceptual  event.  The  purpose  in  objecting  to  classical 
theories  was  to  retain  an  interpretative  option  which  accounted 
for  the  fullness  of  perceptual  interaction.  Most  important 
and  germane  to  our  issue,  the  "fullness"  of  the  perceptual 
event  has  at  its  center,  an  encounter  mode.  1  Merleau-Ponty 
termed  it  pre-reflective  experience.  How  does  this  position 
bear  on  the  issue  of  developing  a  phenomenology  which 
respects  Buber's  insights  and  yet  relates  the  interpersonal 
as  a  perceptual  experience.  First,  we  shall  state  the  gen- 
eral  importance  of  Merleau-Ponty's  alternative;  next,  we 
shall  use  his  concepts  of  project  or  intentionality,  vortex, 
and  intercorporeality,  to  construct  a  more  credible  theory 
about  the  I-Thou  event. 
The  fundamental  importance  of  perception  as  pre-re- 
l  We  are  not  now  indentifying  Buber'  s  conception  of 
encounter  with  Merleau-Ponty's  term  "pre-reflective".  But 
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flective  encounter  lies  in  the  new  relation  Merleau-Ponty 
shaped  between  "knowing"  and  "knowledge  about".  The  con- 
cept  of  "knowing"  captures  the  point  he  sought  to  make 
against  the  classical  theories.  Hearing,  touching,  and 
especially  seeing,  are  not  just  data-producing  functions 
which  tell  us  something  about  the  objects  of  our  perception. 
They  are  much  more  than  vehicles  for  perception;  they  are 
our  modes  of  encountering  and  dealing  with  the  world.  The 
term  lived-world  or  Lebenswelt  keynotes  this.  The  subject- 
world  relation  is  a  network  of  encounters;  the  world  is  not 
just  "out  there";  we  are  intimately  involved  in  and  related 
to  it.  Objects  and  persons  are  perceived  in  terms  of  our 
position  or  condition.  That  "position"  is  inevitably  social. 
We  perceive  according  to  our  personal  and  interpersonal 
fields  of  experience.  Merleau-Ponty  strives  to  demonstrate 
that  we  cannot  construct  "clean"  concepts  of  subject  and 
object'  the  point  is  that  perceptual  activity  is  best 
interpreted  as  a  network  of  exchange.  The  communal  and 
"knowing"  aspects  of  experience  are  the  foundations  for 
his  work. 
In  addition  to  this,  as  its  compliment,  Merleau- 
Ponty  develops  a  concept  of  perception  which  gives  a  new 
interpretation  to  "knowledge  about".  If  knowing  is  the 
primary  mode  of  perception,  knowledge  about  must  be  class- 
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positions,  this  is  a  radical  alternative,  and  it  affects 
our  issue.  His  point  is  certainly  arguable;  we  will  argue 
henceforth  that  the  rational  dimension,  i.  e.  a  concept- 
ualization  of  encounter,  must  grow  out  of  a  recognition  of 
its  "birth  place",  exchange. 
' 
As  we  have  said  consistantly,  the  derivative  nature 
of  knowledge  about  implies  that  it  is  also  proximate, 
never  independent  or  complete.  In  phenomenological  terms 
the  implication  is  clear;  eidetic  forms  are  never  seen  as 
unchangeable;  concepts  are  always  open  to  the  phenomenolog- 
ical  reduction  and  to  additional  inquiry.  This  means  that 
our  application  of  Merleau-Ponty's  work  is  admittedly  open 
to  other  interpretations.  We  accept  this  as  a  discipline 
and  will  attempt  to  remain  sensitive  to  other  options.  We 
turn  to  its  specific  importance. 
Merleau-Ponty's  alternative  offers  a  new  approach 
to  Buber's  typology  and  Hepburn's  criticisms.  These 
following  concepts  are  Merleau-Ponty's  "argument"  for  his 
position;  they  are  particularly  appropriate  in  specifying 
the  meaning  of  interpersonal  exchange. 
The  "project"  character  of  perception  was  cast  as 
an  individual's  total  involvement  in  the  object  of  his  con- 
'We 
shall  not  attempt  discussion  of  the  function  of  knowledge  about  for  other  areas  of  inquiry,  even  though 
Merleau-Ponty's  position  could  mean  much  for  ethics  and 
aesthetics.  We  shall  restrict  ourselves  to  intersubjective 
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cern.  It  seems  to  me  that  this  concept  has  special  rele- 
vance  with  regard  to  intersubjective  exchange. 
There  is  no  reason  to  restrict  the  notion  of  project 
to  an  individual  mode  of  perception.  Merleau-Ponty  would 
agree  with  the  observation  that  individual  projects  which 
involve  other  people  become  "projects  of  relationship". 
That  is,  exchanges  between  persons  form  a  set  of  rela- 
tional  projects.  An  individual  retains  his  or  her  personal 
modes  of  dealing  with  the  world,  but  he  also  participates 
in  relationships  which  have  interpersonal  objectives 
or  modes  of  dealing  with  the  world.  1  There  is,  thus, 
a  sense  in  which  the  concept  of  project  is  an  intersub- 
jective  concept.  That  aspect  is  of  special  interest. 
The  notion  of  project  calls  for  a  holistic  inter- 
pretation  of  relationships;  we  shall  elaborate. 
First,  the  project  character  of  a  relationship 
indicates  that  interaction  shapes  whatever  concepts  (or 
decisions)  one  party  makes  about  the  other.  One  is 
involved  with  the  other  prior  to  estimating  the  worth 
of  the  other,  or  the  relationship.  This  is  not  to  be 
construed  as  a  time  priority  but  as  a  priority  of  import- 
ance.  If  we  take  this  priority  seriously,  it  means  that 
'We 
refer  here  to  a  "we"  form  of  interacting  with 
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we  describe  a  relationship  in  terms  of  its  personal, 
behavioral,  and  environmental  peculiarities  and  growth. 
We  cannot  view  it  as  being  confined  to  mental  decisions 
made  by  the  participants.  The  way  a  relationship  grows  and 
is  nourished  is  of  special  concern  whether  that  requires 
concentration  upon  physical  expressions,  or  recognition 
of  social  influences.  The  notion  of  project  requires 
that  an  interpreter  look  first  at  all  kinds  of  interaction 
which  constitute  it  as  a  "unique"  relationship. 
Once  this  is  corrected,  however,  the  behaviorist 
option  is  no  more  credible.  An  interpersonal  environ- 
ment  includes  personal  decision-making.  Project  description 
is  well  advised  to  focus  upon  the  inclinations,  intentions 
and  decisions  of  the  participants,  though  it  is  certainly 
not  confined  to  these  things.  Project  modes  are  conscious 
modes,  although  not  always  self-conscious.  This  position 
on  conscious  interaction  means  that  relationships  should 
be  described  in  terms  of  their  mental  dimensions  if  we 
do  not  attempt  to  make  these  aspects  all-inclusive. 
The  reational-  emotional  aspects  of  an  interchange  are 
important  indicators  aiding  philosophical  analysis  or 
description. 
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are  seen  operating  together  as  they  should  be,  we  gain  a 
different  approach  to  philosophical  evaluation.  A  rela- 
tionship  has  its  own  unique  forms;  one  relationship  is  not 
the  same  as  another.  We  can  never  make  complete  general- 
izations  by  collecting  data,  e.  g.  about  father-son  inter- 
actions  mother-daughter  relations,  etc.  A  relation  has 
its  own  specific  environment.  In  this  sense  every  rela- 
tionship  is  unique;  that  much  is  evident  if  we  properly 
utilize  the  concept  of  project. 
But  if  a  relation  is  to  be  seen  as  unique,  it  is  also 
to  be  seen  as  being  open  to  many  forces  which  make  up  an 
environment.  The  intentions  of  persons  in  exchange  are 
never  explainable  in  individualistic  or  even  interpersonal 
terms.  They  are  related  to  social,  physical,  and  intellect- 
ual  environments.  In  other  words,  the  project  nature  of 
interaction  indicates  that  relationships  cannot  be  isolated 
from  that  which  goes  on  about  them;  they  are  social  and  thoy 
relate  to  a  broader  sociality,  a  cultural  milieu. 
If  these  aspects  seem  unimportant  philosonhica11y, 
we  have  missed  the  point  of  the  phenomenological  approach. 
In  evaluating  relationships,  or  undertaking  eidetic  forms  as 
the  phenomenologist  would  say,  recognition  of  the  project 
aspect  is  a  good  beginning.  The  phenomenologist  will  remain 
aware  of  the  uniqueness  of  relationships;  he  will  submit 
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he  will  not  be  embarrassed  about  the  proximateness  of 
ideational  forms.  He  will  also  take  due  account  of  factors 
which  influence  relationships  because  they  are  part  of  the 
participant's  project.  In  sum,  he  will  strive  for  themes 
which  do  justice  to  the  broad  theme  of  project. 
How  do  these  themes  affect  our  appraisal  of  the 
I-Thou  typology?  Buber  held  up  the  I-Thou  form  as  the 
only  true  encounter  mode.  To  meet  was  to  encounter  a  Thou, 
to  be  related  in  a  specific  way.  The  implication  was  that 
no  other  mode  was  a  true  encounter.  The  I-It  form  lay 
outside  his  notion  of  encounter.  Our  application  of 
Merleau-Ponty's  notion  of  project  indicates  that  the  I- 
Thou  form's  exclusive  role  is  not  viable;  all  projects 
fall  into  an  encounter  mode.  It  is  obvious  the  two  thinkers 
define  "encounter"  quite  differently. 
Encounter  for  Buber,  is  restricted  to  "being", 
"personal  making  present"  and  "unfolding".  Encounter 
for  Merleau-Ponty  is  all-inclusive;  project  is  synonymous 
with  an  encounter  mode.  If  we  are  to  retain  the  priority 
of  the  project  theme,  we  cannot  at  the  same  time  claim 
that  one  kind  of  project  is  exclusively  an  encounter  mode. 
I  suggest  that  we  begin  to  see  I-Thou  encounters  as  one 
type  of  encounter. 
This  revision  of  our  view  of  I-Thou  encounter 
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comings  of  Buber's  I-Thou  typology  is  that  it  had  no  rootage 
in  perceptual  modes;  he  strained  the  form  by  implying  that 
encounter  was  somehow  different  than  perceptual  interaction. 
Merleau-Ponty's  concept  makes  that  separation  unnecessary 
and  undesireable.  All  modes  in  the  subject-world  relation 
are  perceptual,  and  in  the  encounter  mode.  If  we  think  in 
I-It,  I-Thou  terms,  both  are  encounter  modes  and  are  forms 
of  perception. 
Secondly,  the  project  concept  makes  it  possible  for 
us  to  formulate  the  uniqueness  of  the  I-Thou  form:  namely, 
description  of,  the  I-Thou  form  is  important  because  it  refers 
to  a  kind  of  interaction  that  has  a  distinct  raison  d'etre 
and  form  of  interaction.  Within  the  context  of  project  we 
can  begin  to  sort  out  differing  forms  of  relationships 
while  not  insisting  that  perceptual  modes  are  missing  or 
that  encounter  modes  are  absent  in  other  typologies.  With 
instruction  from  Ifierleau-Ponty  we  begin  to  see  that  involve- 
ment  with  another  can  be  the  kind  Buber  asserted.  Perceptual, 
behavioral  characteristics  play  a  part,  as  Hepburn  suggested, 
but  the  center  of  the  relationship  can  still  bear  the  forme 
of  "personal  making  present"  and  "being;  "  as  Buber  sugponted. 
Once  these  suggestions  are  dealt  with  in  the  con- 
struction  of  a  phenomenology  of  intersubjectivity,  the  I-Thou 
form  can  be  appreciated  as  a  distinct  option.  There  is  no 
reason  to  think  that  what  Buber  sought  to  establish  for  phon- 336 
omenological  inquiry  should  be  disregarded.  The  I-Thou  form 
may  play  an  important,  even  central,  role  in  the  interpre- 
tation  of  encounter  situations.  We  shall  speak  of  its 
actual  relevance  below,  but  it  should  be  said  here  that 
the  I-Thou  form,  "disciplined"  as  it  can  be  by  the  concept 
of  project,  may  still  be  an  integral  part  of  a  phenomenology. 
The  task  remains  to  show  why  the  elements  of  the 
I-Thou  form  should  be  considered  of  central  importance  to 
the  intersubjective  exchange. 
One  of  Merleau-Ponty's  forms  can  serve  as  a  tran- 
sition  to  this,  issue.  I  speak  of  his  use  of  the  term  "vor- 
tex".  Merleau-Ponty  used  this  concept  to  show  that  the 
individual's  experience  of  objects  encouraged  the  thinker 
to  put  social  or  intersubjective  experience  at  the  center 
of  phenomenology.  Vortex  denoted,  for  example,  that 
people's  encounter  with  objects  is  an  expanding  experience) 
we  begin  to  see  tools  as  carpenter's  tools;  objects  indi- 
cate  social  purpose  or  social  usage. 
The  concept  of  vortex  Still  applies  once  the  inter- 
subjective  sphere  is  introduced;  let  us  see  how.  f'ncounter 
with  another  at  an  acquaintance  level  may  lead  to  deep 
personal  interaction  and  social  consciousnonso.  The  issues 
of  ethics,  of  social  responsibility,  for  example,  may  arise 
in  what  seems  to  be  an  isolated  interpersonal  problem  or 
situation.  The  casual  meeting  may  be  followed  by  exchange 337 
about  family  relationships;  understanding  an  individual  means 
encountering  that  person's  environment.  To  carry  it  further, 
an  understanding  of  the  person's  environment  means  that  we 
encounter  his  circle  of  friends,  organizations,  economic  and 
political  forms  of  living.  The  personal  is  never  separate 
from  the  social.  These  options  are  opened  even  though  the 
relationship  remains  unique  to  us.  Interaction,  Merleau- 
Ponty  suggests,  throws  us  into  a  broader  field  of  exper- 
ience;  the  vortex  theme  attempts  to  conceptualize  a  centri- 
fugal  force  in  personal  encounters.  The  same  ideational 
thrust  was  spoken  of  often  by  Heidegger  in  his  character- 
ization  of  Mitsein. 
The  uses  of  the  vortex  concept  are  many;  we  cannot 
begin  to  consider  them  all.  But  one  stands  out.  The  meaning 
of  vortex  indicates  that  interpersonal  exchange  not  only 
opens  areas  of  broader  communication;  it  opens  those  involved 
to  the  meaning  of  intersubjective  exchange  per  ne.  That  is, 
our  experience  of  others  shapes  our  view  of  what  is  both 
possible  in  interpersonal  modalities,  and  our  view  of  the 
character  of  the  lived-world.  Specific  relationships 
shape  our  description  of  human  experience. 
If  one  form  of  encounter,  no  matter  what  ito  character, 
does  have  implications  for  the  whole  of  intersubjectivo 
experience  and  for  a  world  view,  then  specific  forms  of 
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a  view  of  the  whole.  This  does  not  mean  that  the  phenomen- 
ologist  plays  a  game  of  elimination,  i.  e.  that  he  find  some 
forms  important  and  others  unimportant.  He  cannot  afford 
to  disregard  forms  which  affect  a  description  of  the  lived- 
world.  It  means  rather,  that  he  interrogates  forms  or  types 
to  see  how  they  affect  the  total  picture  of  man's  interaction. 
His  specialization  is  to  understand  given  forms  in  order  to 
gain  unitary  concepts  about  the  whole  of  experience. 
Vortex  heightens  the  importance  of  inquiry  into 
typologies  such  as  Buber's  and  Heidegger's.  We  not  only 
ask  about  the  relevance  of  specific  forms  in  shaping  a  phen- 
omenology  of  the  lived-world;  we  ask  what  the  function  of 
a  form  is  in  disclosing  the  sphere  of  intersubjective 
exchange,  --.  and  our  social  world. 
A  most  suggestive  form  for  such  an  inquiry  is  M?  er- 
leau-Ponty's  "intercorporeality".  Through  the  unique  char- 
acter  of  the  vortex  concept  we  have  gained  access,  as  it 
were,  to  the  issue  of  man's  total  experience;  it  is  left 
for  us  to  characterize  that  experience  with  conceptually  appro- 
priate  themes.  ;  Terleau-Ponty's  notion  of  intercorporeality 
serves  an  important  function.  As  a  form,  it  has  the  distinct 
characteristic  of  "opening"  and  it  also  provides  direction 
on  how  one  evaluates  other  typologies.  Buber'a  I-Thou  form 
and  Heidegger's  Mitsein  will  serve  as  comparative  examples. 
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specific  forms  of  intersubjective  exchange  shape  the  whole 
of  our  interpretation  of  experience. 
First,  we  shall  review  Merleau-Ponty's  concept.  Inter- 
corporeality  is  a  form  of  experience  between  persons  which 
opens  them  to  what  it  means  to  be  with  another.  M  erleau- 
Ponty  saw  in  the  handshake  and  glance,  a  deep  interpene- 
tration  of  two  personal  existences.  Subjects  in  this 
mode  see  things  through  the  other's  eyes;  one's  own  world 
invades,  and  is  invaded  by  another's.  The  impact  is  one 
of  total  involvement;  euphoria  occurs.  The  perspectives, 
joys  or  hatreds  of  one  party  become  those  of  the  other; 
lived-worlds  are  shared.  Merleau-Ponty  never  lived  to 
articulate  the  question  of  what  kinds  of  experience  were 
shared;  he  only  said  that  whatever  one  encountered  with 
the  other  became  vitally  important  in  one's  experieneo  of 
the  other  and  of  the  whole  existence.  Individuals  see  them- 
selves  as  sharing  and  belonging  to  a  common  world.  This 
in  itself  is  a  vital  experience.  In  simplest  terms  it 
means  that  one's  privacy  is  broadened  to  include  an  under- 
standing  of  experience  from  another's  viewpoint  or  "project"; 
an  encounter  with  whole  of  existence  is,  likewise,  given  an 
interpersonal  meaning. 
When  this  intensive,  if  rare,  form  of  encounter  in 
compared  to  the  forms  taught  by  Buber  and  Heidegger,  the 
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I  could  see  Buber  affirming  1,4erleau-Ponty's  concept; 
he  would  be  very  friendly  to  it.  He  would  also  employ  it  in 
the  theological  venture.  Its  philosophical  importance, 
Buber  would  say,  lies  in  the  opening  of  private  worlds  to 
divine  grace.  Obviously  the  phenomenologist  cannot  readily 
adopt  this  position.  Intercorporeality  is  rooted  in  per- 
ceptual  contact;  one  might  say  that  intercorporeal  exchange 
is  a  perceptual  exchange.  The  "leap"  from  the  interpersonal 
to  theological  affirmation  is  neither  called  for  nor  implied 
in  the  form  itself.  At  least  Merleau-Ponty  would  not  employ 
that  usage;  the  meaning  of  this  form,  for  him,  is  the  open- 
ing  of  private  worlds.  While  the  two  agree  upon  the  networks 
opening  those  involved,  they  do  not  agree  upon  the  necessity 
of  theological  affirmation. 
If  the  concept's  primary  emphasis  is  upon  the  sharing 
of  personal  existences,  we  can  afford  a  brief  comment  on 
Heidegger's  Mitsein.  As  we  described  that  form,  Mitnein 
was  the  absorbtion  of  the  subject  in  a  social  sickness. 
Identity  for  the  subject  was  lost  and  he  became  possessed 
by  otherdirectedness.  There  was  never  a  mention  of  shy 
worlds.  Because  the  Heideggerian  theme  is  lostness  and 
absorbtion  for  the  individual,  we  conclude  that  hic  form 
is  really  foreign  to  intercorporeality. 
To  summarize  the  comparison:  ßuber'a  form,  while 
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sought  to  appropriate  its  occurrence  for  other  purposes. 
Heidegger's  Pilitsein  plainly  denied  any  real  importance  for 
such  a  form.  Intercorporeality's  primary  significance 
amounts  to  the  affirmation  that  human  exchange  can  open 
one's  life  to  others  and  can  open  one  to  a  new  understanding 
of  the  world.  It  is  a  challenging  assertion  this  concept 
makes  about  our.  experience.  It  affirms  that  we  experience 
with  another,  the  truth  of  belonging  to  the  world  of  others 
and  to  the  mystery  of  the  world  as  a  whole.  Without  theo- 
logical  affirmation,  yet  with  a  bold  ontological  statement, 
bierleau-Ponty  describes  the  intercorporeal  as  encounter  with 
Being.  To  examine  the  truth  of  this  claim  we  shall  look 
into  modes  which  will  aid  us  in  deciding  upon  the  positive 
meaning  of  exchange. 
]ierleau-Ponty  has  directed  us  thus  far,  to  consider 
how  interpersonal  modes  actually  bear  upon  our  appraisal 
of  the  subject-world  relation.  We  have  reached  the  point 
where  we  should  be  able  to  specify  how  certain  mode.  of 
exchange  do  open  one  to  the  whole  of  personal  existence. 
The  problem  can  be  nut  this  way  also:  we  should  be  ablcc  to 
show  which  forms  of  intersubjective  exchange  are  consonant 
with  intercorporeality. 
We  assume  here  that  intersubjectve  exchanges  carry 
positive  value  personally  and  philosophically  as  they  affect 
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view.  Our  problem:  if  intersubjective  exchange  does  not 
alter  our  views  or  projects  in  relation  to  others,  if  it 
does  not  offer  the  option  of  "being  opened"  to  the  world 
in  new  ways,  we  are  wasting  our  time  talking  about  its 
phenomenological  significance  and  its  relevance  to  the 
issue  of  transcendence. 
We  shall  deal  with  the  characteristics  of  "opening" 
first,  on  a  phenomenological  level.  Then  we  shall  attempt 
to  say  how  "opening"  obtains  an  ontological  significance. 
That  is,  we  shall  ascertain  how  intercorporeality  becomes 
a  disclosure  to  Being. 
I  suggest  that  we  are  at  the  stage  in  our  inquiry 
where  the  themes  of  trust  and  love  can  be  beneficially 
compared  to  those  of  alienation.  Our  description  of  these 
forms  may  serve  to  illustrate  the  above  issue,  for  trust 
and  love  have  always  been  used  to  highlight  the  opened 
person  and  alienation  the  isolated  individual.  The  following 
phenomenological  appraisal  is,  admittedly,  an  addition  to 
rerleau-Ponty's  conceptualizations  but  it  5.  o  also  consi^tnnt 
with  the  concepts  he  embraced. 
Trust  and  love  as  forms  of  interpersonal  exchange 
do  not  occur  in  the  sense  that  a  person  adopts  a  mental 
viewpoint  "about"  them  by  concluding  the  other  is  loving  or 
hateful,  faithful  or  unreliable.  One  does  not  decide  upon 
love  or  trust  as  a  viewpoint  at  all.  Rather  the  two  terms 343 
attempt  to  describe  an  intimate  form  of  interaction,  a  deep 
penetration  of  one's  own  world  by,  and  with,  another.  This 
theme  is  suggested  by  one  of  Mierleau-ponty's  remarks  in  the 
article  "A  Child's  Relation  with  Others". 
To  consent  to  love  or  be  loved  is  to  consent  also  to 
influence  somebody  else,  to  decide  to  a  certain  extent 
on  behalf  of  the  other.  To  love  is  inevitably  to 
enter  into  an  undivided  situation  with  another.  l 
The  point  about  interpenetration  of  private  worlds 
is  widely  accepted  as  a  matter  of  common  sense.  Merleau- 
Ponty  showed  throughout  his  work  that  this  same  interpenetra- 
tion  bore  phenomenological  importance.  The  above  remark  says 
it  well;  the  person  who  loves  and  is  loved  enters  "into  an. 
undivided  situation  with  another". 
The  specific  import  of  this  is  that  love  and  trust 
illustrate  the  breaking  of  barriers  between  people;  this 
can  be  expressed  in  two  ways.  The  person  who  loves,  is 
aware  that  his  own  world  is  reshaped  in  terms  of  the  rela- 
tionship.  The  emphasis  is  here,  upon  the  new  way  a  once 
private  world  is  shaped.  Self-awareness  in  a  love  relation 
takes  on  the  element  of  seeing  one's  self  as  one  is  seen  by 
another.  This  can  mean  that  a  person  merely  compliments 
himself  as  being  lovable;  or  more  seriously,  it  may  mean 
that  the  person  sees  himself  as  being  truly  accepted  by 
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another.  In  any  degree  the  latter  option  constitutes  a 
form  of  self-acceptance.  To  be  loved  is  to  see  one's  self 
through  the  eyes  of  the  other  party,  and  that  is  phenomen- 
ologically  speaking,  a  new  mode  of  self  awareness. 
Not  only  does  the  experience  of  trust  and  love  sig- 
nify  the  breaking  of  personal  barriers;  there  is  in  trust- 
ful  relations  a  distinct  mode  of  dealing  with  the  world  at 
large.  It  can  be  put  this  way:  the  "I"  form,  meaning  the 
subject's  individual  approach  to  others,  becomes  a  "we"  form 
in  his  dealings  with  the  world.  Many  things  can  be  articu- 
lated  about  the  dynamics  of  trust  but  this  theme  stands  out. 
A  sense  of  interpersonal  cooperation  at  the  less  intense 
levels  of  trust  exists.  Also,  at  more  intense  levels,  per- 
sons  deal  with  their  worlds  in  the  "we"  form.  They  permit 
their  partner  to  represent  them;  they  are  trusted  to  repre- 
sent  their  mate.  Nothing  about  the  "we"  form  is  static;  it 
is  dynamic  and  changing  but  trust  and  love  cannot  be  described 
fully  apart  from  the  "we". 
In  short,  not  only  is  the  person  opened  to  another= 
the  rerson's  relation  to  the  world  iq  reshaped.  In  trnn^t, 
a  relationship  forms  a  vital  center  for  self-awareness, 
and  a.  unique  mode  of  being  in  the  world. 
Alienation  is  also  a  form  of  interaction.  To  be 
alienated  is  to  be  separated  from  someone;  contact  or  inter- 
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there  has  been  something  experienced  which  suggests  or  en- 
courages  separation.  The  term  connotes  however,  that  one 
is  separated  from  another's  world  in  the  sense  that  sharing 
is  absent.  As  in  the  mode  of  trust  there  is  a  form  of 
self-awarenss  that  becomes  'evident  in  participants.  Whether 
it  be  a  sense  of  rejection  or  unworthiness,  a  person's 
self-appraisal  is  shaped  by  alienating  relationships.  We 
remember  the  "resolved"  man  of  Heidegger's  system:  he 
says,  in  effect  that  when  separateness  is  accepted  by  man, 
he  can  resolve  the  issue  of  death  and  solitary  living. 
Alienation  directs  self-awareness  towards  the  solitary  "I". 
We  take  Heidegger's  description's  seriously. 
Alienated  man's  approach  to  his  world  can  be  put  in 
direct  contrast  to  the  trustful  form  of  living.  The  "we" 
form  is  distinctly  different  than  alienation=  we  might  say 
that  the  logical  outcome  of  alienation  is  the  rejection  of 
a  "we"  form.  The  "we"  form  is  not  possible  if  we  take  alien- 
ation  at  all  seriously;  one  cannot  be  alienated  "with  some- 
one".  To  say  that  is  to  strain  our  language.  For  whatever 
reasons,  this  form  of  relation  pushes  the  individual  into  a 
tighter  more  private  lived-world.  Sociality,  if  rejected, 
means  that  one  not  only  cannot  accent  the  mind  of  the  crowd. 
It  also  means  that  "opening"  to  the  world  is  frustrated. 
To  be  solitary  in  the  final  sense  means  being  cut  off  from 
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form;  taken  as  an  all  inclusive  form,  it  logically  frustrates 
being  open  to  the  world  as  a  whole. 
It  should  not  be  assumed  that  the  forms  or  types  of 
relations  we  have  outlined  are  always  "separate",  meaning 
that  a  given  individual  cannot  experience  both  of  them  as 
well  as  other  forms  not  discussed.  Our  point  is  that  the 
experiential  forms  we  have  described  are  distinct.  The  phen- 
omenological  themes  can  be  delineated.  Our  conclusions 
are  based  upon  their  distinct  characteristics. 
Love  and  trust  connote  the  expanding  of  the  private 
sphere;  they  are  synonymous  with  "opening"  as  rierleau- 
Ponty  indicated  in  his  concepts  of  "project"  and  "vortex". 
Alienation  connotes  what  we  anticipated:  it  is  a  form  of 
interaction  which  hardens  the  lines  between  self  and  others, 
and  illustrates  the  absence  of  openness  to  the  world  as  a 
whole. 
When  the  phenomenological  reduction  is  applied  "why 
this  form  and  not  another",  a  fairly  clear  answer  can  be 
given.  Our  comparison  of  alU.  enation  with  love  and  trust 
forms  indicates  that  alienation  cimnl.  y  cannot  serve  an  an 
"opening"  of  the  subject's  lived-world.  Love  and  trust  can. 
Our  conclusion  is  that  the  forms  of  love  and  trust  are  thc, 
peculiar  forms  which  demonstrate  what  I'.  Lerleau-Ponty  said 
in  other  terminology.  Man,  in  these  forms  is  opened  to 
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"we"  form.  Love  and  trust  are  the  specific  forms  which  most 
clearly  illustrate  the  meaning  of  vortex,  and  intercorpor- 
eality. 
Our  explication  of  love  and  trust  is  surely  incom- 
plete  but  our  purpose  has  been  served.  If  these  forms  are 
of  special  importance  in  opening  the  subject  to  himself, 
others,  and  the  world  at  large,  if  they  have  special  rele- 
vance  for  a  phenomenology  of  intersubjectivity,  they  can 
justifiably  be  considered  as  having  a  special  role  in  open- 
ing  the  issue  of  transcendence. 
One  issue  remains  to  be  discussed:  it  is  the  ques- 
tion,  how  will  the  specific  forms  of  trust  and  love  bear 
upon  the  issue  of  transcendence?  In  any  attempt  to  make 
these  forms  credible  philosophically,  books  could  be  written. 
We  will  not  begin  to  exhaust  the  possibilities  in  our  arpu- 
ment,  but  we  introduced  one  issue  in  our  analysic  of  ror- 
leau-Panty's  ontology  which  is  critical  in  establishing 
credibility.  It  is  the  question  we  asked  at  the  close  o:  f 
that  chanter:  if  we  utilize  ?.  erleau-Ponty's  form  of  onto- 
logical  observation  are  we  abandoning,  as  he  may  have,  all 
connection  with  a  phenomenology  of  perception's  i)id  ý'erl 
Pon-cy  stray,  in  his  descriptions  of  reversibility  and  inter- 
corporeality,  from  the  path  of  phenomenological  discipline? 
That  issue  calls  for  resolution. 
Intercorporeality  was  used  above  to  conceptualize 348 
the  experience  of  a  broadening  self-awareness  and  a  new 
approach  to  the  lived-world  in  the  "we"  form.  We  held 
ourselves  to  the  phenomenological  context  in  those  discuss- 
ions  because  we  believe  it  was  essential  before  any  onto- 
logical  observations  could  be  made.  Intercorporeality, 
however,  was  employed  in  Merleau-Ponty's  ontological  re- 
flections.  Our  task  is  to  see  if  the  types  we  have  intro- 
duced  make  concrete  the  claim  that  intercorporeality  is 
man's  opening  to  Being  or  transcendence. 
Two  concepts  suggested  by  r"erleau-Ponty  will  aid 
our  inquiry.  They  are,  reversibility  and  mediation;  they 
should  help  us  to  see  the  appropriateness  of  the  love  and 
trust  types  in  fulfilling  the  requirements  Merleau-Ponty 
set  for  the  eidos,  intercorporeality. 
Intercorporeality,  we  said  was  the  moot  suggestive 
of  Merleau-Ponty's  ontological  categories.  He  submitted 
it  "by  title",  however;  reversibility  was  described  much 
more  fully.  It  connoted  the  many  aspects  of  awareness  in 
an  intersubjective  encounter;  a  person's  lived--wor.  ]d  is 
seen  both  as  an  individual  donair,  and  as  responsivc+  to  the 
experience  of  ^nothe.  r;  the  per;  on:  i-:  r:  p;  criher1  a^  seeing 
his  oým  world  through  the  eyes  of  another;  he  irains  sccers 
to  the  other's  lived-world  and  participates  in  it;  he  is 
aware  that  lived  worlds  are  shared  and  that  the  whole  sphere 
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Other  things  could  be  said  about  the  networks  of 
reversibility,  but  one  theme  is  all  important.  The  impact 
of  reversibility  is  that  the  participants  belong  to  each 
other  and  to  a  common  world.  The  encounter  brings  home, 
through  its  many  "reverses"  of  awareness,  that  the  partici- 
pants  belong,  in  an  almost  literal  way,  to  each  other  and 
to  a  common  world. 
It  seems  to  me  that  trustful  relations  as  we  have 
described  them  are  peculiar  candidates  for  making  this  form 
of  interchange  understandable  and  concrete. 
Trust  and  love  connote  the  participant's  willingness 
to  submit  their  own  private  worlds  to  each  other.  We  have 
described  this  previously  in  terms  of  "opening";  it  still 
app?  ies.  Love  is  a  particular  way  of  sharing  another's 
world.  We  mean  by  it  that  another's  life  has  become  a  vital 
influence  for  our  own  project.  More  significant,  we  have 
been  given  something  in  a  love  relation  that  we  could  not 
possibly  have  provided  ourselves;  we  become  recipients  of 
the  other's  outlook,  his  or  her  intere^ts  rind  committmenty, 
in  short  his  or  her  peculiar  appr.  ouch  to  the  world.  Tt 
is  not  so  much  that  we  behold  another'  ;.  ]i  veil-world;  it 
is  more  that  we  p^rticip_qte  in  a  common  world  with  the 
beloved.  We  have  opened  ourselves  and  been  opened. 
That  we  experience  this  "reverse"  is  one  part  of 
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is  opened.  This  does  not  imply  that  we  have  been  instru- 
mental  in  the  opening  act,  but  we  have  offered  ourselves 
in  trust  and  the  other  has  accepted.  We  claim  an  opening 
movement  for  the  other  primarily  because  we  have  been  party 
to  the  action  as  one  who  is  received. 
These  rudimentary  observations  on  the  networks  of 
a  loving,  trustful,  relationship  certainly  indicate  that  it 
corresponds  to  what  Prerleau-Ponty  noted  about  reversibility. 
In  being  opened,  we  "belong"  to  another. 
The  experience  of  a  love  relation  uniquely  fulfills 
the  theme,  i'  err  suis.  It  does  so  especially  in  the  sense 
that  man  belongs  to  the  world  in  which  he  lives  and  to  its 
mystery. 
In  this  way,  the  particular  relationship  of  love 
between  two  persons  is  one  which  shapes  man's  grasp  of 
existence  and  its  meaning.  We  have  said  :  )ow  the  other 
"opens"  the  individual  and  how  the  subject  submits  his 
private  world  to  another;  this  very  interaction  is  it^elf 
an  opening  towards  the  world  at  large  and  to  the  ie3^ue  of 
its  meaning.  The  world  is  no  lon,  er  P.  rri  v,  ate  sphere  Jf 
we  take  this  form  seriously. 
i.  `oreover,  once  love  iý,  exneriencecý,  that  form.  brcorýeý3 
a  potential  pattern  for  one's  relation  to  the  whole  of 
existence.  Let  us  be  sure  this  is  understood.  I  am  not 
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other  associations,  or  that  one  trusts  everyone  once  he 
has  known  trust.  I  am  suggesting  that  particular  trustful 
relationships  become  the  foundation  for  our  way  of  coping 
in  society,  our  view  of  others  and  our  conception  of  the 
world  at  large.  Once  the  risk  of  sharing  another's  world 
is  operative,  it  can  grow  into  a  pattern  and  become  the 
focus  of  our  total  project.  No  matter  how  momentary  the 
experience,  it  is  a  network  which  demonstrates  concretely 
that  we  belong  to  others  and  belong  to  the  world.  It  is 
the  unique  forms  of  love  and  trust  which  connote  "belonging" 
as  Merleau-Ponty  described  it. 
The  term  that  comes  to  mind  in  elaborating  thin 
pattern,  is  "infusion".  In  trust  one  undergoes  infusion: 
one's  life  is  invaded  by  another  and  he  lots  his  perceptions 
and  values  be  shared  and  even  cared  for  by  another.  If 
we  step  back  from  this  experience,  it  seems  evident  that 
life-world's  are  shaped  by  this  unique  experience.  Love 
for  another  infuses  us  with  the  awareness  of  belonging. 
We  all  experience  alienation,  but  I  am  suggesting  that  the 
experience  of  love  and  trust  forever  affects  our  openness 
to  the  world  at  large.  In  it  we  have  received  and  given= 
that  pattern  can  become  the  norm  for  all  others.  Once 
belongingness  becomes  apparent,  other  forms  of  relation 
become  subordinate. 
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and  concreteness  by  the  form  of  love  and  trust. 
The  concept  of  mediation  is  also  clarified  by  the 
love  and  trust  forms.  Especially  when  we  attack  the  issue 
of  how  the  interhuman  confronts  man  with  'transcendence, 
are  the  connections  important.  Two  elements  in  the  love 
form  bring  us  to  a  better  understanding  of  mediation. 
When  the  question  arises,  "what  is  comnunicated  or 
mediated  in 
, 
loving  relations,  the  most  sensible  answer 
is,  "the  person,  his  or  her  lived-world".  What  love  and 
trust  indicate  in  the  context  of  mediation  is  that  the 
sharing  of  worlds  is  truly  accomplished;  it  is  not  simply 
a  matter  of  personal  awareness.  The  concept  of  reversibility 
left  that  issue  unanswered  because  it  dealt  with  the  inter- 
human  as  a  matter  of  awareness.  Mediation  says  not  only 
"I  belong";  it  says  life-worlds  are  given  and  received, 
truly  shared.  When  this  is  particularized  in  the  event  of 
love  and  trust  its  meaning  becomes  clear. 
The  experience  of  facing  the  other  and  the  world  at 
large  as  one  who  is  accented,  is  considerably  different 
than  living  as  a  solitary  self.  The  "tire"  form  is  not  a 
form  for  autonomous  beings,  but  for  persons  who  sham  and 
are  different  becaune  of  it.  Once  we  have  felt  the  impact. 
of  the  other  tigre  do  not  hold  ourselves  aloof;  we  have  become 
vunerable,  perhaps,  more  accepting.  The  point  is  we  are 
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behave  differently  and  think  differently  than  if  we  had 
not  confronted  the  beloved.  What  we  mediate  to  others  in 
this  form  is  an  altered,  opened  self.  Mediation  becomes 
more  understandable  in  the  context  of  an  I-Thou  relation. 
The  second  aspect  is  the  nub  of  the  issue  in  this 
study.  Mediation  is  a  two-way  thoroughfare.  The  other  who 
offers  his  world  to  us  and  is  opened  in  the  sharing  of  love, 
communicates  a  new  sense  of  the  whole.  It  is  best  here  to 
speak  of  "being  confronted",  or  of  "reception"  for  that 
element  in  love  is  unmistakable.  What  lerleau-Ponty  describ- 
ed  as  "floating  on  the  wave  of  Being"  is  suggestive  of  the 
point.  In  love  we  experience  the  world  as  being  disclosed. 
The  other  has  opened  himself,  we  share  and  belong 
to  that  world.  When  the  question  of  the  meaning  of  existence 
is  pressed,  the  response  is,  we  have  behold  and  been  involved 
in  an  experience  of  unveiling.  We  have  been  confirmed, 
accepted.  For  those  who  take  this  experience  seriously, 
it  is  not  a  leap  of  the  imagination  that  calls  for  the  claim 
of  truth  about  this  event.  I1,  'edi?  tion  means  dicelonure  of 
truth,  of  Being;  it  is  made  concrete  in  the  I-Thou  form. 
The  two  elements  ayes  we  mediate  a  changed  self  to 
the  other  in  love,  a  vunerable  "I";  we  Ploo  receive  in  the' 
trust  of  another  a  sense  of  disclosure. 
It  should  be  clearly  noted  here  that  we  have  not 
attempted  to  pursue  the  specific  meaning  of  dicclosuro. 35Z. 
That  it  seems  to  me,  would  take  us  into  "high  altitude 
thinking".  We  have  not  attempted  to  assign  universal  values 
or  principles  to  the  event  of  love  and  trust;  we  have  not 
said  that  it  is  analogous  to  grace  or  that  it  reveals  the 
love  of  God.  Merleau-Ponty's  reticence  is  well  placed  and 
so  is  ours.  To  proceed  in  that  manner  would  be  to  present 
an  explanation  of  the  event  and  its  conceptual  themes. 
We  are  especially  mindful  at  this  point  that  we  are  describ- 
ing  an  interpersonal  phenomenon;  we  see  in  that  event  cer- 
tain  forms  and  emerging  themes  but  we  do  not  attempt  explan- 
ation. 
We  have  not  strayed  far  from  the  original  insights 
of  Merleau-Ponty;  yet  we  have  I  suggest,  made  clearer  the 
ontological  implcations  of  intercubjective  exchange.  In 
sum,  we  have  said  that  the  human  subject  is  uniquely  opened 
to  the  meaning  of  his  being  through  love  and  trust;  we  have 
argued  that  the  question  of  the  meaning  of  existence  per  se 
is  shaped  uniquely  by  loving  and  trustful  relationships, 
and  we  have  observed  that  disclosure  is  a  reciprocal  affair. 
The  world  is  not  sir-)ly  an  entity  such  as  Sartre's  massivr' 
Peing,  but  a  "disclo:  &ng"  world,  a  worin  which  we  find 
opening  through  intercubjective  encounter.  Pa.  rti.  cu1ry.  r1y  is 
this  latter  Plement  i.  riportant  in  our  rýtuddy.  Tt  is  the  onto- 
logical  sphere  we  have  affirmed  when  we  say  that,  in  love 
and  trust  man  begins  to  have  a  true  relation  with  the  world 355 
at  large. 
The  ontological  significance  of  love  and  trust  means 
this:  we  affirm  that  the  truth  of  man's  existence  is  commun- 
icated  uniquely  through  this  form  of  relation.  The  truth  of 
our  being  and  the  truth  of  existence  is  encountered  uniquely 
in  the  love  form  of  relation.  The  disclosure  of  Being  may 
still  be  characterized  as  an  encounter  with  mystery  for  we 
have  not  attempted  to  explain  what  is  disclosed;  we  have 
not  assigned  to  the  mystery  the  name  of  love  or  any  other 
name.  That  man  confronts  the  meaning  of  his  existence, 
that  he  belongs  to  the  unveiling  experience  and  to  others 
in  common  wonder,  this  is  enough.  Interpersonal  exchanges 
of  love  and  trust  become  our  access  to  the  truth  about  the 
entire  subject-world  relation. 
Our  phenomenological  description  of  intersubjectivity 
does  not  necessitate  belief  in  God.  That,  it  seems  to  me, 
is  beyond  the  legitimate  bounds  of  our  discussion. 
but  we  have  gone  much  further  than  presenting  a 
nhilosorhical  question  which  theolofy  will  have  to  answer. 
The  constructive  effort  for  a.  phenomenolo7,  y  of  intersubjectiv- 
ity  is  much  more  than  the  creation  of  a  favorable  atmosphere 
for  theological  affirmations.  We  have  made  the  claim  that 
the  truth  of  the  subject-world  relation  is  disclosed  in  the 
experience  of  love.  We  have  claimed  that  a  disclosure  of 
the  truth  of  our  being  can  be  identified  here  as  in  no  other 356 
way.  Without  resorting  to  theological  perspectives  we  have 
argued  that  there  is  something  essential  to  be  known  about 
ourselves  and  our  world  in  the  context  of  the  love-trust 
forms.  The  "new"  knowledge  about  ourselves  can  be  put 
clearly;  as  love  and  trust  become  the  forms  which  yield 
truth,  so  we  are  taught  to  seek  continued  contact  with  self 
and  others  in  that  very  manner.  Through  an  experience  of 
trust  comes  a  continued  awareness  that  we  are  meant  to 
express  what  we  have  found  as  our  truth. 
From  the  phenomenological  standpoint,  the  experience 
of  love  is  the  key  to  a  concept  of  man  as  the  mediator  of 
transcendence.  The  unitary  theme  we  presented  is  that 
man  is  a  communicant  and  communicator;  he  both  participates 
in  relationships  which  present  him  with  a  new  understanding 
of  the  world  and  he  also  offers  others  that  which  they  them- 
selves  cannot  provide.  He  presents  himself  as  "the  other" 
for  the  beloved.  Man  is  a  bearer  of  transcendence  as  he 
is  its  recipient. 
Phenomenological  discipline  requires  we  emphasize 
that  concepts  discussed  here  are  di 
reflective.  They  cannot  be  deemed 
which  we  can  use  without  reference 
But  if  the  experiences  of  love  are 
ological  discourse  we  do  gain  what 
This  much  "knowledge  about"  man  is 
ependent  upon  the  nre- 
absolute  categories 
to  particular  events. 
perrnissable  in  phenomen- 
I  have  suggested  above. 
attainable  within  the 357 
conceptual  scheme. 
Ontology,  as  we  have  attempted  to  develop  it,  is 
not  divorced  from  a  phenomenology  of  encounter.  It  is 
credible  only  if  the  phenomenology  is  so;  encounter  with 
Being  is  rooted  in  the  interpersonal  modes  we  have  found 
to  be  central. 
Our  study  is  but  one  way  of  introducing  a  discussion 
of  the  issue  of  transcendence,  but  I  believe  it  is  an  import- 
ant  approach.  A  phenomenologically  oriented  discussion 
can  conform  to  Buber's  objectives;  discussion  of  trans- 
cendence  as  he  suggested,  will  concentrate  on  the  question 
of  human  relationships  and  will  specifically  take  its  cue 
from  the  love-trust  forms.  It  will  argue  that  concepts  of 
transcendence  should  be  rooted  in  that  experiential  sphere. 
But  as  Hepburn  rightly  saw,  it  will  not  attempt 
either  to  "leap"  to  a  concept  of  grace  from  its  study  of 
the  intersubjective,  and  it  will  not  permit  a  presupposition 
to  direct  its  investigations. 
The  procedures  outlined  are  not  a  simple  compromise 
between  theological  affirmations  and  empirical  philosophy. 
Phenomenological  discipline  and  its  resultant  themes  call 
for  a  radical  reappraisal  of  both  theological  and  philosoph- 
ical  viewpoints. 
A  phenomenology  of  intersubjectivity  is,  I  believe, 
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Without  overstating  the  case,  it  can  be  said  that  the  recog- 
nitions  argued  heretofore  should  force  any  study  of  essences 
to  regard  the  interpersonal  sphere  with  utmost  seriousness. 
We  did  not  set  out  to  explain  every  aspect  of  sociality  and 
we  shall  not  pursue  that  issue  here,  but  mention  of  the  task 
must  be  made. 
Most  importantly  for  this  study,  the  effects  on 
theological  discipline  should  be  reviewed.  The  following 
is  a  brief  statement  of  position  as  dictated  by  this  study. 
Theological  disciplines  have  continually  sought  to 
work  out  a  right  relation  to  philosophy.  That  concern  lay 
in  the  back  of  my  mind  throughout  this  investigation. 
Controversy  has  characterized  every  effort  to  solve  that 
problem.  No  solution  has  satisfied  this  writer.  P+Ierleau- 
Ponty  is  significant  because  he  persisted  in  a  critical 
but  constructive  phenomenology.  I  do  not  think  his  onto- 
logical  reflections  betrayed  his  phenomenology  of  social 
exchange  and  I  do  not  believe  my  portrayal  of  the  I-Thou 
type  as  a  form  of  human  love  and  trust  fades  into  oracul- 
arism.  It  certainly  makes  no  theological  affirmation 
necessary  and  it  receives  its  vitality  in  the  study  of 
perception. 
A  phenomenology  of  the  interhuman,  however,  can  prod 
the  thinker  to  ponder  the  appropriateness  of  faith  in  God. 
To  face  the  other  and  be  opened  to  the  world  is  to  face  the 350 
question  of  Being.  How  is  that  experience  to  be  named? 
The  Neiztschean  man  may  persist  to  say  "Nothingness",  the 
Christian,  "Father".  There  are,  perhaps,  many  other  names. 
But  one  thing  haunts  every  utterance;  we  have  opened  our- 
selves  and  been  opened.  Our  lives  have  been  changed  by 
loving  and  trusting.  The  experience,  if  fleeting,  is 
unique  and  we  are  moved  to  utter  words  and  concepts  which 
approximate  the  impact  of  love  in  our  lives. 
The  theologian  who  responds  to  this  perspective  is 
at  once  restricted  and  set  free  to  make  us  of  phenomen- 
ological  studies.  We  have  repeatedly  asserted  the  restric- 
tion:  there  can  be  no  assumption  that  divine  grace  is 
specified  as  the  presupposition  which  directs  phenomenolog- 
ical  study  to  a  given  finding.  And  there  can  be  no  pretense, 
as  Hepburn  saw,  to  structure  a  phenomenology  so  as  to  reveal 
an  ostensive  definition  of  God  either  through  analogy  or 
the  "gesture"  of  encounter.  We  have  patiently  sought  to 
expose  that  objective  as  philosophically  unjustified.  But 
once  it  is  recognized  as  an  unwise  attemrt  at  natural 
theology,  the  theological  vocation  can  he  er.  ercised. 
We  have  argued  that  a  Phenomenology  of  i.  ntersub  j  ect- 
ivity  does  involve  a  recognition  of  transcendence.  We  have 
described.  that  recognition  as  an  experience  of  Otherness 
or  Being,  intimately  bound  up  with  the  experience  of  another 
person  in  love  and  trust.  Otherness  or  Mystery,  in  phen- 360 
omenological  discipline  cannot  be  named,  that  much  is  certain 
if  we  listen  to  Merleau-Ponty.  But  need  that  be  a  difficulty 
for  the  theologian?  No.  The  relation  is  made  clearer  be- 
tween  phenomenology  and  theology  because  there  is  no  com- 
plete  connection  between  the  disciplines,  their  methods  or 
affirmations.  The  theologian  becomes  the  "warring  brother" 
in  this  senses  he  names  the  experience  of  Otherness;  he 
particularizes  the  experience  of  transcendence.  There  is 
no  neat  justification  for  his  position.  He  sets  himself 
free  to  affirm  something  the  philosopher  cannot  be  expected 
to  affirm.  Theology  becomes  a  discipline  which  consciously 
risks  affirmation. 
In  light  of  our  study  it  is  appropriate  to  commend 
to  theological  study,  the  concept  of  "transcendence  in 
immanence".  We  shall  not  attempt  to  describe  fully  what 
that  concept  entails,  but  it  is  not  beyond  our  bounds  to 
say  why  the  concept  is  appropriate. 
If  the  interhuman  is  to  be  a  vital  artery  in  shaping 
a  concez)t  of  transcendence,  man's  role  as  a  mediator  should 
be  retained.  Transcendence  as  a  mystery  intimately  bound 
to  the  expressions  of  love  does  involve  man's  activity. 
That  man  possesses  the  power  or  divine  spark  need  not  be 
posited;  the  lesson  of  our  study  is  that  man,  in  exchange, 
communicates  the  truth  of  Otherness  and  is  its  recipient. 
Transcendence  in  immanence  retains  this  focus. 361 
A  second  aspect  of  the  concept's  appropriateness  is 
that  it  makes  room  for  the  affirmation  that  Otherness  is 
not  a  creation  of  man.  Otherness  is  experienced  with  an- 
other;  it  is  experienced  but  not  contained  in  the  interhuman 
event.  Phenomenological  discipline  makes  no  claim  which 
would  confine  the  experience  to  a  radical  humanism.  Again, 
transcendence  in  immanence  conveys  this. 
These  two  elements  are  given  prominence  in  our 
research.  They  shape  theological  affirmation  if  the  rindings 
about  the  interhuman  are  deemed  credible. 
The  major  influence,  however,  is  a  more  general  one. 
Phenomenological  descriptions  serve  to  remind  the  religious 
thinker  that  conceptualization  is  rooted  in  the  pre--reflective 
interaction  of  worldly  people.  Faith  is  rooted  in  behavior 
if  we  take  seriously  the  holistic  concept  of  behavior. 
Perhaps,  that  is  the  main  result  of  our  study;  it  is  the 
lesson  that  theological  research  nee('s  to  be  constantly  in 
touch  with  the  lived-world.  That  11-jer'.  -world,  in  the  forms 
of  love  and  trust,  helps  u^  hrticula-,.  -:  the  mystery  of  trans- 
cenc'.  ence. 
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